Writings of Athenagoras
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Introductory Note to the Writings of Athenagoras
Translated by the Rev. B. P. Pratten.
Text edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson and
first published by T&T Clark in Edinburgh in 1867. Additional
introductionary material and notes provided for the American
edition by A. Cleveland Coxe, 1886.
[a.d. 177.] In placing Athenagoras here, somewhat out of the order
usually accepted, I commit no appreciable violence against chronology,
and I gain a great advantage for the reader. To some extent we must
recognise, in collocation, the principles of affinity and historic
growth. Closing up the bright succession of the earlier Apologists,
this favourite author affords also a fitting introduction to the great
founder of the Alexandrian School, who comes next into view. His work
opens the way for Clement's elaboration of Justin's claim, that the
whole of philosophy is embraced in Christianity. It is charming to
find the primal fountains of Christian thought uniting here, to flow
on for ever in the widening and deepening channel of Catholic
orthodoxy, as it gathers into itself all human culture, and enriches
the world with products of regenerated mind, harvested from its
overflow into the fields of philosophy and poetry and art and science.
More of this when we come to Clement, that man of genius who
introduced Christianity to itself, as reflected in the burnished
mirror of his intellect. Shackles are falling from the persecuted and
imprisoned faculties of the faithful, and soon the Faith is to speak
out, no more in tones of apology, but as mistress of the human mind,
and its pilot to new worlds of discovery and broad domains of
conquest. All hail the freedom with which, henceforth, Christians are
to assume the overthrow of heathenism as a foregone conclusion. The
distasteful exposure of heresies was the inevitable task after the
first victory. It was the chase and following-up of the adversary in
his limping and cowardly retreat, "the scattering of the rear of
darkness." With Athenagoras, we touch upon tokens of things to come;
we see philosophy yoked to the chariot of Messiah; we begin to realize
that sibylline surrender of outworn Paganism, and its forecast of an
era of light:--
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"Magnus ab integro sclorum nascitur ordo,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . quo ferrea primum
Desinet, ac toto surget gens aurea mundo."
In Athenagoras, whose very name is a retrospect, we discover a remote
result of St. Paul's speech on Mars Hill. The apostle had cast his
bread upon the waters of Ilissus and Cephisus to find it after many
days. "When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked;"
but here comes a philosopher, from the Athenian agora, a convert to
St. Paul's argument in his Epistle to the Corinthians, confessing "the
unknown God," demolishing the marble mob of deities that so "stirred
the apostle's spirit within him," and teaching alike the Platonist and
the Stoic to sit at the feet of Jesus. "Dionysius the Areopagite, and
the woman named Damaris," are no longer to be despised as the scanty
first-fruits of Attica. They too have found a voice in this splendid
trophy of the Gospel; and, "being dead, they yet speak" through him.
To the meagre facts of his biography, which appear below, there is
nothing to be added; [694] and I shall restrain my disposition to be a
commentator, within the limits of scanty notations. In the notes to
Tatian and Theophilus, I have made the student acquainted with that
useful addition to his treatise on Justin Martyr, in which the able
and judicious Bishop Kaye harmonizes those authors with Justin. The
same harmony enfolds the works of Athenagoras, [695] and thus affords
a synopsis of Christian teaching under the Antonines; in which
precision of theological language is yet unattained, but identity of
faith is clearly exhibited. While the Germans are furnishing the
scholar with critical editions of the ancients, invaluable for their
patient accumulations of fact and illustration, they are so daring in
theory and conjecture when they come to exposition, that one enjoys
the earnest and wholesome tone of sober comment that distinguishes the
English theologian. It has the great merit of being inspired by
profound sympathy with primitive writers, and unadulterated faith in
the Scriptures. Too often a German critic treats one of these
venerable witnesses, who yet live and yet speak, as if they were dead
subjects on the dissecting-table. They cut and carve with anatomical
display, and use the microscope with scientific skill; but, oh! how
frequently they surrender the saints of God as mere corpses, into the
hands of those who count them victims of a blind faith in a dead
Christ.
It will not be necessary, after my quotations from Kaye in the
foregoing sheets, to do more than indicate similar illustrations of
Athenagoras to be found in his pages. The dry version often requires
lubrications of devoutly fragrant exegesis; and providentially they
are at hand in that elaborate but modest work, of which even this
generation should not be allowed to lose sight.
The annotations of Conrad Gesner and Henry Stephans would have greatly
enriched this edition, had I been permitted to enlarge the work by
adding a version of them. They are often curious, and are supplemented
by the interesting letter of Stephans to Peter Nannius, "the eminent
pillar of Louvain," on the earliest copies of Athenagoras, from which
modern editions have proceeded. The Paris edition of Justin Marty
(1615) contains these notes, as well as the Greek of Tatian,
Theophilus, and Athenagoras, with a Latin rendering. As Bishop Kaye
constantly refers to this edition, I have considered myself fortunate
in possessing it; using it largely in comparing his learned comments
with the Edinburgh Version.
A few words as to the noble treatise of our author, on the
Resurrection. As a firm and loving voice to this keynote of Christian
faith, it rings like an anthem through all the variations of his
thought and argument. Comparing his own blessed hope with the
delusions of a world lying in wickedness, and looking stedfastly to
the life of the world to come, what a sublime contrast we find in this
figure of Christ's witness to the sensual life of the heathen, and
even to the groping wisdom of the Attic sages. I think this treatise a
sort of growth from the mind of one who had studied in the Academe,
pitying yet loving poor Socrates and his disciples. Yet more, it is
the outcome of meditation on that sad history in the Acts, which
expounds St. Paul's bitter reminiscences, when he says that his gospel
was, "to the Greeks, foolishness." They never "heard him again on this
matter." He left them under the confused impressions they had
expressed in the agora, when they said, "he seemeth to be a
setter-forth of new gods." St. Luke allows himself a smile only half
suppressed when he adds, "because he preached unto them Jesus and
Anastasis," which in their ears was only a barbarian echo to their own
Phoebus and Artemis; and what did Athenians want of any more wares of
that sort, especially under the introduction of a poor Jew from parts
unknown? Did the apostle's prophetic soul foresee Athenagoras, as he
"departed from among them"? However that may be, his blessed Master
"knew what he would do." He could let none of Paul's words fall to the
ground, without taking care that some seeds should bring forth fruit a
thousand-fold. Here come the sheaves at last. Athenagoras proves,
also, what our Saviour meant, when he said to the Galileans, "Ye are
the light of the world."
The following is the original Introductory Notice:--
It is one of the most singular facts in early ecclesiastical history,
that the name of Athenagoras is scarcely ever mentioned. Only two
references to him and his writings have been discovered. One of these
occurs in the work of Methodius, On the Resurrection of the Body, as
preserved by Epiphanius (Hoer., lxiv.) and Photius (Biblioth.,
ccxxxiv.). The other notice of him is found in the writings [696] of
Philip of Side, in Pamphylia, who flourished in the early part of the
fifth century. It is very remarkable that Eusebius should have been
altogether silent regarding him; and that writings, so elegant and
powerful as are those which still exist under his name, should have
been allowed in early times to sink into almost entire oblivion.
We know with certainty regarding Athenagoras, that he was an Athenian
philosopher who had embraced Christianity, and that his Apology, or,
as he styles it, "Embassy" (presbeia), was presented to the Emperors
Aurelius and Commodus about a.d. 177. He is supposed to have written a
considerable number of works, but the only other production of his
extant is his treatise on the Resurrection. It is probable that this
work was composed somewhat later than the Apology (see chap. xxxvi.),
though its exact date cannot be determined. Philip of Side also states
that he preceded Pantænus as head of the catechetical school at
Alexandria; but this is probably incorrect, and is contradicted by
Eusebius. A more interesting and perhaps well-rounded statement is
made by the same writer respecting Athenagoras, to the effect that he
was won over to Christianity while reading the Scriptures in order to
controvert them. [697] Both his Apology and his treatise on the
Resurrection display a practiced pen and a richly cultured mind. He is
by far the most elegant, and certainly at the same time one of the
ablest, of the early Christian Apologists.
Footnotes
[694] But Lardner tells the whole story much better. Credibility, vol.
ii. p. 193.
[695] The dogmatic value of a patristic quotation depends on the
support it finds in other Fathers, under the supremacy of Scripture:
hence the utility of Kaye's collocations.
[696] The fragment in which the notice occurs was extracted from the
works of Philip by some unknown writer. It is published as an appendix
to Dodwell's Dissertationes in Irenæum.
[697] [Here a picture suggests itself. We go back to the times of
Hadrian. A persecution is raging against the "Nazarenes." A boyish,
but well-cultured Athenian saunters into the market-place to hear some
new thing. They are talking of those enemies of the human race, the
Christians. Curiosity leads him to their assemblies. He finds them
keeping the feast of the resurrection. Quadratus is preaching. He
mocks, but is persuaded to open one of St. Paul's Epistles. "What will
this babbler say?" He reads the fifteenth chapter of First
Corinthians, and resents it with all the objections still preserved in
his pages. One can see him inquiring more about this Paul, and reading
the seventeenth chapter of the Acts. What an animated description of
his own Athens, and in what a new light it reflects the familiar
scenes! He must refute this Paul. But, when he undertakes it, he falls
in love when the intrepid assailant of the gods of Greece. Scales fall
from his own eyes. How he sees it all at last, we find in the two
works here presented, corresponding as they do, first and last, with
the two parts of the apostle's speech to the men of Athens.]
.
A Plea [698] For the Christians
By Athenagoras the Athenian: Philosopher and Christian
To the Emperors Marcus Aurelius Anoninus and Lucius Aurelius Commodus,
conquerors of Armenia and Sarmatia, and more than all, philosophers.
Chapter I.--Injustice Shown Towards the Christians.
In your empire, greatest of sovereigns, different nations have
different customs and laws; and no one is hindered by law or fear of
punishment from following his ancestral usages, however ridiculous
these may be. A citizen of Ilium calls Hector a god, and pays divine
honours to Helen, taking her for Adrasteia. The Lacedæmonian venerates
Agamemnon as Zeus, and Phylonoë the daughter of Tyndarus; and the man
of Tenedos worships Tennes. [699] The Athenian sacrifices to
Erechtheus as Poseidon. The Athenians also perform religious rites and
celebrate mysteries in honour of Agraulus and Pandrosus, women who
were deemed guilty of impiety for opening the box. In short, among
every nation and people, men offer whatever sacrifices and celebrate
whatever mysteries they please. The Egyptians reckon among their gods
even cats, and crocodiles, and serpents, and asps, and dogs. And to
all these both you and the laws give permission so to act, deeming, on
the one hand, that to believe in no god at all is impious and wicked,
and on the other, that it is necessary for each man to worship the
gods he prefers, in order that through fear of the deity, men may be
kept from wrong-doing. But why--for do not, like the multitude, be led
astray by hearsay--why is a mere name odious to you? [700] Names are
not deserving of hatred: it is the unjust act that calls for penalty
and punishment. And accordingly, with admiration of your mildness and
gentleness, and your peaceful and benevolent disposition towards every
man, individuals live in the possession of equal rights; and the
cities, according to their rank, share in equal honour; and the whole
empire, under your intelligent sway, enjoys profound peace. But for us
who are called Christians [701] you have not in like manner cared; but
although we commit no wrong--nay, as will appear in the sequel of this
discourse, are of all men most piously and righteously disposed
towards the Deity and towards your government--you allow us to be
harassed, plundered, and persecuted, the multitude making war upon us
for our name alone. We venture, therefore, to lay a statement of our
case before you--and you will team from this discourse that we suffer
unjustly, and contrary to all law and reason--and we beseech you to
bestow some consideration upon us also, that we may cease at length to
be slaughtered at the instigation of false accusers. For the fine
imposed by our persecutors does not aim merely at our property, nor
their insults at our reputation, nor the damage they do us at any
other of our greater interests. These we hold in contempt, though to
the generality they appear matters of great importance; for we have
learned, not only not to return blow for blow, nor to go to law with
those who plunder and rob us, but to those who smite us on one side of
the face to offer the other side also, and to those who take away our
coat to give likewise our cloak. But, when we have surrendered our
property, they plot against our very bodies and souls, [702] pouring
upon us wholesale charges of crimes of which we are guiltless even in
thought, but which belong to these idle praters themselves, and to the
whole tribe of those who are like them.
Footnotes
[698] Literally, "embassy." [By this name best known to scholars.]
[699] There are here many varieties of reading: we have followed the
text suggested by Gesner.
[700] We here follow the text of Otto; others read hemin.
[701] [Kaye, 153.]
[702] [For three centuries the faithful were made witnesses for Jesus
and the resurrection, even unto death; with "spoiling of their goods,"
not only, but dying daily, and "counted as sheep for the slaughter."
What can refuse such testimony? They conquered through suffering. The
reader will be pleased with this citation from an author, the neglect
of whose heavenly writings is a sad token of spiritual decline in the
spirit of our religion:-- "The Lord is sure of His designed advantages
out of the sufferings of His Church and of His saints for His name. He
loses nothing, and they lose nothing; but their enemies, when they
rage most and prevail most, are ever the greatest losers. His own
glory grows, the graces of His people grow; yea, their very number
grows, and that, sometimes, most by their greatest sufferings. This
was evident in the first ages of the Christian Church. Where were the
glory of so much invincible love and patience, if they had not been so
put to it?" Leighton, Comm. on St. Peter, Works, vol. iv. p. 478.
West's admirable edition, London, Longmans, 1870.]
Chapter II.--Claim to Be Treated as Others are When Accused.
If, indeed, any one can convict us of a crime, be it small or great,
we do not ask to be excused from punishment, but are prepared to
undergo the sharpest and most merciless inflictions. But if the
accusation relates merely to our name--and it is undeniable, that up
to the present time the stories told about us rest on nothing better
than the common undiscriminating popular talk, nor has any Christian
[703] been convicted of crime--it will devolve on you, illustrious and
benevolent and most learned sovereigns, to remove by law this
despiteful treatment, so that, as throughout the world both
individuals and cities partake of your beneficence, we also may feel
grateful to you, exulting that we are no longer the victims of false
accusation. For it does not comport with your justice, that others
when charged with crimes should not be punished till they are
convicted, but that in our case the name we bear should have more
force than the evidence adduced on the trial, when the judges, instead
of inquiring whether the person arraigned have committed any crime,
vent their insults on the name, as if that were itself a crime. [704]
But no name in and by itself is reckoned either good or bad; names
appear bad or good according as the actions underlying them are bad or
good. You, however, have yourselves a clear knowledge of this, since
you are well instructed in philosophy and all learning. For this
reason, too, those who are brought before you for trial, though they
may be arraigned on the gravest charges, have no fear, because they
know that you will inquire respecting their previous life, and not be
influenced by names if they mean nothing, nor by the charges contained
in the indictments if they should be false: they accept with equal
satisfaction, as regards its fairness, the sentence whether of
condemnation or acquittal. What, therefore, is conceded as the common
right of all, we claim for ourselves, that we shall not be hated and
punished because we are called Christians (for what has the name [705]
to do with our being bad men?), but be tried on any charges which may
be brought against us, and either be released on our disproving them,
or punished if convicted of crime--not for the name (for no Christian
is a bad man unless he falsely profess our doctrines), but for the
wrong which has been done. It is thus that we see the philosophers
judged. None of them before trial is deemed by the judge either good
or bad on account of his science or art, but if found guilty of
wickedness he is punished, without thereby affixing any stigma on
philosophy (for he is a bad man for not cultivating philosophy in a
lawful manner, but science is blameless), while if he refutes the
false charges he is acquitted. Let this equal justice, then, be done
to us. Let the life of the accused persons be investigated, but let
the name stand free from all imputation. I must at the outset of my
defence entreat you, illustrious emperors, to listen to me
impartially: not to be carried away by the common irrational talk and
prejudge the case, but to apply your desire of knowledge and love of
truth to the examination of our doctrine also. Thus, while you on your
part will not err through ignorance, we also, by disproving the
charges arising out of the undiscerning rumour of the multitude, shall
cease to be assailed.
Footnotes
[703] [Kaye, 154.]
[704] [Tatian, cap. xxvii., supra, p. 76.]
[705] [Tatian, cap. xxvii., supra, p. 76.]
Chapter III.--Charges Brought Against the Christians.
Three things are alleged against us: atheism, Thyestean feasts, [706]
OEdipodean intercourse. But if these charges are true, spare no class:
proceed at once against our crimes; destroy us root and branch, with
our wives and children, if any Christian [707] is found to live like
the brutes. And yet even the brutes do not touch the flesh of their
own kind; and they pair by a law of nature, and only at the regular
season, not from simple wantonness; they also recognise those from
whom they receive benefits. If any one, therefore, is more savage than
the brutes, what punishment that he can endure shall be deemed
adequate to such offences? But, if these things are only idle tales
and empty slanders, originating in the fact that virtue is opposed by
its very nature to vice, and that contraries war against one another
by a divine law (and you are yourselves witnesses that no such
iniquities are committed by us, for you forbid informations to be laid
against us), it remains for you to make inquiry concerning our life,
our opinions, our loyalty and obedience to you and your house and
government, and thus at length to grant to us the same rights (we ask
nothing more) as to those who persecute us. For we shall then conquer
them, unhesitatingly surrendering, as we now do, our very lives for
the truth's sake.
Footnotes
[706] [See cap. xxxi. Our Lord was "perfect man," yet our author
resents the idea of eating the flesh of one's own kind as worse than
brutal. As to the Eucharist the inference is plain.]
[707] Thus Otto; others read, "if any one of men."
Chapter IV.--The Christians are Not Atheists, But Acknowledge One Only
God.
As regards, first of all, the allegation that we are atheists--for I
will meet the charges one by one, that we may not be ridiculed for
having no answer to give to those who make them--with reason did the
Athenians adjudge Diagoras guilty of atheism, in that he not only
divulged the Orphic doctrine, and published the mysteries of Eleusis
and of the Cabiri, and chopped up the wooden statue of Hercules to
boil his turnips, but openly declared that there was no God at all.
But to us, who distinguish God from matter, [708] and teach that
matter is one thing and God another, and that they are separated by a
wide interval (for that the Deity is uncreated and eternal, to be
beheld by the understanding and reason alone, while matter is created
and perishable), is it not absurd to apply the name of atheism? If our
sentiments were like those of Diagoras, while we have such incentives
to piety--in the established order, the universal harmony, the
magnitude, the colour, the form, the arrangement of the world--with
reason might our reputation for impiety, as well as the cause of our
being thus harassed, be charged on ourselves. But, since our doctrine
acknowledges one God, the Maker of this universe, who is Himself
uncreated (for that which is does not come to be, but that which is
not) but has made all things by the Logos which is from Him, we are
treated unreasonably in both respects, in that we are both defamed and
persecuted.
Footnotes
[708] [Kaye, p. 7.]
Chapter V.--Testimony of the Poets to the Unity of God.
[709]
Poets and philosophers have not been voted atheists for inquiring
concerning God. Euripides, speaking of those who, according to popular
preconception, are ignorantly called gods, says doubtingly:--
"If Zeus indeed does reign in heaven above,
He ought not on the righteous ills to send." [710]
But speaking of Him who is apprehended by the understanding as matter
of certain knowledge, he gives his opinion decidedly, and with
intelligence, thus:--
"Seest thou on high him who, with humid arms,
Clasps both the boundless ether and the earth?
Him reckon Zeus, and him regard as God." [711]
For, as to these so-called gods, he neither saw any real existences,
to which a name is usually assigned, underlying them ("Zeus," for
instance: "who Zeus is I know not, but by report"), nor that any names
were given to realities which actually do exist (for of what use are
names to those who have no real existences underlying them?); but Him
he did see by means of His works, considering with an eye to things
unseen the things which are manifest in air, in ether, on earth. Him
therefore, from whom proceed all created things, and by whose Spirit
they are governed, he concluded to be God; and Sophocles agrees with
him, when he says:--
"There is one God, in truth there is but one,
Who made the heavens, and the broad earth beneath." [712]
[Euripides is speaking] of the nature of God, which fills His works
with beauty, and teaching both where God must be, and that He must be
One.
Footnotes
[709] [De Maistre, who talks nothing but sophistry when he rides his
hobby, and who shocked the pope himself by his fanatical effort to
demonstrate the papal system, is, nevertheless, very suggestive and
interesting when he condescends to talk simply as a Christian. See his
citations showing the heathen consciousness of one Supreme Being.
Soirées de St. Pétersbourg, vol. i. pp. 225, 280; vol. ii. pp. 379,
380.]
[710] From an unknown play.
[711] From an unknown play; the original is ambiguous; comp. Cic. De
Nat Deorum, ii. c. 25, where the words are translated--"Seest thou
this boundless ether on high which embraces the earth in its moist
arms? Reckon this Zeus." Athenagoras cannot so have understood
Euripides.
[712] Not found in his extant works.
Chapter VI.--Opinions of the Philosophers as to the One God.
Philolaus, too, when he says that all things are included in God as in
a stronghold, teaches that He is one, and that He is superior to
matter. Lysis and Opsimus [713] thus define God: the one says that He
is an ineffable number, the other that He is the excess of the
greatest number beyond that which comes nearest to it. So that since
ten is the greatest number according to the Pythagoreans, being the
Tetractys, [714] and containing all the arithmetic and harmonic
principles, and the Nine stands next to it, God is a unit--that is,
one. For the greatest number exceeds the next least by one. Then there
are Plato and Aristotle--not that I am about to go through all that
the philosophers have said about God, as if I wished to exhibit a
complete summary of their opinions; for I know that, as you excel all
men in intelligence and in the power of your rule, in the same
proportion do you surpass them all in an accurate acquaintance with
all learning, cultivating as you do each several branch with more
success than even those who have devoted themselves exclusively to any
one. But, inasmuch as it is impossible to demonstrate without the
citation of names that we are not alone in confining the notion of God
to unity, I have ventured on an enumeration of opinions. Plato, then,
says, "To find out the Maker and Father of this universe is difficult;
and, when found, it is impossible to declare Him to all," [715]
conceiving of one uncreated and eternal God. And if he recognises
others as well, such as the sun, moon, and stars, yet he recognises
them as created: "gods, offspring of gods, of whom I am the Maker, and
the Father of works which are indissoluble apart from my will; but
whatever is compounded can be dissolved." [716] If, therefore, Plato
is not an atheist for conceiving of one uncreated God, the Framer of
the universe, neither are we atheists who acknowledge and firmly hold
that He is God who has framed all things by the Logos, and holds them
in being by His Spirit. Aristotle, again, and his followers,
recognising the existence of one whom they regard as a sort of
compound living creature (zoon), speak of God as consisting of soul
and body, thinking His body to be the etherial space and the planetary
stars and the sphere of the fixed stars, moving in circles; but His
soul, the reason which presides over the motion of the body, itself
not subject to motion, but becoming the cause of motion to the other.
The Stoics also, although by the appellations they employ to suit the
changes of matter, which they say is permeated by the Spirit of God,
they multiply the Deity in name, yet in reality they consider God to
be one. [717] For, if God is an artistic fire advancing methodically
to the production of the several things in the world, embracing in
Himself all the seminal principles by which each thing is produced in
accordance with fate, and if His Spirit pervades the whole world, then
God is one according to them, being named Zeus in respect of the
fervid part (to zeon) of matter, and Hera in respect of the air (ho
aer), and called by other names in respect of that particular part of
matter which He pervades.
Footnotes
[713] Common text has opsei; we follow the text of Otto. [Gesner notes
this corruption, and conjectures that it should be the name of some
philosopher.]
[714] One, two, three, and four together forming ten.
[715] Timæus, p. 28, C.
[716] Timæus, p. 41, A.
[717] [We must not wonder at the scant praise accorded by the
Apologists to the truths embedded everywhere in Plato and other
heathen writers. They felt intensely, that "the world, by wisdom, knew
not God; and that it was their own mission to lead men to the only
source of true philosophy.]
Chapter VII.--Superiority of the Christian Doctrine Respecting God.
Since, therefore, the unity of the Deity is confessed by almost all,
even against their will, when they come to treat of the first
principles of the universe, and we in our turn likewise assert that He
who arranged this universe is God,--why is it that they can say and
write with impunity what they please concerning the Deity, but that
against us a law lies in force, though we are able to demonstrate what
we apprehend and justly believe, namely that there is one God, with
proofs and reason accordant with truth? For poets and philosophers, as
to other subjects so also to this, have applied themselves in the way
of conjecture, moved, by reason of their affinity with the afflatus
from God, [718] each one by his own soul, to try whether he could find
out and apprehend the truth; but they have not been found competent
fully to apprehend it, because they thought fit to learn, not from God
concerning God, but each one from himself; hence they came each to his
own conclusion respecting God, and matter, and forms, and the world.
But we have for witnesses of the things we apprehend and believe,
prophets, men who have pronounced concerning God and the things of
God, guided by the Spirit of God. And you too will admit, excelling
all others as you do in intelligence and in piety towards the true God
(to ontos theion), that it would be irrational for us to cease to
believe in the Spirit from God, who moved the mouths of the prophets
like musical instruments, and to give heed to mere human opinions.
Footnotes
[718] [See cap. xxx., infra. Important, as showing the degree of value
attributed by the Fathers to the Sibylline and Orphic sayings. Comp.
Kaye, p. 177.]
Chapter VIII.--Absurdities of Polytheism.
As regards, then, the doctrine that there was from the beginning one
God, the Maker of this universe, consider it in this wise, that you
may be acquainted with the argumentative grounds also of our faith. If
there were from the beginning two or more gods, they were either in
one and the same place, or each of them separately in his own. In one
and the same place they could not be. For, if they are gods, they are
not alike; but because they are uncreated they are unlike: for created
things are like their patterns; but the uncreated are unlike, being
neither produced from any one, nor formed after the pattern of any
one. Hand and eye and foot are parts of one body, making up together
one man: is God in this sense one? [719] And indeed Socrates was
compounded and divided into parts, just because he was created and
perishable; but God is uncreated, and, impassible, and
indivisible--does not, therefore, consist of parts. But if, on the
contrary, each of them exists separately, since He that made the world
is above the things created, and about the things He has made and set
in order, where can the other or the rest be? For if the world, being
made spherical, is confined within the circles of heaven, and the
Creator of the world is above the things created, managing that [720]
by His providential care of these, what place is there for the second
god, or for the other gods? For he is not in the world, because it
belongs to the other; nor about the world, for God the Maker of the
world is above it. But if he is neither in the world nor about the
world (for all that surrounds it is occupied by this one [721] ),
where is he? Is he above the world and [the first] God? In another
world, or about another? But if he is in another or about another,
then he is not about us, for he does not govern the world; nor is his
power great, for he exists in a circumscribed space. But if he is
neither in another world (for all things are filled by the other), nor
about another (for all things are occupied by the other), he clearly
does not exist at all, for there is no place in which he can be. Or
what does he do, seeing there is another to whom the world belongs,
and he is above the Maker of the world, and yet is neither in the
world nor about the world? Is there, then, some other place where he
can stand? But God, and what belongs to God, are above him. And what,
too, shall be the place, seeing that the other fills the regions which
are above the world? Perhaps he exerts a providential care? [By no
means.] And yet, unless he does so, he has done nothing. If, then, he
neither does anything nor exercises providential care, and if there is
not another place in which he is, then this Being of whom we speak is
the one God from the beginning, and the sole Maker of the world.
Footnotes
[719] i.e., Do several gods make up one God?--Otto. Others read
affirmatively, "God is one."
[720] i.e., the world.
[721] i.e., the Creator, or first God.
Chapter IX.--The Testimony of the Prophets.
If we satisfied ourselves with advancing such considerations as these,
our doctrines might by some be looked upon as human. But, since the
voices of the prophets confirm our arguments--for I think that you
also, with your great zeal for knowledge, and your great attainments
in learning, cannot be ignorant of the writings either of Moses or of
Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the other prophets, who, lifted in ecstasy
above the natural operations of their minds by the impulses of the
Divine Spirit, uttered the things with which they were inspired, the
Spirit making use of them as a flute-player [722] breathes into a
flute;--what, then, do these men say? "The Lord is our God; no other
can be compared with Him." [723] And again: "I am God, the first and
the last, and besides Me there is no God." [724] In like manner:
"Before Me there was no other God, and after Me there shall be none; I
am God, and there is none besides Me." [725] And as to His greatness:
"Heaven is My throne, and the earth is the footstool of My feet: what
house will ye build for Me, or what is the place of My rest?" [726]
But I leave it to you, when you meet with the books themselves, to
examine carefully the prophecies contained in them, that you may on
fitting grounds defend us from the abuse cast upon us.
Footnotes
[722] [Kaye, 179. An important comment; comp. cap. vii., supra.]
[723] Isa. xli. 4; Ex. xx. 2, 3 (as to sense).
[724] Isa. xliv. 6.
[725] Isa. xliii. 10, 11.
[726] Isa. lxvi. 1.
Chapter X.--The Christians Worship the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.
That we are not atheists, therefore, seeing that we acknowledge one
God, uncreated, eternal, invisible, impassible, incomprehensible,
illimitable, who is apprehended by the understanding only and the
reason, who is encompassed by light, and beauty, and spirit, and power
ineffable, by whom the universe has been created through His Logos,
and set in order, and is kept in being--I have sufficiently
demonstrated. [I say "His Logos"], for we acknowledge also a Son of
God. Nor let any one think it ridiculous that God should have a Son.
For though the poets, in their fictions, represent the gods as no
better than men, our mode of thinking is not the same as theirs,
concerning either God the Father or the Son. But the Son of God is the
Logos of the Father, in idea and in operation; for after the pattern
of Him and by Him [727] were all things made, the Father and the Son
being one. And, the Son being in the Father and the Father in the Son,
in oneness and power of spirit, the understanding and reason (nous kai
logos) of the Father is the Son of God. But if, in your surpassing
intelligence, [728] it occurs to you to inquire what is meant by the
Son, I will state briefly that He is the first product of the Father,
not as having been brought into existence (for from the beginning,
God, who is the eternal mind [nous], had the Logos in Himself, being
from eternity instinct with Logos [logikos]); but inasmuch as He came
forth to be the idea and energizing power of all material things,
which lay like a nature without attributes, and an inactive earth, the
grosser particles being mixed up with the lighter. The prophetic
Spirit also agrees with our statements. "The Lord," it says, "made me,
the beginning of His ways to His works." [729] The Holy Spirit Himself
also, which operates in the prophets, we assert to be an effluence of
God, flowing from Him, and returning back again like a beam of the
sun. Who, then, would not be astonished to hear men who speak of God
the Father, and of God the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, [730] and who
declare both their power in union and their distinction in order,
called atheists? Nor is our teaching in what relates to the divine
nature confined to these points; but we recognise also a multitude of
angels and ministers, [731] whom God the Maker and Framer of the world
distributed and appointed to their several posts by His Logos, to
occupy themselves about the elements, and the heavens, and the world,
and the things in it, and the goodly ordering of them all.
Footnotes
[727] "Or, by Him and through Him." [Kaye, pp. 155, 175.]
[728] [Kaye, p. 166.]
[729] Prov. viii. 22.
[730] [Compare Theophilus, supra, p. 101, and Kaye's note, p. 156.]
[731] [Heb. i. 14, the express doctrine of St. Paul. They are
ministers to men, not objects of any sort of worship. "Let no man
beguile you," etc. Col. ii. 4, 18.]
Chapter XI.--The Moral Teaching of the Christians Repels the Charge
Brought Against Them.
If I go minutely into the particulars of our doctrine, let it not
surprise you. It is that you may not be carried away by the popular
and irrational opinion, but may have the truth clearly before you. For
presenting the opinions themselves to which we adhere, as being not
human but uttered and taught by God, we shall be able to persuade you
not to think of us as atheists. What, then, are those teachings in
which we are brought up? "I say unto you, Love your enemies; bless
them that curse you; pray for them that persecute you; that ye may be
the sons of your Father who is in heaven, who causes His sun to rise
on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust."
[732] Allow me here to lift up my voice boldly in loud and audible
outcry, pleading as I do before philosophic princes. For who of those
that reduce syllogisms, and clear up ambiguities, and explain
etymologies, [733] or of those who teach homonyms and synonyms, and
predicaments and axioms, and what is the subject and what the
predicate, and who promise their disciples by these and such like
instructions to make them happy: who of them have so purged their
souls as, instead of hating their enemies, to love them; and, instead
of speaking ill of those who have reviled them (to abstain from which
is of itself an evidence of no mean forbearance), to bless them; and
to pray for those who plot against their lives? On the contrary, they
never cease with evil intent to search out skilfully the secrets of
their art, [734] and are ever bent on working some ill, making the art
of words and not the exhibition of deeds their business and
profession. But among us you will find uneducated persons, and
artisans, and old women, who, if they are unable in words to prove the
benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds exhibit the benefit
arising from their persuasion of its truth: they do not rehearse
speeches, but exhibit good works; when struck, they do not strike
again; when robbed, they do not go to law; they give to those that ask
of them, and love their neighbours as themselves.
Footnotes
[732] Luke vi. 27, 28; Matt. v. 44, 45.
[733] [Kaye, pp. 212-217.]
[734] The meaning is here doubtful; but the probably reference is to
the practices of the Sophists.
Chapter XII.--Consequent Absurdity of the Charge of Atheism.
Should we, then, unless we believed that a God presides over the human
race, thus purge ourselves from evil? Most certainly not. But, because
we are persuaded that we shall give an account of everything in the
present life to God, who made us and the world, we adopt a temperate
and benevolent and generally despised method of life, believing that
we shall suffer no such great evil here, even should our lives be
taken from us, compared with what we shall there receive for our meek
and benevolent and moderate life from the great Judge. Plato indeed
has said that Minos and Rhadamanthus will judge and punish the wicked;
but we say that, even if a man be Minos or Rhadamanthus himself, or
their father, even he will not escape the judgment of God. Are, then,
those who consider life to be comprised in this, "Let us eat and
drink, for to-morrow we die," and who regard death as a deep sleep and
forgetfulness ("sleep and death, twin brothers" [735] ), to be
accounted pious; while men who reckon the present life of very small
worth indeed, and who are conducted to the future life by this one
thing alone, that they know God and His Logos, what is the oneness of
the Son with the Father, what the communion of the Father with the
Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity of these three, the Spirit,
the Son, the Father, and their distinction in unity; and who know that
the life for which we look is far better than can be described in
words, provided we arrive at it pure from all wrong-doing; who,
moreover, carry our benevolence to such an extent, that we not only
love our friends ("for if ye love them," He says, "that love you, and
lend to them that lend to you, what reward will ye have?" [736]
),--shall we, I say, when such is our character, and when we live such
a life as this, that we may escape condemnation at last, not be
accounted pious? These, however, are only small matters taken from
great, and a few things from many, that we may not further trespass on
your patience; for those who test honey and whey, judge by a small
quantity whether the whole is good.
Footnotes
[735] Hom., Il., xvi. 672.
[736] Luke vi. 32, 34; Matt. v. 46.
Chapter XIII.--Why the Christians Do Not Offer Sacrifices.
But, as most of those who charge us with atheism, and that because
they have not even the dreamiest conception of what God is, and are
doltish and utterly unacquainted with natural and divine things, and
such as measure piety by the rule of sacrifices, charges us with not
acknowledging the same gods as the cities, be pleased to attend to the
following considerations, O emperors, on both points. And first, as to
our not sacrificing: the Framer and Father of this universe does not
need blood, nor the odour of burnt-offerings, nor the fragrance of
flowers and incense, [737] forasmuch as He is Himself perfect
fragrance, needing nothing either within or without; but the noblest
sacrifice [738] to Him is for us to know who stretched out and vaulted
the heavens, and fixed the earth in its place like a centre, who
gathered the water into seas and divided the light from the darkness,
who adorned the sky with stars and made the earth to bring forth seed
of every kind, who made animals and fashioned man. When, holding God
to be this Framer of all things, who preserves them in being and
superintends them all by knowledge and administrative skill, we "lift
up holy hands" to Him, what need has He further of a hecatomb?
"For they, when mortals have transgress'd or fail'd
To do aright, by sacrifice and pray'r,
Libations and burnt-offerings, may be soothed." [739]
And what have I to do with holocausts, which God does not stand in
need of?--though indeed it does behove us to offer a bloodless
sacrifice and "the service of our reason." [740]
Footnotes
[737] [Harmless as flowers and incense may be, the Fathers disown them
in this way continually.]
[738] [This brilliant condensation of the Benedicite (Song of the
Three Children) affords Kaye occasion to observe that our author is
silent as to the sacraments. p. 195.]
[739] Hom., Il., ix. 499 sq., Lord Derby's translation, which version
the translator has for the most part used.
[740] Comp. Rom. xii. 1. [Mal. i.11. "A pure Mincha" (Lev. ii. 1) was
the unbloody sacrifice of the Jews. This was to be the Christian
oblation: hence to offering of Christ's natural blood, as the Latins
now teach, was unknown to Athenagoras.]
Chapter XIV.--Inconsistency of Those Who Accuse the Christians.
Then, as to the other complaint, that we do not pray to and believe in
the same gods as the cities, it is an exceedingly silly one. Why, the
very men who charge us with atheism for not admitting the same gods as
they acknowledge, are not agreed among themselves concerning the gods.
The Athenians have set up as gods Celeus and Metanira: the
Lacedæmonians Menelaus; and they offer sacrifices and hold festivals
to him, while the men of Ilium cannot endure the very sound of his
name, and pay their adoration to Hector. The Ceans worship Aristæus,
considering him to be the same as Zeus and Apollo; the Thasians
Theagenes, a man who committed murder at the Olympic games; the
Samians Lysander, notwithstanding all the slaughters and all the
crimes perpetrated by him; Alcman and Hesiod Medea, and the Cilicians
Niobe; the Sicilians Philip the son of Butacides; the Amathusians
Onesilus; the Carthaginians Hamilcar. Time would fail me to enumerate
the whole. When, therefore, they differ among themselves concerning
their gods, why do they bring the charge against us of not agreeing
with them? Then look at the practices prevailing among the Egyptians:
are they not perfectly ridiculous? For in the temples at their solemn
festivals they beat their breasts as for the dead, and sacrifice to
the same beings as gods; and no wonder, when they look upon the brutes
as gods, and shave themselves when they die, and bury them in temples,
and make public lamentation. If, then, we are guilty of impiety
because we do not practice a piety corresponding with theirs, then all
cities and all nations are guilty of impiety, for they do not all
acknowledge the same gods.
Chapter XV.--The Christians Distinguish God from Matter.
But grant that they acknowledge the same. What then? Because the
multitude, who cannot distinguish between matter and God, or see how
great is the interval which lies between them, pray to idols made of
matter, are we therefore, who do distinguish and separate the
uncreated and the created, that which is and that which is not, that
which is apprehended by the understanding and that which is perceived
by the senses, and who give the fitting name to each of them,--are we
to come and worship images? If, indeed, matter and God are the same,
two names for one thing, then certainly, in not regarding stocks and
stones, gold and silver, as gods, we are guilty of impiety. But if
they are at the greatest possible remove from one another--as far
asunder as the artist and the materials of his art--why are we called
to account? For as is the potter and the clay (matter being the clay,
and the artist the potter), so is God, the Framer of the world, and
matter, which is subservient to Him for the purposes of His art. [741]
But as the clay cannot become vessels of itself without art, so
neither did matter, which is capable of taking all forms, receive,
apart from God the Framer, distinction and shape and order. And as we
do not hold the pottery of more worth than him who made it, nor the
vessels of glass and gold than him who wrought them; but if there is
anything about them elegant in art we praise the artificer, and it is
he who reaps the glory of the vessels: even so with matter and
God--the glory and honour of the orderly arrangement of the world
belongs of right not to matter, but to God, the Framer of matter. So
that, if we were to regard the various forms of matter as gods, we
should seem to be without any sense of the true God, because we should
be putting the things which are dissoluble and perishable on a level
with that which is eternal.
Footnotes
[741] [Kaye, p. 172.]
Chapter XVI.--The Christians Do Not Worship the Universe.
Beautiful without doubt is the world, excelling, [742] as well in its
magnitude as in the arrangement of its parts, both those in the
oblique circle and those about the north, and also in its spherical
form. [743] Yet it is not this, but its Artificer, that we must
worship. For when any of your subjects come to you, they do not
neglect to pay their homage to you, their rulers and lords, from whom
they will obtain whatever they need, and address themselves to the
magnificence of your palace; but, if they chance to come upon the
royal residence, they bestow a passing glance of admiration on its
beautiful structure: but it is to you yourselves that they show
honour, as being "all in all." You sovereigns, indeed, rear and adorn
your palaces for yourselves; but the world was not created because God
needed it; for God is Himself everything to Himself,--light
unapproachable, a perfect world, spirit, power, reason. If, therefore,
the world is an instrument in tune, and moving in well-measured time,
I adore the Being who gave its harmony, and strikes its notes, and
sings the accordant strain, and not the instrument. For at the musical
contests the adjudicators do not pass by the lute-players and crown
the lutes. Whether, then, as Plato says, the world be a product of
divine art, I admire its beauty, and adore the Artificer; or whether
it be His essence and body, as the Peripatetics affirm, we do not
neglect to adore God, who is the cause of the motion of the body, and
descend "to the poor and weak elements," adoring in the impassible
[744] air (as they term it), passible matter; or, if any one
apprehends the several parts of the world to be powers of God, we do
not approach and do homage to the powers, but their Maker and Lord. I
do not ask of matter what it has not to give, nor passing God by do I
pay homage to the elements, which can do nothing more than what they
were bidden; for, although they are beautiful to look upon, by reason
of the art of their Framer, yet they still have the nature of matter.
And to this view Plato also bears testimony; "for," says he, "that
which is called heaven and earth has received many blessings from the
Father, but yet partakes of body; hence it cannot possibly be free
from change." [745] If, therefore, while I admire the heavens and the
elements in respect of their art, I do not worship them as gods,
knowing that the law of dissolution is upon them, how can I call those
objects gods of which I know the makers to be men? Attend, I beg, to a
few words on this subject.
Footnotes
[742] Thus Otto; others render "comprising."
[743] [The Ptolemaic universe is conceived of as a sort of hollow
ball, or bubble, within which are the spheres moving about the earth.
Milton adopts from Homer the idea of such a globe, or bubble, hanging
by a chain from heaven (Paradise Lost, ii. 10, 51). The oblique circle
is the zodiac. The Septentriones are referred to also. See Paradise
Lost, viii. 65-168.]
[744] Some refer this to the human spirit.
[745] Polit., p. 269, D.
Chapter XVII.--The Names of the Gods and Their Images are But of Recent
Date.
An apologist must adduce more precise arguments than I have yet given,
both concering the names of the gods, to show that they are of recent
origin, and concerning their images, to show that they are, so to say,
but of yesterday. You yourselves, however, are thoroughly acquainted
with these matters, since you are versed in all departments of
knowledge, and are beyond all other men familiar with the ancients. I
assert, then, that it was Orpheus, and Homer, and Hesiod who [746]
gave both genealogies and names to those whom they call gods. Such,
too, is the testimony of Herodotus. [747] "My opinion," he says, "is
that Hesiod and Homer preceded me by four hundred years, and no more;
and it was they who framed a theogony for the Greeks, and gave the
gods their names, and assigned them their several honours and
functions, and described their forms." Representations of the gods,
again, were not in use at all, so long as statuary, and painting, and
sculpture were unknown; nor did they become common until Saurias the
Samian, and Crato the Sicyonian, and Cleanthes the Corinthian, and the
Corinthian damsel [748] appeared, when drawing in outline was invented
by Saurias, who sketched a horse in the sun, and painting by Crato,
who painted in oil on a whitened tablet the outlines of a man and
woman; and the art of making figures in relief (koroplathike) was
invented by the damsel, [749] who, being in love with a person, traced
his shadow on a wall as he lay asleep, and her father, being delighted
with the exactness of the resemblance (he was a potter), carved out
the sketch and filled it up with clay: this figure is still preserved
at Corinth. After these, Dædalus and Theodorus the Milesian further
invented sculpture and statuary. You perceive, then, that the time
since representations of form and the making of images began is so
short, that we can name the artist of each particular god. The image
of Artemis at Ephesus, for example, and that of Athenâ (or rather of
Athelâ, for so is she named by those who speak more in the style of
the mysteries; for thus was the ancient image made of the olive-tree
called), and the sitting figure of the same goddess, were made by
Endoeus, a pupil of Dædalus; the Pythian god was the work of Theodorus
and Telecles; and the Delian god and Artemis are due to the art of
Tectæus and Angelio; Hera in Samos and in Argos came from the hands of
Smilis, and the other statues [750] were by Phidias; Aphrodité the
courtezan in Cnidus is the production of Praxiteles; Asclepius in
Epidaurus is the work of Phidias. In a word, of not one of these
statues can it be said that it was not made by man. If, then, these
are gods, why did they not exist from the beginning? Why, in sooth,
are they younger than those who made them? Why, in sooth, in order to
their coming into existence, did they need the aid of men and art?
They are nothing but earth, and stones, and matter, and curious art.
[751]
Footnotes
[746] We here follow the text of Otto; others place the clause in the
following sentence.
[747] ii. 53.
[748] Or, Koré. It is doubtful whether or not this should be regarded
as a proper name.
[749] Or, Koré. It is doubtful whether or not this should be regarded
as a proper name.
[750] The reading is here doubtful.
[751] [There were no images or pictures, therefore, in the earliest
Christian places of prayer.]
Chapter XVIII.--The Gods Themselves Have Been Created, as the Poets
Confess.
But, since it is affirmed by some that, although these are only
images, yet there exist gods in honour of whom they are made; and that
the supplications and sacrifices presented to the images are to be
referred to the gods, and are in fact made to the gods; [752] and that
there is not any other way of coming to them, for
"'Tis hard for man
To meet in presence visible a God;" [753]
and whereas, in proof that such is the fact, they adduce the energies
possessed by certain images, let us examine into the power attached to
their names. And I would beseech you, greatest of emperors, before I
enter on this discussion, to be indulgent to me while I bring forward
true considerations; for it is not my design to show the fallacy of
idols, but, by disproving the calumnies vented against us, to offer a
reason for the course of life we follow. May you, by considering
yourselves, be able to discover the heavenly kingdom also! For as all
things are subservient to you, father and son, [754] who have received
the kingdom from above (for "the king's soul is in the hand of God,"
[755] saith the prophetic Spirit), so to the one God and the Logos
proceeding from Him, the Son, apprehended by us as inseparable from
Him, all things are in like manner subjected. This then especially I
beg you carefully to consider. The gods, as they affirm, were not from
the beginning, but every one of them has come into existence just like
ourselves. And in this opinion they all agree. Homer speaks of
"Old Oceanus,
The sire of gods, and Tethys;" [756]
and Orpheus (who, moreover, was the first to invent their names, and
recounted their births, and narrated the exploits of each, and is
believed by them to treat with greater truth than others of divine
things, whom Homer himself follows in most matters, especially in
reference to the gods)--he, too, has fixed their first origin to be
from water:--
"Oceanus, the origin of all."
For, according to him, water was the beginning of all things, and from
water mud was formed, and from both was produced an animal, a dragon
with the head of a lion growing to it, and between the two heads there
was the face of a god, named Heracles and Kronos. This Heracles
generated an egg of enormous size, which, on becoming full, was, by
the powerful friction of its generator, burst into two, the part at
the top receiving the form of heaven (ouranos), and the lower part
that of earth (ge). The goddess Gê moreover, came forth with a body;
and Ouranos, by his union with Gê, begat females, Clotho, Lachesis,
and Atropos; and males, the hundred-handed Cottys, Gyges, Briareus,
and the Cyclopes Brontes, and Steropes, and Argos, whom also he bound
and hurled down to Tartarus, having learnt that he was to be ejected
from his government by his children; whereupon Gê, being enraged,
brought forth the Titans. [757]
"The godlike Gaia bore to Ourano
Sons who are by the name of Titans known,
Because they vengeance [758] took on Ouranos,
Majestic, glitt'ring with his starry crown." [759]
Footnotes
[752] [This was a heathen justification of image-worship, and entirely
foreign to the Christian mind. Leighton, Works, vol. v. p. 323.]
[753] Hom., Il., xx. 131.
[754] [See Kaye's very important note, refuting Gibbon's cavil, and
illustrating the purpose of Bishop Bull, in his quotation. On the
perichoresis, see Bull, Fid. Nicænæ, iv. cap. 4.]
[755] Prov. xxi. 1.
[756] Hom., Il., xiv. 201, 302.
[757] Hom., Il., xiv. 246.
[758] tisasthen.
[759] Orpheus, Fragments.
Chapter XIX.--The Philosophers Agree with the Poets Respecting the Gods.
Such was the beginning of the existence both of their gods and of the
universe. Now what are we to make of this? For each of those things to
which divinity is ascribed is conceived of as having existed from the
first. For, if they have come into being, having previously had no
existence, as those say who treat of the gods, they do not exist. For,
a thing is either uncreated and eternal, or created and perishable.
Nor do I think one thing and the philosophers another. "What is that
which always is, and has no origin; or what is that which has been
originated, yet never is?" [760] Discoursing of the intelligible and
the sensible, Plato teaches that that which always is, the
intelligible, is unoriginated, but that which is not, the sensible, is
originated, beginning to be and ceasing to exist. In like manner, the
Stoics also say that all things will be burnt up and will again exist,
the world receiving another beginning. But if, although there is,
according to them, a twofold cause, one active and governing, namely
providence, the other passive and changeable, namely matter, it is
nevertheless impossible for the world, even though under the care of
Providence, to remain in the same state, because it is created--how
can the constitution of these gods remain, who are not self-existent,
[761] but have been originated? And in what are the gods superior to
matter, since they derive their constitution from water? But not even
water, according to them, is the beginning of all things. From simple
and homogeneous elements what could be constituted? Moreover, matter
requires an artificer, and the artificer requires matter. For how
could figures be made without matter or an artificer? Neither, again,
is it reasonable that matter should be older than God; for the
efficient cause must of necessity exist before the things that are
made.
Footnotes
[760] Plat., Tim., p. 27, D.
[761] Literally, "by nature."
Chapter XX.--Absurd Representations of the Gods.
If the absurdity of their theology were confined to saying that the
gods were created, and owed their constitution to water, since I have
demonstrated that nothing is made which is not also liable to
dissolution, I might proceed to the remaining charges. But, on the one
hand, they have described their bodily forms: speaking of Hercules,
for instance, as a god in the shape of a dragon coiled up; of others
as hundred-handed; of the daughter of Zeus, whom he begat of his
mother Rhea; or of Demeter, as having two eyes in the natural order,
and two in her forehead, and the face of an animal on the back part of
her neck, and as having also horns, so that Rhea, frightened at her
monster of a child, fled from her, and did not give her the breast
(thele), whence mystically she is called Athêlâ, but commonly
Phersephoné and Koré, though she is not the same as Athênâ, [762] who
is called Koré from the pupil of the eye;--and, on the other hand,
they have described their admirable [763] achievements, as they deem
them: how Kronos, for instance, mutilated his father, and hurled him
down from his chariot, and how he murdered his children, and swallowed
the males of them; and how Zeus bound his father, and cast him down to
Tartarus, as did Ouranos also to his sons, and fought with the Titans
for the government; and how he persecuted his mother Rhea when she
refused to wed him, and, she becoming a she-dragon, and he himself
being changed into a dragon, bound her with what is called the
Herculean knot, and accomplished his purpose, of which fact the rod of
Hermes is a symbol; and again, how he violated his daughter
Phersephoné, in this case also assuming the form of a dragon, and
became the father of Dionysus. In face of narrations like these, I
must say at least this much, What that is becoming or useful is there
in such a history, that we must believe Kronos, Zeus, Koré, and the
rest, to be gods? Is it the descriptions of their bodies? Why, what
man of judgment and reflection will believe that a viper was begotten
by a god (thus Orpheus:--
"But from the sacred womb Phanes begat
Another offspring, horrible and fierce,
In sight a frightful viper, on whose head
Were hairs: its face was comely; but the rest,
From the neck downwards, bore the aspect dire
Of a dread dragon" [764] );
or who will admit that Phanes himself, being a first-born god (for he
it was that was produced from the egg), has the body or shape of a
dragon, or was swallowed by Zeus, that Zeus might be too large to be
contained? For if they differ in no respect from the lowest brutes
(since it is evident that the Deity must differ from the things of
earth and those that are derived from matter), they are not gods. How,
then, I ask, can we approach them as suppliants, when their origin
resembles that of cattle, and they themselves have the form of brutes,
and are ugly to behold?
Footnotes
[762] i.e., Minerva.
[763] Or, "have accurately described."
[764] Fragments.
Chapter XXI.--Impure Loves Ascribed to the Gods.
But should it be said that they only had fleshly forms, and possess
blood and seed, and the affections of anger and sexual desire, even
then we must regard such assertions as nonsensical and ridiculous; for
there is neither anger, nor desire and appetite, nor procreative seed,
in gods. Let them, then, have fleshly forms, but let them be superior
to wrath and anger, that Athênâ may not be seen
"Burning with rage and inly wroth with Jove;" [765]
nor Hera appear thus:--
"Juno's breast
Could not contain her rage." [766]
And let them be superior to grief:--
"A woful sight mine eyes behold: a man
I love in flight around the walls! My heart
For Hector grieves." [767]
For I call even men rude and stupid who give way to anger and grief.
But when the "father of men and gods" mourns for his son,--
"Woe, woe! that fate decrees my best belov'd
Sarpedon, by Patroclus' hand to fall;" [768]
and is not able while he mourns to rescue him from his peril:--
"The son of Jove, yet Jove preserv'd him not;" [769]
who would not blame the folly of those who, with tales like these, are
lovers of the gods, or rather, live without any god? Let them have
fleshly forms, but let not Aphrodité be wounded by Diomedes in her
body:--
"The haughty son of Tydeus, Diomed,
Hath wounded me;" [770]
or by Arês in her soul:--
"Me, awkward me, she scorns; and yields her charms
To that fair lecher, the strong god of arms." [771]
"The weapon pierced the flesh." [772]
He who was terrible in battle, the ally of Zeus against the Titans, is
shown to be weaker than Diomedes:--
"He raged, as Mars, when brandishing his spear." [773]
Hush! Homer, a god never rages. But you describe the god to me as
blood-stained, and the bane of mortals:--
"Mars, Mars, the bane of mortals, stained with blood;" [774]
and you tell of his adultery and his bonds:--
"Then, nothing loth, th' enamour'd fair he led,
And sunk transported on the conscious bed.
Down rushed the toils." [775]
Do they not pour forth impious stuff of this sort in abundance
concerning the gods? Ouranos is mutilated; Kronos is bound, and thrust
down to Tartarus; the Titans revolt; Styx dies in battle: yea, they
even represent them as mortal; they are in love with one another; they
are in love with human beings:--
"Æneas, amid Ida's jutting peaks,
Immortal Venus to Anchises bore." [776]
Are they not in love? Do they not suffer? Nay, verily, they are gods,
and desire cannot touch them! Even though a god assume flesh in
pursuance of a divine purpose, [777] he is therefore the slave of
desire.
"For never yet did such a flood of love,
For goddess or for mortal, fill my soul;
Not for Ixion's beauteous wife, who bore
Pirithöus, sage in council as the gods;
Nor the neat-footed maiden Danäe,
A crisius' daughter, her who Perséus bore,
Th' observ'd of all; nor noble Phoenix' child;
. . . . . . nor for Semele;
Nor for Alcmena fair; . . .
No, nor for Ceres, golden-tressèd queen;
Nor for Latona bright; nor for thyself." [778]
He is created, he is perishable, with no trace of a god in him. Nay,
they are even the hired servants of men:--
"Admetus' halls, in which I have endured
To praise the menial table, though a god." [779]
And they tend cattle:--
"And coming to this land, I cattle fed,
For him that was my host, and kept this house." [780]
Admetus, therefore, was superior to the god. prophet and wise one, and
who canst foresee for others the things that shall be, thou didst not
divine the slaughter of thy beloved, but didst even kill him with
thine own hand, dear as he was:--
"And I believed Apollo's mouth divine
Was full of truth, as well as prophet's art."
(Æschylus is reproaching Apollo for being a false prophet:)--
"The very one who sings while at the feast,
The one who said these things, alas! is he
Who slew my son." [781]
Footnotes
[765] Hom., Il., iv. 23.
[766] Ibid., iv. 24.
[767] Ibid., xxii. 168 sq.
[768] Ibid., xvi. 433 sq.
[769] Ibid., xvi. 522.
[770] Ibid., v. 376.
[771] Hom., Od., viii. 308 sq., Pope's transl.
[772] Hom., Il., v. 858.
[773] Hom., Il., xv. 605.
[774] Hom., Il., v. 31, 455.
[775] Hom., Od., viii. 296-298, Pope's transl.
[776] Hom., Il., ii. 820.
[777] [oikonomian. Kaye, p. 174. And see Paris ed., 1615.]
[778] Hom., Il., xiv. 315 sqq.
[779] Eurip., Alcest., 1 sq.
[780] Ibid., 8 sq.
[781] From an unknown play of Æschylus.
Chapter XXII.--Pretended Symbolical Explanations.
But perhaps these things are poetic vagary, and there is some natural
explanation of them, such as this by Empedocles:--
"Let Jove be fire, and Juno source of life,
With Pluto and Nêstis, who bathes with tears
The human founts."
If, then, Zeus is fire, and Hera the earth, and Aïdoneus the air, and
Nê stis water, and these are elements--fire, water, air--none of them
is a god, neither Zeus, nor Hera, nor Aïdoneus; for from matter
separated into parts by God is their constitution and origin:--
"Fire, water, earth, and the air's gentle height,
And harmony with these."
Here are things which without harmony cannot abide; which would be
brought to ruin by strife: how then can any one say that they are
gods? Friendship, according to Empedocles, has an aptitude to govern,
things that are compounded are governed, and that which is apt to
govern has the dominion; so that if we make the power of the governed
and the governing one and the same, we shall be, unawares to
ourselves, putting perishable and fluctuating and changeable matter on
an equality with the uncreated, and eternal, and ever self-accordant
God. Zeus is, according to the Stoics, the fervid part of nature; Hera
is the air (aer)--the very name, if it be joined to itself, signifying
this; [782] Poseidon is what is drunk (water, posis). But these things
are by different persons explained of natural objects in different
ways. Some call Zeus twofold masculine-feminine air; others the season
which brings about mild weather, on which account it was that he alone
escaped from Kronos. But to the Stoics it may be said, If you
acknowledge one God, the supreme and uncreated and eternal One, and as
many compound bodies as there are changes of matter, and say that the
Spirit of God, which pervades matter, obtains according to its
variations a diversity of names, the forms of matter will become the
body of God; but when the elements are destroyed in the conflagration,
the names will necessarily perish along with the forms, the Spirit of
God alone remaining. Who, then, can believe that those bodies, of
which the variation according to matter is allied to corruption, are
gods? But to those who say that Kronos is time, and Rhea the earth,
and that she becomes pregnant by Kronos, and brings forth, whence she
is regarded as the mother of all; and that he begets and devours his
offspring; and that the mutilation is the intercourse of the male with
the female, which cuts off the seed and casts it into the womb, and
generates a human being, who has in himself the sexual desire, which
is Aphrodité; and that the madness of Kronos is the turn of season,
which destroys animate and inanimate things; and that the bonds and
Tartarus are time, which is changed by seasons and disappears;--to
such persons we say, If Kronos is time, he changes; if a season, he
turns about; if darkness, or frost, or the moist part of nature, none
of these is abiding; but the Deity is immortal, and immoveable, and
unalterable: so that neither is Kronos nor his image God. As regards
Zeus again: If he is air, born of Kronos, of which the male part is
called Zeus and the female Hera (whence both sister and wife), he is
subject to change; if a season, he turns about: but the Deity neither
changes nor shifts about. But why should I trespass on your patience
by saying more, when you know so well what has been said by each of
those who have resolved these things into nature, or what various
writers have thought concerning nature, or what they say concerning
Athênâ, whom they affirm to be the wisdom (phronesis) pervading all
things; and concerning Isis, whom they call the birth of all time
(phusis aionos), from whom all have sprung, and by whom all exist; or
concerning Osiris, on whose murder by Typhon his brother Isis with her
son Orus sought after his limbs, and finding them honoured them with a
sepulchre, which sepulchre is to this day called the tomb of Osiris?
For whilst they wander up and down about the forms of matter, they
miss to find the God who can only be beheld by the reason, while they
deify the elements and their several parts, applying different names
to them at different times: calling the sowing of the corn, for
instance, Osiris (hence they say, that in the mysteries, on the
finding of the members of his body, or the fruits, Isis is thus
addressed: We have found, we wish thee joy), the fruit of the vine
Dionysus, the vine itself Semelé, the heat of the sun the thunderbolt.
And yet, in fact, they who refer the fables to actual gods, do
anything rather than add to their divine character; for they do not
perceive, that by the very defence they make for the gods, they
confirm the things which are alleged concerning them. What have
Europa, and the bull, and the swan, and Leda, to do with the earth and
air, that the abominable intercourse of Zeus with them should be taken
for the intercourse of the earth and air? But missing to discover the
greatness of God, and not being able to rise on high with their reason
(for they have no affinity for the heavenly place), they pine away
among the forms of matter, and rooted to the earth, deify the changes
of the elements: just as if any one should put the ship he sailed in
the place of the steersman. But as the ship, although equipped with
everything, is of no use if it have not a steersman, so neither are
the elements, though arranged in perfect order, of any service apart
from the providence of God. For the ship will not sail of itself; and
the elements without their Framer will not move.
Footnotes
[782] Perhaps her (aer) a.
Chapter XXIII.--Opinions of Thales and Plato.
You may say, however, since you excel all men in understanding, How
comes it to pass, then, that some of the idols manifest power, if
those to whom we erect the statues are not gods? For it is not likely
that images destitute of life and motion can of themselves do anything
without a mover. That in various places, cities, and nations, certain
effects are brought about in the name of idols, we are far from
denying. None the more, however, if some have received benefit, and
others, on the contrary, suffered harm, shall we deem those to be gods
who have produced the effects in either case. But I have made careful
inquiry, both why it is that you think the idols to have this power,
and who they are that, usurping their names, produce the effects. It
is necessary for me, however, in attempting to show who they are that
produce the effects ascribed to the idols, and that they are not gods,
to have recourse to some witnesses from among the philosophers. First
Thales, as those who have accurately examined his opinions report,
divides [superior beings] into God, demons, and heroes. God he
recognises as the Intelligence (nous) of the world; by demons he
understands beings possessed of soul (psuchikai); and by heroes the
separated souls of men, the good being the good souls, and the bad the
worthless. Plato again, while withholding his assent on other points,
also divides [superior beings] into the uncreated God and those
produced by the uncreated One for the adornment of heaven, the
planets, and the fixed stars, and into demons; concerning which
demons, while he does not think fit to speak himself, he thinks that
those ought to be listened to who have spoken about them. "To speak
concerning the other demons, and to know their origin, is beyond our
powers; but we ought to believe those who have before spoken, the
descendants of gods, as they say--and surely they must be well
acquainted with their own ancestors: it is impossible, therefore, to
disbelieve the sons of gods, even though they speak without probable
or convincing proofs; but as they profess to tell of their own family
affairs, we are bound, in pursuance of custom, to believe them. In
this way, then, let us hold and speak as they do concerning the origin
of the gods themselves. Of Gê and Ouranos were born Oceanus and
Tethys; and of these Phorcus, Kronos, and Rhea, and the rest; and of
Kronos and Rhea, Zeus, Hera, and all the others, who, we know, are all
called their brothers; besides other descendants again of these."
[783] Did, then, he who had contemplated the eternal Intelligence and
God who is apprehended by reason, and declared His attributes--His
real existence, the simplicity of His nature, the good that flows
forth from Him that is truth, and discoursed of primal power, and how
"all things are about the King of all, and all things exist for His
sake, and He is the cause of all;" and about two and three, that He is
"the second moving about the seconds, and the third about the thirds;"
[784] --did this man think, that to learn the truth concerning those
who are said to have been produced from sensible things, namely earth
and heaven, was a task transcending his powers? It is not to be
believed for a moment. But because he thought it impossible to believe
that gods beget and are brought forth, since everything that begins to
be is followed by an end, and (for this is much more difficult) to
change the views of the multitude, who receive the fables without
examination, on this account it was that he declared it to be beyond
his powers to know and to speak concerning the origin of the other
demons, since he was unable either to admit or teach that gods were
begotten. And as regards that saying of his, "The great sovereign in
heaven, Zeus, driving a winged car, advances first, ordering and
managing all things, and there follow him a host of gods and demons,"
[785] this does not refer to the Zeus who is said to have sprung from
Kronos; for here the name is given to the Maker of the universe. This
is shown by Plato himself: not being able to designate Him by another
title that should be suitable, he availed himself of the popular name,
not as peculiar to God, but for distinctness, because it is not
possible to discourse of God to all men as fully as one might; and he
adds at the same time the epithet "Great," so as to distinguish the
heavenly from the earthly, the uncreated from the created, who is
younger than heaven and earth, and younger than the Cretans, who stole
him away, that he might not be killed by his father.
Footnotes
[783] Tim., p. 40, D.E.
[784] Pseudo-Plat., Epist., ii. p. 312, D.E. The meaning is very
obscure.
[785] Plat., Phoedr., p. 246, E.
Chapter XXIV.--Concerning the Angels and Giants.
What need is there, in speaking to you who have searched into every
department of knowledge, to mention the poets, or to examine opinions
of another kind? Let it suffice to say thus much. If the poets and
philosophers did not acknowledge that there is one God, and concerning
these gods were not of opinion, some that they are demons, others that
they are matter, and others that they once were men,--there might be
some show of reason for our being harassed as we are, since we employ
language which makes a distinction between God and matter, and the
natures of the two. For, as we acknowledge a God, and a Son his Logos,
and a Holy Spirit, united in essence,--the Father, the Son, the
Spirit, because the Son is the Intelligence, Reason, Wisdom of the
Father, and the Spirit an effluence, as light from fire; so also do we
apprehend the existence of other powers, which exercise dominion about
matter, and by means of it, and one in particular, which is hostile to
God: not that anything is really opposed to God, like strife to
friendship, according to Empedocles, and night to day, according to
the appearing and disappearing of the stars (for even if anything had
placed itself in opposition to God, it would have ceased to exist, its
structure being destroyed by the power and might of God), but that to
the good that is in God, which belongs of necessity to Him, and
co-exists with Him, as colour with body, without which it has no
existence (not as being part of it, but as an attendant property
co-existing with it, united and blended, just as it is natural for
fire to be yellow and the ether dark blue),--to the good that is in
God, I say, the spirit which is about matter, [786] who was created by
God, just as the other angels were created by Him, and entrusted with
the control of matter and the forms of matter, is opposed. For this is
the office of the angels,--to exercise providence for God over the
things created and ordered by Him; so that God may have the universal
and general providence of the whole, while the particular parts are
provided for by the angels appointed over them. [787] Just as with
men, who have freedom of choice as to both virtue and vice (for you
would not either honour the good or punish the bad, unless vice and
virtue were in their own power; and some are diligent in the matters
entrusted to them by you, and others faithless), so is it among the
angels. Some, free agents, you will observe, such as they were created
by God, continued in those things for which God had made and over
which He had ordained them; but some outraged both the constitution of
their nature and the government entrusted to them: namely, this ruler
of matter and its various forms, and others of those who were placed
about this first firmament (you know that we say nothing without
witnesses, but state the things which have been declared by the
prophets); these fell into impure love of virgins, and were subjugated
by the flesh, and he became negligent and wicked in the management of
the things entrusted to him. Of these lovers of virgins, therefore,
were begotten those who are called giants. [788] And if something has
been said by the poets, too, about the giants, be not surprised at
this: worldly wisdom and divine differ as much from each other as
truth and plausibility: the one is of heaven and the other of earth;
and indeed, according to the prince of matter,--
"We know we oft speak lies that look like truths." [789]
Footnotes
[786] [Comp. cap. xxvii., infra.]
[787] [Kaye, 192. And see cap. x., supra, p. 133. Divine Providence
does not exclude the ministry of angels by divine appointment.
Resurrection, cap. xviii., infra.]
[788] [The Paris editors caution us against yielding to this
interpretation of Gen. vi. 1-4. It was the Rabbinical interpretation.
See Josephus, book i. cap. 3.]
[789] Hesiod, Theog., 27. [Traces of the Nephilim are found in all
mythologies.]
Chapter XXV.--The Poets and Philosophers Have Denied a Divine Providence.
These angels, then, who have fallen from heaven, and haunt the air and
the earth, and are no longer able to rise to heavenly things, and the
souls of the giants, which are the demons who wander about the world,
perform actions similar, the one (that is, the demons) to the natures
they have received, the other (that is, the angels) to the appetites
they have indulged. But the prince of matter, as may be seen merely
from what transpires, exercises a control and management contrary to
the good that is in God:--
"Ofttimes this anxious thought has crossed my mind,
Whether 'tis chance or deity that rules
The small affairs of men; and, spite of hope
As well as justice, drives to exile some
Stripped of all means of life, while others still
Continue to enjoy prosperity." [790]
Prosperity and adversity, contrary to hope and justice, made it
impossible for Euripides to say to whom belongs the administration of
earthly affairs, which is of such a kind that one might say of it:--
"How then, while seeing these things, can we say
There is a race of gods, or yield to laws?" [791]
The same thing led Aristotle to say that the things below the heaven
are not under the care of Providence, although the eternal providence
of God concerns itself equally with us below,--
"The earth, let willingness move her or not,
Must herbs produce, and thus sustain my flocks," [792] --
and addresses itself to the deserving individually, according to truth
and not according to opinion; and all other things, according to the
general constitution of nature, are provided for by the law of reason.
But because the demoniac movements and operations proceeding from the
adverse spirit produce these disorderly sallies, and moreover move
men, some in one way and some in another, as individuals and as
nations, separately and in common, in accordance with the tendency of
matter on the one hand, and of the affinity for divine things on the
other, from within and from without,--some who are of no mean
reputation have therefore thought that this universe is constituted
without any definite order, and is driven hither and thither by an
irrational chance. But they do not understand, that of those things
which belong to the constitution of the whole world there is nothing
out of order or neglected, but that each one of them has been produced
by reason, and that, therefore, they do not transgress the order
prescribed to them; and that man himself, too, so far as He that made
him is concerned, is well ordered, both by his original nature, which
has one common character for all, and by the constitution of his body,
which does not transgress the law imposed upon it, and by the
termination of his life, which remains equal and common to all alike;
[793] but that, according to the character peculiar to himself and the
operation of the ruling prince and of the demons his followers, he is
impelled and moved in this direction or in that, notwithstanding that
all possess in common the same original constitution of mind. [794]
Footnotes
[790] Eurip.; from an unknown play.
[791] Ibid.
[792] Eurip., Cycl., 332 sq.
[793] [Kaye, p. 190.]
[794] Or, "powers of reasoning" (logismos).
Chapter XXVI.--The Demons Allure Men to the Worship of Images.
They who draw men to idols, then, are the aforesaid demons, who are
eager for the blood of the sacrifices, and lick them; but the gods
that please the multitude, and whose names are given to the images,
were men, as may be learned from their history. And that it is the
demons who act under their names, is proved by the nature of their
operations. For some castrate, as Rhea; others wound and slaughter, as
Artemis; the Tauric goddess puts all strangers to death. I pass over
those who lacerate with knives and scourges of bones, and shall not
attempt to describe all the kinds of demons; for it is not the part of
a god to incite to things against nature.
"But when the demon plots against a man,
He first inflicts some hurt upon his mind." [795]
But God, being perfectly good, is eternally doing good. That,
moreover, those who exert the power are not the same as those to whom
the statues are erected, very strong evidence is afforded by Troas and
Parium. The one has statues of Neryllinus, a man of our own times; and
Parium of Alexander and Proteus: both the sepulchre and the statue of
Alexander are still in the forum. The other statues of Neryllinus,
then, are a public ornament, if indeed a city can be adorned by such
objects as these; but one of them is supposed to utter oracles and to
heal the sick, and on this account the people of the Troad offer
sacrifices to this statue, and overlay it with gold, and hang chaplets
upon it. But of the statues of Alexander and Proteus (the latter, you
are aware, threw himself into the fire near Olympia), that of Proteus
is likewise said to utter oracles; and to that of Alexander--
"Wretched Paris, though in form so fair,
Thou slave of woman" [796] --
sacrifices are offered and festivals are held at the public cost, as
to a god who can hear. Is it, then, Neryllinus, and Proteus, and
Alexander who exert these energies in connection with the statues, or
is it the nature of the matter itself? But the matter is brass. And
what can brass do of itself, which may be made again into a different
form, as Amasis treated the footpan, [797] as told by Herodotus? And
Neryllinus, and Proteus, and Alexander, what good are they to the
sick? For what the image is said now to effect, it effected when
Neryllinus was alive and sick.
Footnotes
[795] From an unknown tragedian. [A passage which I cannot but apply
to the lapse of Tatian.]
[796] Hom., Il., iii. 39.
[797] [see note to Theophilus, cap. x., supra, p. 92.]
Chapter XXVII.--Artifices of the Demons.
What then? In the first place, the irrational and fantastic movements
of the soul about opinions produce a diversity of images (eidola) from
time to time: some they derive from matter, and some they fashion and
bring forth for themselves; and this happens to a soul especially when
it partakes of the material spirit [798] and becomes mingled with it,
looking not at heavenly things and their Maker, but downwards to
earthly things, wholly at the earth, as being now mere flesh and
blood, and no longer pure spirit. [799] These irrational and fantastic
movements of the soul, then, give birth to empty visions in the mind,
by which it becomes madly set on idols. When, too, a tender and
susceptible soul, which has no knowledge or experience of sounder
doctrines, and is unaccustomed to contemplate truth, and to consider
thoughtfully the Father and Maker of all things, gets impressed with
false opinions respecting itself, then the demons who hover about
matter, greedy of sacrificial odours and the blood of victims, and
ever ready to lead men into error, avail themselves of these delusive
movements of the souls of the multitude; and, taking possession of
their thoughts, cause to flow into the mind empty visions as if coming
from the idols and the statues; and when, too, a soul of itself, as
being immortal, [800] moves comformably to reason, either predicting
the future or healing the present, the demons claim the glory for
themselves.
Footnotes
[798] [Kaye, p. 191; and comp. cap. xxiv., supra, p. 142.]
[799] [Comp. On the Resurrection, cap. xiii., infra., p. 439 of ed.
Edinburgh. Also Kaye, p. 199.]
[800] [Kaye, p. 190.]
Chapter XXVIII.--The Heathen Gods Were Simply Men.
But it is perhaps necessary, in accordance with what has already been
adduced, to say a little about their names. Herodotus, then, and
Alexander the son of Philip, in his letter to his mother (and each of
them is said to have conversed with the priests at Heliopolis, and
Memphis, and Thebes), affirm that they learnt from them that the gods
had been men. Herodotus speaks thus: "Of such a nature were, they
said, the beings represented by these images, they were very far
indeed from being gods. However, in the times anterior to them it was
otherwise; then Egypt had gods for its rulers, who dwelt upon the
earth with men, one being always supreme above the rest. The last of
these was Horus the son of Osiris, called by the Greeks Apollo. He
deposed Typhon, and ruled over Egypt as its last god-king. Osiris is
named Dionysus (Bacchus) by the Greeks." [801] "Almost all the names
of the gods came into Greece from Egypt." [802] Apollo was the son of
Dionysus and Isis, as Herodotus likewise affirms: "According to the
Egyptians, Apollo and Diana are the children of Bacchus and Isis;
while Latona is their nurse and their preserver." [803] These beings
of heavenly origin they had for their first kings: partly from
ignorance of the true worship of the Deity, partly from gratitude for
their government, they esteemed them as gods together with their
wives. "The male kine, if clean, and the male calves, are used for
sacrifice by the Egyptians universally; but the females, they are not
allowed to sacrifice, since they are sacred to Isis. The statue of
this goddess has the form of a woman but with horns like a cow,
resembling those of the Greek representations of Io." [804] And who
can be more deserving of credit in making these statements, than those
who in family succession son from father, received not only the
priesthood, but also the history? For it is not likely that the
priests, who make it their business to commend the idols to men's
reverence, would assert falsely that they were men. If Herodotus alone
had said that the Egyptians spoke in their histories of the gods as of
men, when he says, "What they told me concerning their religion it is
not my intention to repeat, except only the names of their deities,
things of very trifling importance," [805] it would behove us not to
credit even Herodotus as being a fabulist. But as Alexander and Hermes
surnamed Trismegistus, who shares with them in the attribute of
eternity, and innumerable others, not to name them individually,
[declare the same], no room is left even for doubt that they, being
kings, were esteemed gods. That they were men, the most learned of the
Egyptians also testify, who, while saying that ether, earth, sun,
moon, are gods, regard the rest as mortal men, and the temples as
their sepulchres. Apollodorus, too, asserts the same thing in his
treatise concerning the gods. But Herodotus calls even their
sufferings mysteries. "The ceremonies at the feast of Isis in the city
of Busiris have been already spoken of. It is there that the whole
multitude, both of men and women, many thousands in number, beat
themselves at the close of the sacrifice in honour of a god whose name
a religious scruple forbids me to mention." [806] If they are gods,
they are also immortal; but if people are beaten for them, and their
sufferings are mysteries, they are men, as Herodotus himself says:
"Here, too, in this same precinct of Minerva at Saïs, is the
burial-place of one whom I think it not right to mention in such a
connection. It stands behind the temple against the back wall, which
it entirely covers. There are also some large stone obelisks in the
enclosure, and there is a lake near them, adorned with an edging of
stone. In form it is circular, and in size, as it seemed to me, about
equal to the lake at Delos called the Hoop. On this lake it is that
the Egyptians represent by night his sufferings whose name I refrain
from mentioning, and this representation they call their mysteries."
[807] And not only is the sepulchre of Osiris shown, but also his
embalming: "When a body is brought to them, they show the bearer
various models of corpses made in wood, and painted so as to resemble
nature. The most perfect is said to be after the manner of him whom I
do not think it religious to name in connection with such a matter."
[808]
Footnotes
[801] ii. 144. Mr. Rawlinson's translation is used in the extracts
from Herodotus.
[802] ii. 50.
[803] ii. 156.
[804] ii. 41.
[805] ii. 3. The text is here uncertain, and differs from that of
Herodotus. [Herodotus, initiated in Egyptian mysteries, was doubtless
sworn to maintain certain secrets of the priests of Osiris.]
[806] ii. 61. [The name of Osiris.]
[807] ii. 170.
[808] ii. 86.
Chapter XXIX.--Proof of the Same from the Poets.
But among the Greeks, also, those who are eminent in poetry and
history say the same thing. Thus of Heracles:--
"That lawless wretch, that man of brutal strength,
Deaf to Heaven's voice, the social rite transgressed." [809]
Such being his nature, deservedly did he go mad, and deservedly did he
light the funeral pile and burn himself to death. Of Asklepius, Hesiod
says:--
"The mighty father both of gods and men
Was filled with wrath, and from Olympus' top
With flaming thunderbolt cast down and slew
Latona's well-lov'd son--such was his ire." [810]
And Pindar:--
"But even wisdom is ensnared by gain.
The brilliant bribe of gold seen in the hand
Ev'n him [811] perverted: therefore Kronos' son
With both hands quickly stopp'd his vital breath,
And by a bolt of fire ensured his doom." [812]
Either, therefore, they were gods and did not hanker after gold--
"O gold, the fairest prize to mortal men,
Which neither mother equals in delight,
Nor children dear" [813] --
for the Deity is in want of nought, and is superior to carnal desire,
nor did they die; or, having been born men, they were wicked by reason
of ignorance, and overcome by love of money. What more need I say, or
refer to Castor, or Pollux, or Amphiaraus, who, having been born, so
to speak, only the other day, men of men, are looked upon as gods,
when they imagine even Ino after her madness and its consequent
sufferings to have become a goddess?
"Sea-rovers will her name Leucothea." [814]
And her son:--
"August Palmon, sailors will invoke."
Footnotes
[809] Hom., Od., xxi. 28. sq.
[810] Hesiod, Frag.
[811] i.e., Æsculapius.
[812] Pyth., iii. 96 sq.
[813] Ascribed by Seneca to the Bellerophon of Eurip.
[814] From the Ino, a lost play of Eurip.
Chapter XXX.--Reasons Why Divinity Has Been Ascribed to Men.
For if detestable and god-hated men had the reputation of being gods,
and the daughter of Derceto, Semiramis, a lascivious and blood-stained
woman, was esteemed a Syria goddess; and if, on account of Derceto,
the Syrians worship doves and Semiramis (for, a thing impossible, a
woman was changed into a dove: the story is in Ctesias), what wonder
if some should be called gods by their people on the ground of their
rule and sovereignty (the Sibyl, of whom Plato also makes mention,
says:--
"It was the generation then the tenth,
Of men endow'd with speech, since forth the flood
Had burst upon the men of former times,
And Kronos, Japetus, and Titan reigned,
Whom men, of Ouranos and Gaïa
Proclaimed the noblest sons, and named them so, [815]
Because of men endowed with gift of speech
They were the first"); [816]
and others for their strength, as Heracles and Perseus; and others for
their art, as Asclepius? Those, therefore, to whom either the subjects
gave honour or the rulers themselves [assumed it], obtained the name,
some from fear, others from revenge. Thus Antinous, through the
benevolence of your ancestors towards their subjects, came to be
regarded as a god. But those who came after adopted the worship
without examination.
"The Cretans always lie; for they, O king,
Have built a tomb to thee who art not dead." [817]
Though you believe, O Callimachus, in the nativity of Zeus, you do not
believe in his sepulchre; and whilst you think to obscure the truth,
you in fact proclaim him dead, even to those who are ignorant; and if
you see the cave, you call to mind the childbirth of Rhea; but when
you see the coffin, you throw a shadow over his death, not considering
that the unbegotten God alone is eternal. For either the tales told by
the multitude and the poets about the gods are unworthy of credit, and
the reverence shown them is superfluous (for those do not exist, the
tales concerning whom are untrue); or if the births, the amours, the
murders, the thefts, the castrations, the thunderbolts, are true, they
no longer exist, having ceased to be since they were born, having
previously had no being. And on what principle must we believe some
things and disbelieve others, when the poets have written their
stories in order to gain greater veneration for them? For surely those
through whom they have got to be considered gods, and who have striven
to represent their deeds as worthy of reverence, cannot have invented
their sufferings. That, therefore, we are not atheists, acknowledging
as we do God the Maker of this universe and His Logos, has been proved
according to my ability, if not according to the importance of the
subject.
Footnotes
[815] i.e., after Gaïa and Ouranos, Earth and Heaven.
[816] Oracc., Sibyll., iii. 108-113. [Kaye, p. 220, and compare cap.
vii., supra. The inspiration of Balaam, and likewise that of the ass,
must, in my opinion, illustrate that of the Sibyls.]
[817] Callim., Hym. Jov., 8 sq. [Tit. i. 12. But St. Paul's quotation
is from Epimenides.]
Chapter XXXI.--Confutation of the Other Charges Brought Against the
Christians.
But they have further also made up stories against us of impious
feasts [818] and forbidden intercourse between the sexes, both that
they may appear to themselves to have rational grounds of hatred, and
because they think either by fear to lead us away from our way of
life, or to render the rulers harsh and inexorable by the magnitude of
the charges they bring. But they lose their labour with those who know
that from of old it has been the custom, and not in our time only, for
vice to make war on virtue. Thus Pythagoras, with three hundred
others, was burnt to death; Heraclitus and Democritus were banished,
the one from the city of the Ephesians, the other from Abdera, because
he was charged with being mad; and the Athenians condemned Socrates to
death. But as they were none the worse in respect of virtue because of
the opinion of the multitude, so neither does the undiscriminating
calumny of some persons cast any shade upon us as regards rectitude of
life, for with God we stand in good repute. Nevertheless, I will meet
these charges also, although I am well assured that by what has been
already said I have cleared myself to you. For as you excel all men in
intelligence, you know that those whose life is directed towards God
as its rule, so that each one among us may be blameless and
irreproachable before Him, will not entertain even the thought of the
slightest sin. For if we believed that we should live only the present
life, then we might be suspected of sinning, through being enslaved to
flesh and blood, or overmastered by gain or carnal desire; but since
we know that God is witness to what we think and what we say both by
night and by day, and that He, being Himself light, sees all things in
our heart, we are persuaded that when we are removed from the present
life we shall live another life, better than the present one, and
heavenly, not earthly (since we shall abide near God, and with God,
free from all change or suffering in the soul, not as flesh, even
though we shall have flesh, [819] but as heavenly spirit), or, falling
with the rest, a worse one and in fire; for God has not made us as
sheep or beasts of burden, a mere by-work, and that we should perish
and be annihilated. On these grounds it is not likely that we should
wish to do evil, or deliver ourselves over to the great Judge to be
punished.
Footnotes
[818] ["Thyestian feasts" (p. 130, supra); a charge which the
Christian Fathers perpetually repel. Of course the sacrament of the
Lord's Supper lent colour to this charge; but it could not have been
repelled, had they believed the material body and blood of the "man
Christ Jesus," present in this sacrament. See cap. iii., note.]
[819] [1 Cor. xv. 44. A very clear representation of the apostle's
doctrine. See Kaye, 199; and compare On the Resurrection, cap. xiii.]
Chapter XXXII.--Elevated Morality of the Christians.
It is, however, nothing wonderful that they should get up tales about
us such as they tell of their own gods, of the incidents of whose
lives they make mysteries. But it behoved them, if they meant to
condemn shameless and promiscuous intercourse, to hate either Zeus,
who begat children of his mother Rhea and his daughter Koré, and took
his own sister to wife, or Orpheus, the inventor of these tales, which
made Zeus more unholy and detestable than Thyestes himself; for the
latter defiled his daughter in pursuance of an oracle, and when he
wanted to obtain the kingdom and avenge himself. But we are so far
from practising promiscuous intercourse, that it is not lawful among
us to indulge even a lustful look. "For," saith He, "he that looketh
on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already in his
heart." [820] Those, then, who are forbidden to look at anything more
than that for which God formed the eyes, which were intended to be a
light to us, and to whom a wanton look is adultery, the eyes being
made for other purposes, and who are to be called to account for their
very thoughts, how can any one doubt that such persons practice
self-control? For our account lies not with human laws, which a bad
man can evade (at the outset I proved to you, sovereign lords, that
our doctrine is from the teaching of God), but we have a law which
makes the measure of rectitude to consist in dealing with our
neighbour as ourselves. [821] On this account, too, according to age,
we recognise some as sons and daughters, others we regard as brothers
and sisters, [822] and to the more advanced in life we give the honour
due to fathers and mothers. On behalf of those, then, to whom we apply
the names of brothers and sisters, and other designations of
relationship, we exercise the greatest care that their bodies should
remain undefiled and uncorrupted; for the Logos [823] again says to
us, "If any one kiss a second time because it has given him pleasure,
[he sins];" adding, "Therefore the kiss, or rather the salutation,
should be given with the greatest care, since, if there be mixed with
it the least defilement of thought, it excludes us from eternal life."
[824]
Footnotes
[820] Matt. v. 28.
[821] Otto translates: "which has made us and our neighbours attain
the highest degree of rectitude." The text is obscure, but the above
seems the probably meaning; comp. Matt. xxii. 39, etc.
[822] [Hermas, p. 47, [11]note, and p. 57, this volume; Elucidation,
[12]ii.]
[823] [The Logos never said, "it excludes us from eternal life:" that
is sure; and the passage, though ambiguous, is not so interpreted in
the Latin of Gesner. Jones remarks that Athenagoras never introduces a
saying of our Lord in this way. Compare Clem. Alexandrin. (Pædagogue,
b. iii. cap. v. p. 297, Edinburgh Series), where he quotes Matt. v.
28, with variation. Lardner (cap. xviii. sec. 20) gives a probable
explanation. Jones on The Canon (vol. i. p. 436) is noteworthy. Kaye
(p. 221) does not solve the puzzle.]
[824] Probably from some apocryphal writing. [Come from what source it
may, it suggests a caution of the utmost importance to Americans. In
the newer parts of the country, the practice, here corrected, as
cropped out among "brothers and sisters" of divers religious names,
and consequent scandals have arisen. To all Christians comes, the
apostolic appeal, "Let it not be once named among you."]
Chapter XXXIII.--Chastity of the Christians with Respect to Marriage.
Therefore, having the hope of eternal life, we despise the things of
this life, even to the pleasures of the soul, each of us reckoning her
his wife whom he has married according to the laws laid down by us,
and that only for the purpose of having children. For as the
husbandman throwing the seed into the ground awaits the harvest, not
sowing more upon it, so to us the procreation of children is the
measure of our indulgence in appetite. Nay, you would find many among
us, both men and women, growing old unmarried, in hope of living in
closer communion with God. [825] But if the remaining in virginity and
in the state of an eunuch brings nearer to God, while the indulgence
of carnal thought and desire leads away from Him, in those cases in
which we shun the thoughts, much more do we reject the deeds. For we
bestow our attention, not on the study of words, but on the exhibition
and teaching of actions,--that a person should either remain as he was
born, or be content with one marriage; for a second marriage is only a
specious adultery. [826] "For whosoever puts away his wife," says He,
"and marries another, commits adultery;" [827] not permitting a man to
send her away whose virginity he has brought to an end, nor to marry
again. For he who deprives himself of his first wife, even though she
be dead, is a cloaked adulterer, [828] resisting the hand of God,
because in the beginning God made one man and one woman, and
dissolving the strictest union of flesh with flesh, formed for the
intercourse of the race.
Footnotes
[825] [This our Lord commends (Matt. xix. 12) as a voluntary act of
private self-devotion.]
[826] [There is perhaps a touch of the rising Phrygian influence in
this passage; yet the language of St. Paul (1 Tim. v. 9) favoured this
view, no doubt, in primitive opinion. See Speaker's Comm. on 1 Tim.
iii. 2. Ed. Scribners, New York.]
[827] Matt. xix. 9.
[828] [But Callistus, heretical Bishop of Rome (a.d. 218.), authorized
even third marriages in the clergy. Hippolytus, vol. vi. p. 343,
Ante-Nicene Fathers, Edinburgh Series.]
Chapter XXXIV.--The Vast Difference in Morals Between the Christians and
Their Accusers.
But though such is our character (Oh! why should I speak of things
unfit to be uttered?), the things said of us are an example of the
proverb, "The harlot reproves the chaste." For those who have set up a
market for fornication and established infamous resorts for the young
for every kind of vile pleasure,--who do not abstain even from males,
males with males committing shocking abominations, outraging all the
noblest and comeliest bodies in all sorts of ways, so dishonouring the
fair workmanship of God (for beauty on earth is not self-made, but
sent hither by the hand and will of God),--these men, I say, revile us
for the very things which they are conscious of themselves, and
ascribe to their own gods, boasting of them as noble deeds, and worthy
of the gods. These adulterers and pæderasts defame the eunuchs and the
once-married (while they themselves live like fishes; [829] for these
gulp down whatever falls in their way, and the stronger chases the
weaker: and, in fact, this is to feed upon human flesh, to do violence
in contravention of the very laws which you and your ancestors, with
due care for all that is fair and right, have enacted), so that not
even the governors of the provinces sent by you suffice for the
hearing of the complaints against those, to whom it even is not
lawful, when they are struck, not to offer themselves for more blows,
nor when defamed not to bless: for it is not enough to be just (and
justice is to return like for like), but it is incumbent on us to be
good and patient of evil.
Footnotes
[829] [An allusion to the fable of the Sargus; and see Burton's Anat.
Mel., p. 445.]
Chapter XXXV.--The Christians Condemn and Detest All Cruelty.
What man of sound mind, therefore, will affirm, while such is our
character, that we are murderers? For we cannot eat human flesh till
we have killed some one. The former charge, therefore, being false, if
any one should ask them in regard to the second, whether they have
seen what they assert, not one of them would be so barefaced as to say
that he had. And yet we have slaves, some more and some fewer, by whom
we could not help being seen; but even of these, not one has been
found to invent even such things against us. For when they know that
we cannot endure even to see a man put to death, though justly; who of
them can accuse us of murder or cannibalism? Who does not reckon among
the things of greatest interest the contests of gladiators and wild
beasts, especially those which are given by you? But we, deeming that
to see a man put to death is much the same as killing him, have
abjured such spectacles. [830] How, then, when we do not even look on,
lest we should contract guilt and pollution, can we put people to
death? And when we say that those women who use drugs to bring on
abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God [831]
for the abortion, on what principle should we commit murder? For it
does not belong to the same person to regard the very foetus in the
womb as a created being, and therefore an object of God's care, and
when it has passed into life, to kill it; and not to expose an infant,
because those who expose them are chargeable with child-murder, and on
the other hand, when it has been reared to destroy it. But we are in
all things always alike and the same, submitting ourselves to reason,
and not ruling over it.
Footnotes
[830] [See Tatian, cap xxiii., supra, p. 75. But here the language of
Gibbon is worthy to be quoted: though the icy-hearted infidel failed
to understand that just such philosophers as he enjoyed these
spectacles, till Christianity taught even such to profess a refined
abhorrence of what the Gospel abolished, with no help from them. He
says, "the first Christian emperor may claim the honour of the first
edict which condemned the art and amusement of shedding human blood;
but this benevolent law expressed the wishes of the prince, without
reforming an inveterate abuse which degraded a civilized (?) nation
below the condition of savage cannibals. Several hundred, perhaps
several thousand, victims were annually slaughtered in the great
cities of the empire." He tells the story of the heroic Telemachus,
without eulogy; how his death, while struggling to separate the
combatants abolished forever the inhuman sports and sacrifices of the
amphitheatre. This happened under Honorius. Milman's Gibbon, iii.
210.]
Footnotes
[831] [Let Americans read this, and ask whether a relapse into
heathenism is not threatening our civilization, in this respect. May I
venture to refer to Moral Reforms (ed. 1869, Lippincotts,
Philadelphia), a little book of my own, rebuking this inquity, and
tracing the earliest violation of this law of Christian morals, and of
nature itself, to an unhappy Bishop of Rome, rebuked by Hippolytus.
See vol. vi. p. 345, Edinburgh Series of Ante-Nicene Fathers.]
Chapter XXXVI.--Bearing of the Doctrine of the Resurrection on the
Practices of the Christians.
Who, then, that believes in a resurrection, would make himself into a
tomb for bodies that will rise again? For it is not the part of the
same persons to believe that our bodies will rise again, and to eat
them as if they would not; and to think that the earth will give back
the bodies held by it, but that those which a man has entombed in
himself will not be demanded back. On the contrary, it is reasonable
to suppose, that those who think they shall have no account to give of
the present life, ill or well spent, and that there is no
resurrection, but calculate on the soul perishing with the body, and
being as it were quenched in it, will refrain from no deed of daring;
but as for those who are persuaded that nothing will escape the
scrutiny of God, but that even the body which has ministered to the
irrational impulses of the soul, and to its desires, will be punished
along with it, it is not likely that they will commit even the
smallest sin. But if to any one it appears sheer nonsense that the
body which has mouldered away, and been dissolved, and reduced to
nothing, should be reconstructed, we certainly cannot with any reason
be accused of wickedness with reference to those that believe not, but
only of folly; for with the opinions by which we deceive ourselves we
injure no one else. But that it is not our belief alone that bodies
will rise again, but that many philosophers also hold the same view,
it is out of place to show just now, lest we should be thought to
introduce topics irrelevant to the matter in hand, either by speaking
of the intelligible and the sensible, and the nature of these
respectively, or by contending that the incorporeal is older than the
corporeal, and that the intelligible precedes the sensible, although
we become acquainted with the latter earliest, since the corporeal is
formed from the incorporeal, by the combination with it of the
intelligible, and that the sensible is formed from the intelligible;
for nothing hinders, according to Pythagoras and Plato, that when the
dissolution of bodies takes place, they should, from the very same
elements of which they were constructed at first, be constructed
again. [832] But let us defer the discourse concerning the
resurrection. [833]
Footnotes
[832] [Comp. cap. xxxi., supra, p. 146. The science of their times
lent itself to the notions of the Fathers necessarily; but neither
Holy Scripture nor theology binds us to any theory of the how, in this
great mystery; hence Plato and Pythagoras are only useful, as showing
that even they saw nothing impossible in the resurrection of the dead.
As to "the same elements," identity does not consist in the same
particles of material, but in the continuity of material, by which
every seed reproduces "its own body." 1 Cor. xv. 38.]
[833] [It is a fair inference that The Discourse was written after the
Embassy. "In it," says Kaye, "may be found nearly all the arguments
which human reason has been able to advance in support of the
resurrection." p. 200.]
Chapter XXXVII.--Entreaty to Be Fairly Judged.
And now do you, who are entirely in everything, by nature and by
education, upright, and moderate, and benevolent, and worthy of your
rule, now that I have disposed of the several accusations, and proved
that we are pious, and gentle, and temperate in spirit, bend your
royal head in approval. For who are more deserving to obtain the
things they ask, than those who, like us, pray for your government,
that you may, as is most equitable, receive the kingdom, son from
father, and that your empire may receive increase and addition, all
men becoming subject to your sway? And this is also for our advantage,
that we may lead a peaceable and quiet life, and may ourselves readily
perform all that is commanded us. [834]
Footnotes
[834] [1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. Kaye, p. 154. They refused worship, however,
to imperial images; and for this they suffered. "Bend your royal head"
is an amusing reference to the nod of the Thunderer.]
.
The Treatise of Athenagoras
The Athenian, Philosopher and Christian, on the Resurrection of the Dead.
Chapter I.--Defence of the Truth Should Precede Discussions Regarding It.
[835]
By the side of every opinion and doctrine which agrees with the truth
of things, there springs up some falsehood; and it does so, not
because it takes its rise naturally from some fundamental principle,
or from some cause peculiar to the matter in hand, but because it is
invented on purpose by men who set a value on the spurious seed, for
its tendency to corrupt the truth. This is apparent, in the first
place, from those who in former times addicted themselves to such
inquiries, and their want of agreement with their predecessors and
contemporaries, and then, not least, from the very confusion which
marks the discussions that are now going on. For such men have left no
truth free from their calumnious attacks--not the being of God, not
His knowledge, not His operations, not those books which follow by a
regular and strict sequence from these, and delineate for us the
doctrines of piety. On the contrary, some of them utterly, and once
for all, give up in despair the truth concerning these things, and
some distort it to suit their own views, and some of set purpose doubt
even of things which are palpably evident. Hence I think that those
who bestow attention on such subjects should adopt two lines of
argument, one in defence of the truth, another concerning the truth:
that in defence of the truth, for disbelievers and doubters; that
concerning the truth, for such as are candid and receive the truth
with readiness. Accordingly it behoves those who wish to investigate
these matters, to keep in view that which the necessity of the case in
each instance requires, and to regulate their discussion by this; to
accommodate the order of their treatment of these subjects to what is
suitable to the occasion, and not for the sake of appearing always to
preserve the same method, to disregard fitness and the place which
properly belongs to each topic. For, so far as proof and the natural
order are concerned, dissertations concerning the truth always take
precedence of those in defence of it; but, for the purpose of greater
utility, the order must be reversed, and arguments in defence of it
precede those concerning it. For the farmer could not properly cast
the seed into the ground, unless he first extirpated the wild wood,
and whatever would be hurtful to the good seed; nor the physician
introduce any wholesome medicines into the body that needed his care,
if he did not previously remove the disease within, or stay that which
was approaching. Neither surely can he who wishes to teach the truth
persuade any one by speaking about it, so long as there is a false
opinion lurking in the mind of his hearers, and barring the entrance
of his arguments. And, therefore, from regard to greater utility, I
myself sometimes place arguments in defence of the truth before those
concerning the truth; and on the present occasion it appears to me,
looking at the requirements of the case, not without advantage to
follow the same method in treating of the resurrection. For in regard
to this subject also we find some utterly disbelieving, and some
others doubting, and even among those who have accepted the first
principles some who are as much at a loss what to believe as those who
doubt; the most unaccountable thing of all being, that they are in
this state of mind without having any ground whatsoever in the matters
themselves for their disbelief, or finding it possible to assign any
reasonable cause why they disbelieve or experience any perplexity.
Footnotes
[835] [This argument was adapted to the times, and to those to whom it
was addressed, with great rhetorical art and concealment of art. Its
faults arise from the defective science of the age, and from the
habits of thought and of public instruction then in fashion. He does
not address himself to believers, but to sceptics, and meets them on
their highest levels of speech and of reason.]
Chapter II.--A Resurrection is Not Impossible.
Let us, then, consider the subject in the way I have indicated. If all
disbelief does not arise from levity and inconsideration, but if it
springs up in some minds on strong grounds and accompanied by the
certainty which belongs to truth [well and good]; for it then
maintains the appearance of being just, when the thing itself to which
their disbelief relates appears to them unworthy of belief; but to
disbelieve things which are not deserving of disbelief, is the act of
men who do not employ a sound judgment about the truth. It behoves,
therefore, those who disbelieve or doubt concerning the resurrection,
to form their opinion on the subject, not from any view they have
hastily adopted, and from what is acceptable to profligate men, but
either to assign the origin of men to no cause (a notion which is very
easily refuted), or, ascribing the cause of all things to God, to keep
steadily in view the principle involved in this article of belief, and
from this to demonstrate that the resurrection is utterly unworthy of
credit. This they will succeed in, if they are able to show that it is
either impossible for God, or contrary to His will, to unite and
gather together again bodies that are dead, or even entirely dissolved
into their elements, so as to constitute the same persons. If they
cannot do this, let them cease from this godless disbelief, and from
this blasphemy against sacred things: for, that they do not speak the
truth when they say that it is impossible, or not in accordance with
the divine will, will clearly appear from what I am about to say. A
thing is in strictness of language considered impossible to a person,
when it is of such a kind that he either does not know what is to be
done, or has not sufficient power for the proper doing of the thing
known. For he who is ignorant of anything that requires to be done, is
utterly unable either to attempt or to do what he is ignorant of; and
he, too, who knows ever so well what has to be done, and by what
means, and how, but either has no power at all to do the thing known,
or not power sufficient, will not even make the attempt, if he be wise
and consider his powers; and if he did attempt it without due
consideration, he would not accomplish his purpose. But it is not
possible for God to be ignorant, either of the nature of the bodies
that are to be raised, as regards both the members entire and the
particles of which they consist, or whither each of the dissolved
particles passes, and what part of the elements has received that
which is dissolved and has passed into that with which it has
affinity, although to men it may appear quite impossible that what has
again combined according to its nature with the universe should be
separable from it again. For He from whom, antecedently to the
peculiar formation of each, was not concealed either the nature of the
elements of which the bodies of men were to consist, or the parts of
these from which He was about to take what seemed to Him suitable for
the formation of the human body, will manifestly, after the
dissolution of the whole, not be ignorant whither each of the
particles has passed which He took for the construction of each. For,
viewed relatively to the order of things now obtaining among us, and
the judgment we form concerning other matters, it is a greater thing
to know beforehand that which has not yet come to pass; but, viewed
relatively to the majesty and wisdom of God, both are according to
nature, and it is equally easy to know beforehand things that have not
yet come into existence, and to know things which have been dissolved.
Chapter III.--He Who Could Create, Can Also Raise Up the Dead.
Moreover also, that His power is sufficient for the raising of dead
bodies, is shown by the creation of these same bodies. For if, when
they did not exist, He made at their first formation the bodies of
men, and their original elements, He will, when they are dissolved, in
whatever manner that may take place, raise them again with equal ease:
for this, too, is equally possible to Him. And it is no damage to the
argument, if some suppose the first beginnings to be from matter, or
the bodies of men at least to be derived from the elements as the
first materials, or from seed. For that power which could give shape
to what is regarded by them as shapeless matter, and adorn it, when
destitute of form and order, with many and diverse forms, and gather
into one the several portions of the elements, and divide the seed
which was one and simple into many, and organize that which was
unorganized, and give life to that which had no life,--that same power
can reunite what is dissolved, and raise up what is prostrate, and
restore the dead to life again, and put the corruptible into a state
of incorruption. And to the same Being it will belong, and to the same
power and skill, to separate that which has been broken up and
distributed among a multitude of animals of all kinds which are wont
to have recourse to such bodies, and glut their appetite upon
them,--to separate this, I say, and unite it again with the proper
members and parts of members, whether it has passed into some one of
those animals, or into many, or thence into others, or, after being
dissolved along with these, has been carried back again to the
original elements, resolved into these according to a natural law--a
matter this which seems to have exceedingly confounded some, even of
those admired for wisdom, who, I cannot tell why, think those doubts
worthy of serious attention which are brought forward by the many.
Chapter IV.--Objection from the Fact that Some Human Bodies Have Become
Part of Others.
These persons, to wit, say that many bodies of those who have come to
an unhappy death in shipwrecks and rivers have become food for fishes,
and many of those who perish in war, or who from some other sad cause
or state of things are deprived of burial, lie exposed to become the
food of any animals which may chance to light upon them. Since, then,
bodies are thus consumed, and the members and parts composing them are
broken up and distributed among a great multitude of animals, and by
means of nutrition become incorporated with the bodies of those that
are nourished by them,--in the first place, they say, their separation
from these is impossible; and besides this, in the second place, they
adduce another circumstance more difficult still. When animals of the
kind suitable for human food, which have fed on the bodies of men,
pass through their stomach, and become incorporated with the bodies of
those who have partaken of them, it is an absolute necessity, they
say, that the parts of the bodies of men which have served as
nourishment to the animals which have partaken of them should pass
into other bodies of men, since the animals which meanwhile have been
nourished by them convey the nutriment derived from those by whom they
were nourished into those men of whom they become the nutriment. Then
to this they tragically add the devouring of offspring perpetrated by
people in famine and madness, and the children eaten by their own
parents through the contrivance of enemies, and the celebrated Median
feast, and the tragic banquet of Thyestes; and they add, moreover,
other such like unheard-of occurrences which have taken place among
Greeks and barbarians: and from these things they establish, as they
suppose, the impossibility of the resurrection, on the ground that the
same parts cannot rise again with one set of bodies, and with another
as well; for that either the bodies of the former possessors cannot be
reconstituted, the parts which composed them having passed into
others, or that, these having been restored to the former, the bodies
of the last possessors will come short.
Chapter V.--Reference to the Processes of Digestion and Nutrition.
But it appears to me that such persons, in the first place, are
ignorant of the power and skill of Him that fashioned and regulates
this universe, who has adapted to the nature and kind of each animal
the nourishment suitable and correspondent to it, and has neither
ordained that everything in nature shall enter into union and
combination with every kind of body, nor is at any loss to separate
what has been so united, but grants to the nature of each several
created being or thing to do or to suffer what is naturally suited to
it, and sometimes also hinders and allows or forbids whatever He
wishes, and for the purpose He wishes; and, moreover, that they have
not considered the power and nature of each of the creatures that
nourish or are nourished. Otherwise they would have known that not
everything which is taken for food under the pressure of outward
necessity turns out to be suitable nourishment for the animal, but
that some things no sooner come into contact with the plicatures of
the stomach than they are wont to be corrupted, and are vomited or
voided, or disposed of in some other way, so that not even for a
little time do they undergo the first and natural digestion, much less
become incorporated with that which is to be nourished; as also, that
not even everything which has been digested in the stomach and
received the first change actually arrives at the parts to be
nourished, since some of it loses its nutritive power even in the
stomach, and some during the second change, and the digestion that
takes place in the liver is separated and passes into something else
which is destitute of the power to nourish; nay, that the change which
takes place in the liver does not all issue in nourishment to men, but
the matter changed is separated as refuse according to its natural
purpose; and that the nourishment which is left in the members and
parts themselves that have to be nourished sometimes changes to
something else, according as that predominates which is present in
greater or less [836] abundance, and is apt to corrupt or to turn into
itself that which comes near it.
Footnotes
[836] The common reading is "excessive."
Chapter VI.--Everything that is Useless or Hurtful is Rejected.
Since, therefore, great difference of nature obtains in all animals,
and the very nourishment which is accordant with nature is varied to
suit each kind of animal, and the body which is nourished; and as in
the nourishment of every animal there is a threefold cleansing and
separation, it follows that whatever is alien from the nourishment of
the animal must be wholly destroyed and carried off to its natural
place, or change into something else, since it cannot coalesce with
it; that the power of the nourishing body must be suitable to the
nature of the animal to be nourished, and accordant with its powers;
and that this, when it has passed through the strainers appointed for
the purpose, and been thoroughly purified by the natural means of
purification, must become a most genuine addition to the
substance,--the only thing, in fact, which any one calling things by
their right names would call nourishment at all; because it rejects
everything that is foreign and hurtful to the constitution of the
animal nourished and that mass of superfluous food introduced merely
for filling the stomach and gratifying the appetite. This nourishment,
no one can doubt, becomes incorporated with the body that is
nourished, interwoven and blended with all the members and parts of
members; but that which is different and contrary to nature is
speedily corrupted if brought into contact with a stronger power, but
easily destroys that which is overcome by it, and is converted into
hurtful humours and poisonous qualities, because producing nothing
akin or friendly to the body which is to be nourished. And it is a
very clear proof of this, that in many of the animals nourished, pain,
or disease, or death follows from these things, if, owing to a too
keen appetite, they take in mingled with their food something
poisonous and contrary to nature; which, of course, would tend to the
utter destruction of the body to be nourished, since that which is
nourished is nourished by substances akin to it and which accord with
its nature, but is destroyed by those of a contrary kind. If,
therefore, according to the different nature of animals, different
kinds of food have been provided suitable to their nature, and none of
that which the animal may have taken, not even an accidental part of
it, admits of being blended with the body which is nourished, but only
that part which has been purified by an entire digestion, and
undergone a complete change for union with a particular body, and
adapted to the parts which are to receive nourishment,--it is very
plain that none of the things contrary to nature can be united with
those bodies for which it is not a suitable and correspondent
nourishment, but either passes off by the bowels before it produces
some other humour, crude and corrupted; or, if it continue for a
longer time, produces suffering or disease hard to cure, destroying at
the same time the natural nourishment, or even the flesh itself which
needs nourishment. But even though it be expelled at length, overcome
by certain medicines, or by better food, or by the natural forces, it
is not got rid of without doing much harm, since it bears no peaceful
aspect towards what is natural, because it cannot coalesce with
nature.
Chapter VII.--The Resurrection-Body Different from the Present.
Nay, suppose we were to grant that the nourishment coming from these
things (let it be so called, as more accordant with the common way of
speaking), although against nature, is yet separated and changed into
some one of the moist or dry, or warm or cold, matters which the body
contains, our opponents would gain nothing by the concession: for the
bodies that rise again are reconstituted from the parts which properly
belong to them, whereas no one of the things mentioned is such a part,
nor has it the form or place of a part; nay, it does not remain always
with the parts of the body which are nourished, or rise again with the
parts that rise, since no longer does blood, or phlegm, or bile, or
breath, contribute anything to the life. Neither, again, will the
bodies nourished then require the things they once required, seeing
that, along with the want and corruption of the bodies nourished, the
need also of those things by which they were nourished is taken away.
To this must be added, that if we were to suppose the change arising
from such nourishment to reach as far as flesh, in that case too there
would be no necessity that the flesh recently changed by food of that
kind, if it became united to the body of some other man, should again
as a part contribute to the formation of that body, since neither the
flesh which takes it up always retains what it takes, nor does the
flesh so incorporated abide and remain with that to which it was
added, but is subject to a great variety of changes,--at one time
being dispersed by toil or care, at another time being wasted by grief
or trouble or disease, and by the distempers arising from being heated
or chilled, the humours which are changed with the flesh and fat not
receiving the nourishment so as to remain what they are. But while
such are the changes to which the flesh is subject, we should find
that flesh, nourished by food unsuited to it, suffers them in a much
greater degree; now swelling out and growing fat by what it has
received, and then again rejecting it in some way or other, and
decreasing in bulk, from one or more of the causes already mentioned;
and that that alone remains in the parts which is adapted to bind
together, or cover, or warm the flesh that has been chosen by nature,
and adheres to those parts by which it sustains the life which is
according to nature, and fulfils the labours of that life. So that
whether the investigation in which we have just been engaged be fairly
judged of, or the objections urged against our position be conceded,
in neither case can it be shown that what is said by our opponents is
true, nor can the bodies of men ever combine with those of the same
nature, whether at any time, through ignorance and being cheated of
their perception by some one else, men have partaken of such a body,
or of their own accord, impelled by want or madness, they have defiled
themselves with the body of one of like form; for we are very well
aware that some brutes have human forms, or have a nature compounded
of men and brutes, such as the more daring of the poets are accustomed
to represent.
Chapter VIII.--Human Flesh Not the Proper or Natural Food of Men.
But what need is there to speak of bodies not allotted to be the food
of any animal, and destined only for a burial in the earth in honour
of nature, since the Maker of the world has not alloted any animal
whatsoever as food to those of the same kind, although some others of
a different kind serve for food according to nature? If, indeed, they
are able to show that the flesh of men was alloted to men for food,
there will be nothing to hinder its being according to nature that
they should eat one another, just like anything else that is allowed
by nature, and nothing to prohibit those who dare to say such things
from regaling themselves with the bodies of their dearest friends as
delicacies, as being especially suited to them, and to entertain their
living friends with the same fare. But if it be unlawful even to speak
of this, and if for men to partake of the flesh of men is a thing most
hateful and abominable, and more detestable than any other unlawful
and unnatural food or act; and if what is against nature can never
pass into nourishment for the limbs and parts requiring it, and what
does not pass into nourishment can never become united with that which
it is not adapted to nourish,--then can the bodies of men never
combine with bodies like themselves, to which this nourishment would
be against nature, even though it were to pass many times through
their stomach, owing to some most bitter mischance; but, removed from
the influence of the nourishing power, and scattered to those parts of
the universe again from which they obtained their first origin, they
are united with these for as long a period of time as may be the lot
of each; and, separated thence again by the skill and power of Him who
has fixed the nature of every animal, and furnished it with its
peculiar powers, they are united suitably, each to each, whether they
have been burnt up by fire, or rotted by water, or consumed by wild
beasts, or by any other animals, or separated from the entire body and
dissolved before the other parts; and, being again united with one
another, they occupy the same place for the exact construction and
formation of the same body, and for the resurrection and life of that
which was dead, or even entirely dissolved. To expatiate further,
however, on these topics, is not suitable; for all men are agreed in
their decision respecting them,--those at least who are not half
brutes.
Chapter IX.--Absurdity of Arguing from Man's Impotency.
As there are many things of more importance to the inquiry before us,
I beg to be excused from replying for the present to those who take
refuge in the works of men, and even the constructors of them, who are
unable to make anew such of their works as are broken in pieces, or
worn out by time, or otherwise destroyed, and then from the analogy of
potters and carpenters attempt to show that God neither can will, nor
if He willed would be able, to raise again a body that is dead, or has
been dissolved,--not considering that by such reasoning they offer the
grossest insult to God, putting, as they do, on the same level the
capabilities of things which are altogether different, or rather the
natures of those who use them, and comparing the works of art with
those of nature. To bestow any serious attention on such arguments
would be not undeserving of censure, for it is really foolish to reply
to superficial and trifling objections. It is surely far more
probable, yea, most absolutely true, to say that what is impossible
with men is possible with God. And if by this statement of itself as
probable, and by the whole investigation in which we have just been
engaged reason shows it to be possible, it is quite clear that it is
not impossible. No, nor is it such a thing as God could not will.
Chapter X.--It Cannot Be Shown that God Does Not Will a Resurrection.
For that which is not accordant with His will is so either as being
unjust or as unworthy of Him. And again, the injustice regards either
him who is to rise again, or some other than he. But it is evident
that no one of the beings exterior to him, and that are reckoned among
the things that have existence, is injured. Spiritual natures (noetai
phuseis) cannot be injured by the resurrection of men, for the
resurrection of men is no hindrance to their existing, nor is any loss
or violence inflicted on them by it; nor, again, would the nature of
irrational or inanimate beings sustain wrong, for they will have no
existence after the resurrection, and no wrong can be done to that
which is not. But even if any one should suppose them to exist for
ever, they would not suffer wrong by the renewal of human bodies: for
if now, in being subservient to the nature of men and their
necessities while they require them, and subjected to the yoke and
every kind of drudgery, they suffer no wrong, much more, when men have
become immortal and free from want, and no longer need their service,
and when they are themselves liberated from bondage, will they suffer
no wrong. For if they had the gift of speech, they would not bring
against the Creator the charge of making them, contrary to justice,
inferior to men because they did not share in the same resurrection.
For to creatures whose nature is not alike the Just Being does not
assign a like end. And, besides, with creatures that have no notion of
justice there can be no complaint of injustice. Nor can it be said
either that there is any injustice done as regards the man to be
raised, for he consists of soul and body, and he suffers no wrong as
to either soul or body. No person in his senses will affirm that his
soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking so, he would at the same time
be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for if now, while
dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it has had no
wrong done to it, much less will it suffer wrong when living in
conjunction with a body which is free from corruption and suffering.
The body, again, suffers no wrong; for if no wrong is done to it now
while united a corruptible thing with an incorruptible, manifestly
will it not be wronged when united an incorruptible with an
incorruptible. No; nor can any one say that it is a work unworthy of
God to raise up and bring together again a body which has been
dissolved: for if the worse was not unworthy of Him, namely, to make
the body which is subject to corruption and suffering, much more is
the better not unworthy, to make one not liable to corruption or
suffering.
Chapter XI.--Recapitulation.
If, then, by means of that which is by nature first and that which
follows from it, each of the points investigated has been proved, it
is very evident that the resurrection of dissolved bodies is a work
which the Creator can perform, and can will, and such as is worthy of
Him: for by these considerations the falsehood of the contrary opinion
has been shown, and the absurdity of the position taken by
disbelievers. For why should I speak of their correspondence each with
each, and of their connection with one another? If indeed we ought to
use the word connection, as though they were separated by some
difference of nature; and not rather say, that what God can do He can
also will, and that what God can will it is perfectly possible for Him
to do, and that it is accordant with the dignity of Him who wills it.
That to discourse concerning the truth is one thing, and to discourse
in defence of it is another, has been sufficiently explained in the
remarks already made, as also in what respects they differ from each
other, and when and in dealing with whom they are severally useful;
but perhaps there is no reason why, with a view to the general
certainty, and because of the connection of what has been said with
what remains, we should not make a fresh beginning from these same
points and those which are allied to them. To the one kind of argument
it naturally pertains to hold the foremost place, to the other to
attend upon the first, and clear the way, and to remove whatever is
obstructive or hostile. The discourse concerning the truth, as being
necessary to all men for certainty and safety, holds the first place,
whether in nature, or order, or usefulness: in nature, as furnishing
the knowledge of the subject; in order, as being in those things and
along with those things which it informs us of; in usefulness, as
being a guarantee of certainty and safety to those who become
acquainted with it. The discourse in defence of the truth is inferior
in nature and force, for the refutation of falsehood is less important
than the establishment of truth; and second in order, for it employs
its strength against those who hold false opinions, and false opinions
are an aftergrowth from another sowing and from degeneration. But,
notwithstanding all this, it is often placed first, and sometimes is
found more useful, because it removes and clears away beforehand the
disbelief which disquiets some minds, and the doubt or false opinion
of such as have but recently come over. And yet each of them is
referrible to the same end, for the refutation of falsehood and the
establishment of truth both have piety for their object: not, indeed,
that they are absolutely one and the same, but the one is necessary,
as I have said, to all who believe, and to those who are concerned
about the truth and their own salvation; but the other proves to be
more useful on some occasions, and to some persons, and in dealing
with some. Thus much by way of recapitulation, to recall what has been
already said. We must now pass on to what we proposed, and show the
truth of the doctrine concerning the resurrection, both from the cause
itself, according to which, and on account of which, the first man and
his posterity were created, although they were not brought into
existence in the same manner, and from the common nature of all men as
men; and further, from the judgment of their Maker upon them according
to the time each has lived, and according to the rules by which each
has regulated his behaviour,--a judgment which no one can doubt will
be just.
Chapter XII.--Argument for the Resurrection /rom the Purpose Contemplated
in Man's Creation.
The argument from the cause will appear, if we consider whether man
was made at random and in vain, or for some purpose; and if for some
purpose, whether simply that he might live and continue in the natural
condition in which he was created, or for the use of another; and if
with a view to use, whether for that of the Creator Himself, or of
some one of the beings who belong to Him, and are by Him deemed worthy
of greater care. Now, if we consider this in the most general way, we
find that a person of sound mind, and who is moved by a rational
judgment to do anything, does nothing in vain which he does
intentionally, but either for his own use, or for the use of some
other person for whom he cares, or for the sake of the work itself,
being moved by some natural inclination and affection towards its
production. For instance (to make use of an illustration, that our
meaning may be clear), a man makes a house for his own use, but for
cattle and camels and other animals of which he has need he makes the
shelter suitable for each of them; not for his own use, if we regard
the appearance only, though for that, if we look at the end he has in
view, but as regards the immediate object, from concern for those for
whom he cares. He has children, too, not for his own use, nor for the
sake of anything else belonging to him, but that those who spring from
him may exist and continue as long as possible, thus by the succession
of children and grandchildren comforting himself respecting the close
of his own life, and hoping in this way to immortalize the mortal.
Such is the procedure of men. But God can neither have made man in
vain, for He is wise, and no work of wisdom is in vain; nor for His
own use, for He is in want of nothing. But to a Being absolutely in
need of nothing, no one of His works can contribute anything to His
own use. Neither, again, did He make man for the sake of any of the
other works which He has made. For nothing that is endowed with reason
and judgment has been created, or is created, for the use of another,
whether greater or less than itself, but for the sake of the life and
continuance of the being itself so created. For reason cannot discover
any use which might be deemed a cause for the creation of men, since
immortals are free from want, and in need of no help from men in order
to their existence; and irrational beings are by nature in a state of
subjection, and perform those services for men for which each of them
was intended, but are not intended in their turn to make use of men:
for it neither was nor is right to lower that which rules and takes
the lead to the use of the inferior, or to subject the rational to the
irrational, which is not suited to rule. Therefore, if man has been
created neither without cause and in vain (for none of God's works is
in vain, so far at least as the purpose of their Maker is concerned),
nor for the use of the Maker Himself, or of any of the works which
have proceeded from Him, it is quite clear that although, according to
the first and more general view of the subject, God made man for
Himself, and in pursuance of the goodness and wisdom which are
conspicuous throughout the creation, yet, according to the view which
more nearly touches the beings created, He made him for the sake of
the life of those created, which is not kindled for a little while and
then extinguished. For to creeping things, I suppose, and birds, and
fishes, or, to speak more generally, all irrational creatures, God has
assigned such a life as that; but to those who bear upon them the
image of the Creator Himself, and are endowed with understanding, and
blessed with a rational judgment, the Creator has assigned perpetual
duration, in order that, recognising their own Maker, and His power
and skill, and obeying law and justice, they may pass their whole
existence free from suffering, in the possession of those qualities
with which they have bravely borne their preceding life, although they
lived in corruptible and earthly bodies. For whatever has been created
for the sake of something else, when that has ceased to be for the
sake of which it was created, will itself also fitly cease to be, and
will not continue to exist in vain, since, among the works of God,
that which is useless can have no place; but that which was created
for the very purpose of existing and living a life naturally suited to
it, since the cause itself is bound up with its nature, and is
recognised only in connection with existence itself, can never admit
of any cause which shall utterly annihilate its existence. But since
this cause is seen to lie in perpetual existence, the being so created
must be preserved for ever, doing and experiencing what is suitable to
its nature, each of the two parts of which it consists contributing
what belongs to it, so that the soul may exist and remain without
change in the nature in which it was made, and discharge its
appropriate functions (such as presiding over the impulses of the
body, and judging of and measuring that which occurs from time to time
by the proper standards and measures), and the body be moved according
to its nature towards its appropriate objects, and undergo the changes
allotted to it, and, among the rest (relating to age, or appearance,
or size), the resurrection. For the resurrection is a species of
change, and the last of all, and a change for the better of what still
remains in existence at that time.
Chapter XIII.--Continuation of the Argument.
[837] Confident of these things, no less than of those which have
already come to pass, and reflecting on our own nature, we are content
with a life associated with neediness and corruption, as suited to our
present state of existence, and we stedfastly hope for a continuance
of being in immortality; and this we do not take without foundation
from the inventions of men, feeding ourselves on false hopes, but our
belief rests on a most infallible guarantee--the purpose of Him who
fashioned us, according to which He made man of an immortal soul [838]
and a body, and furnished him with understanding and an innate law for
the preservation and safeguard of the things given by Him as suitable
to an intelligent existence and a rational life: for we know well that
He would not have fashioned such a being, and furnished him with
everything belonging to perpetuity, had He not intended that what was
so created should continue in perpetuity. If, therefore, the Maker of
this universe made man with a view to his partaking of an intelligent
life, and that, having become a spectator of His grandeur, and of the
wisdom which is manifest in all things, he might continue always in
the contemplation of these; then, according to the purpose of his
Author, and the nature which he has received, the cause of his
creation is a pledge of his continuance for ever, and this continuance
is a pledge of the resurrection, without which man could not continue.
So that, from what has been said, it is quite clear that the
resurrection is plainly proved by the cause of man's creation, and the
purpose of Him who made him. Such being the nature of the cause for
which man has been brought into this world, the next thing will be to
consider that which immediately follows, naturally or in the order
proposed; and in our investigation the cause of their creation is
followed by the nature of the men so created, and the nature of those
created by the just judgment of their Maker upon them, and all these
by the end of their existence. Having investigated therefore the point
placed first in order, we must now go on to consider the nature of
men.
Footnotes
[837] [The calm sublimity of this paragraph excels all that ever came
from an Athenian before. In the Phoedon we have conjectures: here is
certain hope and patient submission as our resonable service.]
[838] [Kaye, p. 199. Compare Embassy, cap. xxvii., supra, p. 143.]
Chapter XIV.--The Resurrection Does Not Rest Solely on the Fact of a
Future Judgment.
The proof [839] of the several doctrines of which the truth consists,
or of any matter whatsoever proposed for examination, if it is to
produce an unwavering confidence in what is said, must begin, not from
anything without, nor from what certain persons think or have thought,
[840] but from the common and natural notion [841] of the matter, or
from the connection of secondary truths with primary ones. For the
question relates either to primary beliefs, and then all that is
necessary is reminiscence, so as to stir up the natural notion; or to
things which naturally follow from the first and to their natural
sequence. And in these things we must observe order, showing what
strictly follows from the first truths, or from those which are placed
first, so as neither to be unmindful of the truth, or of our certainty
respecting it, nor to confound the things arranged by nature and
distinguished from each other, or break up the natural order. Hence I
think it behoves those who desire to handle the subject with fairness,
and who wish to form an intelligent judgment whether there is a
resurrection or not, first to consider attentively the force of the
arguments contributing to the proof of this, and what place each of
them holds--which is first, which second, which third, and which last.
And in the arrangement of these they should place first the cause of
the creation of men,--namely, the purpose of the Creator in making
man; and then connect with this, as is suitable, the nature of the men
so created; not as being second in order, but because we are unable to
pass our judgment on both at the same time, although they have the
closest natural connection with each other, and are of equal force in
reference to the subject before us. But while from these proofs as the
primary ones, and as being derived from the work of creation, the
resurrection is clearly demonstrated, none the less can we gain
conviction respecting it from the arguments taken from providence,--I
mean from the reward or punishment due to each man in accordance with
just judgment, and from the end of human existence. For many, in
discussing the subject of the resurrection, have rested the whole
cause on the third argument alone, deeming that the cause of the
resurrection is the judgment. But the fallacy of this is very clearly
shown, from the fact that, although all human beings who die rise
again, yet not all who rise again are to be judged: for if only a just
judgment were the cause of the resurrection, it would of course follow
that those who had done neither evil nor good--namely, very young
children [842] --would not rise again; but seeing that all are to rise
again, those who have died in infancy as well as others, they too
justify our conclusion that the resurrection takes place not for the
sake of the judgment as the primary reason, but in consequence of the
purpose of God in forming men, and the nature of the beings so formed.
Footnotes
[839] [This chapter of itself establishes the fact that Christians
have a right to demand the evidence for what they are required to
believe. It refutes the idea that what any single bishop or saint has
said or thought is doctrine, for that reason only; but it leaves the
fact that concurrent testimony is evidence, on certain conditions, in
all its force.]
[840] [Not strong enough for the force of the original: oud' ek ton
tisi dokounton e dedogmenon.]
[841] [From the natural common sense of the thing.]
[842] [A beautiful and cogent argument for his proposition, and a
precious testimony to the innocence of babes falling asleep in Christ.
See Kaye, 190.]
Chapter XV.--Argument for the Resurrection from the Nature of Man.
But while the cause discoverable in the creation of men is of itself
sufficient to prove that the resurrection follows by natural sequence
on the dissolution of bodies, yet it is perhaps right not to shrink
from adducing either of the proposed arguments, but, agreeably to what
has been said, to point out to those who are not able of themselves to
discern them, the arguments from each of the truths evolved from the
primary; and first and foremost, the nature of the men created, which
conducts us to the same notion, and has the same force as evidence of
the resurrection. For if the whole nature of men in general is
composed of an immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the
creation, and if neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to
the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or
such a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men
compounded of the two, in order that they may, when they have passed
through their present existence, arrive at one common end, with the
same elements of which they are composed at their birth and during
life, it unavoidably follows, since one living-being is formed from
the two, experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever the
body experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment
of the senses or of the reason, that the whole series of these things
must be referred to some one end, in order that they all, and by means
of all,--namely, man's creation, man's nature, man's life, man's
doings and sufferings, his course of existence, and the end suitable
to his nature,--may concur in one harmony and the same common
experience. But if there is some one harmony and community of
experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things which
spring from the soul or of those which are accomplished by means of
the body, the end for all these must also be one. And the end will be
in strictness one, if the being whose end that end is remains the same
in its constitution; and the being will be exactly the same, if all
those things of which the being consists as parts are the same. And
they will be the same in respect of their peculiar union, if the parts
dissolved are again united for the constitution of the being. And the
constitution of the same men of necessity proves that a resurrection
will follow of the dead and dissolved bodies; for without this,
neither could the same parts be united according to nature with one
another, nor could the nature of the same men be reconstituted. And if
both understanding and reason have been given to men for the
discernment of things which are perceived by the understanding, and
not of existences only, but also of the goodness and wisdom and
rectitude of their Giver, it necessarily follows that, since those
things continue for the sake of which the rational judgment is given,
the judgment given for these things should also continue. But it is
impossible for this to continue, unless the nature which has received
it, and in which it adheres, continues. But that which has received
both understanding and reason is man, not the soul by itself. Man,
therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But
it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no
resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not
continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain has the
soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in
vain has the body been fettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs
for, obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a
bridle; in vain is the understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the
observance of rectitude, or even the practice of every virtue, and the
enactment and enforcement of laws,--to say all in a word, whatever is
noble in men or for men's sake, or rather the very creation and nature
of men. But if vanity is utterly excluded from all the works of God,
and from all the gifts bestowed by Him, the conclusion is unavoidable,
that, along with the interminable duration of the soul, there will be
a perpetual continuance of the body according to its proper nature.
Chapter XVI--Analogy of Death and Sleep, and Consequent Argument for the
Resurrection.
And let no one think it strange that we call by the name of life a
continuance of being which is interrupted by death and corruption; but
let him consider rather that this word has not one meaning only, nor
is there only one measure of continuance, because the nature also of
the things that continue is not one. For if each of the things that
continue has its continuance according to its peculiar nature, neither
in the case of those who are wholly incorruptible and immortal shall
we find the continuance like ours, because the natures of superior
beings do not take the level of such as are inferior; nor in men is it
proper to look for a continuance invariable and unchangeable; inasmuch
as the former are from the first created immortal, and continue to
exist without end by the simple will of their Maker, and men, in
respect of the soul, have from their first origin an unchangeable
continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality by means of
change. This is what is meant by the doctrine of the resurrection;
and, looking to this, we both await the dissolution of the body, as
the sequel to a life of want and corruption, and after this we hope
for a continuance with immortality, [843] not putting either our death
on a level with the death of the irrational animals, or the
continuance of man with the continuance of immortals, lest we should
unawares in this way put human nature and life on a level with things
with which it is not proper to compare them. It ought not, therefore,
to excite dissatisfaction, if some inequality appears to exist in
regard to the duration of men; nor, because the separation of the soul
from the members of the body and the dissolution of its parts
interrupts the continuity of life, must we therefore despair of the
resurrection. For although the relaxation of the senses and of the
physical powers, which naturally takes place in sleep, seems to
interrupt the sensational life when men sleep at equal intervals of
time, and, as it were, come back to life again, yet we do not refuse
to call it life; and for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the
brother of death, [844] not as deriving their origin from the same
ancestors and fathers, but because those who are dead and those who
sleep are subject to similar states, as regards at least the stillness
and the absence of all sense of the present or the past, or rather of
existence itself and their own life. If, therefore, we do not refuse
to call by the name of life the life of men full of such inequality
from birth to dissolution, and interrupted by all those things which
we have before mentioned, neither ought we to despair of the life
succeeding to dissolution, such as involves the resurrection, although
for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from the
body.
Footnotes
[843] [Job xix. 25. On which see St. Jerome, Ad Paulinum, cap. 10,
tom. iv. 569, ed. Bened. And, on the text itself, see Pusey on Daniel,
p. 504, London, 1864. A fine passage in Calvin, ad locum: "En igitur
qualis debate esse nostra Fides," etc. Opp., tom. ii. p. 260, ed.
Amsterdam, 1676.]
[844] [Homer, Iliad, b. xiv. 231, and Virgil, Æn., vi. 278.]
Chapter XVII.--The Series of Changes We Can Now Trace in Man Renders a
Resurrection Probable.
For this nature of men, which has inequality allotted to it from the
first, and according to the purpose of its Maker, has an unequal life
and continuance, interrupted sometimes by sleep, at another time by
death, and by the changes incident to each period of life, whilst
those which follow the first are not clearly seen beforehand. Would
any one have believed, unless taught by experience, that in the soft
seed alike in all its parts there was deposited such a variety and
number of great powers, or of masses, which in this way arise and
become consolidated--I mean of bones, and nerves, and cartilages, of
muscles too, and flesh, and intestines, and the other parts of the
body? For neither in the yet moist seed is anything of this kind to be
seen, nor even in infants do any of those things make their appearance
which pertain to adults, or in the adult period what belongs to those
who are past their prime, or in these what belongs to such as have
grown old. But although some of the things I have said exhibit not at
all, and others but faintly, the natural sequence and the changes that
come upon the nature of men, yet all who are not blinded in their
judgment of these matters by vice or sloth, know that there must be
first the depositing of the seed, and that when this is completely
organized in respect of every member and part and the progeny comes
forth to the light, there comes the growth belonging to the first
period of life, and the maturity which attends growth, and after the
maturity the slackening of the physical powers till old age, and then,
when the body is worn out, its dissolution. As, therefore, in this
matter, though neither the seed has inscribed upon it the life or form
of men, nor the life the dissolution into the primary elements; the
succession of natural occurrences makes things credible which have no
credibility from the phenomena themselves, much more does reason,
tracing out the truth from the natural sequence, afford ground for
believing in the resurrection, since it is safer and stronger than
experience for establishing the truth.
Chapter XVIII.--Judgment Must Have Reference Both to Soul and Body: There
Will Therefore Be a Resurrection.
The arguments I just now proposed for examination, as establishing the
truth of the resurrection, are all of the same kind, since they all
start from the same point; for their starting-point is the origin of
the first men by creation. But while some of them derive their
strength from the starting-point itself from which they take their
rise, others, consequent upon the nature and the life of men, acquire
their credibility from the superintendence of God over us; for the
cause according to which, and on account of which, men have come into
being, being closely connected with the nature of men, derives its
force from creation; but the argument from rectitude, which represents
God as judging men according as they have lived well or ill, derives
its force from the end of their existence: they come into being on the
former ground, but their state depends more on God's superintendence.
And now that the matters which come first have been demonstrated by me
to the best of my ability, it will be well to prove our proposition by
those also which come after--I mean by the reward or punishment due to
each man in accordance with righteous judgment, and by the final cause
of human existence; and of these I put foremost that which takes the
lead by nature, and inquire first into the argument relating to the
judgment: premising only one thing, from concern for the principle
which appertains to the matters before us, and for order--namely, that
it is incumbent on those who admit God to be the Maker of this
universe, to ascribe to His wisdom and rectitude the preservation and
care of all that has been created, if they wish to keep to their own
principles; and with such views to hold that nothing either in earth
or in heaven is without guardianship or providence, but that, on the
contrary, to everything, invisible and visible alike, small and great,
the attention of the Creator reaches; for all created things require
the attention of the Creator, [845] and each one in particular,
according to its nature and the end for which it was made: though I
think it would be a useless expenditure of trouble to go through the
list now, or distinguish between the several cases, or mention in
detail what is suitable to each nature. Man, at all events, of whom it
is now our business to speak, as being in want, requires food; as
being mortal, posterity; as being rational, a process of judgment. But
if each of these things belongs to man by nature, and he requires food
for his life, and requires posterity for the continuance of the race,
and requires a judgment in order that food and posterity may be
according to law, it of course follows, since food and posterity refer
to both together, that the judgment must be referred to them too (by
both together I mean man, consisting of soul and body), and that such
man becomes accountable for all his actions, and receives for them
either reward or punishment. Now, if the righteous judgment awards to
both together its retribution for the deeds wrought; and if it is not
proper that either the soul alone should receive the wages of the
deeds wrought in union with the body (for this of itself has no
inclination to the faults which are committed in connection with the
pleasure or food and culture of the body), or that the body alone
should (for this of itself is incapable of distinguishing law and
justice), but man, composed of these, is subjected to trial for each
of the deeds wrought by him; and if reason does not find this
happening either in this life (for the award according to merit finds
no place in the present existence, since many atheists and persons who
practice every iniquity and wickedness live on to the last, unvisited
by calamity, whilst, on the contrary, those who have manifestly lived
an exemplary life in respect of every virtue, live in pain, in insult,
in calumny and outrage, and suffering of all kinds) or after death
(for both together no longer exist, the soul being separated from the
body, and the body itself being resolved again into the materials out
of which it was composed, and no longer retaining anything of its
former structure or form, much less the remembrance of its actions):
the result of all this is very plain to every one,--namely, that, in
the language of the apostle, "this corruptible (and dissoluble) must
put on incorruption," [846] in order that those who were dead, having
been made alive by the resurrection, and the parts that were separated
and entirely dissolved having been again united, each one may, in
accordance with justice, receive what he has done by the body, whether
it be good or bad.
Footnotes
[845] [Noble testimony to a minute and particular Providence. Kaye, p.
191.]
[846] 1 Cor. xv. 54.
Chapter XIX.--Man Would Be More Unfavourably Situated Than the Beasts If
There Were No Resurrection.
In replying, then, to those who acknowledge a divine superintendence,
and admit the same principles as we do, yet somehow depart from their
own admissions, one may use such arguments as those which have been
adduced, and many more than these, should he be disposed to amplify
what has been said only concisely and in a cursory manner. But in
dealing with those who differ from us concerning primary truths, it
will perhaps be well to lay down another principle antecedent to
these, joining with them in doubting of the things to which their
opinions relate, and examining the matter along with them in this
manner--whether the life of men, and their entire course of existence,
is overlooked, and a sort of dense darkness is poured down upon the
earth, hiding in ignorance and silence both the men themselves and
their actions; or whether it is much safer to be of opinion that the
Maker presides over the things which He Himself has made, inspecting
all things whatsoever which exist, or come into existence, Judge of
both deeds and purposes. For if no judgment whatever were to be passed
on the actions of men, men would have no advantage over the irrational
creatures, but rather would fare worse than these do, inasmuch as they
keep in subjection their passions, and concern themselves about piety,
and righteousness, and the other virtues; and a life after the manner
of brutes would be the best, virtue would be absurd, the threat of
judgment a matter for broad laughter, indulgence in every kind of
pleasure the highest good, and the common resolve of all these and
their one law would be that maxim, so dear to the intemperate and
lewd, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." For the
termination of such a life is not even pleasure, as some suppose, but
utter insensibility. But if the Maker of men takes any concern about
His own works, and the distinction is anywhere to be found between
those who have lived well and ill, it must be either in the present
life, while men are still living who have conducted themselves
virtuously or viciously, or after death, when men are in a state of
separation and dissolution. But according to neither of these
suppositions can we find a just judgment taking place; for neither do
the good in the present life obtain the rewards of virtue, nor yet do
the bad receive the wages of vice. I pass over the fact, that so long
as the nature we at present possess is preserved, the moral nature is
not able to bear a punishment commensurate with the more numerous or
more serious faults. For the robber, or ruler, or tyrant, who has
unjustly put to death myriads on myriads, could not by one death make
restitution for these deeds; and the man who holds no true opinion
concerning God, but lives in all outrage and blasphemy, despises
divine things, breaks the laws, commits outrage against boys and women
alike, razes cities unjustly, burns houses with their inhabitants, and
devastates a country, and at the same time destroys inhabitants of
cities and peoples, and even an entire nation--how in a mortal body
could he endure a penalty adequate to these crimes, since death
prevents the deserved punishment, and the mortal nature does not
suffice for any single one of his deeds? It is proved, therefore, that
neither in the present life is there a judgment according to men's
deserts, nor after death.
Chapter XX.--Man Must Be Possessed Both of a Body and Soul Hereafter,
that the Judgment Passed Upon Him May Be Just.
For either death is the entire extinction of life, the soul being
dissolved and corrupted along with the body, or the soul remains by
itself, incapable of dissolution, of dispersion, of corruption, whilst
the body is corrupted and dissolved, retaining no longer any
remembrance of past actions, nor sense of what it experienced in
connection with the soul. If the life of men is to be utterly
extinguished, it is manifest there will be no care for men who are not
living, no judgment respecting those who have lived in virtue or in
vice; but there will rush in again upon us whatever belongs to a
lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities which follow from it, and
that which is the summit of this lawlessness--atheism. But if the body
were to be corrupted, and each of the dissolved particles to pass to
its kindred element, yet the soul to remain by itself as immortal,
neither on this supposition would any judgment on the soul take place,
since there would be an absence of equity: for it is unlawful to
suspect that any judgment can proceed out of God and from God which is
wanting in equity. Yet equity is wanting to the judgment, if the being
is not preserved in existence who practiced righteousness or
lawlessness: for that which practiced each of the things in life on
which the judgment is passed was man, not soul by itself. To sum up
all in a word, this view will in no case consist with equity.
Chapter XXI.--Continuation of the Argument.
For if good deeds are rewarded, the body will clearly be wronged,
inasmuch as it has shared with the soul in the toils connected with
well-doing, but does not share in the reward of the good deeds, and
because, though the soul is often excused for certain faults on the
ground of the body's neediness and want, the body itself is deprived
of all share in the good deeds done, the toils on behalf of which it
helped to bear during life. Nor, again, if faults are judged, is the
soul dealt fairly with, supposing it alone to pay the penalty for the
faults it committed through being solicited by the body and drawn away
by it to its own appetites and motions, at one time being seized upon
and carried off, at another attracted in some very violent manner, and
sometimes concurring with it by way of kindness and attention to its
preservation. How can it possibly be other than unjust for the soul to
be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own
nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as
licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts
arising out of these? For if the majority of such evils come from
men's not having the mastery of the passions which solicit them, and
they are solicited by the neediness and want of the body, and the care
and attention required by it (for these are the motives for every
acquisition of property, and especially for the using of it, and
moreover for marriage and all the actions of life, in which things,
and in connection with which, is seen what is faulty and what is not
so), how can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of
those things which the body is the first to be sensible of, and in
which it draws the soul away to sympathy and participation in actions
with a view to things which it wants; and that the appetites and
pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which whatever
exceeds the proper bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in
motion by the body, and yet that the sins arising from these, and the
punishments for the sins committed, should fall upon the soul alone,
which neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or
suffers of itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer? But even if
we hold that these affections do not pertain to the body alone, but to
man, in saying which we should speak correctly, because the life of
man is one, though composed of the two, yet surely we shall not assert
that these things belong to the soul, if we only look simply at its
peculiar nature. For if it is absolutely without need of food, it can
never desire those things which it does not in the least require for
its subsistence; nor can it feel any impulse towards any of those
things which it is not at all fitted to use; nor, again, can it be
grieved at the want of money or other property, since these are not
suited to it. And if, too, it is superior to corruption, it fears
nothing whatever as destructive of itself: it has no dread of famine,
or disease, or mutilation, or blemish, or fire, or sword, since it
cannot suffer from any of these any hurt or pain, because neither
bodies nor bodily powers touch it at all. But if it is absurd to
attach the passions to the soul as belonging specially to it, it is in
the highest degree unjust and unworthy of the judgment of God to lay
upon the soul alone the sins which spring from them, and the
consequent punishments.
Chapter XXII.--Continuation of the Argument.
In addition to what has been said, is it not absurd that, while we
cannot even have the notion of virtue and vice as existing separately
in the soul (for we recognise the virtues as man's virtues, even as in
like manner vice, their opposite, as not belonging to the soul in
separation from the body, and existing by itself), yet that the reward
or punishment for these should be assigned to the soul alone? How can
any one have even the notion of courage or fortitude as existing in
the soul alone, when it has no fear of death, or wounds, or maiming,
or loss, or maltreatment, or of the pain connected with these, or the
suffering resulting from them? And what shall we say of self-control
and temperance, when there is no desire drawing it to food or sexual
intercourse, or other pleasures and enjoyments, nor any other thing
soliciting it from within or exciting it from without? And what of
practical wisdom, when things are not proposed to it which may or may
not be done, nor things to be chosen or avoided, or rather when there
is in it no motion at all or natural impulse towards the doing of
anything? And how in any sense can equity be an attribute of souls,
either in reference to one another or to anything else, whether of the
same or of a different kind, when they are not able from any source,
or by any means, or in any way, to bestow that which is equal
according to merit or according to analogy, with the exception of the
honour rendered to God, and, moreover, have no impulse or motion
towards the use of their own things, or abstinence from those of
others, since the use of those things which are according to nature,
or the abstinence from them, is considered in reference to those who
are so constituted as to use them, whereas the soul neither wants
anything, nor is so constituted as to use any things or any single
thing, and therefore what is called the independent action of the
parts cannot be found in the soul so constituted?
Chapter XXIII.--Continuation of the Argument.
But the most irrational thing of all is this: to impose properly
sanctioned laws on men, and then to assign to their souls alone the
recompense of their lawful or unlawful deeds. For if he who receives
the laws would also justly receive the recompense of the transgression
of the laws, and if it was man that received the laws, and not the
soul by itself, man must also bear the recompense for the sins
committed, and not the soul by itself, since God has not enjoined on
souls to abstain from things which have no relation to them, such as
adultery, murder, theft, rapine, dishonour to parents, and every
desire in general that tends to the injury and loss of our neighbours.
For neither the command, "Honour thy father and thy mother," is
adapted to souls alone, since such names are not applicable to them,
for souls do not produce souls, so as to appropriate the appellation
of father or mother, but men produce men; nor could the command, "Thou
shalt not commit adultery," ever be properly addressed to souls, or
even thought of in such a connection, since the difference of male and
female does not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual
intercourse, nor appetite for it; and where there is no appetite,
there can be no intercourse; and where there is no intercourse at all,
there can be no legitimate intercourse, namely marriage; and where
there is no lawful intercourse, neither can there be unlawful desire
of, or intercourse with, another man's wife, namely adultery. Nor,
again, is the prohibition of theft, or of the desire of having more,
applicable to souls, for they do not need those things, through the
need of which, by reason of natural indigence or want, men are
accustomed to steal or to rob, such as gold, or silver, or an animal,
or something else adapted for food, or shelter, or use; for to an
immortal nature everything which is desired by the needy as useful is
useless. But let the fuller discussion of these matters be left to
those who wish to investigate each point more exactly, or to contend
more earnestly with opponents. But, since what has just been said, and
that which concurs with this to guarantee the resurrection, suffices
for us, it would not be seasonable to dwell any longer upon them; for
we have not made it our aim to omit nothing that might be said, but to
point out in a summary manner to those who have assembled what ought
to be thought concerning the resurrection, and to adapt to the
capacity of those present the arguments bearing on this question.
Chapter XXIV.--Argument for the Resurrection from the Chief End of Man.
The points proposed for consideration having been to some extent
investigated, it remains to examine the argument from the end or final
cause, which indeed has already emerged in what has been said, and
only requires just so much attention and further discussion as may
enable us to avoid the appearance of leaving unmentioned any of the
matters briefly referred to by us, and thus indirectly damaging the
subject or the division of topics made at the outset. For the sake of
those present, therefore, and of others who may pay attention to this
subject, it may be well just to signify that each of those things
which are constituted by nature, and of those which are made by art,
must have an end peculiar to itself, as indeed is taught us by the
common sense of all men, and testified by the things that pass before
our eyes. For do we not see that husbandmen have one end, and
physicians another; and again, the things which spring out of the
earth another, and the animals nourished upon it, and produced
according to a certain natural series, another? If this is evident,
and natural and artificial powers, and the actions arising from these,
must by all means be accompanied by an end in accordance with nature,
it is absolutely necessary that the end of men, since it is that of a
peculiar nature, should be separated from community with the rest; for
it is not lawful to suppose the same end for beings destitute of
rational judgment, and of those whose actions are regulated by the
innate law and reason, and who live an intelligent life and observe
justice. Freedom from pain, therefore, cannot be the proper end for
the latter, for this they would have in common with beings utterly
devoid of sensibility: nor can it consist in the enjoyment of things
which nourish or delight the body, or in an abundance of pleasures;
else a life like that of the brutes must hold the first place, while
that regulated by virtue is without a final cause. For such an end as
this, I suppose, belongs to beasts and cattle, not to men possessed of
an immortal soul and rational judgment.
Chapter XXV.--Argument Continued and Concluded.
Nor again is it the happiness of soul separated from body: for we are
not inquiring about the life or final cause of either of the parts of
which man consists, but of the being who is composed of both; for such
is every man who has a share in this present existence, and there must
be some appropriate end proposed for this life. But if it is the end
of both parts together, and this can be discovered neither while they
are still living in the present state of existence through the
numerous causes already mentioned, nor yet when the soul is in a state
of separation, because the man cannot be said to exist when the body
is dissolved, and indeed entirely scattered abroad, even though the
soul continue by itself--it is absolutely necessary that the end of a
man's being should appear in some reconstitution of the two together,
and of the same living being. And as this follows of necessity, there
must by all means be a resurrection of the bodies which are dead, or
even entirely dissolved, and the same men must be formed anew, since
the law of nature ordains the end not absolutely, nor as the end of
any men whatsoever, but of the same men who passed through the
previous life; but it is impossible for the same men to be
reconstituted unless the same bodies are restored to the same souls.
But that the same soul should obtain the same body is impossible in
any other way, and possible only by the resurrection; for if this
takes place, an end befitting the nature of men follows also. And we
shall make no mistake in saying, that the final cause of an
intelligent life and rational judgment, is to be occupied
uninterruptedly with those objects to which the natural reason is
chiefly and primarily adapted, and to delight unceasingly in the
contemplation of Him who is, and of His decrees, notwithstanding that
the majority of men, because they are affected too passionately and
too violently by things below, pass through life without attaining
this object. For the large number of those who fail of the end that
belongs to them does not make void the common lot, since the
examination relates to individuals, and the reward or punishment of
lives ill or well spent is proportioned to the merit of each.
[This concluding chapter is of itself a masterpiece, and comforts my
own soul unspeakably, as proving that this life is very precious, if
only directed to the end from which we are created. Blest be
Athenagoras for completing what St. Paul began on the Areopagus, and
for giving us "beauty for ashes" out of the gardens of Plato. Now we
find what power there was in the apostle's word, when he preached to
the Athenians, "Jesus and the resurrection."]
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