Writings of Augustine. A Treatise on the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin.
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Augustin and the Pelagian Controversy.
A Treatise on the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin.
Published in 1886 by Philip Schaff,
New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co.
Extract from Augustin's "Retractations," Book II. Chap. 50,
On the Following Treatise, "De gratia christi, et de peccato originali."
"After the conviction and condemnation [1784] of the Pelagian heresy
with its authors by the bishops of the Church of Rome,--first
Innocent, and then Zosimus,--with the co-operation of letters of
African councils, I wrote two books against them: one On the Grace of
Christ, and the other On Original Sin. The work began with the
following words: `How greatly we rejoice on account of your bodily,
and, above all, because of your Spiritual welfare.'"
Footnotes
[1784] From this it follows that we must refer his books On the Grace
of Christ and On Original Sin to the year 418; for it was in this year
that the Pelagian heresy was condemned by the pope Zosimus. Somewhat
earlier there was held a general council of the bishops of Africa at
Carthage, to take measures against the heresy,--the precise date of
which council is May 1st of this year 418. Augustin, on account of
this council, was detained at Carthage, and his stay in that city was
longer than usual, as one may learn from the 94th canon of the
council, or from the Codex Canonum of the Church of Africa, canon 127,
as well as from his epistle (193, sec. 1) to Mercator. And it was in
this interval of time, before he started for Mauritania Cæsariensis,
that he wrote these two books for Albina, Pinianus, and Melania;
accordingly, in his Retractations, he places them just previous to the
time of his proceedings with Emeritus, which were concluded at Cæsarea
on the 20th of September in this very year 418. Julianus, in his work
addressed to Turbantius, calumniously attacked a passage in the book
On the Grace of Christ; the passage is defended by Augustin in his
work against Julianus, iv. 8. 47, where he mentions this first book,
addressed to the holy Pinianus, as he calls him, and gives its title
as "Concerning Grace, in opposition to Pelagius." [Albina, with her
son-in-law Pinianus, and her daughter Melania, by whose questions
Augustin was led to write this work, constituted an interesting family
of ascetics, which had formerly lived in Africa, but at this time were
in Palestine; Pinianus at the head of a monastery, and his wife an
inmate of a convent.--W.]
A Treatise on the Grace of Christ, and on Original Sin,
by Aurelius Augustin, Bishop of Hippo;
In Two Books,
written against Pelagius and Coelestius in the year a.d. 418.
.
Book I.
On the Grace of Christ.
Wherein he shows that Pelagius is disingenuous in his confession of
grace, inasmuch as he places grace either in nature and free will, or
in law and teaching; and, moreover, asserts that it is merely the
"possibility" (as he calls it) of will and action, and not the will
and action itself, which is assisted by divine grace; and that this
assisting grace, too, is given by God according to men's merits;
whilst he further thinks that they are so assisted for the sole
purpose of being able the more easily to fulfil the commandments.
Augustin examines those passages of his writings in which he boasted
that he had bestowed express commendation on the grace of God, and
points out how they can be interpreted as referring to law and
teaching,--in other words, to the divine revelation and the example of
Christ which are alike included in "the teaching,"--or else to the
remission of sins; nor do they afford any evidence whatever that
Pelagius really acknowledged Christian grace, in the sense of help
rendered for the performance of right action to natural faculty and
instruction, by the inspiration of a most glowing and luminous love;
and he concludes with a request that Pelagius would seriously listen
to Ambrose, whom he is so very fond of quoting, in his excellent
eulogy in commendation of the grace of God.
Chapter 1 [I.]--Introductory.
How greatly we rejoice on account of your bodily, and, above all, your
spiritual welfare, my most sincerely attached brethren and beloved of
God, Albina, Pinianus, and Melania, [1785] we cannot express in words;
we therefore leave all this to your own thoughts and belief, in order
that we may now rather speak of the matters on which you consulted us.
We have, indeed, had to compose these words to the best of the ability
which God has vouchsafed to us, while our messenger was in a hurry to
be gone, and amidst many occupations, which are much more absorbing to
me at Carthage than in any other place whatever.
Footnotes
[1785] [See note to the passage from the Retractations above; and for
full accounts see Smith and Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography,
under these names.--W.]
Chapter 2 [II.]--Suspicious Character of Pelagius' Confession as to
the Necessity of Grace for Every Single Act of Ours.
You informed me in your letter, that you had entreated Pelagius to
express in writing his condemnation of all that had been alleged
against him; and that he had said, in the audience of you all: "I
anathematize the man who either thinks or says that the grace of God,
whereby `Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners,' [1786] is
not necessary not only for every hour and for every moment, but also
for every act of our lives: and those who endeavour to disannul it
deserve everlasting punishment." Now, whoever hears these words, and
is ignorant of the opinion which he has clearly enough expressed in
his books,--not those, indeed, which he declares to have been stolen
from him in an incorrect form, nor those which he repudiates, but
those even which he mentions in his own letter which he forwarded to
Rome,--would certainly suppose that the views he holds are in strict
accordance with the truth. But whoever notices what he openly declares
in them, cannot fail to regard these statements with suspicion.
Because, although he makes that grace of God whereby Christ came into
the world to save sinners to consist simply in the remission of sins,
he can still accommodate his words to this meaning, by alleging that
the necessity of such grace for every hour and for every moment and
for every action of our life, comes to this, that while we recollect
and keep in mind the forgiveness of our past sins, we sin no more,
aided not by any supply of power from without, but by the powers of
our own will as it recalls to our mind, in every action we do, what
advantage has been conferred upon us by the remission of sins. Then,
again, whereas they are accustomed to say that Christ has given us
assistance for avoiding sin, in that He has left us an example by
living righteously and teaching what is right Himself, they have it in
their power here also to accommodate their words, by affirming that
this is the necessity of grace to us for every moment and for every
action, namely, that we should in all our conversation regard the
example of the Lord's conversation. Your own fidelity, however,
enables you clearly to perceive how such a profession of opinion as
this differs from that true confession of grace which is now the
question before us. And yet how easily can it be obscured and
disguised by their ambiguous statements!
Footnotes
[1786] 1 Tim i. 15.
Chapter 3 [III.]--Grace According to the Pelagians.
But why should we wonder at this? For the same Pelagius, who in the
Proceedings of the episcopal synod unhesitatingly condemned those who
say "that God's grace and assistance are not given for single acts,
but consist in free will, or in law and teaching," [1787] upon which
points we were apt to think that he had expended all his subterfuges;
and who also condemned such as affirm that the grace of God is
bestowed in proportion to our merits:--is proved, notwithstanding, to
hold, in the books which he has published on the freedom of the will,
and which he mentions in the letter he sent to Rome, no other
sentiments than those which he seemingly condemned. For that grace and
help of God, by which we are assisted in avoiding sin, he places
either in nature and free will, or else in the gift of the law and
teaching; the result of which of course is this, that whenever God
helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away from evil
and do good, by revealing to him and teaching him what he ought to do,
[1788] but not with the additional assistance of His co-operation and
inspiration of love, that he may accomplish that which he had
discovered it to be his duty to do.
Footnotes
[1787] See De Gestis Pelagii, c. 30.
[1788] We have in these two clauses an explanation of the terms "law"
and "teaching," which Pelagius uses almost technically.
Chapter 4.--Pelagius' System of Faculties.
In his system, he posits and distinguishes three faculties, by which
he says God's commandments are fulfilled,--capacity, volition, and
action: [1789] meaning by "capacity," that by which a man is able to
be righteous; by "volition" that by which he wills to be righteous; by
"action," that by which he actually is righteous. The first of these,
the capacity, he allows to have been bestowed on us by the Creator of
our nature; it is not in our power, and we possess it even against our
will. The other two, however, the volition and the action, he asserts
to be our own; and he assigns them to us so strictly as to contend
that they proceed simply from ourselves. In short, according to his
view, God's grace has nothing to do with assisting those two faculties
which he will have to be altogether our own, the volition and the
action, but that only which is not in our own power and comes to us
from God, namely the capacity; as if the faculties which are our own,
that is, the volition and the action, have such avail for declining
evil and doing good, that they require no divine help, whereas that
faculty which we have of God, that is to say, the capacity, is so
weak, that it is always assisted by the aid of grace.
Footnotes
[1789] [These three technical terms are, possibilitas, voluntas,
actio.--W.]
Chapter 5 [IV.]--Pelagius' Own Account of the Faculties, Quoted.
Lest, however, it should chance to be said that we either do not
correctly understand what he advances, or malevolently pervert to
another meaning what he never meant to bear such a sense, I beg of you
to consider his own actual words: "We distinguish," says he, "three
things, arranging them in a certain graduated order. We put in the
first place `ability;' in the second, `volition;' and in the third,
`actuality.' [1790] The `ability' we place in our nature, the
`volition' in our will, and the `actuality' in the effect. The first,
that is, the `ability,' properly belongs to God, who has bestowed it
on His creature; the other two, that is, the `volition' and the
`actuality,' must be referred to man, because they flow forth from the
fountain of the will. For his willing, therefore, and doing a good
work, the praise belongs to man; or rather both to man, and to God who
has bestowed on him the `capacity' for his will and work, and who
evermore by the help of His grace assists even this capacity. That a
man is able to will and effect any good work, comes from God alone. So
that this one faculty can exist, even when the other two have no
being; but these latter cannot exist without that former one. I am
therefore free not to have either a good volition or action; but I am
by no means able not to have the capacity of good. This capacity is
inherent in me, whether I will or no; nor does nature at any time
receive in this point freedom for itself. Now the meaning of all this
will be rendered clearer by an example or two. That we are able to see
with our eyes is not of us; but it is our own that we make a good or a
bad use of our eyes. So again (that I may, by applying a general case
in illustration, embrace all), that we are able to do, say, think, any
good thing, comes from Him who has endowed us with this `ability,' and
who also assists this `ability;' but that we really do a good thing,
or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own
selves, because we are also able to turn all these into evil.
Accordingly,--and this is a point which needs frequent repetition,
because of your calumniation of us,--whenever we say that a man can
live without sin, we also give praise to God by our acknowledgment of
the capacity which we have received from Him, who has bestowed such
`ability' upon us; and there is here no occasion for praising the
human agent, since it is God's matter alone that is for the moment
treated of; for the question is not about `willing,' or `effecting,'
but simply and solely about that which may possibly be."
Footnotes
[1790] [The three terms here are, posse, velle, esse.--W.]
Chapter 6 [V.]--Pelagius and Paul of Different Opinions.
The whole of this dogma of Pelagius, observe, is carefully expressed
in these words, and none other, in the third book of his treatise in
defence of the liberty of the will, in which he has taken care to
distinguish with so great subtlety these three things,--the
"capacity," the "volition," and the "action," that is, the "ability,"
the "volition," and the "actuality,"--that, whenever we read or hear
of his acknowledging the assistance of divine grace in order to our
avoidance of evil and accomplishment of good,--whatever he may mean by
the said assistance of grace, whether law and the teaching or any
other thing,--we are sure of what he says; nor can we run into any
mistake by understanding him otherwise than he means. For we cannot
help knowing that, according to his belief, it is not our "volition"
nor our "action" which is assisted by the divine help, but solely our
"capacity" to will and act, which alone of the three, as he affirms,
we have of God. As if that faculty were infirm which God Himself
placed in our nature; while the other two, which, as he would have it,
are our own, are so strong and firm and self-sufficient as to require
none of His help! so that He does not help us to will, nor help us to
act, but simply helps us to the possibility of willing and acting. The
apostle, however, holds the contrary, when he says, "Work out your own
salvation with fear and trembling." [1791] And that they might be sure
that it was not simply in their being able to work (for this they had
already received in nature and in teaching), but in their actual
working, that they were divinely assisted, the apostle does not say to
them, "For it is God that worketh in you to be able," as if they
already possessed volition and operation among their own resources,
without requiring His assistance in respect of these two; but he says,
"For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to perform of His
own good pleasure;" [1792] or, as the reading runs in other copies,
especially the Greek, "both to will and to operate." Consider, now,
whether the apostle did not thus long before foresee by the Holy Ghost
that there would arise adversaries of the grace of God; and did not
therefore declare that God works within us those two very things, even
"willing" and "operating," which this man so determined to be our own,
as if they were in no wise assisted by the help of divine grace.
Footnotes
[1791] Phil. ii. 12.
[1792] Phil. ii. 13.
Chapter 7 [VI.]--Pelagius Posits God's Aid Only for Our "Capacity."
Let not Pelagius, however, in this way deceive incautious and simple
persons, or even himself; for after saying, "Man is therefore to be
praised for his willing and doing a good work," he added, as if by way
of correcting himself, these words: "Or rather, this praise belongs to
man and to God." It was not, however, that he wished to be understood
as showing any deference to the sound doctrine, that it is "God which
worketh in us both to will and to do," that he thus expressed himself;
but it is clear enough, on his own showing, why he added the latter
clause, for he immediately subjoins: "Who has bestowed on him the
`capacity' for this very will and work." From his preceding words it
is manifest that he places this capacity in our nature. Lest he should
seem, however, to have said nothing about grace, he added these words:
"And who evermore, by the help of His grace, assists this very
capacity,"--"this very capacity," observe; not "very will," or "very
action;" for if he had said so much as this, he would clearly not be
at variance with the teaching of the apostle. But there are his words:
"this very capacity;" meaning that very one of the three faculties
which he had placed in our nature. This God "evermore assists by the
help of His grace." The result, indeed, is, that "the praise does not
belong to man and to God," because man so wills that yet God also
inspires his volition with the ardour of love, or that man so works
that God nevertheless also cooperates with him,--and without His help,
what is man? But he has associated God in this praise in this wise,
that were it not for the nature which God gave us in our creation
wherewith we might be able to exercise volition and action, we should
neither will nor act.
Chapter 8.--Grace, According to the Pelagians, Consists in the
Internal and Manifold Illumination of the Mind.
As to this natural capacity which, he allows, is assisted by the grace
of God, it is by no means clear from the passage either what grace he
means, or to what extent he supposes our nature to be assisted by it.
But, as is the case in other passages in which he expresses himself
with more clearness and decision, we may here also perceive that no
other grace is intended by him as helping natural capacity than the
law and the teaching. [VII.] For in one passage he says: "We are
supposed by very ignorant persons to do wrong in this matter to divine
grace, because we say that it by no means perfects sanctity in us
without our will,--as if God could have imposed any command on His
grace, without also supplying the help of His grace to those on whom
he imposed His commands, so that men might more easily accomplish
through grace what they are required to do by their free will." Then,
as if he meant to explain what grace he meant, he immediately went on
to add these words: "And this grace we for our part do not, as you
suppose, allow to consist merely in the law, but also in the help of
God." Now who can help wishing that he would show us what grace it is
that he would have us understand? Indeed, we have the strongest reason
for desiring him to tell us what he means by saying that he does not
allow grace merely to consist in the law. Whilst, however, we are in
the suspense of our expectation, observe, I pray you, what he has
further to tell us: "God helps us," says he, "by His teaching and
revelation, whilst He opens the eyes of our heart; whilst He points
out to us the future, that we may not be absorbed in the present;
whilst He discovers to us the snares of the devil; whilst He
enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace."
He then concludes his statement with a kind of absolution: "Does the
man," he asks, "who says all this appear to you to be a denier of
grace? Does he not acknowledge both man's free will and God's grace?"
But, after all, he has not got beyond his commendation of the law and
of teaching; assiduously inculcating this as the grace that helps us,
and so following up the idea with which he had started, when he said,
"We, however, allow it to consist in the help of God." God's help,
indeed, he supposed must be recommended to us by manifold lures; by
setting forth teaching and revelation, the opening of the eyes of the
heart, the demonstration of the future, the discovery of the devil's
wiles, and the illumination of our minds by the varied and
indescribable gift of heavenly grace,--all this, of course, with a
view to our learning the commandments and promises of God. And what
else is this than placing God's grace in "the law and the teaching"?
Chapter 9 [VIII.]--The Law One Thing, Grace Another. The Utility of
the Law.
Hence, then, it is clear that he acknowledges that grace whereby God
points out and reveals to us what we are bound to do; but not that
whereby He endows and assists us to act, since the knowledge of the
law, unless it be accompanied by the assistance of grace, rather
avails for producing the transgression of the commandment. "Where
there is no law," says the apostle, "there is no transgression;"
[1793] and again: "I had not known lust except the law had said, Thou
shalt not covet." [1794] Therefore so far are the law and grace from
being the same thing, that the law is not only unprofitable, but it is
absolutely prejudicial, unless grace assists it; and the utility of
the law may be shown by this, that it obliges all whom it proves
guilty of transgression to betake themselves to grace for deliverance
and help to overcome their evil lusts. For it rather commands than
assists; it discovers disease, but does not heal it; nay, the malady
that is not healed is rather aggravated by it, so that the cure of
grace is more earnestly and anxiously sought for, inasmuch as "The
letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." [1795] "For if there had
been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness
should have been by the law." [1796] To what extent, however, the law
gives assistance, the apostle informs us when he says immediately
afterwards: "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the
promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe."
[1797] Wherefore, says the apostle, "the law was our schoolmaster in
Christ Jesus." [1798] Now this very thing is serviceable to proud men,
to be more firmly and manifestly "concluded under sin," so that none
may pre-sumptuously endeavour to accomplish their justification by
means of free will as if by their own resources; but rather "that
every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before
God. Because by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified
in His sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the
righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by
the law and the prophets." [1799] How then manifested without the law,
if witnessed by the law? For this very reason the phrase is not,
"manifested without the law," but "the righteousness without the law,"
because it is "the righteousness of God;" that is, the righteousness
which we have not from the law, but from God,--not the righteousness,
indeed, which by reason of His commanding it, causes us fear through
our knowledge of it; but rather the righteousness which by reason of
His bestowing it, is held fast and maintained by us through our loving
it,--"so that he that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord." [1800]
Footnotes
[1793] Rom. iv. 15.
[1794] Rom. vii. 7.
[1795] 2 Cor. iii. 6.
[1796] Gal. iii. 21.
[1797] Gal. iii. 22.
[1798] Gal. iii. 24.
[1799] Rom. iii. 19-21.
[1800] 1 Cor. i. 31.
Chapter 10 [IX.]--What Purpose the Law Subserves.
What object, then, can this man gain by accounting the law and the
teaching to be the grace whereby we are helped to work righteousness?
For, in order that it may help much, it must help us to feel our need
of grace. No man, indeed, is able to fulfil the law through the law.
"Love is the fulfilling of the law." [1801] And the love of God is not
shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy Ghost, which is
given unto us. [1802] Grace, therefore, is pointed at by the law, in
order that the law may be fulfilled by grace. Now what does it avail
for Pelagius, that he declares the self-same thing under different
phrases, that he may not be understood to place in law and teaching
that grace which, as he avers, assists the "capacity" of our nature?
So far, indeed, as I can conjecture, the reason why he fears being so
understood is, because he condemned all those who maintain that God's
grace and help are not given for a man's single actions, but exist
rather in his freedom, or in the law and teaching. And yet he supposes
that he escapes detection by the shifts he so constantly employs for
disguising what he means by his formula of "law and teaching" under so
many various phrases.
Footnotes
[1801] Rom. xiii. 10.
[1802] Rom. v. 5.
Chapter 11 [X.]--Pelagius' Definition of How God Helps Us: "He
Promises Us Future Glory."
For in another passage, after asserting at length that it is not by
the help of God, but out of our own selves, that a good will is formed
within us, he confronted himself with a question out of the apostle's
epistle; and he asked this question: "How will this stand consistently
with the apostle's words, [1803] `It is God that worketh in you both
to will and to perfect'?" Then, in order to obviate this opposing
authority, which he plainly saw to be most thoroughly contrasted with
his own dogma, he went on at once to add: "He works in us to will what
is good, to will what is holy, when He rouses us from our devotion to
earthly desires, and from our love of the present only, after the
manner of brute animals, by the magnitude of the future glory and the
promise of its rewards; when by revealing wisdom to us He stirs up our
sluggish will to a longing after God; when (what you are not afraid to
deny in another passage) he persuades us to everything which is good."
Now what can be plainer, than that by the grace whereby God works
within us to will what is good, he means nothing else than the law and
the teaching? For in the law and the teaching of the holy Scriptures
are promised future glory and its great rewards. To the teaching also
appertains the revelation of wisdom, whilst it is its further function
to direct our thoughts to everything that is good. And if between
teaching and persuading (or rather exhorting) there seems to be a
difference, yet even this is provided for in the general term
"teaching," which is contained in the several discourses or letters;
for the holy Scriptures both teach and exhort, and in the processes of
teaching and exhorting there is room likewise for man's operation. We,
however, on our side would fain have him sometime confess that grace,
by which not only future glory in all its magnitude is promised, but
also is believed in and hoped for; by which wisdom is not only
revealed, but also loved; by which everything that is good is not only
recommended, but pressed upon us until we accept it. For all men do
not possess faith, [1804] who hear the Lord in the Scriptures
promising the kingdom of heaven; nor are all men persuaded, who are
counselled to come to Him, who says, "Come unto me, all ye that
labour." [1805] They, however, who have faith are the same who are
also persuaded to come to Him. This He Himself set forth most plainly,
when He said, "No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath
sent me, draw him." [1806] And some verses afterwards, when speaking
of such as believe not, He says, "Therefore said I unto you, that no
man can come unto me except it were given unto him of my Father."
[1807] This is the grace which Pelagius ought to acknowledge, if he
wishes not only to be called a Christian, but to be one.
Footnotes
[1803] Phil. ii. 13.
[1804] 2 Thess. iii. 2.
[1805] Matt. xi. 28.
[1806] John vi. 44.
[1807] John vi. 65.
Chapter 12 [XI.]--The Same Continued: "He Reveals Wisdom."
But what shall I say about the revelation of wisdom? For there is no
man who can in the present life very well hope to attain to the great
revelations which were given to the Apostle Paul; and of course it is
impossible to suppose that anything was accustomed in these
revelations to be made known to him but what appertained to wisdom.
Yet for all this he says: "Lest I should be exalted above measure
through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a
thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me. For this
thing I besought the Lord thrice, that He would take it away from me.
And He said unto me, My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength
is made perfect in weakness." [1808] Now, undoubtedly, if there were
already in the apostle that perfection of love which admitted of no
further addition, and which could be puffed up no more, there could
have been no further need of the messenger of Satan to buffet him, and
thereby to repress the excessive elation which might arise from
abundance of revelations. What means this elation, however, but a
being puffed up? And of love it has been indeed most truly said, "Love
vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." [1809] This love, therefore,
was still in process of constant increase in the great apostle, day by
day, as long as his "inward man was renewed day by day," [1810] and
would then be perfected, no doubt, when he was got beyond the reach of
all further vaunting and elation. But at that time his mind was still
in a condition to be inflated by an abundance of revelations before it
was perfected in the solid edifice of love; for he had not arrived at
the goal and apprehended the prize, to which he was reaching forward
in his course.
Footnotes
[1808] 2 Cor. xii. 7-9.
[1809] 1 Cor. xiii. 4.
[1810] 2 Cor. iv. 6.
Chapter 13 [XII.]--Grace Causes Us to Do.
To him, therefore, who is reluctant to endure the troublesome process,
whereby this vaunting disposition is restrained, before he attains to
the ultimate and highest perfection of charity, it is most properly
said, "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made
perfect in weakness," [1811] --in weakness, that is, not of the flesh
only, as this man supposes, but both of the flesh and of the mind;
because the mind, too, was, in comparison of that last stage of
complete perfection, weak, and to it also was assigned, in order to
check its elation, that messenger of Satan, the thorn in the flesh;
although it was very strong, in contrast with the carnal or animal
faculties, which as yet understand not the things of the Spirit of
God. [1812] Inasmuch, then, as strength is made perfect in weakness,
whoever does not own himself to be weak, is not in the way to be
perfected. This grace, however, by which strength is perfected in
weakness, conducts all who are predestinated and called according to
the divine purpose [1813] to the state of the highest perfection and
glory. By such grace it is effected, not only that we discover what
ought to be done, but also that we do what we have discovered,--not
only that we believe what ought to be loved, but also that we love
what we have believed.
Footnotes
[1811] 2 Cor. xii. 9.
[1812] 1 Cor. ii. 14.
[1813] Rom. viii. 28, 30.
Chapter 14 [XII.]--The Righteousness Which is of God, and the
Righteousness Which is of the Law.
If this grace is to be called "teaching," let it at any rate be so
called in such wise that God may be believed to infuse it, along with
an ineffable sweetness, more deeply and more internally, not only by
their agency who plant and water from without, but likewise by His own
too who ministers in secret His own increase,--in such a way, that He
not only exhibits truth, but likewise imparts love. For it is thus
that God teaches those who have been called according to His purpose,
giving them simultaneously both to know what they ought to do, and to
do what they know. Accordingly, the apostle thus speaks to the
Thessalonians: "As touching love of the brethren, ye need not that I
write unto you; for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one
another." [1814] And then, by way of proving that they had been taught
of God, he subjoined: "And indeed ye do it towards all the brethren
which are in all Macedonia." [1815] As if the surest sign that you
have been taught of God, is that you put into practice what you have
been taught. Of that character are all who are called according to
God's purpose, as it is written in the prophets: "They shall be all
taught of God." [1816] The man, however, who has learned what ought to
be done, but does it not, has not as yet been "taught of God"
according to grace, but only according to the law,--not according to
the spirit, but only according to the letter. Although there are many
who appear to do what the law commands, through fear of punishment,
not through love of righteousness; and such righteousness as this the
apostle calls "his own which is after the law,"--a thing as it were
commanded, not given. When, indeed, it has been given, it is not
called our own righteousness, but God's; because it becomes our own
only so that we have it from God. These are the apostle's words: "That
I may be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness which is of
the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ the
righteousness which is of God by faith." [1817] So great, then, is the
difference between the law and grace, that although the law is
undoubtedly of God, yet the righteousness which is "of the law" is not
"of God," but the righteousness which is consummated by grace is "of
God." The one is designated "the righteousness of the law," because it
is done through fear of the curse of the law; while the other is
called "the righteousness of God," because it is bestowed through the
beneficence of His grace, so that it is not a terrible but a pleasant
commandment, according to the prayer in the psalm: "Good art Thou, O
Lord, therefore in Thy goodness teach me Thy righteousness;" [1818]
that is, that I may not be compelled like a slave to live under the
law with fear of punishment; but rather in the freedom of love may be
delighted to live with law as my companion. When the freeman keeps a
commandment, he does it readily. And whosoever learns his duty in this
spirit, does everything that he has learned ought to be done.
Footnotes
[1814] 1 Thess. iv. 9.
[1815] 1 Thess. iv. 10.
[1816] Isa. liv. 13; Jer. xxxi. 34; John vi. 45.
[1817] Phil. iii. 9.
[1818] Ps. cxix. 68.
Chapter 15 [XIV.]--He Who Has Been Taught by Grace Actually Comes to
Christ.
Now as touching this kind of teaching, the Lord also says: "Every man
that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me."
[1819] Of the man, therefore, who has not come, it cannot be correctly
said: "Has heard and has learned that it is his duty to come to Him,
but he is not willing to do what he has learned." It is indeed
absolutely improper to apply such a statement to that method of
teaching, whereby God teaches by grace. For if, as the Truth says,
"Every man that hath learned cometh," it follows, of course, that
whoever does not come has not learned. But who can fail to see that a
man's coming or not coming is by the determination of his will? This
determination, however, may stand alone, if the man does not come; but
if he does come, it cannot be without assistance; and such assistance,
that he not only knows what it is he ought to do, but also actually
does what he thus knows. And thus, when God teaches, it is not by the
letter of the law, but by the grace of the Spirit. Moreover, He so
teaches, that whatever a man learns, he not only sees with his
perception, but also desires with his choice, and accomplishes in
action. By this mode, therefore, of divine instruction, volition
itself, and performance itself, are assisted, and not merely the
natural "capacity" of willing and performing. For if nothing but this
"capacity" of ours were assisted by this grace, the Lord would rather
have said, "Every man that hath heard and hath learned of the Father
may possibly come unto me." This, however, is not what He said; but
His words are these: "Every man that hath heard and hath learned of
the Father cometh unto me." Now the possibility of coming Pelagius
places in nature, or even--as we found him attempting to say some time
ago [1820] --in grace (whatever that may mean according to him),--when
he says, "whereby this very capacity is assisted;" whereas the actual
coming lies in the will and act. It does not, however, follow that he
who may come actually comes, unless he has also willed and acted for
the coming. But every one who has learned of the Father not only has
the possibility of coming, but comes; and in this result are already
included the motion of the capacity, the affection of the will, and
the effect of the action. [1821]
Footnotes
[1819] John vi. 45.
[1820] See above, ch. 7 [vi.].
[1821] The technical gradation is here neatly expressed by profectus,
affectus, and effectus.
Chapter 16 [XV.]--We Need Divine Aid in the Use of Our Powers.
Illustration from Sight.
Now what is the use of his examples, if they do not really accomplish
his own promise of making his meaning clearer to us; [1822] not,
indeed, that we are bound to admit their sense, but that we may
discover more plainly and openly what is his drift and purpose in
using them? "That we are able," says he, "to see with our eyes is not
of us; but it is of us that we make a good or a bad use of our sight."
Well, there is an answer for him in the psalm, in which the psalmist
says to God, "Turn Thou away mine eyes, that they behold not
iniquity." [1823] Now although this was said of the eyes of the mind,
it still follows from it, that in respect of our bodily eyes there is
either a good use or a bad use that may be made of them: not in the
literal sense merely of a good sight when the eyes are sound, and a
bad sight when they are bleared, but in the moral sense of a right
sight when it is directed towards succouring the helpless, or a bad
sight when its object is the indulgence of lust. For although both the
pauper who is succoured, and the woman who is lusted after, are seen
by these external eyes; it is after all from the inner eyes that
either compassion in the one case or lust in the other proceeds. How
then is it that the prayer is offered to God, "Turn Thou away mine
eyes, that they behold not iniquity"? Or why is that asked for which
lies within our own power, if it be true that God does not assist the
will?
Footnotes
[1822] See above, ch. 5 [iv.].
[1823] Ps. cxix. 37.
Chapter 17 [XVI.]--Does Pelagius Designedly Refrain from Openly Saying
that All Good Action is from God?
"That we are able to speak," says he, "is of God; but that we make a
good or a bad use of speech is of ourselves." He, however, who has
made the most excellent use of speech does not teach us so. "For,"
says He, "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that
speaketh in you." [1824] "So, again," adds Pelagius, "that I may, by
applying a general case in illustration, embrace all,--that we are
able to do, say, think, any good thing, comes from Him who has endowed
us with this ability, and who also assists it." Observe how even here
he repeats his former meaning --that of these three, capacity,
volition, action, it is only the capacity which receives help. Then,
by way of completely stating what he intends to say, he adds: "But
that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good
thought, proceeds from our own selves." He forgot what he had before
[1825] said by way of correcting, as it were, his own words; for after
saying, "Man is to be praised therefore for his willing and doing a
good work," he at once goes on to modify his statement thus: "Or
rather, this praise belongs both to man, and to God who has given him
the capacity of this very will and work." Now what is the reason why
he did not remember this admission when giving his examples, so as to
say this much at least after quoting them: "That we are able to do,
say, think any good thing, comes from Him who has given us this
ability, and who also assists it. That, however, we really do a good
thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds both
from ourselves and from Him!" This, however, he has not said. But, if
I am not mistaken, I think I see why he was afraid to do so.
Footnotes
[1824] Matt. x. 20.
[1825] See ch. 5.
Chapter 18 [XVII.]--He Discovers the Reason of Pelagius' Hesitation So
to Say.
For, when wishing to point out why this lies within our own
competency, he says: "Because we are able to turn all these actions
into evil." This, then, was the reason why he was afraid to admit that
such an action proceeds "both from ourselves and from God," lest it
should be objected to him in reply: "If the fact of our doing,
speaking, thinking anything good, is owing both to ourselves and to
God, because He has endowed us with this ability, then it follows that
our doing, thinking, speaking evil things, is due to ourselves and to
God, because He has here also endowed us with ability of indifferency;
the conclusion from this being--and God forbid that we should admit
any such--that just as God is associated with ourselves in the praise
of good actions, so must He share with us the blame of evil actions."
For that "capacity" with which He has endowed us makes us capable
alike of good actions and of evil ones.
Chapter 19 [XVIII.]--The Two Roots of Action, Love and Cupidity; And
Each Brings Forth Its Own Fruit.
Concerning this "capacity," Pelagius thus writes in the first book of
his Defence of Free Will: "Now," says he, "we have implanted in us by
God a capacity for either part. [1826] It resembles, as I may say, a
fruitful and fecund root which yields and produces diversely according
to the will of man, and which is capable, at the planter's own choice,
of either shedding a beautiful bloom of virtues, or of bristling with
the thorny thickets of vices." Scarcely heeding what he says, he here
makes one and the same root productive both of good and evil fruits,
in opposition to gospel truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord
declares that "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can
a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit;" [1827] and when the Apostle
Paul says that covetousness is "the root of all evils," [1828] he
intimates to us, of course, that love may be regarded as the root of
all good things. On the supposition, therefore, that two trees, one
good and the other corrupt, represent two human beings, a good one and
a bad, what else is the good man except one with a good will, that is,
a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except one with a bad
will, that is, a tree with a bad root? The fruits which spring from
such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts, which
proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one.
Footnotes
[1826] [The technical phrase is possibilitas utriusque partis.--W.]
[1827] Matt. vii. 18.
[1828] 1 Tim. vi. 10.
Chapter 20 [XIX.]--How a Man Makes a Good or a Bad Tree.
Now a man makes a good tree when he receives the grace of God. For it
is not by himself that he makes himself good instead of evil; but it
is of Him, and through Him, and in Him who is always good. And in
order that he may not only be a good tree, but also bear good fruit,
it is necessary for him to be assisted by the self-same grace, without
which he can do nothing good. For God Himself cooperates in the
production of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and
tends them by the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself
also gives the increase. [1829] A man, however, makes a corrupt tree
when he makes himself corrupt, when he falls away from Him who is the
unchanging good; for such a declension from Him is the origin of an
evil will. Now this decline does not initiate some other corrupt
nature, but it corrupts that which has been already created good. When
this corruption, however, has been healed, no evil remains; for
although nature no doubt had received an injury, yet nature was not
itself a blemish. [1830]
Footnotes
[1829] 1 Cor. iii. 7.
[1830] [Here the phraseology contrasts vitium naturæ, with vitium
natura.--W.]
Chapter 21 [XX.]--Love the Root of All Good Things; Cupidity, of All
Evil Ones.
The "capacity," then, of which we speak is not (as he supposes) the
one identical root both of good things and evil. For the love which is
the root of good things is quite different from the cupidity which is
the root of evil things--as different, indeed, as virtue is from vice.
But without doubt this "capacity" is capable of either root: because a
man is not only able to possess love, whereby the tree becomes a good
one; but he is likewise able to have cupidity, which makes the tree
evil. This human cupidity, however, which is a vice, has for its
author man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is indeed
that "lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of
life, which is not of the Father, but is of the world." [1831] And who
can be ignorant of the usage of the Scripture, which under the
designation of "the world" is accustomed to describe those who inhabit
the world?
Footnotes
[1831] 1 John ii. 16.
Chapter 22 [XXI.]--Love is a Good Will.
That love, however, which is a virtue, comes to us from God, not from
ourselves, according to the testimony of Scripture, which says: "Love
is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God:
for God is love." [1832] It is on the principle of this love that one
can best understand the passage, "Whosoever is born of God doth not
commit sin;" [1833] as well as the sentence, "And he cannot sin."
[1834] Because the love according to which we are born of God "doth
not behave itself unseemly," and "thinketh no evil." [1835] Therefore,
whenever a man sins, it is not according to love: but it is according
to cupidity that he commits sin; and following such a disposition, he
is not born of God. Because, as it has been already stated, "the
capacity" of which we speak is capable of either root. When,
therefore, the Scripture says, "Love is of God," or still more
pointedly, "God is love;" when the Apostle John so very emphatically
exclaims, "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon
us, that we should be called, and be, the sons of God!" [1836] with
what face can this writer, on hearing that "God is love," persist in
maintaining his opinion, that we bare of God one only of those three,
[1837] namely, "the capacity;" whereas it is of ourselves that we have
"the good will" and "the good action?" As if, indeed, this good will
were a different thing from that love which the Scripture so loudly
proclaims to have come to us from God, and to have been given to us by
the Father, that we might become His children.
Footnotes
[1832] 1 John iv. 7, 8.
[1833] 1 John iii. 9.
[1834] Same verse.
[1835] 1 Cor. xiii. 5.
[1836] 1 John iii. 1.
[1837] See above, ch. 4.
Chapter 23 [XXII.]--Pelagius' Double Dealing Concerning the Ground of
the Conferrence of Grace.
Perhaps, however, our own antecedent merits caused this gift to be
bestowed upon us; as this writer has already suggested in reference to
God's grace, in that work which he addressed to a holy virgin, [1838]
whom he mentions in the letter sent by him to Rome. For, after
adducing the testimony of the Apostle James, in which he says, "Submit
yourselves unto God; but resist the devil, and he will flee from you,"
[1839] he goes on to say: "He shows us how we ought to resist the
devil, if we submit ourselves indeed to God and by doing His will
merit His divine grace, and by the help of the Holy Ghost more easily
withstand the evil spirit." Judge, then, how sincere was his
condemnation in the Palestine Synod of those persons who say that
God's grace is conferred on us according to our merits! Have we any
doubt as to his still holding this opinion, and most openly
proclaiming it? Well, how could that confession of his before the
bishops have been true and real? Had he already written the book in
which he most explicitly alleges that grace is bestowed on us
according to our deserts--the very position which he without any
reservation condemned at that Synod in the East? Let him frankly
acknowledge that he once held the opinion, but that he holds it no
longer; so should we most frankly rejoice in his improvement. As it
is, however, when, besides other objections, this one was laid to his
charge which we are now discussing, he said in reply: "Whether these
are the opinions of Coelestius or not, is the concern of those who
affirm that they are. For my own part, indeed, I never entertained
such views; on the contrary, I anathematize every one who does
entertain them." [1840] But how could he "never have entertained such
views," when he had already composed this work? Or how does he still
"anathematize everybody who entertains these views," if he afterwards
composed this work?
Footnotes
[1838] Epistola ad Demetriadem, c. 25.
[1839] Jas. iv. 7.
[1840] See the De Gestis Pelagii, ch. 30 [xiv.].
Chapter 24.--Pelagius Places Free Will at the Basis of All Turning to
God for Grace.
But perhaps he may meet us with this rejoinder, that in the sentence
before us he spoke of our "meriting the divine grace by doing the will
of God," in the sense that grace is added to those who believe and
lead godly lives, whereby they may boldly withstand the tempter;
whereas their very first reception of grace was, that they might do
the will of God. Lest, then, he make such a rejoinder, consider some
other words of his on this subject: "The man," says he, "who hastens
to the Lord, and desires to be directed by Him, that is, who makes his
own will depend upon God's, who moreover cleaves so closely to the
Lord as to become (as the apostle says) `one spirit' with Him, [1841]
does all this by nothing else than by his freedom of will." Observe
how great a result he has here stated to be accomplished only by our
freedom of will; and how, in fact, he supposes us to cleave to God
without the help of God: for such is the force of his words, "by
nothing else than by his own freedom of will." So that, after we have
cleaved to the Lord without His help, we even then, because of such
adhesion of our own, deserve to be assisted. [XXIII.] For he goes on
to say: "Whosoever makes a right use of this" (that is, rightly uses
his freedom of will), "does so entirely surrender himself to God, and
does so completely mortify his own will, that he is able to say with
the apostle, `Nevertheless it is already not I that live, but Christ
liveth in me;' [1842] and `He placeth his heart in the hand of God, so
that He turneth it whithersoever He willeth.'" [1843] Great indeed is
the help of the grace of God, so that He turns our heart in whatever
direction He pleases. But according to this writer's foolish opinion,
however great the help may be, we deserve it all at the moment when,
without any assistance beyond the liberty of our will, we hasten to
the Lord, desire His guidance and direction, suspend our own will
entirely on His, and by close adherence to Him become one spirit with
Him. Now all these vast courses of goodness we (according to him)
accomplish, forsooth, simply by the freedom of our own free will; and
by reason of such antecedent merits we so secure His grace, that He
turns our heart which way soever He pleases. Well, now, how is that
grace which is not gratuitously conferred? How can it be grace, if it
is given in payment of a debt? How can that be true which the apostle
says, "It is not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not of
works, lest any man should boast;" [1844] and again, "If it is of
grace, then is it no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace:"
[1845] how, I repeat, can this be true, if such meritorious works
precede as to procure for us the bestowal of grace? Surely, under the
circumstances, there can be no gratuitous gift, but only the
recompense of a due reward. Is it the case, then, that in order to
find their way to the help of God, men run to God without God's help?
And in order that we may receive God's help while cleaving to Him, do
we without His help cleave to God? What greater gift, or even what
similar gift, could grace itself bestow upon any man, if he has
already without grace been able to make himself one spirit with the
Lord by no other power than that of his own free will?
Footnotes
[1841] 1 Cor. vi. 17.
[1842] Gal. ii. 20.
[1843] Prov. xxi. 1.
[1844] Eph. ii. 8, 9.
[1845] Rom. xi. 6.
Chapter 25 [XXIV.]--God by His Wonderful Power Works in Our Hearts
Good Dispositions of Our Will.
Now I want him to tell us whether that king of Assyria, [1846] whose
holy wife Esther "abhorred his bed," [1847] whilst sitting upon the
throne of his kingdom, and clothed in all his glorious apparel,
adorned all over with gold and precious stones, and dreadful in his
majesty when he raised his face, which was inflamed with anger, in the
midst of his splendour, and beheld her, with the glare of a wild bull
in the fierceness of his indignation; and the queen was afraid, and
her colour changed as she fainted, and she bowed herself upon the head
of the maid that went before her; [1848] --I want him to tell us
whether this king had yet "hastened to the Lord, and had desired to be
directed by Him, and had subordinated his own will to His, and had, by
cleaving fast to God, become one spirit with Him, simply by the force
of his own free will." Had he surrendered himself wholly to God, and
entirely mortified his own will, and placed his heart in the hand of
God? I suppose that anybody who should think this of the king, in the
state he was then in, would be not foolish only, but even mad. And yet
God converted him, and turned his indignation into gentleness. Who,
however, can fail to see how much greater a task it is to change and
turn wrath completely into gentleness, than to bend the heart to
something, when it is not preoccupied with either affection, but is
indifferently poised between the two? Let them therefore read and
understand, observe and acknowledge, that it is not by law and
teaching uttering their lessons from without, but by a secret,
wonderful, and ineffable power operating within, that God works in
men's hearts not only revelations of the truth, but also good
dispositions of the will.
Footnotes
[1846] The reading "Assyrius" is replaced in some editions by the more
suitable word "Assuerus."
[1847] This "exsecrabatur cubile" seems to refer to Esther's words in
her prayer, bdelussomai koiten aperitmeton, "I abhor the couch of the
uncircumcised" (Esth. iv., Septuagint).
[1848] Esth. v. 1.
Chapter 26 [XXV.]--The Pelagian Grace of "Capacity" Exploded. The
Scripture Teaches the Need of God's Help in Doing, Speaking, and
Thinking, Alike.
Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to deceive both himself and
others by his disputations against the grace of God. It is not on
account of only one of these three [1849] --that is to say, of the
"capacity" of a good will and work--that the grace of God towards us
ought to be proclaimed; but also on account of the good "will" and
"work" themselves. This "capacity," indeed, according to his
definition, avails for both directions; and yet our sins must not also
be attributed to God in consequence, as our good actions, according to
his view, are attributed to Him owing to the same capacity. It is not
only, therefore, on this account that the help of God's grace is
maintained, because it assists our natural capacity. He must cease to
say, "That we are able to do, say, think any good, is from Him who has
given us this ability, and who also assists this ability; whereas that
we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good
thought, proceeds from our own selves." He must, I repeat, cease to
say this. For God has not only given us the ability and aids it, but
He further works in us "to will and to do." [1850] It is not because
we do not will, or do not do, that we will and do nothing good, but
because we are without His help. How can he say, "That we are able to
do good is of God, but that we actually do it is of ourselves," when
the apostle tells us that he "prays to God" in behalf of those to whom
he was writing, "that they should do no evil, but that they should do
that which is good?" [1851] His words are not, "We pray that ye be
able to do nothing evil;" but, "that ye do no evil." Neither does he
say, "that ye be able to do good;" but, "that ye do good." Forasmuch
as it is written, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are
the sons of God," [1852] it follows that, in order that they may do
that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good. How can
Pelagius say, "That we are able to make a good use of speech comes
from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech
proceeds from ourselves," when the Lord declares, "It is the Spirit of
your Father which speaketh in you"? [1853] He does not say, "It is not
you who have given to yourselves the power of speaking well;" but His
words are, "It is not ye that speak." [1854] Nor does He say, "It is
the Spirit of your Father which giveth, or hath given, you the power
to speak well;" but He says, "which speaketh in you." He does not
allude to the motion [1855] of "the capacity," but He asserts the
effect of the co-operation. How can this arrogant asserter of free
will say, "That we are able to think a good thought comes from God,
but that we actually think a good thought proceeds from ourselves"? He
has his answer from the humble preacher of grace, who says, "Not that
we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but
our sufficiency is of God." [1856] Observe he does not say, "to be
able to think anything;" but, "to think anything."
Footnotes
[1849] See above, ch. 4.
[1850] Phil. ii. 13.
[1851] See 2 Cor. xiii. 7.
[1852] Rom. viii. 14.
[1853] Matt. x. 20.
[1854] Matt. x. 20.
[1855] See ch. 15 at the end.
[1856] 2 Cor. iii. 5.
Chapter 27 [XXVI.]--What True Grace Is, and Wherefore Given. Merits Do
Not Precede Grace.
Now even Pelagius should frankly confess that this grace is plainly
set forth in the inspired Scriptures; nor should he with shameless
effrontery hide the fact that he has too long opposed it, but admit it
with salutary regret; so that the holy Church may cease to be harassed
by his stubborn persistence, and rather rejoice in his sincere
conversion. Let him distinguish between knowledge and love, as they
ought to be distinguished; because "knowledge puffeth up, but love
edifieth." [1857] And then knowledge no longer puffeth up when love
builds up. And inasmuch as each is the gift of God (although one is
less, and the other greater), he must not extol our righteousness
above the praise which is due to Him who justifies us, in such a way
as to assign to the lesser of these two gifts the help of divine
grace, and to claim the greater one for the human will. And should he
consent that we receive love from the grace of God, he must not
suppose that any merits of our own preceded our reception of the gift.
For what merits could we possibly have had at the time when we loved
not God? In order, indeed, that we might receive that love whereby we
might love, we were loved while as yet we had no love ourselves. This
the Apostle John most expressly declares: "Not that we loved God,"
says he, "but that He loved us;" [1858] and again, "We love Him,
because He first loved us." [1859] Most excellently and truly spoken!
For we could not have wherewithal to love Him, unless we received it
from Him in His first loving us. And what good could we possibly do if
we possessed no love? Or how could we help doing good if we have love?
For although God's commandment appears sometimes to be kept by those
who do not love Him, but only fear Him; yet where there is no love, no
good work is imputed, nor is there any good work, rightly so called;
because "whatsoever is not of faith is sin," [1860] and "faith worketh
by love." [1861] Hence also that grace of God, whereby "His love is
shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost, which is given unto
us," [1862] must be so confessed by the man who would make a true
confession, as to show his undoubting belief that nothing whatever in
the way of goodness pertaining to godliness and real holiness can be
accomplished without it. Not after the fashion of him who clearly
enough shows us what he thinks of it when he says, that "grace is
bestowed in order that what God commands may be the more easily
fulfilled;" which of course means, that even without grace God's
commandments may, although less easily, yet actually, be accomplished.
Footnotes
[1857] 1 Cor. viii. 1.
[1858] 1 John iv. 10.
[1859] 1 John iv. 19.
[1860] Rom. xiv. 23.
[1861] Gal. v. 6.
[1862] Rom. v. 5.
Chapter 28 [XXVII.]--Pelagius Teaches that Satan May Be Resisted
Without the Help of the Grace of God.
In the book which he addressed to a certain holy virgin, there is a
passage which I have already mentioned, [1863] wherein he plainly
indicates what he holds on this subject; for he speaks of our
"deserving the grace of God, and by the help of the Holy Ghost more
easily resisting the evil spirit." Now why did he insert the phrase
"more easily"? Was not the sense already complete: "And by the help of
the Holy Ghost resisting the evil spirit"? But who can fail to
perceive what an injury he has done by this insertion? He wants it, of
course, to be supposed, that so great are the powers of our nature,
which he is in such a hurry to exalt,that even without the assistance
of the Holy Ghost the evil spirit can be resisted--less easily it may
be, but still in a certain measure.
Footnotes
[1863] Quoted above, ch. 23 [xxii.], from the Epistola ad Demetriadem.
Chapter 29 [XXVIII.]--When He Speaks of God's Help, He Means It Only
to Help Us Do What Without It We Still Could Do.
Again, in the first book of his Defence of the Freedom of the Will, he
says: "But while we have within us a free will so strong and so
stedfast against sinning, which our Maker has implanted in human
nature generally, still, by His unspeakable goodness, we are further
defended by His own daily help." What need is there of such help, if
free will is so strong and so stedfast against sinning? But here, as
before, he would have it understood that the purpose of the alleged
assistance is, that that may be more easily accomplished by grace
which he nevertheless supposes may be effected, less easily, no doubt,
but yet actually, without grace.
Chapter 30 [XXIX.]--What Pelagius Thinks is Needful for Ease of
Performance is Really Necessary for the Performance.
In like manner, in another passage of the same book, he says: "In
order that men may more easily accomplish by grace that which they are
commanded to do by free will." Now, expunge the phrase "more easily,"
and you leave not only a full, but also a sound sense, if it be
regarded as meaning simply this: "That men may accomplish through
grace what they are commanded to do by free will." The addition of the
words "more easily," however, tacitly suggests the possibility of
accomplishing good works even without the grace of God. But such a
meaning is disallowed by Him who says, "Without me ye can do nothing."
[1864]
Footnotes
[1864] John xv. 5.
Chapter 31 [XXX.]--Pelagius and Coelestius Nowhere Really Acknowledge
Grace.
Let him amend all this, that if human infirmity has erred in subjects
so profound, he may not add to the error diabolical deception and
wilfulness, either by denying what he has really believed, or by
maintaining what he has rashly believed, after he has once discovered,
on recollecting the light of truth, that he ought never to have so
believed. As for that grace, indeed, by which we are justified,--in
other words, whereby "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by
the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us," [1865] --I have nowhere, in
those writings of Pelagius and Coelestius which I have had the
opportunity of reading, found them acknowledging it as it ought to be
acknowledged. In no passage at all have I observed them recognising
"the children of the promise," concerning whom the apostle thus
speaks: "They which are children of the flesh, these are not the
children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the
seed." [1866] For that which God promises we do not ourselves bring
about by our own choice or natural power, but He Himself effects it by
grace.
Footnotes
[1865] Rom. v. 5.
[1866] Rom. ix. 8.
Chapter 32.--Why the Pelagians Deemed Prayers to Be Necessary. The
Letter Which Pelagius Despatched to Pope Innocent with an Exposition
of His Belief.
Now I will say nothing at present about the works of Coelestius, or
those tracts of his which he produced in those ecclesiastical
proceedings, [1867] copies of the whole of which we have taken care to
send to you, along with another letter which we deemed it necessary to
add. If you carefully examine all these documents, you will observe
that he does not posit the grace of God, which helps us whether to
avoid evil or to do good, beyond the natural choice of the will, but
only in the law and teaching. Thus he even asserts that their very
prayers are necessary for the purpose of showing men what to desire
and love. All these documents, however, I may omit further notice of
at present; for Pelagius himself has lately forwarded to Rome both a
letter and an exposition of his belief, addressing it to Pope
Innocent, of blessed memory, of whose death he was ignorant. Now in
this letter he says that "there are certain subjects about which some
men are trying to vilify him. One of these is, that he refuses to
infants the sacrament of baptism, and promises the kingdom of heaven
to some, independently of Christ's redemption. Another of them is,
that he so speaks of man's ability to avoid sin as to exclude God's
help, and so strongly confides in free will that he repudiates the
help of divine grace." Now, as touching the perverted opinion he holds
about the baptism of infants (although he allows that it ought to be
administered to them), in opposition to the Christian faith and
catholic truth, this is not the place for us to enter on an accurate
discussion, for we must now complete our treatise on the assistance of
grace, which is the subject we undertook. Let us see what answer he
makes out of this very letter to the objection which he has proposed
concerning this matter. Omitting his invidious complaints about his
opponents, we approach the subject before us; and find him expressing
himself as follows.
Footnotes
[1867] Augustin again mentions a short treatise by Coelestius produced
by him at Rome in some proceedings of the church there, below, in ch.
36 (xxxiii.), and also in his work De Peccato Originali, chs. 2 and 5
(ii., v.), etc. Those acts of the Roman church were drawn up (as
Augustin testifies in his Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, ii. 3,
"when Coelestius was present to answer charges laid against him") in
the time of Pope Zosimus, A.D. 417.
Chapter 33 [XXXI.]--Pelagius Professes Nothing on the Subject of Grace
Which May Not Be Understood of the Law and Teaching.
"See," he says, "how this epistle will clear me before your
Blessedness; for in it we clearly and simply declare, that we possess
a free will which is unimpaired for sinning and for not sinning;
[1868] and this free will is in all good works always assisted by
divine help." Now you perceive, by the understanding which the Lord
has given you, that these words of his are inadequate to solve the
question. For it is still open to us to inquire what the help is by
which he would say that the free will is assisted; lest perchance he
should, as is usual with him, maintain that law and teaching are
meant. If, indeed, you were to ask him why he used the word "always,"
he might answer: Because it is written, And in His law will he
meditate day and night." [1869] Then, after interposing a statement
about the condition of man, and his natural capacity for sinning and
not sinning, he added the following words: "Now this power of free
will we declare to reside generally in all alike--in Christians, in
Jews, and in Gentiles. In all men free will exists equally by nature,
but in Christians alone is it assisted by grace." We again ask: "By
what grace?" And again he might answer: "By the law and the Christian
teaching."
Footnotes
[1868] [Ad peccandum et ad non peccandum integrum liberum
arbitrium.--W.]
[1869] Ps. i. 2.
Chapter 34.--Pelagius Says that Grace is Given According to Men's
Merits. The Beginning, However, of Merit is Faith; And This is a
Gratuitous Gift, Not a Recompense for Our Merits.
Then, again, whatever it is which he means by "grace," he says is
given even to Christians according to their merits, although (as I
have already mentioned above [1870] ), when he was in Palestine, in
his very remarkable vindication of himself, he condemned those who
hold this opinion. Now these are his words: "In the one," says he,
"the good of their created [1871] condition is naked and defenceless;"
meaning in those who are not Christians. Then adding the rest: "In
these, however, who belong to Christ, there is defence afforded by
Christ's help." You see it is still uncertain what the help is,
according to the remark we have already made on the same subject. He
goes on, however, to say of those who are not Christians: "Those
deserve judgment and condemnation, because, although they possess free
will whereby they could come to have faith and deserve God's grace,
they make a bad use of the freedom which has been granted to them. But
these deserve to be rewarded, who by the right use of free will merit
the Lord's grace, and keep His commandments." Now it is clear that he
says grace is bestowed according to merit, whatever and of what kind
soever the grace is which he means, but which he does not plainly
declare. For when he speaks of those persons as deserving reward who
make a good use of their free will, and as therefore meriting the
Lord's grace, he asserts in fact that a debt is paid to them. What,
then, becomes of the apostle's saying, "Being justified freely by His
grace"? [1872] And what of his other statement too, "By grace are ye
saved"? [1873] --where, that he might prevent men's supposing that it
is by works, he expressly added, "by faith." [1874] And yet further,
lest it should be imagined that faith itself is to be attributed to
men independently of the grace of God, the apostle says: "And that not
of yourselves; for it is the gift of God." [1875] It follows,
therefore, that we receive, without any merit of our own, that from
which everything which, according to them, we obtain because of our
merit, has its beginning--that is, faith itself. If, however, they
insist on denying that this is freely given to us, what is the meaning
of the apostle's words: "According as God hath dealt to every man the
measure of faith"? [1876] But if it is contended that faith is so
bestowed as to be a recompense for merit, not a free gift, what then
becomes of another saying of the apostle: "Unto you it is given in the
behalf of Christ, not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for
His sake"? [1877] Each is by the apostle's testimony made a
gift,--both that he believes in Christ, and that each suffers for His
sake. These men however, attribute faith to free will in such a way as
to make it appear that grace is rendered to faith not as a gratuitous
gift, but as a debt--thus ceasing to be grace any longer, because that
is not grace which is not gratuitous.
Footnotes
[1870] In ch. 23 [xxii.].
[1871] Conditionis bonum.
[1872] Rom. iii. 24.
[1873] Eph. i. 8.
[1874] Eph. i. 8.
[1875] Eph. i. 8.
[1876] Rom. xii. 3.
[1877] Phil. i. 29.
Chapter 35 [XXXII.]--Pelagius Believes that Infants Have No Sin to Be
Remitted in Baptism.
But Pelagius would have the reader pass from this letter to the book
which states his belief. This he has made mention of to yourselves,
and in it he has discoursed a good deal on points about which no
question was raised as to his views. Let us, however, look simply at
the subjects about which our own controversy with them is concerned.
Having, then terminated a discussion which he had conducted to his
heart's content,--from the Unity of the Trinity to the resurrection of
the flesh, on which nobody was questioning him,--he goes on to say:
"We hold likewise one baptism, which we aver ought to be administered
to infants in the same sacramental formula as it is to adults." Well,
now, you have yourselves affirmed that you heard him admit at least as
much as this in your presence. What, however, is the use of his saying
that the sacrament of baptism is administered to children "in the same
words as it is to adults," when our inquiry concerns the thing, not
merely the words? It is a more important matter, that (as you write)
with his own mouth he replied to your own question, that "infants
receive baptism for the remission of sins." For he did not say here,
too, "in words of remission of sins," but he acknowledged that they
are baptized for the remission itself; and yet for all this, if you
were to ask him what the sin is which he supposes to be remitted to
them, he would contend that they had none whatever.
Chapter 36 [XXXIII.]--Coelestius Openly Declares Infants to Have No
Original Sin.
Who would believe that, under so clear a confession, there is
concealed a contrary meaning, if Coelestius had not exposed it? He who
in that book of his, which he quoted at Rome in the ecclesiastical
proceedings there, [1878] distinctly acknowledged that "infants too
are baptized for the remission of sins," also denied "that they have
any original sin." But let us now observe what Pelagius thought, not
about the baptism of infants, but rather about the assistance of
divine grace, in this exposition of his belief which he forwarded to
Rome. "We confess," says he, "free will in such a sense that we
declare ourselves to be always in need of the help of God." Well, now,
we ask again, what the help is which he says we require; and again we
find ambiguity, since he may possibly answer that he meant the law and
the teaching of Christ, whereby that natural "capacity" is assisted.
We, however, on our side require them to acknowledge a grace like that
which the apostle describes, when he says: "For God hath not given us
the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind;"
[1879] although it does not follow by any means that the man who has
the gift of knowledge, whereby he has discovered what he ought to do,
has also the grace of love so as to do it.
Footnotes
[1878] See above, ch. 32 [xxx.]; compare De Pecc. Orig. chs. 5, 6.
[1879] 2 Tim. i. 7.
Chapter 37 [XXXIV.]--Pelagius Nowhere Admits the Need of Divine Help
for Will and Action.
I also have read those books or writings of his which he mentions in
the letter which he sent to Pope Innocent, of blessed memory, with the
exception of a brief epistle which he says he sent to the holy Bishop
Constantius; but I have nowhere been able to find in them that he
acknowledges such a grace as helps not only that "natural capacity of
willing and acting" (which according to him we possess, even when we
neither will a good thing nor do it), but also the will and the action
itself, by the ministration of the Holy Ghost.
Chapter 38 [XXXV.]--A Definition of the Grace of Christ by Pelagius.
"Let them read," says he, "the epistle which we wrote about twelve
years ago to that holy man Bishop Paulinus: its subject throughout in
some three hundred lines is the confession of God's grace and
assistance alone, and our own inability to do any good thing at all
without God." Well, I have read this epistle also, and found him
dwelling throughout it on scarcely any other topic than the faculty
and capacity of nature, whilst he makes God's grace consist almost
entirely in this. Christ's grace, indeed, he treats with great
brevity, simply mentioning its name, so that his only aim seems to
have been to avoid the scandal of ignoring it altogether. It is,
however, absolutely uncertain whether he means Christ's grace to
consist in the remission of sins, or even in the teaching of Christ,
including also the example of His life (a meaning which he asserts in
several passages of his treatises); or whether he believes it to be a
help towards good living, in addition to nature and teaching, through
the inspiring influence of a burning and shining love.
Chapter 39 [XXXVI]--A Letter of Pelagius Unknown to Augustin.
"Let them also read," says he, "my epistle to the holy Bishop
Constantius, wherein I have--briefly no doubt, but yet
plainly--conjoined the grace and help of God with man's free will."
This epistle, as I have already stated, [1880] I have not read; but if
it is not unlike the other writings which he mentions, and with which
I am acquainted, even this work does nothing for the subject of our
present inquiry.
Footnotes
[1880] See above, ch. 37 [xxxiv.].
Chapter 40 [XXXVII]--The Help of Grace Placed by Pelagius in the Mere
Revelation of Teaching.
"Let them read moreover" says he, "what I wrote, [1881] when I was in
the East, to Christ's holy virgin Demetrias, and they will find that
we so commend the nature of man as always to add the help of God's
grace." Well, I read this letter too; and it had almost persuaded me
that he did acknowledge therein the grace about which our discussion
is concerned, although he did certainly seem in many passages of this
work to contradict himself. But when there also came to my hands those
other treatises which he afterwards wrote for more extensive
circulation, I discovered in what sense he must have intended to speak
of grace,--concealing what he believed under an ambiguous generality,
but employing the term "grace" in order to break the force of obloquy,
and to avoid giving offence. For at the very commencement of this work
(where he says: "Let us apply ourselves with all earnestness to the
task which we have set before us, nor let us have any misgiving
because of our own humble ability; for we believe that we are assisted
by the mother's faith and her daughter's merit" [1882] ) he appeared
to me at first to acknowledge the grace which helps us to individual
action; nor did I notice at once the fact that he might possibly have
made this grace consist simply in the revelation of teaching.
Footnotes
[1881] See above, ch. 23.
[1882] Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 1.
Chapter 41.--Restoration of Nature Understood by Pelagius as
Forgiveness of Sins.
In this same work he says in another passage: "Now, if even without
God men show of what character they have been made by God, see what
Christians have it in their power to do, whose nature has been through
Christ restored to a better condition, and who are, moreover, assisted
by the help of divine grace." [1883] By this restoration of nature to
a better state he would have us understand the remission of sins. This
he has shown with sufficient clearness in another passage of this
epistle, where he says: "Even those who have become in a certain sense
obdurate through their long practice of sinning, can be restored
through repentance." [1884] But he may even here too make the
assistance of divine grace consist in the revelation of teaching.
Footnotes
[1883] Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 3.
[1884] Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 17.
Chapter 42 [XXXVIII.]--Grace Placed by Pelagius in the Remission of
Sins and the Example of Christ.
Likewise in another place in this epistle of his he says: "Now, if
even before the law, as we have already remarked, and long previous to
the coming of our Lord and Saviour, some men are related to have lived
righteous and holy lives; how much more worthy of belief is it that we
are capable of doing this since the illumination of His coming, who
have been restored by the grace of Christ, and born again into a
better man? How much better than they, who lived before the law, ought
we to be, who have been reconciled and cleansed by His blood, and by
His example encouraged to the perfection of righteousness!" [1885]
Observe how even here, although in different language, he has made the
assistance of grace to consist in the remission of sins and the
example of Christ. He then completes the passage by adding these
words: "Better than they were even who lived under the law; according
to the apostle, who says, `Sin shall not have dominion over you: for
ye are not under the law, but under grace.' [1886] Now, inasmuch as we
have," says he, "said enough, as I suppose, on this point, let us
describe a perfect virgin, who shall testify the good at once of
nature and of grace by the holiness of her conduct, evermore warmed
with the virtues of both." [1887] Now you ought to notice that in
these words also he wished to conclude what he was saying in such a
way that we might understand the good of nature to be that which we
received when we were created; but the good of grace to be that which
we receive when we regard and follow the example of Christ,--as if sin
were not permitted to those who were or are under the law, on this
account, because they either had not Christ's example, or else do not
believe in Him.
Footnotes
[1885] Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 8.
[1886] Rom. vi. 14.
[1887] Epistle to Demetrias, ch. 9.
Chapter 43 [XXXIX.]--The Forgiveness of Sins and Example of Christ
Held by Pelagius Enough to Save the Most Hardened Sinner.
That this, indeed, is his meaning, other words also of his show
us,--not contained in this work, but in the third book of his Defence
of Free Will, wherein he holds a discussion with an opponent, who had
insisted on the apostle's words when he says, "For what I would, that
do I not;" [1888] and again, "I see another law in my members, warring
against the law of my mind." [1889] To this he replied in these words:
"Now that which you wish us to understand of the apostle himself, all
Church writers [1890] assert that he spoke in the person of the
sinner, and of one who was still under the law,--such a man as was, by
reason of a very long custom of vice, held bound, as it were, by a
certain necessity of sinning, and who, although he desired good with
his will, in practice indeed was hurried headlong into evil. In the
person, however, of one man," he continues, "the apostle designates
the people who still sinned under the ancient law. This nation he
declares was to be delivered from this evil of custom through Christ,
who first of all remits all sins in baptism to those who believe in
Him, and then urges them by an imitation of Himself to perfect
holiness, and by the example of His own virtues overcomes the evil
custom of their sins." Observe in what way he supposes them to be
assisted who sin under the law: they are to be delivered by being
justified through Christ's grace, as if the law alone were
insufficient for them, without some reinforcement from Christ, owing
to their long habit of sinning; not the inspiration of love by His
Holy Spirit, but the contemplation and copy of His example in the
inculcation of virtue by the gospel. Now here, at any rate, there was
the very greatest call on him to say plainly what grace he meant,
seeing that the apostle closed the very passage which formed the
ground of discussion with these telling words: "O wretched man that I
am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of
God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." [1891] Now, when he places this
grace, not in the aid of His power, but in His example for imitation,
what further hope must we entertain of him, since everywhere the word
"grace" is mentioned by him under an ambiguous generality?
Footnotes
[1888] Rom. vii. 15.
[1889] Rom. vii. 23.
[1890] By his ecclesiastici viri he refers, of course, to
ecclesiastical writers who had commented on St. Paul's doctrine. See
also Augustin's Contra duas Epistt. Pelag. i. 14 [viii.]; Contra
Julianum, ii. 5 [iii.], 8 [iv.], 13 [v.], 30 [viii.]; and De
Predestinatione Sanctorum, 4 [iv.].
[1891] Rom. vii. 25.
Chapter 44 [XL.]--Pelagius Once More Guards Himself Against the
Necessity of Grace.
Then, again, in the work addressed to the holy virgin, [1892] of which
we have spoken already, there is this passage: "Let us submit
ourselves to God, and by doing His will let us merit the divine grace;
and let us the more easily, by the help of the Holy Ghost, resist the
evil spirit." Now, in these words of his, it is plain enough that he
regards us as assisted by the grace of the Holy Ghost, not because we
are unable to resist the tempter without Him by the sheer capacity of
our nature, but in order that we may resist more easily. With respect,
however, to the quantity and quality, whatever these might be, of this
assistance, we may well believe that he made them consist of the
additional knowledge which the Spirit reveals to us through teaching,
and which we either cannot, or scarcely can, possess by nature. Such
are the particulars which I have been able to discover in the book
which he addressed to the virgin of Christ, and wherein he seems to
confess grace. Of what purport and kind these are, you of course
perceive.
Footnotes
[1892] The nun Demetrias. See above, chs. 23, 28.
Chapter 45 [XLI.]--To What Purpose Pelagius Thought Prayers Ought to
Be Offered.
"Let them also read," says he, "my recent little treatise which we
were obliged to publish a short while ago in defence of free will, and
let them acknowledge how unfair is their determination to disparage us
for a denial of grace, when we throughout almost the whole work
acknowledge fully and sincerely both free will and grace." There are
four books in this treatise, all of which I read, marking such
passages as required consideration, and which I proposed to discuss:
these I examined as well as I was able, before we came to that epistle
of his which was sent to Rome. But even in these four books, that
which he seems to regard as the grace which helps us to turn aside
from evil and to do good, he describes in such a manner as to keep to
his old ambiguity of language, and thus have it in his power so to
explain to his followers, that they may suppose the assistance which
is rendered by grace, for the purpose of helping our natural capacity,
consists of nothing else than the law and the teaching. Thus our very
prayers (as, indeed, he most plainly affirms in his writings) are of
no other use, in his opinion, than to procure for us the explanation
of the teaching by a divine revelation, not to procure help for the
mind of man to perfect by love and action what it has learned should
be done. The fact is, he does not in the least relinquish that very
manifest dogma of his system in which he sets forth those three
things, capacity, volition, action; maintaining that only the first of
these, the capacity, is favoured with the constant assistance of
divine help, but supposing that the volition and the action stand in
no need of God's assistance. Moreover, the very help which he says
assists our natural capacity, he places in the law and teaching. This
teaching, he allows, is revealed or explained to us by the Holy Ghost,
on which account it is that he concedes the necessity of prayer. But
still this assistance of law and teaching he supposes to have existed
even in the days of the prophets; whereas the help of grace, which is
properly so called, he will have to lie simply in the example of
Christ. But this example, you can plainly see, pertains after all to
"teaching,"--even that which is preached to us as the gospel. The
general result, then, is the pointing out, as it were, of a road to us
by which we are bound to walk, by the powers of our free will, and
needing no assistance from any one else, may suffice to ourselves not
to faint or fail on the way. And even as to the discovery of the road
itself, he contends that nature alone is competent for it; only the
discovery will be more easily effected if grace renders assistance.
Chapter 46 [XLII]--Pelagius Professes to Respect the Catholic Authors.
Such are the particulars which, to the best of my ability, I have
succeeded in obtaining from the writings of Pelagius, whenever he
makes mention of grace. You perceive, however, that men who entertain
such opinions as we have reviewed are "ignorant of God's
righteousness, and desire to establish their own," [1893] and are far
off from "the righteousness which we have of God" [1894] and not of
ourselves; and this they ought to have discovered and recognised in
the very holy canonical Scriptures. Forasmuch, however, as they read
these Scriptures in a sense of their own, they of course fail to
observe even the most obvious truths therein. Would that they would
but turn their attention in no careless mood to what might be learned
concerning the help of God's grace in the writings, at all events, of
catholic authors; for they freely allow that the Scriptures were
correctly understood by these, and that they would not pass them by in
neglect, out of an overweening fondness for their own opinions. For
note how this very man Pelagius, in that very treatise of his so
recently put forth, and which he formally mentions in his self-defence
(that is to say, in the third book of his Defence of Free Will),
praises St. Ambrose.
Footnotes
[1893] Rom. x. 3.
[1894] Phil. iii. 9.
Chapter 47 [XLIII.]--Ambrose Most Highly Praised by Pelagius.
"The blessed Bishop Ambrose," says he, "in whose writings the Roman
faith shines forth with especial brightness, and whom the Latins have
always regarded as the very flower and glory of their authors, and who
has never found a foe bold enough to censure his faith or the purity
of his understanding of the Scriptures." Observe the sort as well as
the amount of the praises which he bestows; nevertheless, however holy
and learned he is, he is not to be compared to the authority of the
canonical Scripture. The reason of this high commendation of Ambrose
lies in the circumstance, that Pelagius sees proper to quote a certain
passage from his writings to prove that man is able to live without
sin. [1895] This, however, is not the question before us. We are at
present discussing that assistance of grace which helps us towards
avoiding sin, and leading holy lives.
Footnotes
[1895] See On Nature and Grace, above, ch. 74.
Chapter 48 [XLIV].--Ambrose is Not in Agreement with Pelagius.
I wish, indeed, that he would listen to the venerable bishop when, in
the second book of his Exposition of the Gospel according to Luke,
[1896] he expressly teaches us that the Lord co-operates also with our
wills. "You see, therefore," says he, "because the power of the Lord
co-operates everywhere with human efforts, that no man is able to
build without the Lord, no man to watch without the Lord, no man to
undertake anything without the Lord. Whence the apostle thus enjoins:
`Whether ye eat, or whether ye drink, do all to the glory of God.'"
[1897] You observe how the holy Ambrose takes away from men even their
familiar expressions,--such as, "We undertake, but God
accomplishes,"--when he says here that "no man is able to undertake
anything without the Lord." To the same effect he says, in the sixth
book of the same work, [1898] treating of the two debtors of a certain
creditor: "According to men's opinions, he perhaps is the greater
offender who owed most. The case, however, is altered by the Lord's
mercy, so that he loves the most who owes the most, if he yet obtains
grace." See how the catholic doctor most plainly declares that the
very love which prompts every man to an ampler love appertains to the
kindly gift of grace.
Footnotes
[1896] Book ii. c. 84, on Luke iii. 22. Compare Against Two Letters of
the Pelagians, below, iv. ch. 30.
[1897] 1 Cor. x. 31.
[1898] Book vi. c. 25, on Luke vii. 41.
Chapter 49 [XLV.]--Ambrose Teaches with What Eye Christ Turned and
Looked Upon Peter.
That repentance, indeed, itself, which beyond all doubt is an action
of the will, is wrought into action by the mercy and help of the Lord,
is asserted by the blessed Ambrose in the following passage in the
ninth book of the same work: [1899] "Good, says he, "are the tears
which wash away sin. They upon whom the Lord at last turns and looks,
bewail. Peter denied Him first, and did not weep, because the Lord had
not turned and looked upon him. He denied Him a second time, and still
wept not, because the Lord had not even yet turned and looked upon
him. The third time also he denied Him, Jesus turned and looked, and
then he wept most bitterly." Let these persons read the Gospel; let
them consider how that the Lord Jesus was at that moment within,
having a hearing before the chief of the priests; whilst the Apostle
Peter was outside, [1900] and down in the hall, [1901] sitting at one
time with the servants at the fire, [1902] at another time standing,
[1903] as the most accurate and consistent narrative of the
evangelists shows. It cannot therefore be said that it was with His
bodily eyes that the Lord turned and looked upon him by a visible and
apparent admonition. That, then, which is described in the words, "The
Lord turned and looked upon Peter," [1904] was effected internally; it
was wrought in the mind, wrought in the will. In mercy the Lord
silently and secretly approached, touched the heart, recalled the
memory of the past, with His own internal grace visited Peter, stirred
and brought out into external tears the feelings of his inner man.
Behold in what manner God is present with His help to our wills and
actions; behold how "He worketh in us both to will and to do."
Footnotes
[1899] "In the ninth book of the same work," says St. Augustin. The
reference, however, is to book x. of the editions, c. 89, on Luke
xxii. 61.
[1900] Matt. xxvi. 69, 71.
[1901] Mark xiv. 66.
[1902] Luke xxii. 55.
[1903] John xviii. 16.
[1904] Luke xxii. 61.
Chapter 50.--Ambrose Teaches that All Men Need God's Help.
In the same book the same St. Ambrose says again: [1905] "Now if Peter
fell, who said, `Though all men shall be offended, yet will I never be
offended,' who else shall rightly presume concerning himself? David,
indeed, because he had said, `In my prosperity I said, I shall never
be moved,' confesses how injurious his confidence had proved to
himself: `Thou didst turn away Thy face,' he says, `and I was
troubled.'" [1906] Pelagius ought to listen to the teaching of so
eminent a man, and should follow his faith, since he has commended his
teaching and faith. Let him listen humbly; let him follow with
fidelity; let him indulge no longer in obstinate presumption, lest he
perish. Why does Pelagius choose to be sunk in that sea whence Peter
was rescued by the Rock? [1907]
Footnotes
[1905] Book x. c. 89.
[1906] Ps. xxx. 7.
[1907] It is impossible to preserve the paronomasia of the original,
which plays on the meaning of the names Pelagius (pelago, sea) and
Petrus (petra, rock).
Chapter 51 [XLVI.]--Ambrose Teaches that It is God that Does for Man
What Pelagius Attributes to Free Will.
Let him lend an ear also to the same godly bishop, who says, in the
sixth book of this same book: [1908] "The reason why they would not
receive Him is mentioned by the evangelist himself in these words,
`Because His face was as though He would go to Jerusalem.' [1909] But
His disciples had a strong wish that He should be received into the
Samaritan town. God, however, calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He
wills He makes religious." What wise insight of the man of God, drawn
from the very fountain of God's grace! "God," says he, "calls
whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He makes religious." See
whether this is not the prophet's own declaration: "I will have mercy
on whom I will have mercy, and will show pity on whom I will be
pitiful;" [1910] and the apostle's deduction therefrom: "So then,"
says he, "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but
of God that showeth mercy." [1911] Now, when even his model man of our
own times says, that "whomsoever God deigns He calls, and whom He
wills He makes religious," will any one be bold enough to contend that
that man is not yet religious "who hastens to the Lord, and desires to
be directed by Him, and makes his own will depend upon God's; who,
moreover, cleaves so closely to the Lord, that he becomes (as the
apostle says) `one spirit' with Him?" [1912] Great, however, as is
this entire work of a "religious man," Pelagius maintains that "it is
effected only by the freedom of the will." But his own blessed
Ambrose, whom he so highly commends in word, is against him, saying,
"The Lord God calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He makes
religious." It is God, then, who makes religious whomsoever He
pleases, in order that he may "hasten to the Lord, and desire to be
directed by Him, and make his own will depend upon God's, and cleave
so closely to the Lord as to become (as the apostle says) `one spirit'
with Him;" and all this none but a religious man does. Who, then, ever
does so much, unless he be made by God to do it?
Footnotes
[1908] It is the seventh book in the editions, c. 27, on Luke ix. 53.
[1909] Luke ix. 53.
[1910] Ex. xxxiii. 19.
[1911] Rom. ix. 16.
[1912] 1 Cor. vi. 17. These are the words of Pelagius, which have been
already quoted above, in ch. 24.
Chapter 52 [XLVII.]--If Pelagius Agrees with Ambrose, Augustin Has No
Controversy with Him.
Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about free will and God's grace
has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is
maintained, God's grace is apparently denied; whilst when God's grace
is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with,--Pelagius can
so involve himself in the shades of this obscurity as to profess
agreement with all that we have quoted from St. Ambrose, and declare
that such is, and always has been, his opinion also; and endeavour so
to explain each, that men may suppose his opinion, to be in fair
accord with Ambrose's. So far therefore, as concerns the questions of
God's help and grace, you are requested to observe the three things
which he has distinguished so very plainly, under the terms "ability,"
"will," and "actuality," that is, "capacity," "volition," and
"action." [1913] If, then, he has come round to an agreement with us,
then not the "capacity" alone in man, even if he neither wills nor
performs the good, but the volition and the action also,--in other
words, our willing well and doing well,--things which have no
existence in man, except when he has a good will and acts
rightly:--if, I repeat, he thus consents to hold with us that even the
volition and the action are assisted by God, and so assisted that we
can neither will nor do any good thing without such help; if, too, he
believes that this is that very grace of God through our Lord Jesus
Christ which makes us righteous through His righteousness, and not our
own, so that our true righteousness is that which we have of
Him,--then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no further
controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the
grace of God.
Footnotes
[1913] See above, ch. 4.
Chapter 53 [XLVIII.]--In What Sense Some Men May Be Said to Live
Without Sin in the Present Life.
But in reference to the particular point in which he quoted the holy
Ambrose with so much approbation,--because he found in that author's
writings, from the praises he accorded to Zacharias and Elisabeth, the
opinion that a man might possibly in this life be without sin; [1914]
although this cannot be denied if God wills it, with whom all things
are possible, yet he ought to consider more carefully in what sense
this was said. Now, so far as I can see, this statement was made in
accordance with a certain standard of conduct, which is among men held
to be worthy of approval and praise, and which no human being could
justly call in question for the purpose of laying accusation or
censure. Such a standard Zacharias and his wife Elisabeth are said to
have maintained in the sight of God, for no other reason than that
they, by walking therein, never deceived people by any dissimulation;
but as they in their sincerity appeared to men, so were they known in
the sight of God. [1915] The statement, however, was not made with any
reference to that perfect state of righteousness in which we shall one
day live truly and absolutely in a condition of spotless purity. The
Apostle Paul, indeed, has told us that he was "blameless, as touching
the righteousness which is of the law;" [1916] and it was in respect
of the same law that Zacharias also lived a blameless life. This
righteousness, however, the apostle counted as "dung" and "loss," in
comparison with the righteousness which is the object of our hope,
[1917] and which we ought to "hunger and thirst after," [1918] in
order that hereafter we may be satisfied with the vision thereof,
enjoying it now by faith, so long as "the just do live by faith."
[1919]
Footnotes
[1914] Ambrose on St. Luke, Book i. c. 17.
[1915] Luke i. 6; compare De Perfect. Just. ch. 38.
[1916] Phil. iii. 6.
[1917] Phil. iii. 8.
[1918] Matt. v. 6.
[1919] Rom. i. 17.
Chapter 54 [XLIX.]--Ambrose Teaches that No One is Sinless in This
World.
Lastly, let him give good heed to his venerable bishop, when he is
expounding the Prophet Isaiah, [1920] and says that "no man in this
world can be without sin." Now nobody can pretend to say that by the
phrase "in this world" he simply meant, in the love of this world. For
he was speaking of the apostle, who said, "Our conversation is in
heaven;" [1921] and while unfolding the sense of these words, the
eminent bishop expressed himself thus: "Now the apostle says that many
men, even while living in the present world, are perfect with
themselves, who could not possibly be deemed perfect, if one looks at
true perfection. For he says himself: `We now see through a glass,
darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I
know, even as also I am known.' [1922] Thus, there are those who are
spotless in this world, there are those who will be spotless in the
kingdom of God; although, of course, if you sift the thing minutely,
no one could be spotless, because no one is without sin." That
passage, then, of the holy Ambrose, which Pelagius applies in support
of his own opinion, was either written in a qualified sense, probable,
indeed, but not expressed with minute accuracy; or if the holy and
lowly-minded author did think that Zacharias and Elisabeth lived
according to the highest and absolutely perfect righteousness, which
was incapable of increase or addition, he certainly corrected his
opinion on a minuter examination of it.
Footnotes
[1920] This work of Ambrose is no longer extant. It is again quoted by
Augustin in his work, De Peccato Originali, c. 47 [xli.]; in his De
Nuptiis et Concupisc. i. 40 [xxxv.]; in his Contra Julianum, i. 11
[iv.], ii. 24 [viii.]; and in his Contra duas Epist. Pelagianorum, c.
30 [xi.]. Ambrose himself mentions this work of his in his Exposition
of Luke, Book ii. c. 56, on Luke ii. 19.
[1921] Phil. iii. 20.
[1922] 1 Cor. xiii. 13.
Chapter 55 [L.]--Ambrose Witnesses that Perfect Purity is Impossible
to Human Nature.
He ought, moreover, carefully to note that, in the very same context
from which he quoted that passage of Ambrose's, which seemed so
satisfactory for his purpose, he also said this: "To be spotless from
the beginning is an impossibility to human nature." [1923] In this
sentence the venerable Ambrose does undoubtedly predicate feebleness
and infirmity of that natural "capacity," which Pelagius refuses
faithfully to regard as corrupted by sin, and therefore boastfully
extols. Beyond question, this runs counter to this man's will and
inclination, although it does not contravene the truthful confession
of the apostle, wherein he says: "We too were once by nature the
children of wrath, even as others." [1924] For through the sin of the
first man, which came from his free will, our nature became corrupted
and ruined; and nothing but God's grace alone, through Him who is the
Mediator between God and men, and our Almighty Physician, succours it.
Now, since we have already prolonged this work too far in treating of
the assistance of the divine grace towards our justification, by which
God co-operates in all things for good with those who love Him, [1925]
and whom He first loved [1926] --giving to them that He might receive
from them: we must commence another treatise, as the Lord shall enable
us, on the subject of sin also, which by one man has entered into the
world, along with death, and so has passed upon all men, [1927]
setting forth as much as shall seem needful and sufficient, in
opposition to those persons who have broken out into violent and open
error, contrary to the truth here stated.
Footnotes
[1923] See Augustin, above, De Naturâ et Gratiâ, c. 75 [lxiii.].
[1924] Eph. ii. 3.
[1925] Rom. viii. 28.
[1926] 1 John iv. 19.
[1927] Rom. v. 12.
.
Book II.
On Original Sin.
Wherein Augustin shows that Pelagius really differs in no respect, on
the question of original sin and the baptism of infants, from his
follower Coelestius, who, refusing to acknowledge original sin and
even daring to deny the doctrine in public, was condemned in trials
before the bishops--first at Carthage, and afterwards at Rome; for
this question is not, as these heretics would have it, one wherein
persons might err without danger to the faith. Their heresy, indeed,
aimed at nothing else than the very foundations of Christian belief.
He afterwards refutes all such as maintained that the blessing of
matrimony is disparaged by the doctrine of original depravity, and an
injury done to God himself, the Creator of man who is born by means of
matrimony.
Chapter 1 [I.]--Caution Needed in Attending to Pelagius' Deliverances
on Infant Baptism.
Next I beg of you, [1928] carefully to observe with what caution you
ought to lend an ear, on the question of the baptism of infants, to
men of this character, who dare not openly deny the laver of
regeneration and the forgiveness of sins to this early age, for fear
that Christian ears would not bear to listen to them; and who yet
persist in holding and urging their opinion, that the carnal
generation is not held guilty of man's first sin, although they seem
to allow infants to be baptized for the remission of sins. You have,
indeed, yourselves informed me in your letter, that you heard Pelagius
say in your presence, reading out of that book of his which he
declared that he had also sent to Rome, that they maintain that
"infants ought to be baptized with the same formula of sacramental
words as adults." [1929] Who, after that statement, would suppose that
one ought to raise any question at all on this subject? Or if he did,
to whom would he not seem to indulge a very calumnious
disposition--previous to the perusal of their plain assertions, in
which they deny that infants inherit original sin, and contend that
all persons are born free from all corruption?
Footnotes
[1928] For the persons addressed, see above, in Book i. c. 1, of On
the Grace of Christ.
[1929] See above, On the Grace of Christ, ch. 35.
Chapter 2 [II.]--Coelestius, on His Trial at Carthage, Refuses to
Condemn His Error; The Written Statement Which He Gave to Zosimus.
Coelestius, indeed, maintained this erroneous doctrine with less
restraint. To such an extent did he push his freedom as actually to
refuse, when on trial before the bishops at Carthage, [1930] to
condemn those who say, "That Adam's sin injured only Adam himself, and
not the human race; and that infants at their birth are in the same
state that Adam was in before his transgression." [1931] In the
written statement, too, which he presented to the most blessed Pope
Zosimus at Rome, he declared with especial plainness, "that original
sin binds no single infant." Concerning the ecclesiastical proceedings
at Carthage we copy the following account of his words.
Footnotes
[1930] See Concerning the Proceedings of Pelagius, ch. 23.
[1931] Pelagius, at Diospolis, condemned this position of Coelestius.
Hence the comparative restraint of Pelagius, and the greater freedom
in holding the error which is here attributed to Coelestius.
Chapter 3 [III.]--Part of the Proceedings of the Council of Carthage
Against Coelestius.
"The bishop Aurelius said: `Let what follows be recited.' It was
accordingly recited, `That the sin of Adam was injurious to him alone,
and not to the human race.' Then, after the recital, Coelestius said:
`I said that I was in doubt about the transmission of sin, [1932] but
so as to yield assent to any man whom God has gifted with the grace of
knowledge; for I have heard different opinions from those who have
been even appointed presbyters in the Catholic Church.' The deacon
Paulinus [1933] said: `Tell us their names.' Coelestius answered: `The
holy presbyter Rufinus, [1934] who lived at Rome with the holy
Pammachius. I have heard him declare that there is no transmission of
sin.' The deacon Paulinus then asked: `Is there any one else?'
Coelestius replied: `I have heard more say the same.' The deacon
Paulinus rejoined: `Tell us their names.' Coelestius said: `Is not one
priest enough for you?'" Then afterwards in another place we read:
"The bishop Aurelius said: `Let the rest of the accusation be read.'
It then was recited `That infants at their birth are in the same state
that Adam was before the transgression;' and they read to the very end
of the brief accusation which had been previously put in. [IV.] The
bishop Aurelius inquired: `Have you, Coelestius, taught at any time,
as the deacon Paulinus has stated, that infants are at their birth in
the same state that Adam was before his transgression?' Coelestius
answered: `Let him explain what he meant when he said, "before the
transgression.'" The deacon Paulinus then said: `Do you on your side
deny that you ever taught this doctrine? It must be one of two things:
he must either say that he never so taught, or else he must now
condemn the opinion.' Coelestius rejoined: `I have already said, Let
him explain the words he mentioned, "before the transgression."' The
deacon Paulinus then said: `You must deny ever having taught this.'
The bishop Aurelius said: `I ask, What conclusion I have on my part to
draw from this man's obstinacy; my affirmation is, that although Adam,
as created in Paradise, is said to have been made immortal at first,
he afterwards became corruptible through transgressing the
commandment. Do you say this, brother Paulinus?' `I do, my lord,'
answered the deacon Paulinus. Then the bishop Aurelius said: `As
regards the condition of infants before baptism at the present day,
the deacon Paulinus wishes to be informed whether it is such as Adam's
was before the transgression; and whether it derives the guilt of
transgression from the same origin of sin from which it is born?' The
deacon Paulinus asked: `Let him deny whether he taught this, or not.'
Coelestius answered: `As touching the transmission of sin, I have
already asserted, that I have heard many persons of acknowledged
position in the catholic Church deny it altogether; and on the other
hand, others affirm it: it may be fairly deemed a matter for inquiry,
but not a heresy. I have always maintained that infants require
baptism, and ought to be baptized. What else does he want?'"
Footnotes
[1932] De traduce peccati, the technical phrase to express the
conveyance by birth of original sin.
[1933] This Paulinus, according to Mercator (Commonit. super nomine
Coelestii), was the deacon of Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, and the author
of his biography, which he wrote at the instance of Augustin.
According to his own showing, he lived in Africa, and wrote the Life
of Ambrose when John was pretorian prefect, i.e. either in the year
412, or 413, or 422. The trial mentioned in the text took place about
the commencement of the year 412, according to Augustin's letter to
Pope Innocent (See Augustin's letter, 175, 1. 6). See above, in the
treatise On the Proceedings of Pelagius, 23.
[1934] Mercator (Commonit. adv. Hæres. Pelagii) informs us that a
certain Syrian called Rufinus introduced the discussion against
original sin and its transmission into Rome in the pontificate of
Anastasius. According to some, this was the Rufinus of Aquileia, whom
Jerome (in Epist. ad Ctesiphont.) notices as the precursor of Pelagius
in his error about the sinless nature of man; according, however, to
others, it is the other Rufinus, mentioned by Jerome in his 66th
Epistle, who is possibly the same as he who rejects the transmission
of original sin in a treatise On Faith, which J. Sismondi published as
the work of Rufinus, a presbyter of the province of Palestine. It is,
at any rate, hardly possible to suppose that the Aquileian Rufinus
either went to Rome, or lodged there with Pammachius, in the time of
Pope Anastasius.
Chapter 4.--Coelestius Concedes Baptism for Infants, Without Affirming
Original Sin.
You, of course, see that Coelestius here conceded baptism for infants
only in such a manner as to be unwilling to confess that the sin of
the first man, which is washed away in the laver of regeneration,
passes over to them, although at the same time he did not venture to
deny this; and on account of this doubt he refused to condemn those
who maintain "That Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human
race;" and "that infants at their birth are in the same condition
wherein Adam was before the transgression."
Chapter 5 [V.]--Coelestius' Book Which Was Produced in the Proceedings
at Rome.
But in the book which he published at Rome, and produced in the
proceedings before the church there, he so speaks on this question as
to show that he really believes what he had professed to be in doubt
about. For these are his words: [1935] "That infants, however, ought
to be baptized for the remission of sins, according to the rule of the
Church universal, and according to the meaning of the Gospel, we
confess. For the Lord has determined that the kingdom of heaven should
only be conferred on baptized persons; [1936] and since the resources
of nature do not possess it, it must necessarily be conferred by the
gift of grace." Now if he had not said anything elsewhere on this
subject, who would not have supposed that he acknowledged the
remission of original sin even in infants at their baptism, by saying
that they ought to be baptized for the remission of sins? Hence the
point of what you have stated in your letter, that Pelagius' answer to
you was on this wise, "That infants are baptized with the same words
of sacramental formula as adults," and that you were rejoiced to hear
the very thing which you were desirous of hearing, and yet that you
preferred holding a consultation with us concerning his words.
Footnotes
[1935] See above, On the Grace of Christ, ch. 36.
[1936] John iii. 5.
Chapter 6 [VI.]--Coelestius the Disciple is In This Work Bolder Than
His Master.
Carefully observe, then, what Coelestius has advanced so very openly,
and you will discover what amount of concealment Pelagius has
practised upon you. Coelestius goes on to say as follows: "That
infants, however, must be baptized for the remission of sins, was not
admitted by us with the view of our seeming to affirm sin by
transmission. This is very alien from the catholic meaning, because
sin is not born with a man,--it is subsequently committed by the man
for it is shown to be a fault, not of nature, but of the will. It is
fitting, therefore, to confess this, lest we should seem to make
different kinds of baptism; it is, moreover, necessary to lay down
this preliminary safeguard, lest by the occasion of this mystery evil
should, to the disparagement of the Creator, be said to be conveyed to
man by nature, before that it has been committed by man." Now Pelagius
was either afraid or ashamed to avow this to be his own opinion before
you; although his disciple experienced neither a qualm nor a blush in
openly professing it to be his, without any obscure subterfuges, in
presence of the Apostolic See.
Chapter 7.--Pope Zosimus Kindly Excuses Him.
The bishop, however, who presides over this See, upon seeing him
hurrying headlong in so great presumption like a madman, chose in his
great compassion, with a view to the man's repentance, if it might be,
rather to bind him tightly by eliciting from him answers to questions
proposed by himself, than by the stroke of a severe condemnation to
drive him over the precipice, down which he seemed to be even now
ready to fall. I say advisedly, "down which he seemed to be ready to
fall," rather than "over which he had actually fallen," because he had
already in this same book of his forecast the subject with an intended
reference to questions of this sort in the following words: "If it
should so happen that any error of ignorance has stolen over us human
beings, let it be corrected by your decisive sentence."
Chapter 8 [VII.]--Coelestius Condemned by Zosimus.
The venerable Pope Zosimus, keeping in view this deprecatory preamble,
dealt with the man, puffed up as he was with the blasts of false
doctrine, so as that he should condemn all the objectionable points
which had been alleged against him by the deacon Paulinus, and that he
should yield his assent to the rescript of the Apostolic See which had
been issued by his predecessor of sacred memory. The accused man,
however, refused to condemn the objections raised by the deacon, yet
he did not dare to hold out against the letter of the blessed Pope
Innocent; indeed, he went so far as to "promise that he would condemn
all the points which the Apostolic See condemned." Thus the man was
treated with gentle remedies, as a delirious patient who required
rest; but, at the same time, he was not regarded as being yet ready to
be released from the restraints of excommunication. The interval of
two months being granted him, until communications could be received
from Africa, a place for recovery was conceded to him, under the mild
restorative of the sentence which had been pronounced. For in truth,
if he would have laid aside his vain obstinacy, and be now willing to
carry out what he had undertaken, and would carefully read the very
letter to which he had replied by promising submission, he would yet
come to a better mind. But after the rescripts were duly issued from
the council of the African bishops, there were very good reasons why
the sentence should be carried out against him, in strictest
accordance with equity. What these reasons were you may read for
yourselves, for we have sent you all the particulars.
Chapter 9 [VIII.]--Pelagius Deceived the Council in Palestine, But Was
Unable to Deceive the Church at Rome.
Wherefore Pelagius, too, if he will only reflect candidly on his own
position and writings, has no reason for saying that he ought not to
have been banned with such a sentence. For although he deceived the
council in Palestine, seemingly clearing himself before it, he
entirely failed in imposing on the church at Rome (where, as you well
know, he is by no means a stranger), although he went so far as to
make the attempt, if he might somehow succeed. But, as I have just
said, he entirely failed. For the most blessed Pope Zosimus
recollected what his predecessor, who had set him so worthy an
example, had thought of these very proceedings. Nor did he omit to
observe what opinion was entertained about this man by the trusty
Romans, whose faith deserved to be spoken of in the Lord, [1937] and
whose consistent zeal in defence of catholic truth against this heresy
he saw prevailing amongst them with warmth, and at the same time most
perfect harmony. The man had lived among them for a long while, and
his opinions could not escape their notice; moreover, they had so
completely found out his disciple Coelestius, as to be able at once to
adduce the most trustworthy and irrefragable evidence on this subject.
Now what was the solemn judgment which the holy Pope Innocent formed
respecting the proceedings in the Synod of Palestine, by which
Pelagius boasts of having been acquitted, you may indeed read in the
letter which he addressed to me. It is duly mentioned also in the
answer which was forwarded by the African Synod to the venerable Pope
Zosimus and which, along with the other instructions, we have
despatched to your loving selves. [1938] But it seems to me, at the
same time, that I ought not to omit producing the particulars in the
present work.
Footnotes
[1937] Rom. i. 8.
[1938] Albina, Pinianus, and Melania. Literally, they are here
addressed as "your Love."
Chapter 10 [IX.]--The Judgment of Innocent Respecting the Proceedings
in Palestine.
Five bishops, then, of whom I was one, wrote him a letter, [1939]
wherein we mentioned the proceedings in Palestine, of which the report
had already reached us. We informed him that in the East, where this
man lived, there had taken place certain ecclesiastical proceedings,
in which he was thought to have been acquitted on all the charges. To
this communication from us Innocent replied in a letter which contains
the following among other words: "There are," says he, "sundry
positions, as stated in these very Proceedings, which, when they were
objected against him, he partly suppressed by avoiding them, and
partly confused in absolute obscurity, by wresting the sense of many
words; whilst there are other allegations which he cleared off,--not,
indeed, in the honest way which he might seem at the time to use, but
rather by methods of sophistry, meeting some of the objections with a
flat denial, and tampering with others by a fallacious interpretation.
Would, however, that he would even now adopt what is the far more
desirable course of turning from his own error back to the true ways
of catholic faith; that he would also, duly considering God's daily
grace, and acknowledging the help thereof, be willing and desirous to
appear, amidst the approbation of all men, to be truly corrected by
the method of open conviction,--not, indeed, by judicial process, but
by a hearty conversion to the catholic faith. We are therefore unable
either to approve of or to blame their proceedings at that trial; for
we cannot tell whether the proceedings were true, or even, if true,
whether they do not really show that the man escaped by subterfuge,
rather than that he cleared himself by entire truth." [1940] You see
clearly from these words, how that the most blessed Pope Innocent
without doubt speaks of this man as of one who was by no means unknown
to him. You see what opinion he entertained about his acquittal. You
see, moreover, what his successor the holy Pope Zosimus was bound to
recollect,--as in truth he did,--so as to confirm without hesitation
the judgment of his predecessor in this case.
Footnotes
[1939] Epistle 177, in the collection of Augustin's letters.
[1940] Innocent's letter occurs amongst the epistles of Augustin,
letter 183. 3, 4.
Chapter 11 [X.]--How that Pelagius Deceived the Synod of Palestine.
Now I pray you carefully to observe by what evidence Pelagius is shown
to have deceived his judges in Palestine, not to mention other points,
on this very question of the baptism of infants, lest we should seem
to any one to have used calumny and suspicion, rather than to have
ascertained the certain fact, when we alleged that Pelagius concealed
the opinion which Coelestius expressed with greater frankness, while
at the same time he actually entertained the same views. Now, from
what has been stated above, it has been clearly seen that Coelestius
refused to condemn the assertion that "Adam's sin injured only
himself, and not the human race, and that infants at their birth are
in the same state that Adam was before the transgression," because he
saw that, if he condemned these propositions, he would affirm that
there was in infants a transmission of sin from Adam. When, however,
it was objected to Pelagius that he was of one mind with Coelestius on
this point, he condemned the words without hesitation. I am quite
aware that you have read all this before. Since, however, we are not
writing this account for you alone, we proceed to transcribe the very
words of the synodal acts, lest the reader should be unwilling either
to turn to the record for himself, or if he does not possess it, take
the trouble to procure a copy. Here, then, are the words:--
Chapter 12 [XI.]--A Portion of the Proceedings of the Synod of
Palestine in the Cause of Pelagius.
"The synod said: [1941] Now, forasmuch as Pelagius has pronounced his
anathema on this uncertain utterance of folly, rightly replying that a
man by God's help and grace is able to live anamartetos, that is to
say, without sin, let him give us his answer on other articles also.
Another particular in the teaching of Coelestius, disciple of
Pelagius, selected from the heads which were mentioned and heard at
Carthage before the holy Aurelius bishop of Carthage, and other
bishops, was to this effect: `That Adam was made mortal, and that he
would have died, whether he sinned or did not sin; that Adam's sin
injured himself alone, and not the human race; that the law no less
than the gospel leads us to the kingdom; that before the coming of
Christ there were persons without sin; that newborn infants are in the
same condition that Adam was before the transgression; that, on the
one hand, the entire human race does not die on account of Adam's
death and transgression, nor, on the other hand, does the whole human
race rise again through the resurrection of Christ; that the holy
bishop Augustin wrote a book in answer to his followers in Sicily, on
articles which were subjoined, and in this book, which was addressed
to Hilary, are contained the following statements: That a man is able
to be without sin if he wishes; that infants, even if they are
unbaptized, have eternal life; that rich men, even if they are
baptized, unless they renounce and give up all, have, whatever good
they may seem to have done, nothing of it reckoned unto them, neither
can they possess the kingdom of heaven.' Pelagius then said: As
regards man's ability to be without sin, my opinion has been already
spoken. With respect, however, to the allegation that there were even
before the Lord's coming persons who lived without sin, we also on our
part say, that before the coming of Christ there certainly were
persons who passed their lives in holiness and righteousness,
according to the accounts which have been handed down to us in the
Holy Scriptures. As for the other points, indeed, even on their own
showing, they are not of a character which obliges me to be answerable
for them; but yet, for the satisfaction of the sacred Synod, I
anathematize those who either now hold or have ever held these
opinions."
Footnotes
[1941] Compare On the Proceedings of Pelagius, chs. 16, 23.
Chapter 13 [XII.]--Coelestius the Bolder Heretic; Pelagius the More
Subtle.
You see, indeed, not to mention other points, how that Pelagius
pronounced his anathema against those who hold that "Adam's sin
injured only himself, and not the human race; and that infants are at
their birth in the same condition in which Adam was before the
transgression." Now what else could the bishops who sat in judgment on
him have possibly understood him to mean by this, but that the sin of
Adam is transmitted to infants? It was to avoid making such an
admission that Coelestius refused to condemn this statement, which
this man on the contrary anathematized. If, therefore, I shall show
that he did not really entertain any other opinion concerning infants
than that they are born with