Against Hermogenes - Tertullian
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Containing an Argument Against His Opinion that Matter is Eternal.
Translated by Dr. Holmes.
Text edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson and
first published by T&T Clark in Edinburgh in 1867. Additional
introductionary material and notes provided for the American
edition by A. Cleveland Coxe, 1886.
Chapter I. The Opinions of Hermogenes, by the Prescriptive Rule of Antiquity
Shown to Be Heretical. Not Derived from Christianity, But from Heathen
Philosophy. Some of the Tenets Mentioned.
We are accustomed, for the purpose of shortening argument, [6108] to lay
down the rule against heretics of the lateness of their date. [6109] For in
as far as by our rule, priority is given to the truth, which also foretold
that there would be heresies, in so far must all later opinions be prejudged
as heresies, being such as were, by the more ancient rule of truth,
predicted as (one day) to happen. Now, the doctrine of Hermogenes has this
[6110] taint of novelty. He is, in short, [6111] a man living in the world
at the present time; by his very nature a heretic, and turbulent withal, who
mistakes loquacity for eloquence, and supposes impudence to be firmness, and
judges it to be the duty of a good conscience to speak ill of individuals.
[6112] Moreover, he despises God's law in his painting, [6113] maintaining
repeated marriages, [6114] alleges the law of God in defence of lust, [6115]
and yet despises it in respect of his art. [6116] He falsifies by a twofold
process'with his cautery and his pen. [6117] He is a thorough adulterer,
both doctrinally and carnally, since he is rank indeed with the contagion of
your marriage-hacks, [6118] and has also failed in cleaving to the rule of
faith as much as the apostle's own Hermogenes. [6119] However, never mind
the man, when it is his doctrine which I question. He does not appear to
acknowledge any other Christ as Lord, [6120] though he holds Him in a
different way; but by this difference in his faith he really makes Him
another being,'nay, he takes from Him everything which is God, since he will
not have it that He made all things of nothing. For, turning away from
Christians to the philosophers, from the Church to the Academy and the
Porch, he learned there from the Stoics how to place Matter (on the same
level) with the Lord, just as if it too had existed ever both unborn and
unmade, having no beginning at all nor end, out of which, according to
him, [6121] the Lord afterwards created all things.
Chapter II. Hermogenes, After a Perverse Induction from Mere Heretical
Assumptions, Concludes that God Created All Things Out of Pre-Existing
Matter.
Our very bad painter has coloured this his primary shade absolutely without
any light, with such arguments as these: He begins with laying down the
premiss, [6122] that the Lord made all things either out of Himself, or
out of nothing, or out of something; in order that, after he has shown that
it was impossible for Him to have made them either out of Himself or out of
nothing, he might thence affirm the residuary proposition that He made them
out of something, and therefore that that something was Matter. He could not
have made all things, he says, of Himself; because whatever things the Lord
made of Himself would have been parts of Himself; but [6123] He is not
dissoluble into parts, [6124] , because, being the Lord, He is
indivisible, and unchangeable, and always the same. Besides, if He had made
anything out of Himself, it would have been something of Himself.
Everything, however, both which was made and which He made must be accounted
imperfect, because it was made of a part, and He made it of a part; or if,
again, it was a whole which He made, who is a whole Himself, He must in that
case have been at once both a whole, and yet not a whole; because it behaved
Him to be a whole, that He might produce Himself, [6125] and yet not a
whole, that He might be produced out of Himself. [6126] But this is a most
difficult position. For if He were in existence, He could not be made, for
He was in existence already; if, however, he were not in existence He could
not make, because He was a nonentity. He maintains, moreover, that He who
always exists, does not come into existence, [6127] but exists for ever
and ever. He accordingly concludes that He made nothing out of Himself,
since He never passed into such a condition [6128] as made it possible for
Him to make anything out of Himself. In like manner, he contends that He
could not have made all things out of nothing'thus: He defines the Lord as a
being who is good, nay, very good, who must will to make things as good and
excellent as He is Himself; indeed it were impossible for Him either to will
or to make anything which was not good, nay, very good itself. Therefore all
things ought to have been made good and excellent by Him, after His own
condition. Experience shows, [6129] however, that things which are even
evil were made by Him: not, of course, of His own will and pleasure;
because, if it had been of His own will and pleasure, He would be sure to
have made nothing unfitting or unworthy of Himself. That, therefore, which
He made not of His own will must be understood to have been made from the
fault of something, and that is from Matter, without a doubt.
Chapter III. An Argument of Hermogenes. The Answer: While God is a Title
Eternally Applicable to the Divine Being, Lord and Father are Only Relative
Appellations, Not Eternally Applicable. An Inconsistency in the Argument of
Hermogenes Pointed Out.
He adds also another point: that as God was always God, there was never a
time when God was not also Lord. But [6130] it was in no way possible for
Him to be regarded as always Lord, in the same manner as He had been always
God, if there had not been always, in the previous eternity, [6131] a
something of which He could be regarded as evermore the Lord. So he
concludes [6132] that God always had Matter co-existent with Himself as
the Lord thereof. Now, this tissue [6133] of his I shall at once hasten to
pull abroad. I have been willing to set it out in form to this length, for
the information of those who are unacquainted with the subject, that they
may know that his other arguments likewise need only be [6134] understood
to be refuted. We affirm, then, that the name of God always existed with
Himself and in Himself'but not eternally so the Lord. Because the condition
of the one is not the same as that of the other. God is the designation of
the substance itself, that is, of the Divinity; but Lord is (the name) not
of substance, but of power. I maintain that the substance existed always
with its own name, which is God; the title Lord was afterwards added, as the
indication indeed [6135] of something accruing. For from the moment when
those things began to exist, over which the power of a Lord was to act, God,
by the accession of that power, both became Lord and received the name
thereof. Because God is in like manner a Father, and He is also a Judge; but
He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having
always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son,
nor a Judge previous to sin. There was, however, a time when neither sin
existed with Him, nor the Son; the former of which was to constitute the
Lord a Judge, and the latter a Father. In this way He was not Lord previous
to those things of which He was to be the Lord. But He was only to become
Lord at some future time: just as He became the Father by the Son, and a
Judge by sin, so also did He become Lord by means of those things which He
had made, in order that they might serve Him. Do I seem to you to be weaving
arguments, [6136] Hermogenes? how neatly does Scripture lend us its aid,
[6137] when it applies the two titles to Him with a distinction, and reveals
them each at its proper time! For (the title ) God, indeed, which always
belonged to Him, it names at the very first: "In the beginning God created
the heaven and the earth; " [6138] and as long as He continued making, one
after the other, those things of which He was to be the Lord, it merely
mentions God. "And God said," "and God made," "and God saw; " [6139] but
nowhere do we yet find the Lord. But when He completed the whole creation,
and especially man himself, who was destined to understand His sovereignty
in a way of special propriety, He then is designated [6140] Lord. Then
also the Scripture added the name Lord: "And the Lord God, Deus Dominus,
took the man, whom He had formed; " [6141] "And the Lord God commanded
Adam." [6142] Thenceforth He, who was previously God only, is the Lord,
from the time of His having something of which He might be the Lord. For to
Himself He was always God, but to all things was He only then God, when He
became also Lord. Therefore, in as far as (Hermogenes) shall suppose that
Matter was eternal, on the ground that the Lord was eternal, in so far will
it be evident that nothing existed, because it is plain that the Lord as
such did not always exist. Now I mean also, on my own part, [6143] to add
a remark for the sake of ignorant persons, of whom Hermogenes is an extreme
instance, [6144] and actually to retort against him his own arguments.
[6145] For when he denies that Matter was born or made, I find that, even on
these terms, the title Lord is unsuitable to God in respect of Matter,
because it must have been free, [6146] when by not having a beginning it
had not an author. The fact of its past existence it owed to no one, so that
it could be a subject to no one. Therefore ever since God exercised His
power over it, by creating (all things) out of Matter, although it had all
along experienced God as its Lord, yet Matter does, after all, demonstrate
that God did not exist in the relation of Lord to it, [6147] although all
the while He was really so. [6148]
Chapter IV. Hermogenes Gives Divine Attributes to Matter, and So Makes Two
Gods.
At this point, then, I shall begin to treat of Matter, how that, (according
to Hermogenes, ) [6149] God compares it with Himself as equally unborn,
equally unmade, equally eternal, set forth as being without a beginning,
without an end. For what other estimate [6150] of God is there than
eternity? What other condition has eternity than to have ever existed, and
to exist yet for evermore by virtue of its privilege of having neither
beginning nor end? Now, since this is the property of God, it will belong to
God alone, whose property it is'of course [6151] on this ground, that if
it can be ascribed to any other being, it will no longer be the property of
God, but will belong, along with Him, to that being also to which it is
ascribed. For "although there be that are called gods" in name, "whether in
heaven or in earth, yet to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are
all things; " [6152] whence the greater reason why, in our view, [6153]
that which is the property [6154] of God ought to be regarded as
pertaining to God alone, and why (as I have already said) that should cease
to be such a property, when it is shared by another being. Now, since He is
God, it must necessarily be a unique mark of this quality, [6155] that it
be confined to One. Else, what will be unique and singular, if that is not
which has nothing equal to it? What will be principal, if that is not which
is above all things, before all things, and from which all things proceed?
By possessing these He is God alone, and by His sole possession of them He
is One. If another also shared in the possession, there would then be as
many gods as there were possessors of these attributes of God. Hermogenes,
therefore, introduces two gods: he introduces Matter as God's equal. God,
however, must be One, because that is God which is supreme; but nothing else
can be supreme than that which is unique; and that cannot possibly be unique
which has anything equal to it; and Matter will be equal with God when it is
held to be [6156] eternal.
Chapter V. Hermogenes Coquets with His Own Argument, as If Rather Afraid of
It. After Investing Matter with Divine Qualities, He Tries to Make It
Somehow Inferior to God.
But God is God, and Matter is Matter. As if a mere difference in their names
prevented equality, [6157] when an identity of condition is claimed for
them! Grant that their nature is different; assume, too, that their form is
not identical,'what matters it so long as their absolute state have but one
mode? [6158] God is unborn; is not Matter also unborn? God ever exists; is
not Matter, too, ever existent? Both are without beginning; both are without
end; both are the authors of the universe'both He who created it, and the
Matter of which He made it. For it is impossible that Matter should not be
regarded as the author [6159] of all things, when the universe is composed
of it. What answer will he give? Will he say that Matter is not then
comparable with God as soon as [6160] it has something belonging to God;
since, by not having total (divinity), it cannot correspond to the whole
extent of the comparison? But what more has he reserved for God, that he
should not seem to have accorded to Matter the full amount of the Deity?
[6161] He says in reply, that even though this is the prerogative of Matter,
both the authority and the substance of God must remain intact, by virtue of
which He is regarded as the sole and prime Author, as well as the Lord of
all things. Truth, however, maintains the unity of God in such a way as to
insist that whatever belongs to God Himself belongs to Him alone. For so
will it belong to Himself if it belong to Him alone; and therefore it will
be impossible that another god should be admitted, when it is permitted to
no other being to possess anything of God. Well, then, you say, we ourselves
at that rate possess nothing of God. But indeed we do, and shall continue to
do'only it is from Him that we receive it, and not from ourselves. For we
shall be even gods, if we, shall deserve to be among those of whom He
declared, "I have said, Ye are gods," [6162] and, "God standeth in the
congregation of the gods." [6163] But this comes of His own grace, not
from any property in us, because it is He alone who can make gods. The
property of Matter, however, he [6164] makes to be that which it has in
common with God. Otherwise, if it received from God the property which
belongs to God,'I mean its attribute [6165] of eternity -one might then
even suppose that it both possesses an attribute in common with God, and yet
at the same time is not God. But what inconsistency is it for him [6166]
to allow that there is a conjoint possession of an attribute with God, and
also to wish that what he does not refuse to Matter should be, after all,
the exclusive privilege of God!
Chapter VI. The Shifts to Which Hermogenes is Reduced, Who Deifies Matter,
and Yet is Unwilling to Hold Him Equal with the Divine Creator.
He declares that God's attribute is still safe to Him, of being the only
God, and the First, and the Author of all things, and the Lord of all
things, and being incomparable to any'qualities which he straightway
ascribes to Matter also. He is God, to be sure. God shall also attest the
same; but He has also sworn sometimes by Himself, that there is no other God
like Him. [6167] Hermogenes, however, will make Him a liar. For Matter
will be such a God as He'being unmade, unborn, without beginning, and
without end. God will say, "I am the first!" [6168] Yet how is He the
first, when Matter is co-eternal with Him? Between co-eternals and
contemporaries there is no sequence of rank. [6169] Is then, Matter also
the first? "I," says the Lord, "have stretched out the heavens alone."
[6170] But indeed He was not alone, when that likewise stretched them out,
of which He made the expanse. When he asserts the position that Matter was
eternal, without any encroachment on the condition of God, let him see to it
that we do not in ridicule turn the tables on him, that God similarly was
eternal without any encroachment on the condition of Matter'the condition of
Both being still common to Them. The position, therefore, remains
unimpugned [6171] both in the case of Matter, that it did itself exist,
only along with God; and that God existed alone, but with Matter. It also
was first with God, as God, too, was first with it; it, however, is not
comparable with God, as God, too, is not to be compared with it; with God
also it was the Author (of all things), and with God their Sovereign. In
this way he proposes that God has something, and yet not the whole, of
Matter. For Him, accordingly, Hermogenes has reserved nothing which he had
not equally conferred on Matter, so that it is not Matter which is compared
with God, but rather God who is compared with Matter. Now, inasmuch as those
qualities which we claim as peculiar to God'to have always existed, without
a beginning, without an end, and to have been the First, and Alone, and the
Author of all things'are also compatible to Matter, I want to know what
property Matter possesses different and alien from God, and hereby special
to itself, by reason of which it is incapable of being compared with God?
That Being, in which occur [6172] all the properties of God, is
sufficiently predetermined without any further comparison.
Chapter VII. Hermogenes Held to His Theory in Order that Its Absurdity May
Be Exposed on His Own Principles.
When he contends that matter is less than God, and inferior to Him, and
therefore diverse from Him, and for the same reason not a fit subject of
comparison with Him, who is a greater and superior Being, I meet him with
this prescription, that what is eternal and unborn is incapable of any
diminution and inferiority, because it is simply this which makes even God
to be as great as He is, inferior and subject to none'nay, greater and
higher than all. For, just as all things which are born, or which come to an
end, and are therefore not eternal, do, by reason of their exposure at once
to an end and a beginning, admit of qualities which are repugnant to God'I
mean diminution and inferiority, because they are born and made'so likewise
God, for this very reason, is unsusceptible of these accidents, because He
is absolutely unborn, [6173] and also unmade. And yet such also is the
condition of Matter. [6174] Therefore, of the two Beings which are
eternal, as being unborn and unmade'God and Matter'by reason of the
identical mode of their common condition (both of them equally possessing
that which admits neither of diminution nor subjection'that is, the
attribute of eternity), we affirm that neither of them is less or greater
than the other, neither of them is inferior or superior to the other; but
that they both stand on a par in greatness, on a par in sublimity, and on
the same level of that complete and perfect felicity of which eternity is
reckoned to consist. Now we must not resemble the heathen in our opinions;
for they, when constrained to acknowledge God, insist on having other
deities below Him. The Divinity, however, has no degrees, because it is
unique; and if it shall be found in Matter'as being equally unborn and
unmade and eternal'it must be resident in both alike, [6175] because in no
case can it be inferior to itself. In what way, then, will Hermogenes have
the courage to draw distinctions; and thus to subject matter to God, an
eternal to the Eternal, an unborn to the Unborn, an author to the Author?
seeing that it dares to say, I also am the first; I too am before all
things; and I am that from which all things proceed; equal we have been,
together we have been'both alike without beginning, without end; both alike
without an Author, without a God. [6176] What God, then, is He who
subjects me to a contemporaneous, co-eternal power? If it be He who is
called God, then I myself, too, have my own (divine) name. Either I am God,
or He is Matter, because we both are that which neither of us is. Do you
suppose, therefore, that he [6177] has not made Matter equal with God,
although, for-sooth, he pretends it to be inferior to Him?
Chapter VIII. On His Own Principles, Hermogenes Makes Matter, on the Whole,
Superior to God.
Nay more, [6178] he even prefers Matter to God, and rather subjects God to
it, when he will have it that God made all things out of Matter. For if He
drew His resources from it [6179] for the creation of the world, Matter is
already found to be the superior, inasmuch as it furnished Him with the
means of effecting His works; and God is thereby clearly subjected to
Matter, of which the substance was indispensable to Him. For there is no one
but requires that which he makes use of; [6180] no one but is subject to
the thing which he requires, for the very purpose of being able to make use
of it. So, again, there is no one who, from using what belongs to another,
is not inferior to him of whose property he makes use; and there is no one
who imparts [6181] of his own for another's use, who is not in this
respect superior to him to whose use he lends his property. On this
principle, [6182] Matter self, no doubt, [6183] was not in want of God,
but rather lent itself to God, who was in want of it'rich and abundant and
liberal as it was'to one who was, I suppose, too small, and too weak, and
too unskilful, to form what He willed out of nothing. A grand service,
verily, [6184] did it confer on God in giving Him means at the present
time whereby He might be known to be God, and be called Almighty'only that
He is no longer Almighty, since He is not powerful enough for this, to
produce all things out of nothing. To be sure, [6185] Matter bestowed
somewhat on itself also'even to get its own self acknowledged with God as
God's co-equal, nay more, as His helper; only there is this drawback, that
Hermogenes is the only man that has found out this fact, besides the
philosophers'those patriarchs of all heresy. [6186] For the prophets knew
nothing about it, nor the apostles thus far, nor, I suppose, even Christ.
Chapter IX. Sundry Inevitable But Intolerable Conclusions from the
Principles of Hermogenes.
He cannot say that it was as its Lord that God employed Matter for His
creative works, for He could not have been the Lord of a substance which was
co-equal with Himself. Well, but perhaps it was a title derived from the
will of another, [6187] which he enjoyed'a precarious holding, and not a
lordship, [6188] and that to such a degree, that [6189] although Matter
was evil, He yet endured to make use of an evil substance, owing, of course,
to the restraint of His own limited power, [6190] which made Him impotent
to create out of nothing, not in consequence of His power; for if, as God,
He had at all possessed power over Matter which He knew to be evil, He would
first have converted it into good'as its Lord and the good God'that so He
might have a good thing to make use of, instead of a bad one. But being
undoubtedly good, only not the Lord withal, He, by using such power [6191]
as He possessed, showed the necessity He was under of yielding to the
condition of Matter, which He would have amended if He had been its Lord.
Now this is the answer which must be given to Hermogenes when he maintains
that it was by virtue of His Lordship that God used Matter'even of His
non-possession of any right to it, on the ground, of course, of His not
having Himself made it. Evil then, on your terms, [6192] must proceed from
God Himself, since He is'I will not say the Author of evil, because He did
not form it, but'the permitter thereof, as having dominion over it. [6193]
If indeed Matter shall prove not even to belong to God at all, as being
evil, it follows, [6194] that when He made use of what belonged to
another, He used it either on a precarious title [6195] because He was in
need of it, or else by violent possession because He was stronger than it.
For by three methods is the property of others obtained,'by right, by
permission, by violence; in other words, by lordship, by a title derived
from the will of another, [6196] by force. Now, as lordship is out of the
question, Hermogenes must choose which (of the other methods) is suitable to
God. Did He, then, make all things out of Matter, by permission, or by
force? But, in truth, would not God have more wisely determined that nothing
at all should be created, than that it should be created by the mere
sufferance of another, or by violence, and that, too, with [6197] a
substance which was evil?
Chapter X. To What Straits Hermogenes Absurdly Reduces the Divine Being. He
Does Nothing Short of Making Him the Author of Evil.
Even if Matter had been the perfection of good, [6198] would it not have
been equally indecorous in Him to have thought of the property of another,
however good, (to effect His purpose by the help of it)? It was, therefore,
absurd enough for Him, in the interest of His own glory, to have created the
world in such a way as to betray His own obligation to a substance which
belonged to another'and that even not good. Was He then, asks (Hermogenes),
to make all things out of nothing, that so evil things themselves might be
attributed to His will? Great, in all conscience, [6199] must be the
blindness of our heretics which leaves them to argue in such a way that they
either insist on the belief of another God supremely good, on the ground of
their thinking the Creator to be the author of evil, or else they set up
Matter with the Creator, in order that they may derive evil from Matter, not
from the Creator. And yet there is absolutely no god at all that is free
from such a doubtful plight, so as to be able to avoid the appearance even
of being the author of evil, whosoever he is that'I will not say, indeed,
has made, but still'has permitted evil to be made by some author or other,
and from some source or other. Hermogenes, therefore, ought to be told
[6200] at once, although we postpone to another place our distinction
concerning the mode of evil, [6201] that even he has effected no result by
this device of his. [6202] For observe how God is found to be, if not the
Author of, yet at any rate the conniver at, [6203] evil, inasmuch as He,
with all His extreme goodness, endured evil in Matter before He created the
world, although, as being good, and the enemy of evil, He ought to have
corrected it. For He either was able to correct it, but was unwilling; or
else was willing, but being a weak God, was not able. If He was able and yet
unwilling, He was Himself evil, as having favoured evil; and thus He now
opens Himself to the charge of evil, because even if He did not create it
yet still, since it would not be existing if He had been against its
existence, He must Himself have then caused it to exist, when He refused to
will its non-existence. And what is more shameful than this? When He willed
that to be which He was Himself unwilling to create, He acted in fact
against His very self, [6204] inasmuch as He was both willing that that
should exist which He was unwilling to make, and unwilling to make that
which He was willing should exist. As if what He willed was good, and at the
same time what he refused to be the Maker of was evil. What He judged to be
evil by not creating it, He also proclaimed to be good by permitting it to
exist. By bearing with evil as a good instead of rather extirpating it, He
proved Himself to be the promoter thereof; criminally, [6205] if through
His own will'disgracefully, if through necessity. God must either be the
servant of evil or the friend thereof, since He held converse with evil in
Matter'nay, more, effected His works out of the evil thereof.
Chapter XI. Hermogenes Makes Great Efforts to Remove Evil from God to
Matter. How He Fails to Do This Consistently with His Own Argument.
But, after all, [6206] by what proofs does Hermogenes persuade us that
Matter is evil? For it will be impossible for him not to call that evil to
which he imputes evil. Now we lay down this principle, [6207] that what
is eternal cannot possibly admit of diminution and subjection, so as to be
considered inferior to another co-eternal Being. So that we now affirm that
evil is not even compatible with it, [6208] since it is incapable of
subjection, from the fact that it cannot in any wise be subject to any,
because it is eternal. But inasmuch as, on other grounds, [6209] it is
evident what is eternal as God is the highest good, whereby also He alone is
good'as being eternal, and therefore good'as being God, how can evil be
inherent in Matter, which (since it is eternal) must needs be believed to be
the highest good? Else if that which is eternal prove to be also capable of
evil, this (evil) will be able to be also believed of God to His
prejudice; [6210] so that it is without adequate reason that he has been
so anxious [6211] to remove evil from God; since evil must be compatible
with l an eternal Being, even by being made compatible with Matter, as
Hermogenes makes it. But, as the argument now stands, [6212] since what
is eternal can be deemed evil, the evil must prove to be invincible and
insuperable, as being eternal; and in that case [6213] it will be in vain
that we labour "to put away evil from the midst of us; " [6214] in that
case, moreover, God vainly gives us such a command and precept; nay more, in
vain has God appointed any judgment at all, when He means, indeed, [6215]
to inflict punishment with injustice. But if, on the other hand, there is to
be an end of evil, when the chief thereof, the devil, shall "go away into
the fire which God hath prepared for him and his angels" [6216] 'having
been first "cast into the bottomless pit; " [6217] when likewise "the
manifestation of the children of God" [6218] shall have "delivered the
creature" [6219] from evil, which had been "made subject to vanity; "
[6220] when the cattle restored in the innocence and integrity of their
nature [6221] shall be at peace [6222] with the beasts of the field,
when also little children shall play with serpents; [6223] when the
Father shall have put beneath the feet of His Son His enemies, [6224] as
being the workers of evil,'if in this way an end is compatible with evil, it
must follow of necessary that a beginning is also compatible with it; and
Matter will turn out to have a beginning, by virtue of its having also an
end. For whatever things are set to the account of evil, [6225] have a
compatibility with the condition of evil.
Chapter XII. The Mode of Controversy Changed. The Premisses of Hermogenes
Accepted, in Order to Show into What Confusion They Lead Him.
Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by nature of
course, just as we believe God to be good, even very good, in like manner by
nature. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed, just as persistently
fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable and unchangeable in good
in the case of God. Because, as is evident, [6226] if nature admits of
change from evil to good in Matter, it can be changed from good to evil in
God. Here some man will say, Then will "children not be raised up to Abraham
from the stones? " [6227] Will "generations of vipers not bring forth the
fruit of repentance? " [6228] And "children of wrath" fail to become sons
of peace, if nature be unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as
these, my friend, [6229] is a thoughtless [6230] one. For things which
owe their existence to birth such as stones and vipers and human beings'are
not apposite to the case of Matter, which is unborn; since their nature, by
possessing a beginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind
[6231] that Matter has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being
unmade, unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and
incorruptible nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself,
which he alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make
(anything) of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of
change, because it would lose'so the opinion runs [6232] 'what it once
was, in becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not
eternal. But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, (he maintained) that He
could not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt
this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame
Matter with a like censure, because out of it, evil though it be'nay, very
evil'good things have been created, nay, "very good" ones: "And God saw that
they were good, and God blessed them" [6233] 'because, of course, of
their very great goodness; certainly not because they were evil, or very
evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this being the case, it
has lost its condition of eternity; in short, [6234] its beauty is
decayed in death. [6235] Eternity, however, cannot be lost, because it
cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from loss. For the same
reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as, since it is eternity, it
can by no means be changed.
Chapter XIII. Another Ground of Hermogenes that Matter Has Some Good in It.
Its Absurdity.
Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of it,
[6236] which were formed without any change at all? [6237] How occurs the
seed of what is good, nay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil?
Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit, [6238] since there is no
God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is
not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there
is some germ of good in it, then there will be no longer a uniform nature
(pervading it), that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead
thereof (we now encounter) a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and
again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil,
there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for
sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly diverse as good and evil
have been able to unite together, [6239] and have imparted to Matter a
double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will
absolutely [6240] good things be imputable to God, just as evil things
are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since
they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to
God neither gratitude for good things, nor grudge [6241] for evil ones,
because He has produced no work of His own proper character. [6242] From
which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subservient
to Matter.
Chapter XIV. Tertullian Pushes His Opponent into a Dilemma.
Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the
opportunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good
creatures, as having detected [6243] what was good in matter'although
this, too, be a discreditable supposition [6244] 'yet, at any rate, when
He produces evil likewise out of the same (Matter), He is a servant to
Matter, since, of course, [6245] it is not of His own accord that He
produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than to effect
creation out of an evil stock [6246] 'unwillingly, no doubt, as being
good; of necessity, too, as being unwilling; and as an act of servitude,
because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He
created evil things of necessity, or of His own accord? Because it was
indeed of necessity that He created them, if out of Matter; of His own
accord, if out of nothing. For you are now labouring in vain when you try to
avoid making God the Author of evil things; because, since He made all
things of Matter, they will have to be ascribed to Himself, who made them,
just because [6247] He made them. Plainly the interest of the question,
whence He made all things, identifies itself with (the question), whether He
made all things out of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all
things, so that He made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to
Him. [6248] Now, more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own
will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a creation out of
nothing, than from one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God
is free, even as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power,
whatever it be, is more suited to Him than infirmity. [6249] If we thus
even admit that matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced
whatever good He did produce of His own power, then some other questions
will with equal reason arise. First, since there was no good at all in
Matter, it is clear that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground
indeed that Matter did not possess it. Next, if good was not made of Matter,
it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have been
made of nothing. 'For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes' own showing.
[6250]
Chapter XV. The Truth, that God Made All Things from Nothing, Rescued from
the Opponent's Flounderings.
Now, if good was neither produced out of matter, since it was not in it,
evil as it was, nor out of God, since, according to the position of
Hermogenes, nothing could have been produced out of god, it will be found
that good was created out of nothing, inasmuch as it was formed of
none'neither of Matter nor of God. And if good was formed out of nothing,
why not evil too? Nay, if anything was formed out of nothing, why not all
things? Unless indeed it be that the divine might was insufficient for the
production of all things, though it produced a something out of nothing. Or
else if good proceeded from evil matter, since it issued neither from
nothing nor from God, it will follow that it must have proceeded from the
conversion of Matter contrary to that unchangeable attribute which has been
claimed for it, as an eternal being. [6251] Thus, in regard to the source
whence good derived its existence, Hermogenes will now have to deny the
possibility of such. But still it is necessary that (good) should proceed
from some one of those sources from which he has denied the very possibility
of its having been derived. Now if evil be denied to be of nothing for the
purpose of denying it to be the work of God, from whose will there would be
too much appearance of its being derived, and be alleged to proceed from
Matter, that it may be the property of that very thing of whose substance it
is assumed to be made, even here also, as I have said, God will have to be
regarded as the Author of evil; because, whereas it had been His duty
[6252] to produce all good things out of Matter, or rather good things
simply, by His identical attribute of power and will, He did yet not only
not produce all good things, but even (some) evil things'of course, either
willing that the evil should exist if He was able to cause their
non-existence, or not being strong enough to effect that all things should
be good, if being desirous of that result, He failed in the accomplishment
thereof; since there can be no difference whether it were by weakness or by
will, that the Lord proved to be the Author of evil. Else what was the
reason that, after creating good things, as if Himself good, He should have
also produced evil things, as if He failed in His goodness, since He did not
confine Himself to the production of things which were simply consistent
with Himself? What necessity was there, after the production of His proper
work, for His troubling Himself about Matter also by producing evil
likewise, in order to secure His being alone acknowledged as good from His
good, and at the same time [6253] to prevent Matter being regarded as
evil from (created) evil? Good would have flourished much better if evil had
not blown upon it. For Hermogenes himself explodes the arguments of sundry
persons who contend that evil things were necessary to impart lustre to the
good, which must be understood from their contrasts. This, therefore, was
not the ground for the production of evil; but if some other reason must be
sought for the introduction thereof, why could it not have been introduced
even from nothing, [6254] since the very same reason would exculpate the
Lord from the reproach of being thought the author of evil, which now
excuses the existence of evil things, when He produces them out of Matter?
And if there is this excuse, then the question is completely [6255] shut
up in a corner, where they are unwilling to find it, who, without examining
into the reason itself of evil, or distinguishing how they should either
attribute it to God or separate it from God, do in fact expose God to many
most unworthy calumnies. [6256]
Chapter XVI. A Series of Dilemmas. They Show that Hermogenes Cannot Escape
from the Orthodox Conclusion.
On the very threshold, [6257] then, of this doctrine, [6258] which I
shall probably have to treat of elsewhere, I distinctly lay it down as my
position, that both good and evil must be ascribed either to God, who made
them out of Matter; or to Matter itself, out of which He made them; or both
one and the other to both of them together, [6259] because they are bound
together'both He who created, and that out of which He created; or (lastly)
one to One and the other to the Other, [6260] because after Matter and
God there is not a third. Now if both should prove to belong to God, God
evidently will be the author of evil; but God, as being good, cannot be the
author of evil. Again, if both are ascribed to Matter, Matter will evidently
be the very mother of good, [6261] but inasmuch as Matter is wholly evil,
it cannot be the mother of good. But if both one and the other should be
thought to belong to Both together, then in this case also Matter will be
comparable with God; and both will be equal, being on equal terms allied to
evil as well as to good. Matter, however, ought not to be compared with God,
in order that it may not make two gods. If, (lastly, ) one be ascribed to
One, and the other to the Other'that is to say, let the good be God's, and
the evil belong to Matter'then, on the one hand, evil must not be ascribed
to God, nor, on the other hand, good to Matter. And God, moreover, by making
both good things and evil things out of Matter, creates them along with it.
This being the case, I cannot tell how Hermogenes [6262] is to escape
from my conclusion; for he supposes that God cannot be the author of evil,
in what way soever He created evil out of Matter, whether it was of His own
will, or of necessity, or from the reason (of the case). If, however, He is
the author of evil, who was the actual Creator, Matter being simply
associated with Him by reason of its furnishing Him with substance,
[6263] you now do away with the cause [6264] of your introducing Matter.
For it is not the less true, that it is by means of Matter that God shows
Himself the author of evil, although Matter has been assumed by you
expressly to prevent God's seeming to be the author of evil. Matter being
therefore excluded, since the cause of it is excluded, it remains that God
without doubt, must have made all things out of nothing. Whether evil things
were amongst them we shall see, when it shall be made clear what are evil
things, and whether those things are evil which you at present deem to be
so. For it is more worthy of God that He produced even these of His own
will, by producing them out of nothing, than from the predetermination of
another, [6265] (which must have been the case) if He had produced them
out of Matter. It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the character of
God. I would much rather that He should have even willed to create evil of
Himself, than that He should have lacked ability to hinder its creation.
Chapter XVII. The Truth of God's Work in Creation. You Cannot Depart in the
Least from It, Without Landing Yourself in an Absurdity.
This rule is required by the nature of the One-only God, [6266] who is
One-only in no other way than as the sole God; and in no other way sole,
than as having nothing else (co-existent) with Him. So also He will be
first, because all things are after Him; and all things are after Him,
because all things are by Him; and all things are by Him, because they are
of nothing: so that reason coincides with the Scripture, which says: "Who
hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or with
whom took He counsel? or who hath shown to Him the way of wisdom and
knowledge? Who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed to him
again? " [6267] Surely none! Because there was present with Him no power,
no material, no nature which belonged to any other than Himself. But if it
was with some (portion of Matter) [6268] that He effected His creation,
He must have received from that (Matter) itself both the design and the
treatment of its order as being "the way of wisdom and knowledge." For He
had to operate conformably with the quality of the thing, and according to
the nature of Matter, not according to His own will in consequence of which
He must have made [6269] even evil things suitably to the nature not of
Himself, but of Matter.
Chapter XVIII. An Eulogy on the Wisdom and Word of God, by Which God Made
All Things of Nothing.
If any material was necessary to God in the creation of the world, as
Hermogenes supposed, God had a far nobler and more suitable one in His own
wisdom [6270] 'one which was not to be gauged by the writings of
[6271] philosophers, but to be learnt from the words or prophets. This
alone, indeed, knew the mind of the Lord. For "who knoweth the things of
God, and the things in God, but the Spirit, which is in Him? " [6272] Now
His wisdom is that Spirit. This was His counsellor, the very way of His
wisdom and knowledge. [6273] Of this He made all things, making them
through It, and making them with It. "When He prepared the heavens," so says
(the Scripture [6274] ), "I was present with Him; and when He
strengthened above the winds the lofty clouds, and when He secured the
fountains [6275] which are under the heaven, I was present, compacting
these things [6276] along with Him. I was He [6277] in whom He took
delight; moreover, I daily rejoiced in His presence: for He rejoiced when He
had finished the world, and amongst the sons of men did He show forth His
pleasure." [6278] Now, who would not rather approve of [6279] this as
the fountain and origin of all things'of this as, in very deed, the Matter
of all Matter, not liable to any end, [6280] not diverse in condition,
not restless in motion, not ungraceful in form, but natural, and proper, and
duly proportioned, and beautiful, such truly as even God might well have
required, who requires His own and not another's? Indeed, as soon as He
perceived It to be necessary for His creation of the world, He immediately
creates It, and generates It in Himself. "The Lord," says the Scripture,
"possessed [6281] me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His
works. Before the worlds He rounded me; before He made the earth, before the
mountains were settled in their places; moreover, before the hills He
generated me, and prior to the depths was I begotten." [6282] Let
Hermogenes then confess that the very Wisdom of God is declared to be born
and created, for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there
is any other being than God alone who is unbegotten and uncreated. For if
that, which from its being inherent in the Lord [6283] was of Him and in
Him, was yet not without a beginning,'I mean [6284] His wisdom, which was
then born and created, when in the thought of God It began to assume
motion [6285] for the arrangement of His creative works,'how much more
impossible [6286] is it that anything should have been without a
beginning which was extrinsic to the Lord! [6287] But if this same Wisdom
is the Word of God, in the capacity [6288] of Wisdom, and (as being He)
without whom nothing was made, just as also (nothing) was set in order
without Wisdom, how can it be that anything, except the Father, should be
older, and on this account indeed nobler, than the Son of God, the
only-begotten and first-begotten Word? Not to say that [6289] what is
unbegotten is stronger than that which is born, and what is not made more
powerful than that which is made. Because that which did not require a Maker
to give it existence, will be much more elevated in rank than that which had
an author to bring it into being. On this principle, then, [6290] if evil
is indeed unbegotten, whilst the Son of God is begotten ("for," says God,
"my heart hath emitted my most excellent Word" [6291] ), I am not quite
sure that evil may not be introduced by good, the stronger by the weak, in
the same way as the unbegotten is by the begotten. Therefore on this ground
Hermogenes puts Matter even before God, by putting it before the Son.
Because the Son is the Word, and "the Word is God," [6292] and "I and my
Father are one." [6293] But after all, perhaps, [6294] the Son will
patiently enough submit to having that preferred before Him which (by
Hermogenes), is made equal to the Father!
Chapter XIX. An Appeal to the History of Creation. True Meaning of the Term
Beginning, Which the Heretic Curiously Wrests to an Absurd Sense.
But I shall appeal to the original document [6295] of Moses, by help of
which they on the other side vainly endeavour to prop up their conjectures,
with the view, of course, of appearing to have the support of that authority
which is indispensable in such an inquiry. They have found their
opportunity, as is usual with heretics, in wresting the plain meaning of
certain words. For instance the very beginning, [6296] when God made the
heaven and the earth, they will construe as if it meant something
substantial and embodied, [6297] to be regarded as Matter. We, however,
insist on the proper signification of every word, and say that principium
means beginning,'being a term which is suitable to represent things which
begin to exist. For nothing which has come into being is without a
beginning, nor can this its commencement be at any other moment than when it
begins to have existence. Thus principium or beginning, is simply a term of
inception, not the name of a substance. Now, inasmuch as the heaven and the
earth are the principal works of God, and since, by His making them first,
He constituted them in an especial manner the beginning of His creation,
before all things else, with good reason does the Scripture preface (its
record of creation) with the words," In the beginning God made the heaven
and the earth; " [6298] just as it would have said, "At last God made the
heaven and the earth," if God had created these after all the rest. Now, if
the beginning is a substance, the end must also be material. No doubt, a
substantial thing [6299] may be the beginning of some other thing which
may be formed out of it thus the clay is the beginning of the vessel. and
the seed is the beginning of the plant. But when we employ the word
beginning in this sense of origin, and not in that of order, we do not omit
to mention also the name of that particular thing which we regard as the
origin of the other. On the other hand, [6300] if we were to make such a
statement as this, for example, "In the beginning the potter made a basin or
a water-jug," the word beginning will not here indicate a material substance
(for I have not mentioned the clay, which is the beginning in this sense,
but only the order of the work, meaning that the potter made the basin and
the jug first, before anything else'intending afterwards to make the rest.
It is, then, to the order of the works that the word beginning has
reference, not to the origin of their substances. I might also explain this
word beginning in another way, which would not, however, be inapposite.
[6301] The Greek term for beginning, which is admits the sense not
only of priority of order, but of power as well; whence princes and
magistrates are called arkontes.Therefore in this sense too, beginning may
be taken for princely authority and power. It was, indeed, in His
transcendent authority and power, that God made the heaven and the earth.
Chapter XX. Meaning of the Phrase'In the Beginning. Tertullian Connects It
with the Wisdom of God, and Elicits from It the Truth that the Creation Was
Not Out of Pre-Existent Matter.
But in proof that the Greek word means nothing else than beginning, and that
beginning admits of no other sense than the initial one, we have that
(Being) [6302] even acknowledging such a beginning, who says: "The Lord
possessed [6303] me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His
works." [6304] For since all things were made by the Wisdom of God, it
follows that, when God made both the heaven and the earth in principio'that
is to say, in the beginning'He made them in His Wisdom. If, indeed,
beginning had a material signification, the Scripture would not have
informed us that God made so and so in principio, at the beginning, but
rather ex principio, of the beginning; for He would not have created in, but
of, matter. When Wisdom, however, was referred to, it was quite right to
say, in the beginning. For it was in Wisdom that He made all things at
first, because by meditating and arranging His plans therein, [6305] He
had in fact already done (the work of creation); and if He had even intended
to create out of matter, He would yet have effected His creation when He
previously meditated on it and arranged it in His Wisdom, since It [6306]
was in fact the beginning of His ways: this meditation and arrangement being
the primal operation of Wisdom, opening as it does the way to the works by
the act of meditation and thought. [6307] This authority of Scripture I
claim for myself even from this circumstance, that whilst it shows me the
God who created, and the works He created, it does not in like manner reveal
to me the source from which He created. For since in every operation there
are three principal things, He who makes, and that which is made, and that
of which it is made, there must be three names mentioned in a correct
narrative of the operation'the person of the maker the sort of thing which
is made, [6308] and the material of which it is formed. If the material
is not mentioned, while the work and the maker of the work are both
mentioned, it is manifest that He made the work out of nothing.For if He had
had anything to operate upon, it would have been mentioned as well as (the
other two particulars). [6309] In conclusion, I will apply the Gospel as
a supplementary testimony to the Old Testament. Now in this there is all the
greater reason why there should be shown the material (if there were any)
out of which God made all things, inasmuch as it is therein plainly revealed
by whom He made all things. "In the beginning was the Word" [6310] 'that
is, the same beginning, of course, in which God made the heaven and the
earth [6311] '"and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All
things were made by Him, and without Him nothing was made." [6312] Now,
since we have here clearly told us who the Maker was, that is, God, and what
He made, even all things, and through whom He made them, even His Word,
would not the order of the narrative have required that the source out of
which all things were made by God through the Word should likewise be
declared, if they had been in fact made out of anything? What, therefore,
did not exist, the Scripture was unable to mention; and by not mentioning
it, it has given us a clear proof that there was no such thing: for if there
had been, the Scripture would have mentioned it.
Chapter XXI. A Retort of Heresy Answered. That Scripture Should in So Many
Words Tell Us that the World Was Made of Nothing is Superfluous.
But, you will say to me, if you determine that all things were made of
nothing, on the ground that it is not told us that anything was made out of
pre-existent Matter, take care that it be not contended on the opposite
side, that on the same ground all things were made out of Matter, because it
is not likewise expressly said that anything was made out of nothing. Some
arguments may, of course, [6313] be thus retorted easily enough; but it
does not follow that they are on that account fairly admissible, where there
is a diversity in the cause. For I maintain that, even if the Scripture has
not expressly declared that all things were made out of nothing'just as it
abstains (from saying that they were formed)out of Matter'there was no such
pressing need for expressly indicating the creation of all things out of
nothing, as there was of their creation out of Matter, if that had been
their origin. Because, in the case of what is made out of nothing, the very
fact of its not being indicated that it was made of any particular thing
shows that it was made of nothing; and there is no danger of its being
supposed that it was made of anything, when there is no indication at all of
what it was made of. In the case, however, of that which is made out of
something, unless the very fact be plainly declared, that it was made out of
something, there will be danger, until [6314] it is shown of what it was
made, first of its appearing to be made of nothing, because it is not said
of what it was made; and then, should it be of such a nature [6315] as to
have the appearance of having certainly been made of something, there will
be a similar risk of its seeming to have been made of afar different
material from the proper one, so long as there is an absence of statement of
what it was made of. Then, if God had been unable to make all things of
nothing, the Scripture could not possibly have added that He had made all
things of nothing: (there could have been no room for such a statement, )
but it must by all means have informed us that He had made all things out of
Matter, since Matter must have been the source; because the one case was
quite to be understood, [6316] if it were not actually stated, whereas
the other case would be left in doubt unless it were stated.
Chapter XXII. This Conclusion Confirmed by the Usage of Holy Scripture in
Its History of the Creation. Hermogenes in Danger of the Woe Pronounced
Against Adding to Scripture.
And to such a degree has the Holy Ghost made this the rule of His Scripture,
that whenever anything is made out of anything, He mentions both the thing
that is made and the thing of which it is made. "Let the earth," says He,
"bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding
fruit after its kind, whose seed is in itself, after its kind. And it was
so. And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after its
kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after its
kind." [6317] And again: "And God said, Let the waters bring forth
abundantly the moving creatures that have life, and fowl that may fly above
the earth through the firmament of heaven. And it was so. And God created
great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters
brought forth abundantly, after their kind." [6318] Again afterwards:
"And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind,
cattle, and creeping thing, and beasts of the earth after their kind."
[6319] If therefore God, when producing other things out of things which had
been already made, indicates them by the prophet, and tells us what He has
produced from such and such a source [6320] (although we might ourselves
suppose them to be derived from some source or other, short of nothing;
[6321] since there had already been created certain things, from which they
might easily seem to have been made); if the Holy Ghost took upon Himself so
great a concern for our instruction, that we might know from what everything
was produced, [6322] would He not in like manner have kept us well
informed about both the heaven and the earth, by indicating to us what it
was that He made them of, if their original consisted of any material
substance, so that the more He seemed to have made them of nothing, the less
in fact was there as yet made, from which He could appear to have made them?
Therefore, just as He shows us the original out of which He drew such things
as were derived from a given source, so also with regard to those things of
which He does not point out whence He produced them, He confirms (by that
silence our assertion) that they were produced out of nothing. "In the
beginning," then, "God made the heaven and the earth." [6323] I revere
[6324] the fulness of His Scripture, in which He manifests to me both the
Creator and the creation. In the gospel, moreover, I discover a Minister and
Witness of the Creator, even His Word. [6325] But whether all things were
made out of any underlying Matter, I have as yet failed anywhere to find.
Where such a statement is written, Hermogenes' shop [6326] must tell us.
If it is nowhere written, then let it fear the woe which impends on all who
add to or take away from the written word. [6327]
Chapter XXIII. Hermogenes Pursued to Another Passage of Scripture. The
Absurdity of His Interpretation Exposed.
But he draws an argument from the following words, where it is written: "And
the earth was without form, and void." [6328] For he resolves [6329]
the word earth into Matter, because that which is made out of it is the
earth. And to the word was he gives the same direction, as if it pointed to
what had always existed unbegotten and unmade. It was without form,
moreover, and void, because he will have Matter to have existed shapeless
and confused, and without the finish of a maker's hand. [6330] Now these
opinions of his I will refute singly; but first I wish to say to him, by way
of general answer: We are of opinion that Matter is pointed at in these
terms. But yet does the Scripture intimate that, because Matter was in
existence before all, anything of like condition [6331] was even formed
out of it? Nothing of the kind. Matter might have had existence, if it so
pleased'or rather if Hermogenes so pleased. It might, I say, have existed,
and yet God might not have made anything out of it, either as it was
unsuitable to Him to have required the aid of anything, or at least because
He is not shown to have made anything out of Matter.Its existence must
therefore be without a cause, you will say. Oh, no! certainly [6332] not
without cause. For even if the world were not made out of it, yet a heresy
has been hatched there from; and a specially impudent one too, because it is
not Matter which has produced the heresy, but the heresy has rather made
Matter itself.
Chapter XXIV. Earth Does Not Mean Matter as Hermogenes Would Have It.
I now return to the several points [6333] by means of which he thought
that Matter was signified. And first I will inquire about the terms. For we
read only of one of them, Earth; the other, namely Matter, we do not meet
with. I ask, then, since Matter is not mentioned in Scripture, how the term
earth can be applied to it, which marks a substance of another kind? There
is all the greater need why mention should also have been made of Matter, if
this has acquired the further sense of Earth, in order that I may be sure
that Earth is one and the same name as Matter, and so not claim the
designation for merely one substance, as the proper name thereof, and by
which it is better known; or else be unable (if I should feel the
inclination), to apply it to some particular species of Mater, instead,
indeed, [6334] of making it the common term [6335] of all Matter. For
when a proper name does not exist for that thing to which a common term is
ascribed, the less apparent [6336] is the object to which it may be
ascribed, the more capable will it be of being applied to any other object
whatever. Therefore, even supposing that Hermogenes could show us the
name [6337] Matter, he is bound to prove to us further, that the same
object has the surname [6338] Earth, in order that he may claim for it
both designations alike.
Chapter XXV. The Assumption that There are Two Earths Mentioned in the
History of the Creation, Refuted.
He accordingly maintains that there are two earths set before us in the
passage in question: one, which God made in the beginning; the other being
the Matter of which God made the world, and concerning which it is said,
"And the earth was without form, and void." [6339] Of course, if I were
to ask, to which of the two earths the name earth is best suited, [6340]
I shall be told that the earth which was made derived the appellation from
that of which it was made, on the ground that it is more likely that the
offspring should get its name from the original, than the original from the
offspring. This being the case, another question presents itself to us,
whether it is right and proper that this earth which God made should have
derived its name from that out of which He made it? For I find from
Hermogenes and the rest of the Materialist heretics, [6341] that while
the one earth was indeed "without form, and void," this one of ours obtained
from God in an equal degree [6342] both form, and beauty, and symmetry;
and therefore that the earth which was created was a different thing from
that out of which it was created. Now, having become a different thing, it
could not possibly have shared with the other in its name, after it had
declined from its condition. If earth was the proper name of the (original)
Matter, this world of ours, which is not Matter, because it has become
another thing, is unfit to bear the name of earth, seeing that that name
belongs to something else, and is a stranger to its nature. But (you will
tell me) Matter which has undergone creation, that is, our earth, had with
its original a community of name no less than of kind. By no means. For
although the pitcher is formed out of the clay, I shall no longer call it
clay, but a pitcher; so likewise, although electrum [6343] is compounded
of gold and silver, I shall yet not call it either gold or silver, but
electrum. When there is a departure from the nature of any thing, there is
likewise a relinquishment of its name'with a propriety which is alike
demanded by the designation and the condition. How great a change indeed
from the condition of that earth, which is Matter, has come over this earth
of ours, is plain even from the fact that the latter has received this
testimony to its goodness in Genesis, "And God saw that it was good; "
[6344] while the former, according to Hermogenes, is regarded as the origin
and cause of all evils. Lastly, if the one is Earth because the other is,
why also is the one not Matter as the other is? Indeed, by this rule both
the heaven and all creatures ought to have had the names of Earth and
Matter, since they all consist of Matter. I have said enough touching the
designation Earth, by which he will have it that Matter is understood. This,
as everybody knows, is the name of one of the elements; for so we are taught
by nature first, and afterwards by Scripture, except it be that credence
must be given to that Silenus who talked so confidently in the presence of
king Midas of another world, according to the account of Theopompus. But the
same author informs us that there are also several gods.
Chapter XXVI. The Method Observed in the History of the Creation, in Reply
to the Perverse Interpretation of Hermogenes.
We, however, have but one God, and but one earth too, which in the beginning
God made. [6345] The Scripture, which at its very outset proposes to run
through the order thereof tells us as its first information that it was
created; it next proceeds to set forth what sort of earth it was. [6346]
In like manner with respect to the heaven, it informs us first of its
creation'"In the beginning God made the heaven: " [6347] it then goes on
to introduce its arrangement; how that God both separated "the water which
was below the firmament from that which was above the firmament," [6348]
and called the firmament heaven, [6349] 'the very thing He had created in
the beginning. Similarly it (afterwards) treats of man: "And God created
man, in the image of God made He him." [6350] It next reveals how He made
him: "And (the Lord) God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."
[6351] Now this is undoubtedly [6352] the correct and fitting mode for
the narrative. First comes a prefatory statement, then follow the details in
full; [6353] first the subject is named, then it is described. [6354]
How absurd is the other view of the account, [6355] when even before
he [6356] had premised any mention of his subject, i.e. Matter, without
even giving us its name, he all on a sudden promulged its form and
condition, describing to us its quality before mentioning its
existence,'pointing out the figure of the thing formed, but concealing its
name! But how much more credible is our opinion, which holds that Scripture
has only subjoined the arrangement of the subject after it has first duly
described its formation and mentioned its name! Indeed, how full and
complete [6357] is the meaning of these words: "In the beginning God
created the heaven and the earth; but [6358] the earth was without form,
and void," [6359] 'the very same earth, no doubt, which God made, and of
which the Scripture had been speaking at that very moment. [6360] For
that very "but" [6361] is inserted into the narrative like a clasp,
[6362] (in its function) of a conjunctive particle, to connect the two
sentences indissolubly together: "But the earth." This word carries back the
mind to that earth of which mention had just been made, and binds the sense
thereunto. [6363] Take away this "but," and the tie is loosened; so much
so that the passage, "But the earth was without form, and void," may then
seem to have been meant for any other earth.
Chapter XXVII. Some Hair-Splitting Use of Words in Which His Opponent Had
Indulged.
But you next praise your eyebrows, and toss back your head, and beckon with
your finger, in characteristic disdain, [6364] and say: There is the was,
looking as if it pointed to an eternal existence,'making its subject, of
course, unbegotten and unmade, and on that account worthy of being supposed
to be Matter. Well now, for my own part, I shall resort to no affected
protestation, [6365] but simply reply that "was" may be predicated of
everything'even of a thing which has been created, which was born, which
once was not, and which is not your Matter. For of everything which has
being, from whatever source it has it, whether it has it by a beginning or
without a beginning, the word "was" will be predicated from the very fact
that it exists. To whatever thing the first tense [6366] of the verb is
applicable for definition, to the same will be suitable the later form
[6367] of the verb, when it has to descend to relation. "Est" (it is) forms
the essential part [6368] of a definition, "erat" (it was) of a relation.
Such are the trifles and subtleties of heretics, who wrest and bring into
question the simple meaning of the commonest words. A grand question it is,
to be sure, [6369] whether "the earth was," which was made! The real
point of discussion is, whether "being without form, and void," is a state
which is more suitable to that which was created, or to that of which it was
created, so that the predicate (was) may appertain to the same thing to
which the subject (that which was) also belongs. [6370]
Chap, XXVIII. A
Curious Inconsistency IN Hermogenes Exposed. Certain Expressions IN The
History OF Creation Vindicated IN The True Sense.
But we shall show not only that this condition [6371] agreed with this
earth of ours, but that it did not agree with that other (insisted on by
Hermogenes). For, inasmuch as pure Matter was thus subsistent with God,
[6372] without the interposition indeed of any element at all (because as
yet there existed nothing but itself and God), it could not of course have
been invisible. Because, although Hermogenes contends that darkness was
inherent in the substance of Matter, a position which we shall have to meet
in its proper place, [6373] yet darkness is visible even to a human being
(for the very fact that there is the darkness is an evident one), much more
is it so to God. If indeed it [6374] had been invisible, its quality
would not have been by any means discoverable. How, then, did Hermogenes
find out [6375] that that substance was "without form," and confused and
disordered, which, as being invisible, was not palpable to his senses? If
this mystery was revealed to him by God, he ought to give us his proof. I
want to know also, whether (the substance in question) could have been
described as "void." That certainly is "void" which is imperfect. Equally
certain is it, that nothing can be imperfect but that which is made; it is
imperfect when it is not fully made. [6376] Certainly, you admit. Matter,
therefore, which was not made at all, could not have been imperfect; and
what was not imperfect was not "void." Having no beginning, because it was
not made, it was also unsusceptible of any void-condition. [6377] For
this void-condition is an accident of beginning. The earth, on the contrary,
which was made, was deservedly called "void." For as soon as it was made, it
had the condition of being imperfect, previous to its completion.
Chapter XXIX. The Gradual Development of Cosmical Order Out of Chaos in the
Creation, Beautifully Stated.
God, indeed, consummated all His works in a due order; at first He paled
them out, [6378] as it were, in their unformed elements, and then He
arranged them [6379] in their finished beauty. For He did not all at once
inundate light with the splendour of the sun, nor all at once temper
darkness with the moon's assuaging ray. [6380] The heaven He did not all
at once bedeck [6381] with constellations and stars, nor did He at once
fill the seas with their teeming monsters. [6382] The earth itself He did
not endow with its varied fruitfulness all at once; but at first He bestowed
upon it being, and then He filled it, that it might not be made in vain.
[6383] For thus says Isaiah: "He created it not in vain; He formed it to be
inhabited." [6384] Therefore after it was made, and while awaiting its
perfect state, [6385] it was "without form, and void: ""void" indeed,
from the very fact that it was without form (as being not yet perfect to the
sight, and at the same time unfurnished as yet with its other qualities);
[6386] and "without form," because it was still covered with waters, as if
with the rampart of its fecundating moisture, [6387] by which is produced
our flesh, in a form allied with its own. For to this purport does David
say: [6388] "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; the world,
and all that dwell therein: He hath rounded it upon the seas, and on the
streams hath He established it." [6389] It was when the waters were
withdrawn into their hollow abysses that the dry land became conspicuous,
[6390] which was hitherto covered with its watery envelope. Then it
forthwith becomes "visible," [6391] God saying, "Let the water be
gathered together into one mass, [6392] and let the dry land appear."
[6393] "Appear," says He, not "be made." It had been already made, only in
its invisible condition it was then waiting [6394] to appear. "Dry,"
because it was about to become such by its severance from the moisture, but
yet "land." "And God called the dry land Earth," [6395] not Matter. And
so, when it afterwards attains its perfection, it ceases to be accounted
void, when God declares, "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding
seed after its kind, and cording to its likeness, and the fruit-tree
yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after its kind." [6396] Again:
"Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and
creeping things, and beasts of the earth, after their kind." [6397] Thus
the divine Scripture accomplished its full order. For to that, which it had
at first described as "without form (invisible) and void," it gave both
visibility and completion. Now no other Matter was "without form (invisible)
and void." Henceforth, then, Matter will have to be visible and complete. So
that I must [6398] see Matter, since it has become visible. I must
likewise recognize it as a completed thing, so as to be able to gather from
it the herb bearing seed, and the tree yielding fruit, and that living
creatures, made out of it, may minister to my need. Matter, however, is
nowhere, [6399] but the Earth is here, confessed to my view. I see it, I
enjoy it, ever since it ceased to be "without form (invisible), and void."
Concerning it most certainly did Isaiah speak when he said, "Thus saith the
Lord that created the heavens, He was the God that formed the earth, and
made it." [6400] The same earth for certain did He form, which He also
made. Now how did He form [6401] it? Of course by saying, "Let the dry
land appear." [6402] Why does He command it to appear, if it were not
previously invisible? His purpose was also, that He might thus prevent His
having made it in vain, by rendering it visible, and so fit for use. And
thus, throughout, proofs arise to us that this earth which we inhabit is the
very same which was both created and formed [6403] by God, and that none
other was "Without form, and void," than that which had been created and
formed. It therefore follows that the sentence, "Now the earth was without
form, and void," applies to that same earth which God mentioned separately
along with the heaven. [6404]
Chapter XXX. Another Passage in the Sacred History of the Creation, Released
from the Mishandling of Hermogenes.
The following words will in like manner apparently corroborate the
conjecture of Hermogenes, "And darkness was upon the face of the deep, and
the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the water; [6405] as if these
blended [6406] substances, presented us with arguments for his massive
pile of Matter. [6407] Now, so discriminating an enumeration of certain
and distinct elements (as we have in this passage), which severally
designates" darkness," "the deep" "the Spirit of God," "the waters," forbids
the inference that anything confused or (from such confusion) uncertain is
meant. Still more, when He ascribed to them their own places, [6408]
"darkness on the face of the deep," "the Spirit upon the face of the
waters," He repudiated all confusion in the substances; and by demonstrating
their separate position, [6409] He demonstrated also their distinction.
Most absurd, indeed, would it be that Matter, which is introduced to our
view as "without form," should have its "formless" condition maintained by
so many words indicative of form, [6410] without any intimation of what
that confused body [6411] is, which must of course be supposed to be
unique, [6412] since it is without form. [6413] For that which is
without form is uniform; but even [6414] that which is without form, when
it is blended together [6415] from various component parts, [6416]
must necessarily have one outward appearance; [6417] and it has not any
appearance, until it has the one appearance (which comes) from many parts
combined. [6418] Now Matter either had those specific parts [6419]
within itself, from the words indicative of which it had to be understood'I
mean "darkness," and "the deep," and "the Spirit," and "the waters"'or it
had them not. If it had them, how is it introduced as being "without form?
" [6420] If it had them not, how does it become known? [6421]
Chapter XXXI. A Further Vindication of the Scripture Narrative of the
Creation, Against a Futile View of Hermogenes.
But this circumstance, too, will be caught at, that Scripture meant to
indicate of the heaven only, and this earth of yours, [6422] that God
made it in the beginning, while nothing of the kind is said of the
above-mentioned specific parts; [6423] and therefore that these, which
are not described as having been made, appertain to unformed Matter. To this
point [6424] also we must give an answer. Holy I Scripture would be
sufficiently explicit, if it had declared that the heaven and the earth, as
the very highest works of creation, were made by God, possessing of course
their own special appurtenances, [6425] which might be understood to be
implied in these highest works themselves. Now the appurtenances of the
heaven and the earth, made then in the beginning, were the darkness and the
deep, and the spirit, and the waters. For the depth and the darkness
underlay the earth. Since the deep was under the earth, and the darkness was
over the deep, undoubtedly both the darkness and the deep were under the
earth. Below the heaven, too, lay the spirit [6426] and the waters. For
since the waters were over the earth, which they covered, whilst the spirit
was over the waters, both the spirit and the waters were alike over the
earth. Now that which is over the earth, is of course under the heaven. And
even as the earth brooded over the deep and the darkness, so also did the
heaven brood over the spirit and the waters, and embrace them.Nor, indeed,
is there any novelty in mentioning only that which contains, as pertaining
to the whole, [6427] and understanding that which is contained as
included in it, in its character of a portion. [6428] Suppose now I
should say the city built a theatre and a circus, but the stage [6429]
was of such and such a kind, and the statues were on the canal, and the
obelisk was reared above them all, would it follow that, because I did not
distinctly state that these specific things [6430] were made by the city,
they were therefore not made by it along with the circus and the theatre?
Did I not, indeed, refrain from specially mentioning the formation of these
particular things because they were implied in the things which I had
already said were made, and might be understood to be inherent in the things
in which they were contained? But this example may be an idle one as being
derived from a human circumstance; I will take another, which has the
authority of Scripture itself. It says that "God made man of the dust of the
ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a
living soul." [6431] Now, although it here mentions the nostrils,
[6432] it does not say that they were made by God; so again it speaks of
skin [6433] and bones, and flesh and eyes, and sweat and blood, in
subsequent passages, [6434] and yet it never intimated that they had been
created by God. What will Hermogenes have to answer? That the human limbs
must belong to Matter, because they are not specially mentioned as objects
of creation? Or are they included in the formation of man? In like manner,
the deep and the darkness, and the spirit and the waters, were as members of
the heaven and the earth. For in the bodies the limbs were made, in the
bodies the limbs too were mentioned. No element but what is a member of that
element in which it is contained. But all elements are contained in the
heaven and the earth.
Chapter XXXII. The Account of the Creation in Genesis a General One.
Corroborated, However, by Many Other Passages of the Old Testament, Which
Give Account of Specific Creations. Further Cavillings Confuted.
This is the answer I should give in defence of the Scripture before us, for
seeming here to set forth [6435] the formation of the heaven and the
earth, as if (they were) the sole bodies made. It could not but know that
there were those who would at once in the bodies understand their several
members also, and therefore it employed this concise mode of speech. But, at
the same time, it foresaw that there would be stupid and crafty men, who,
after paltering with the virtual meaning, [6436] would require for the
several members a word descriptive of their formation too. It is therefore
because of such persons, that Scripture in other passages teaches us of the
creation of the individual parts. You have Wisdom saying, "But before the
depths was I brought forth," [6437] in order that you may believe that
the depths were also "brought forth"'that is, created'just as we create sons
also, though we "bring them forth." It matters not whether the depth was
made or born, so that a beginning be accorded to it, which however would not
be, if it were subjoined [6438] to matter. Of darkness, indeed, the Lord
Himself by Isaiah says, "I formed the light, and I created darkness."
[6439] Of the wind [6440] also Amos says, "He that strengtheneth the
thunder [6441] , and createth the wind, and declareth His Christ
[6442] unto men; " [6443] thus showing that that wind was created which
was reckoned with the formation of the earth, which was wafted over the
waters, balancing and refreshing and animating all things: not (as some
suppose) meaning God Himself by the spirit, [6444] on the ground that
"God is a Spirit," [6445] because the waters would not be able to bear up
their Lord; but He speaks of that spirit of which the winds consist, as He
says by Isaiah, "Because my spirit went forth from me, and I made every
blast." [6446] In like manner the same Wisdom says of the waters, "Also
when He made the fountains strong, things which [6447] are under the sky,
I was fashioning [6448] them along with Him." [6449] Now, when we
prove that these particular things were created by God, although they are
only mentioned in Genesis, without any intimation of their having been made,
we shall perhaps receive from the other side the reply, that these were
made, it is true, [6450] but out of Matter, since the very statement of
Moses, "And darkness was on the face of the deep, and the spirit of God
moved on the face of the waters," [6451] refers to Matter, as indeed do
all those other Scriptures here and there, [6452] which demonstrate that
the separate parts were made out of Matter. It must follow, then, [6453]
that as earth consisted of earth, so also depth consisted of depth, and
darkness of darkness, and the wind and waters of wind and waters. And, as we
said above, [6454] Matter could not have been without form, since it had
specific parts, which were formed out of it'although as separate things
[6455] 'unless, indeed, they were not separate, but were the very same with
those out of which they came. For it is really impossible that those
specific things, which are set forth under the same names, should have been
diverse; because in that case [6456] the operation of God might seem to
be useless, [6457] if it made things which existed already; since that
alone would be a creation, [6458] when things came into being, which had
not been (previously) made. Therefore, to conclude, either Moses then
pointed to Matter when he wrote the words: "And darkness was on the face of
the deep, and the spirit of God moved on the face of the waters; "or else,
inasmuch as these specific parts of creation are afterwards shown in other
passages to have been made by God, they ought to have been with equal
explicitness [6459] shown to have been made out of the Matter which,
according to you, Moses had previously mentioned; [6460] or else,
finally, if Moses pointed to those specific parts, and not to Matter, I want
to know where Matter has been pointed out at all.
Chapter XXXIII. Statement of the True Doctrine Concerning Matter. Its
Relation to God's Creation of the World.
But although Hermogenes finds it amongst his own colourable pretences
[6461] (for it was not in his power to discover it in the Scriptures of
God), it is enough for us, both that it is certain that all things were made
by God, and that there is no certainty whatever that they were made out of
Matter. And even if Matter had previously existed, we must have believed
that it had been really made by God, since we maintained (no less) when we
held the rule of faith to be, [6462] that nothing except God was
uncreated. [6463] Up to this point there is room for controversy, until
Matter is brought to the test of the Scriptures, and fails to make good its
case. [6464] The conclusion of the whole is this: I find that there was
nothing made, except out of nothing; because that which I find was made, I
know did not once exist. Whatever [6465] was made out of something, has
its origin in something made: for instance, out of the ground was made the
grass, and the fruit, and the cattle, and the form of man himself; so from
the waters were produced the animals which swim and fly. The original
fabrics [6466] out of which such creatures were produced I may call their
materials, [6467] but then even these were created by God.
Chapter XXXIV. A Presumption that All Things Were Created by God Out of
Nothing Afforded by the Ultimate Reduction of All Things to Nothing.
Scriptures Proving This Reduction Vindicated from Hermogenes' Charge of
Being Merely Figurative.
Besides, [6468] the belief that everything was made from nothing will be
impressed upon us by that ultimate dispensation of God which will bring back
all things to nothing. For "the very heaven shall be rolled together as a
scroll; '" [6469] nay, it shall come to nothing along with the earth
itself, with which it was made in the beginning. "Heaven and earth shall
pass away," [6470] says He. "The first heaven and the first earth passed
away," [6471] "and there was found no place for them," [6472] because,
of course, that which comes to an end loses locality. In like manner David
says, "The heavens, the works of Thine hands, shall themselves perish. For
even as a vesture shall He change them, and they shall be changed."
[6473] Now to be changed is to fall from that primitive state which they
lose whilst undergoing the change. "And the stars too shall fall from
heaven, even as a fig-tree casteth her green figs [6474] when she is
shaken of a mighty wind." [6475] "The mountains shall melt like wax at
the presence of the Lord; " [6476] that is, "when He riseth to shake
terribly the earth." [6477] "But I will dry up the pools; " [6478] and
"they shall seek water, and they shall find none." [6479] Even" the sea
shall be no more." [6480] Now if any person should go so far as to
suppose that all these passages ought to be spiritually interpreted, he will
yet be unable to deprive them of the true accomplishment of those issues
which must come to pass just as they have been written For all figures of
speech necessarily arise out of real things, not out of chimerical ones; t
because nothing is capable of imparting anything of its own for a
similitude, except it actually be that very thing which it imparts in the
similitude. I return therefore to the principle [6481] which defines that
all things which have come from nothing shall return at last to nothing. For
God would not have made any perishable thing out of what was eternal, that
is to say, out of Matter; neither out of greater things would He have
created inferior ones, to whose character it would be more agreeable to
produce greater things out of inferior ones,'in other words, what is eternal
out of what is perishable. This is the promise He makes even to our flesh,
and it has been His will to deposit within us this pledge of His own virtue
and power, in order that we may believe o that He has actually [6482]
awakened the universe out of nothing, as if it had been stepped in death,
[6483] in the sense, of course, of its previous non-existence for the
purpose of its coming into existence. [6484]
Chapter XXXV. Contradictory Propositions Advanced by Hermogenes Respecting
Matter and Its Qualities.
As regards all other points touching Matter, although there is no necessity
why we should treat of them (for our first point was the manifest proof of
its existence), we must for all that pursue our discussion just as if it did
exist, in order that its non-existence may be the more apparent, when these
other points concerning it prove inconsistent with each other, and in order
at the same time that Hermogenes may acknowledge his own contradictory
positions. Matter, says he, at first sight seems to us to be incorporeal;
but when examined by the light of right reason, it is found to be neither
corporeal nor incorporeal. What is this right reason of yours, [6485]
which declares nothing right, that is, nothing certain? For, if I mistake
not, everything must of necessity be either corporeal or incorporeal
(although I may for the moment [6486] allow that there is a certain
incorporeality in even substantial things, [6487] although their very
substance is the body of particular things); at all events, after the
corporeal and the incorporeal there is no third state. But if it be
contended [6488] that there is a third state discovered by this right
reason of Hermogenes, which makes Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal,
(I ask, ) Where is it? what sort of thing is it? what is it called? what is
its description? what is it understood to be? This only has his reason
declared, that Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.
Chapter XXXVI. Other Absurd Theories Respecting Matter and Its Incidents
Exposed in an Ironical Strain, Motion in Matter. Hermogenes' Conceits
Respecting It.
But see what a contradiction he next advances [6489] (or perhaps some
other reason [6490] occurs to him), when he declares that Matter partly
corporeal and partly incorporeal. Then must Matter be considered (to
embrace) both conditions, in order that it may not have either? For it will
be corporeal, and incorporeal in spite of [6491] the declaration of that
antithesis, [6492] which is plainly above giving any reason for its
opinion, just as that "other reason" also was. Now, by the corporeal part of
Matter, he means that of which bodies are created; but by the incorporeal
part of Matter, he means its uncreated [6493] motion. If, says he, Matter
were simply a body, there would appear to be in it nothing incorporeal, that
is, (no) motion; if, on the other hand, it had been wholly incorporeal no
body could be formed out of it. What a peculiarly right [6494] reason
have we here! Only if you make your sketches as right as you make your
reason, Hermogenes, no painter would be more stupid [6495] than yourself.
For who is going to allow you to reckon motion as a moiety of Matter
[6496] , seeing that it is not a substantial thing, because it is not
corporeal, but an accident (if indeed it be even that) of a substance and a
body? Just as action is, and impulsion, just as a slip is, or a fall, so is
motion. When anything moves even of itself, its motion is the result of
impulse; [6497] but certainly it is no part of its substance in your
sense, [6498] when you make motion the incorporeal part of matter. All
things, indeed, [6499] have motion'either of themselves as animals, or of
others as inanimate things; but yet we should not say that either a man or a
stone was both corporeal and incorporeal because they had both a body and
motion: we should say rather that all things have one form of simple
[6500] corporeality, which is the essential quality [6501] of substance.
If any incorporeal incidents accrue to them, as actions, or passions, or
functions, [6502] or desires, we do not reckon these parts as of the
things. How then does he contrive to assign an integral portion of Matter to
motion, which does not pertain to substance, but to a certain condition
[6503] of substance? Is not this incontrovertible? [6504] Suppose you had
taken it into your head [6505] to represent matter as immoveable, would
then the immobility seem to you to be a moiety of its form? Certainly not.
Neither, in like manner, could motion. But I shall be at liberty to speak of
motion elsewhere. [6506]
Chapter XXXVII. Ironical Dilemmas Respecting Matter, and Sundry Moral
Qualities Fancifully Attributed to It.
I see now that you are coming back again to that reason, which has been in
the habit of declaring to you nothing in the way of certainty. For just as
you introduce to our notice Matter as being neither corporeal nor
incorporeal, so you allege of it that it is neither good nor evil; and you
say, whilst arguing further on it in the same strain: "If it were good,
seeing that it had ever been so, it would not require the arrangement of
itself by God; [6507] if it were naturally evil, it would not have
admitted of a change [6508] for the better, nor would God have ever
applied to such a nature any attempt at arrangement of it, for His labour
would have been in vain." Such are your words, which it would have been well
if you had remembered in other passages also, so as to have avoided any
contradiction of them. As, however, we have already treated to some extent
of this ambiguity of good and evil touching Matter, I will now reply to the
only proposition and argument of yours which we have before us. I shall not
stop to repeat my opinion, that it was your bounden duty to have said for
certain that Matter was either good or bad, or in some third condition; but
(I must observe)that you have not here even kept to the statement which you
chose to make before. Indeed, you retract what you declared'that Matter is
neither good nor evil; because you imply that it is evil when you say, "If
it were good, it would not require to be set in order by God; "so again,
when you add, "If it were naturally evil, it would not admit of any change
for the better," you seem to intimate [6509] that it is good. And so you
attribute to it a close relation [6510] to good and evil, although you
declared it neither good nor evil. With a view, however, to re lute the
argument whereby you thought you were going to clinch your proposition, I
here contend: If Matter had always been good, why should it not have still
wanted a change for the better? Does that which is good never desire, never
wish, never feel able to advance, so as to change its good for a better? And
in like manner, if Matter had been by nature evil, why might it not have
been changed by God as the more powerful Being, as able to convert the
nature of stones into children of Abraham? [6511] Surely by such means
you not only compare the Lord with Matter, but you even put Him below
[6512] it, since you affirm that [6513] the nature of Matter could not
possibly be brought under control by Him, and trained to something better.
But although you are here disinclined to allow that Matter is by nature
evil, yet in another passage you will deny having made such an admission.
[6514]
Chapter XXXIII. Other Speculations of Hermogenes, About Matter and Some of
Its Adjuncts, Shown to Be Absurd. For Instance, Its Alleged Infinity.
My observations touching the site [6515] of Matter, as also concerning
its mode [6516] have one and the same object in view'to meet and refute
your perverse positions. You put Matter below God, and thus, of course, you
assign a place to it below God. Therefore Matter is local. [6517] Now, if
it is local, it is within locality; if within locality, it is bounded
[6518] by the place within which it is; if it is bounded, it has an
outline, [6519] which (painter as you are in your special vocation) you
know is the boundary to every object susceptible of outline. Matter,
therefore, cannot be infinite, which, since it is in space, is bounded by
space; and being thus determinable by space, it is susceptible of an
outline. You, however, make it infinite, when you say: "It is on this
account infinite, because it is always existent." And if any of your
disciples should choose to meet us by declaring your meaning to be that
Matter is infinite in time, not in its corporeal mass, [6520] still what
follows will show that (you mean) corporeal infinity to be an attribute of
Matter, that it is in respect of bulk immense and un-circumscribed.
"Wherefore," say you, "it is not fabricated as a whole, but in its
parts." [6521] In bulk, therefore, is it infinite, not in time. And you
contradict yourself [6522] when you make Matter infinite in bulk, and at
the same time ascribe place to it, including it within space and local
outline. But yet at the same time I cannot tell why God should not have
entirely formed it, [6523] unless it be because He was either impotent or
envious. I want therefore to know the moiety of that which was not wholly
formed (by God), in order that I may understand what kind of thing the
entirety was. It was only right that God should have made it known as a
model of antiquity, [6524] to set off the glory of His work.
Chapter XXXIX. These Latter Speculations Shown to Be Contradictory to the
First Principles Respecting Matter, Formerly Laid Down by Hermogenes.
Well, now, since it seems to you to be the correcter thing, [6525] let
Matter be circumscribed [6526] by means of changes and displacements; let
it also be capable of comprehension, since (as you say)it is used as
material by God, [6527] on the ground of its being convertible, mutable,
and separable. For its changes, you say, show it to be inseparable. And here
you have swerved from your own lines [6528] which you prescribed
respecting the person of God when you laid down the rule that God made it
not out of His own self, because it was not possible for Him to become
divided [6529] seeing that He is eternal and abiding for ever, and
therefore unchangeable and indivisible. Since Matter too is estimated by the
same eternity, having neither beginning nor end, it will be unsusceptible of
division, of change, for the same reason that God also is. Since it is
associated with Him in the joint possession of eternity, it must needs share
with Him also the powers, the laws, and the conditions of eternity. In like
manner, when you say, "All things simultaneously throughout the universe
[6530] possess portions of it, [6531] that so the whole may be
ascertained from [6532] its parts," you of course mean to indicate those
parts which were produced out of it, and which are now visible to us. How
then is this possession (of Matter)by all things throughout the universe
effected'that is, of course, from the very beginning [6533] 'when the
things which are now visible to us are different in their condition
[6534] from what they were in the beginning?
Chapter XL. Shapeless Matter an Incongruous Origin for God's Beautiful
Cosmos. Hermogenes Does Not Mend His Argument by Supposing that Only a
Portion of Matter Was Used in the Creation.
You say that Matter was reformed for the better [6535] 'from a worse
condition, of course; and thus you would make the better a copy of the
worse. Everything was in confusion, but now it is reduced to order; and
would you also say, that out of order, disorder is produced? No one thing is
the exact mirror [6536] of another thing; that is to say, it is not its
co-equal. Nobody ever found himself in a barber's looking-glass look like an
ass [6537] instead of a man; unless it be he who supposes that unformed
and shapeless Matter answers to Matter which is now arranged and beautified
in the fabric of the world. What is there now that is without form in the
world, what was there once that was formed [6538] in Matter, that the
world is the mirror of Matter? Since the world is known among the Greeks by
a term denoting ornament, [6539] how can it present the image of
unadorned [6540] Matter, in such a way that you can say the whole is
known by its parts? To that whole will certainly belong even the portion
which has not yet become formed; and you have already declared that the
whole of Matter was not used as material in the creation. [6541] It
follows, then, that this rude, and confused, and unarranged portion cannot
be recognized in the polished, and distinct and well-arranged parts of
creation, which indeed can hardly with propriety be called parts of Matter,
since they have quitted [6542] its condition, by being separated from it
in the transformation they have undergone.
Chapter XLI. Sundry Quotations from Hermogenes. Now Uncertain and Vague are
His Speculations Respecting Motion in Matter, and the Material Qualities of
Good and Evil.
I come back to the point of motion, [6543] that I may show how slippery
you are at every step. Motion in Matter was disordered, and confused, and
turbulent. This is why you apply to it the comparison of a boiler of hot
water surging over. Now how is it, that in another passage another sort of
motion is affirmed by you? For when you want to represent Matter as neither
good nor evil, you say: "Matter, which is the substratum (of creation)
[6544] possessing as it does motion in an equable impulse, [6545] tends
in no very great degree either to good or to evil." Now if it had this
equable impulse, it could not be turbulent, nor be like the boiling water of
the caldron; it would rather be even and regular, oscillating indeed of its
own accord between good and evil, but yet not prone or tending to either
side. It would swing, as the phrase is, in a just and exact balance. Now
this is not unrest; this is not turbulence or inconstancy; [6546] but
rather the regularity, and evenness, and exactitude of a motion, inclining
to neither side. If it oscillated this way and that way, and inclined rather
to one particular side, it would plainly in that case merit the reproach of
unevenness, and inequality, and turbulence. Moreover, although the motion of
Matter was not prone either to good or to evil, it would still, of course,
oscillate between good and evil; so that from this circumstance too it is
obvious that Matter is contained within certain limits, [6547] because
its motion, while prone to neither good nor evil, since it had no natural
bent either way, oscillated from either between both, and therefore was
contained within the limits of the two. But you, in fact, place both good
and evil in a local habitation, [6548] when you assert that motion in
Matter inclined to neither of them. For Matter which was local, [6549]
when inclining neither hither nor thither, inclined not to the places in
which good and evil were. But when you assign locality to good and evil, you
make them corporeal by making them local, since those things which have
local space must needs first have bodily substance. In fact, [6550]
incorporeal things could not have any locality of their own except in a
body, when they have access to a body. [6551] But when Matter inclined
not to good and evil, it was as corporeal or local essences that it did not
incline to them. You err, therefore, when you will have it that good and
evil are substances. For you make substances of the things to which you
assign locality; [6552] but you assign locality when you keep motion in
Matter poised equally distant from both sides. [6553]
Chapter XLII. Further Exposure of Inconsistencies in the Opinions of
Hermogenes Respecting the Divine Qualities of Matter.
You have thrown out all your views loosely and at random, [6554] in order
that it might not be apparent, by too close a proximity, how contrary they
are to one another. I, however, mean to gather them together and compare
them. You allege that motion in Matter is without regularity, [6555] and
you go on to say that Matter aims at a shapeless condition, and I then, in
another passage, that it desires to be set in order by God. Does that, then,
which affects to be without form, want to be put into shape? Or does that
which wants to be put into shape, affect to be without form? You are
unwilling that God should seem to be equal to Matter; and then again you say
that it has a common condition [6556] with God. "For it is impossible,"
you say, "if it has nothing in common with God, that it can be set in order
by Him." But if it had anything in common with God, it did not want to be
set in order, [6557] being, forsooth, a part of the Deity through a
community of condition; or else even God was susceptible of being set in
order [6558] by Matter, by His having Himself something in common with
it. And now you herein subject God to necessity, since there was in Matter
something on account of which He gave it form. You make it, however, a
common attribute of both of them, that they set themselves in motion by
themselves, and that they are ever in motion. What less do you ascribe to
Matter than to God? There will be found all through a fellowship of divinity
in this freedom and perpetuity of motion.
Only in God motion is regular, [6559] in Matter irregular. [6560] In
both, however, there is equally the attribute of Deity'both alike having
free and eternal motion. At the same time, you assign more to Matter, to
which belonged the privilege of thus moving itself in a way not allowed to
God.
Chapter XLIII. Other Discrepancies Exposed and Refuted Respecting the Evil
in Matter Being Changed to Good.
On the subject of motion I would make this further remark. Following the
simile of the boiling caldron, you say that motion in Matter, before it was
regulated, was confused, [6561] restless, incomprehensible by reason of
excess in the commotion. [6562] Then again you go on to say, "But it
waited for the regulation [6563] of God, and kept its irregular motion
incomprehensible, owing to the tardiness of its irregular motion." Just
before you ascribe commotion, here tardiness, to motion. Now observe how
many slips you make respecting the nature of Matter. In a former passage
[6564] you say, "If Matter were naturally evil, it would not have admitted
of a change for the better; nor would God have ever applied to it any
attempt at arrangement, for His labour would have been in vain." You
therefore concluded your two opinions, that Matter was not by nature evil,
and that its nature was incapable of being changed by God; and then,
forgetting them, you afterwards drew this inference: "But when it received
adjustment from God, and was reduced to order, [6565] it relinquished its
nature." Now, inasmuch as it was transformed to good, it was of course
transformed from evil; and if by God's setting it in order it
relinquished [6566] the nature of evil, it follows that its nature came
to an end; [6567] now its nature was evil before the adjustment, but
after the transformation it might have relinquished that nature.
Chapter XLIV. Curious Views Respecting God's Method of Working with Matter
Exposed. Discrepancies in the Heretic's Opinion About God's Local Relation
to Matter.
But it remains that I should show also how you make God work. You are
plainly enough at variance with the philosophers; but neither are you in
accord with the prophets. The Stoics maintain that God pervaded Matter, just
as honey the honeycomb. You, however, affirm that it is not by pervading
Matter that God makes the world, but simply by appearing, and approaching
it, just as beauty affects [6568] a thing by simply appearing, and a
loadstone by approaching it. Now what similarity is there in God forming the
world, and beauty wounding a soul, or a magnet attracting iron? For even if
God appeared to Matter, He yet did not wound it, as beauty does the soul;
if, again, He approached it, He yet did not cohere to it, as the magnet does
to the iron. Suppose, however, that your examples are suitable ones. Then,
of course, [6569] it was by appearing and approaching to Matter that God
made the world, and He made it when He appeared and when He approached to
it. Therefore, since He had not made it before then, [6570] He had
neither appeared nor approached to it. Now, by whom can it be believed that
God had not appeared to Matter'of the same nature as it even was owing to
its eternity? Or that He had been at a distance from it'even He whom we
believe to be existent everywhere, and everywhere apparent; whose praises
all things chant, even inanimate things and things incorporeal, according to
(the prophet) Daniel? [6571] How immense the place, where God kept
Himself so far aloof from Matter as to have neither appeared nor approached
to it before the creation of the world! I suppose He journeyed to it from a
long distance, as soon as He washed to appear and approach to it.
Chapter XLV. Conclusion. Contrast Between the Statements of Hermogenes and
the Testimony of Holy Scripture Respecting the Creation. Creation Out of
Nothing, Not Out of Matter.
But it is not thus that the prophets and the apostles have told us that the
world was made by God merely appearing and approaching Matter. They did not
even mention any Matter, but (said) that Wisdom was first set up, the
beginning of His ways, for His works. [6572] Then that the Word was
produced, "through whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was
made." [6573] Indeed, "by the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and
all their hosts by the breath of His mouth." [6574] He is the Lord's
right hand, [6575] indeed His two bands, by which He worked and
constructed the universe. "For," says He, "the heavens are the works of
Thine hands," [6576] wherewith "He hath meted out the heaven, and the
earth with a span." [6577] Do not be willing so to cover God with
flattery, as to contend that He produced by His mere appearance and simple
approach so many vast substances, instead of rather forming them by His own
energies. For this is proved by Jeremiah when he says, "God hath made the
earth by His power, He hath established the world by His wisdom, and hath
stretched out the heaven by His understanding." [6578] These are the
energies by the stress of which He made this universe. [6579] His glory
is greater if He laboured. At length on the seventh day He rested from His
works. Both one and the other were after His manner. If, on the contrary,
[6580] He made this world simply by appearing and approaching it, did He, on
the completion of His work, cease to appear and approach it any more. Nay
rather, [6581] God began to appear more conspicuously and to be
everywhere accessible [6582] from the time when the world was made. You
see, therefore, how all things consist by the operation of that God who
"made the earth by His power, who established the world by His wisdom, and
stretched out the heaven by His understanding; "not appearing merely, nor
approaching, but applying the almighty efforts of His mind, His wisdom, His
power, His understanding, His word, His Spirit, His might. Now these things
were not necessary to Him, if He had been perfect by simply appearing and
approaching. They are, however, His "invisible things," which, according to
the apostle, "are from the creation of the world clearly seen by the things
that are made; [6583] they are no parts of a nondescript [6584]
Matter, but they are the sensible [6585] evidences of Himself. "For who
hath known the mind of the Lord," [6586] of which (the apostle) exclaims:
"O the depth of the riches both of His wisdom and knowledge! how
unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! " [6587]
Now what clearer truth do these words indicate, than that all things were
made out of nothing? They are incapable of being found out or investigated,
except by God alone. Otherwise, if they were traceable or discoverable in
Matter, they would be capable of investigation. Therefore, in as far as it
has become evident that Matter had no prior existence (even from this
circumstance, that it is impossible [6588] for it to have had such an
existence as is assigned to it), in so far is it proved that all things were
made by God out of nothing. It must be admitted, however, [6589] that
Hermogenes, by describing for Matter a condition like his own'irregular,
confused, turbulent, of a doubtful and precipate and fervid impulse'has
displayed a specimen of his own art, and painted his own portrait.
Footnotes
[6108] Compendii gratia. [The reference here to the De Proescript. forbids
us to date this tract earlier than 207 a.d. Of this Hermogenes, we only know
that he was probably a Carthaginian, a painter, and of a versatile and
clever mind.]
[6109] This is the criterion prescribed in the Proescript. Hoeret. xxxi.
xxxiv., and often applied by Tertullian. See our Anti-Marcion, pp. 272, 345,
470, and passim.
[6110] The tam novella is a relative phrase, referring to the fore-mentioned
rule.
[6111] Denique.
[6112] Maldicere singuis.
[6113] Probably by painting idols (Rigalt.; and so Neander).
[6114] It is uncertian whether Tertullian means to charge Hermogenes with
defending polygamy, or only second marriages, in the phrase nubit assidue.
Probably the latter, which was offensive to the rigorous Tertullian; and so
Neander puts it.
[6115] Quoting Gen. i. 28, "Be fruitful and multiply" (Rigalt.).
[6116] Disregarding the law when it forbids the representation of idols.
(Rigalt.).
[6117] Et cauterio et stilo. The former instrument was used by the
encaustic painters for burning in the wax colours into the ground of their
pictures (Westropp's Handbook of Archoeology, p. 219). Tertullian charges
Hermogenes with using his encaustic art to the injury of the scriptures, by
practially violating their percepts in his artistic works; and with using
using his pen (stilus) in corrupting the doctrine thereof by his heresy.
[6118] By the numbentium contagium, Tertullian, in his Montanist rigour,
censures those who married more than once.
[6119] 2 Tim. i. 15.
[6120] Thus differing from Marcion.
[6121] The force of the subjunctive, ex qua fecerit.
[6122] Praestruens.
[6123] Porro.
[6124] In partes non devenire.
[6125] Ut faceret semetipsum.
[6126] Ut fieret de semetipso.
[6127] Non fieri.
[6128] Non ejus fieret conditionis.
[6129] Inveniri.
[6130] Porro.
[6131] Retro.
[6132] Itaque.
[6133] Conjecturam.
[6134] Tamquam.
[6135] Scilicet.
[6136] Argumentari: in the sense of argutari.
[6137] Naviter nobis patrocinatur.
[6138] Gen. i. 1.
[6139] Gen. i. 3, etc.
[6140] Cognominatur: as if by way of surname, Deus Dominus.
[6141] Gen. ii. 15.
[6142] Gen. ii. 16.
[6143] Et ego.
[6144] Extrema linea. Rhenanus sees in this phrase a slur against
Hermogenes, who was an artist. Tertullian, Isuppose, meant that Hermogenes
was extremely ignorant.
[6145] Experimenta.
[6146] Libera: and so not a possible subject for the Lordship of God.
[6147] Matter having, by the hypothesis, been independent of God, and so
incapable of giving Him any title to Lordship.
[6148] Fuit hoc utique. In Hermogenes' own opinion, which is thus shown
to have been contradictory to itself, and so absurd.
[6149] Quod, with the subjunctive comparet.
[6150] Census.
[6151] Sculicet.
[6152] 1 Cor. viii. 5.
[6153] Apud nos.
[6154] The property of being eternal.
[6155] Unicum sit necesse est.
[6156] Censetur.
[6157] Comparationi.
[6158] Ratio.
[6159] Auctrix.
[6160] Statim si.
[6161] Totum Dei.
[6162] Ps. lxxxii. 6.
[6163] Ver. I.
[6164] Hermogenes.
[6165] Ordinem: or course.
[6166] Quale autem est: "how comes it to pass that."
[6167] Isa. xlv. 23.
[6168] Isa. xli. 4, xliv. 6, xlviii. 12.
[6169] Ordo.
[6170] Isa. xliv. 24.
[6171] Salvum egro erit.
[6172] Recensentur.
[6173] Nec natus omnino.
[6174] Of course, according to Hermogenes, whom Tertullian refutes with
an argumentum ad hominem.
[6175] Aderit utrobique.
[6176] That is, having no God superior to themselves.
[6177] Hermogenes.
[6178] Atquin etiam.
[6179] Ex illa usus est.
[6180] De cujus utitur.
[6181] Praestat.
[6182] Itaque.
[6183] Quidem.
[6184] Revera.
[6185] Sane.
[6186] They are so deemed in the de Proescript. Hoeret. c. vii.
[6187] We have rather paraphrased the word "precario"'"obtained by
prayer." [See p. 456.]
[6188] Domino: opposed to "precario."
[6189] Ideout.
[6190] Mediocritatis.
[6191] Tali: i.e. potestate.
[6192] Jam ergo: introducing an argumentum ad hominem against Hermogenes.
[6193] Quia dominator.
[6194] Ergo.
[6195] Aut precario: "as having begged for it."
[6196] Precario: See above, note 2, p. 482.
[6197] De is often in Tertullian the sign of an instrumental noun.
[6198] Optima.
[6199] Bona fide.
[6200] Audiat.
[6201] De mali ratione.
[6202] Hac sua injectione. See our Anti-Marcion, iv. i., for this word,
p. 345.
[6203] Assentator. Fr. Junius suggests "adsectator" of the stronger
meaning "promoter;" nor does Oehler object.
[6204] Adversum semetisum.
[6205] Male: in reference to His alleged complicity with evil.
[6206] Et tamen.
[6207] Definimus.
[6208] Competere illi.
[6209] Alias.
[6210] Et in Deum credi.
[6211] Gestivit.
[6212] Jam vero.
[6213] Tum.
[6214] 1 Cor. v. 13.
[6215] Utique: with a touch of irony, in the argumentum ad hominem.
[6216] Matt. xxv. 41.
[6217] Rev. xx. 3.
[6218] Rom. viii. 19.
[6219] Rom. viii. 21.
[6220] Rom. viii. 20.
[6221] Conditionis: "creation."
[6222] Condixerint.
[6223] Isa. xi. 6.
[6224] Ps. cx. 1.
[6225] Male deputantur.
[6226] Scilicet.
[6227] Matt. iii. 9.
[6228] Verses 7, 8.
[6229] O homo.
[6230] Temere.
[6231] Tene.
[6232] Scilicet.
[6233] Gen. i. 21, 22.
[6234] Denique.
[6235] That is, of course, by its own natural law.
[6236] Matter.
[6237] i.e. in their nature, Matter being evil, and they good, on the
hypothesis.
[6238] Matt. vii. 18.
[6239] Concurrisse.
[6240] Ipsa.
[6241] Individiam.
[6242] Ingenio.
[6243] Nactus.
[6244] Turpe.
[6245] Utique.
[6246] Ex malo.
[6247] Proinde quatenus.
[6248] We subjoin the original of thes sentence: "Plane sic interest
unde fecerit ac si de nihilo fecisset, nec interest uned fecerit, ut inde
fecerit unde eum magis decuit."
[6249] Pusillitas.
[6250] Secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.
[6251] Contra denegatam aeterni conversationem. Literally, "Contrary to
that convertibility of an eternal nature which has been denied (by
Hermogenes) to be possible." It will be obvious why we have, in commection
with the preceding clause preferred the equvalent rendering of our text. For
the denial of Hermogenes, which Tertullian refers to, see above, chap. xii.
p. 484.
[6252] Debuisset protulisse.
[6253] This clumsy expedient to save the character of both God and
Matter was one of the weaknesses of Hermogenes' system.
[6254] Cur non et ex nihilo potuerit induci?
[6255] Ubique et undique.
[6256] Destructionibus. "Ruin of character" is the true idea of thes
strong term.
[6257] Praestructione. The notion is of the foundation of an edifice:
here = "preliminary remarks" (see our Anti-Marcion, v. 5, p. 438).
[6258] Articuli.
[6259] Utrumque utrique.
[6260] Alterum alteri.
[6261] Boni matrix.
[6262] The usual reading is "Hermogenes." Rigaltius, however, reads
"Hermogenis," of which Oehler approves; so as to make Tertullian say, "I
cannot tell how I can avoid the opinion of Hermogenes, who," etc. etc.
[6263] Per substantiae suggestum.
[6264] Excusas jam causam. Hermogenes held that Matter was eternal, to
exclude God from the authorship of evil. This causa of Matter he was now
illogically evading. Excusare = ex, causa, "to cancel the cause."
[6265] De praejudicio alieno.
[6266] Unici Dei.
[6267] Rom. xi. 34, 35; comp. Isa. xl. 14.
[6268] De aliquo.
[6269] Adeo ut fecerit.
[6270] Sophiam suam scilicet.
[6271] Apud.
[6272] 1 Cor. ii. 11.
[6273] Isa. xl. 14.
[6274] Or the "inquit" may indicate the very words of "Wisdom."
[6275] Fontes. Although Oehler prefers Junius' reading "montes," he yet
retains "fontes," because Tertullian (in ch. xxxii. below) has the
unmistakable reading "fontes" in a like connection.
[6276] Compingens.
[6277] Ad quem: the expression is masculine.
[6278] Prov. viii. 27-31.
[6279] Commendet.
[6280] "Non fini subditam" is Oehler's better reading than the old "sibi
subditam."
[6281] Condit: created.
[6282] See Prov. viii.
[6283] Intra Dominum.
[6284] Scilicet.
[6285] Coepti agitari.
[6286] Multo magis non capit.
[6287] Extra Dominum.
[6288] Sensu.
[6289] Nedum.
[6290] Proinde.
[6291] On this version of Ps. xlv. 1., and its application by
Tertullian, see our Anti-Marcion (p. 299, note 5).
[6292] John i. 1.
[6293] John x. 30.
[6294] Nisi quod.
[6295] Originale instrumentum: which may mean "the document which treats
of the origin of all things."
[6296] Principium.
[6297] Corpulentum.
[6298] Gen. i. 1.
[6299] Substantivum aliquid.
[6300] De cetero.
[6301] Non ab re tamen.
[6302] Illamquae.
[6303] Condidit: "created."
[6304] Prov. viii. 22.
[6305] In qua: in Wisdom.
[6306] Wisdom.
[6307] De cogitatu.
[6308] Species facti.
[6309] Proinde.
[6310] John i. 1.
[6311] Gen. i. 1.
[6312] John i. 1-3.
[6313] Plane.
[6314] Dum ostenditur: which Oehler and Rigalt. construe as "donec
ostendatur." One reading has "dum non ostenditur," "so long as it is not
shown."
[6315] Ea conditione.
[6316] In totum habebat intelligi.
[6317] Gen. i. 11, 12.
[6318] Gen. i. 20, 21.
[6319] Ver. 24.
[6320] Quid unde protulerit: properly a double question = "what was
produced, and whence?"
[6321] Unde undedumne.
[6322] Quid unde processerit: properly a double question = "what was
produced, and whence?"
[6323] Gen. i. 1.
[6324] Adoro: reverently admire.
[6325] John i. 3.
[6326] Officina.
[6327] Rev. xxii. 18, 19.
[6328] Gen. i. 2.
[6329] Redigit in.
[6330] Inconditam: we have combined the two senses of the word.
[6331] Tale aliquid.
[6332] Plane: ironical.
[6333] Articulos.
[6334] Nec utique.
[6335] Communicare.
[6336] We have construed Oehler's reading: "Quanto non comparet" (i.e.,
by a frequent ellipse of Tertullian, "quanto magis non comparet"). Fr.
Junius, however, suspects that instead of "quanto" we should read "quando":
this would produce the sense, "since it is not apparent to what object it
may be ascribed," etc.
[6337] Nominatam.
[6338] Cognominatam.
[6339] Gen. i. 2.
[6340] Quae cui nomen terrae accommodare debeat. This is literally a
double question, asking about the fitness of the name, and to which earth it
is best adapted.
[6341] He means those who have gone wrong on the eternity of matter.
[6342] Proinde.
[6343] A mixed metal, of the colour of amber.
[6344] Gen. i. 31.
[6345] Gen. i. 1.
[6346] Qualitatem ejus: unless this means "how He made it," like the
"qualiter fecerit" below.
[6347] Gen. i. 1.
[6348] Gen. i. 7.
[6349] Ver. 8.
[6350] Gen. i. 27.
[6351] Gen. ii. 7.
[6352] Utique.
[6353] Prosequi.
[6354] Primo praefari, postea prosequi; nominare, deinde describere.
[6355] Alioquin.
[6356] Hermogenes, whose view of the narrative is criticised.
[6357] Integer.
[6358] Autem.
[6359] Gen. i. 1, 2.
[6360] Cum maxime edixerat.
[6361] The "autem" of the note just before this.
[6362] Fibula.
[6363] Alligat sensum.
[6364] Implied in the emphatic tu.
[6365] Sine u lo lenocinio pronunciationis.
[6366] Prima positio: the first inflection perhaps, i.e. the present
tense.
[6367] Declinatio: the past tense.
[6368] Caput.
[6369] Scilicet.
[6370] This seems to be the meaning of the obscure passage, "Ut ejusdem
sit Erat cujus et quod erat."
[6371] Habitum.
[6372] Deo subjacebat.
[6373] See below, ch. xxx. p. 494.
[6374] Matter.
[6375] "Compertus est" is here a deponent verb.
[6376] Minus factum.
[6377] Rudimento. Tertullian uses the word "rudis" (unformed) for the
scriptural term ("void"); of this word "rudimentum" is the abstract.
[6378] Depalans.
[6379] Dedicans: "disposed" them.
[6380] Solatio lunae: a beautiful expression!
[6381] Significavit.
[6382] Belluis.
[6383] In vacuum: void.
[6384] Isa. xlv. 18.
[6385] Futura etiam perfecta.
[6386] De reliquo nondum instructa.
[6387] Genitalis humoris.
[6388] Canit: "sing," as the Psalmist.
[6389] Ps. xxiv. 1.
[6390] Emicantior.
[6391] "Visibilis" is here the opposite of the term "invisibilis," which
Tertullian uses for the Scripture phrase "without form."
[6392] In congregatione una.
[6393] Gen. i. 9.
[6394] Sustinebat: i.e. expectabat (Oehler).
[6395] Gen. i. 10.
[6396] Ver. 11.
[6397] Ver. 24.
[6398] Volo.
[6399] He means, of course, the theoretic "Matter" of Hermogenes.
[6400] Isa. xlv. 18.
[6401] Demonstravit: "make it visible." Tertullian here all along makes
form and visibility synonymous
[6402] Gen. i. 9.
[6403] Ostensam: "manifested" (see note 10, p. 96.)
[6404] Cum caelo separavit: Gen. i. 1.
[6405] Gen. i. 2.
[6406] Confusae.
[6407] Massalis illus molis.
[6408] Situs.
[6409] Dispositionem.
[6410] Tot formarum vocabulis.
[6411] Corpus confusionis.
[6412] Unicum.
[6413] Informe.
[6414] Autem.
[6415] Confusum.
[6416] Ex varietate.
[6417] Unam speciem.
[6418] Unam ex multis speciem.
[6419] Istas species.
[6420] Non habens formas.
[6421] Agnoscitur.
[6422] Ista: the earth, which has been the subject of contention.
[6423] Speciecus.
[6424] Scrupulo: doubt of difficulity.
[6425] Suggestus: "Hoc est, apparatus, ornatus" (Oehler).
[6426] It will be observed that Tertullian applies the spiritus to the
wind as a creature.
[6427] Qua summale.
[6428] Qua portionale.
[6429] Scena.
[6430] Has species.
[6431] Gen. ii. 7.
[6432] Both in the quotation and here, Tertullian read "faciem" where we
read "nostrils."
[6433] Cutem: another reading has "costam," rib.
[6434] See Gen. ii. 21, 23, iii. 5, 19, iv. 10.
[6435] Quatenus hic commendare videtur.
[6436] Dissimulato tacito intellectu.
[6437] Prov. viii. 24.
[6438] Subjecta.
[6439] Isa. xlv. 7.
[6440] De spiritu. This shows that Tertullian took the spirit of Gen. i.
2 in the inferior sense.
[6441] So also the Septuagint.
[6442] So also the Septuagint.
[6443] Amos iv. 13.
[6444] The "wind."
[6445] John iv. 24.
[6446] Flatum: "breath;" so LXX. of Isa. lvii. 16.
[6447] Fonter, quae.
[6448] Modulans.
[6449] Prov. viii. 28.
[6450] Plane.
[6451] Gen. i. 2.
[6452] In disperso.
[6453] Ergo: Tertullian's answer.
[6454] Ch. xxx., towards the end.
[6455] Ut et aliae.
[6456] Jam.
[6457] Otiosa.
[6458] Generatio: creation in the higest sense of matter issuing from
the maker. Another reading has "generosiora essent," for our "generatio sola
esset," meaning that, "those things would be nobler which had not been
made." which is obviously quite opposed to Terullian's argument.
[6459] Aeque.
[6460] Praemiserat.
[6461] Colores. See our "Anti-Marcion," p. 217, Edin., where the word
pretension should stand instead of precedent.
[6462] Praescribentes.
[6463] Innatum: see above, note 12.
[6464] Donec ad Scripturas provocata deficiat exibitio materiae.
[6465] Etiamsi quid.
[6466] Orgines.
[6467] Materias. There is a point in this use of the plural of the
controverted term materia.
[6468] Ceterum.
[6469] Isa. xxxiv. 4; Matt. xxiv. 29; 2 Pet. iii. 10; Rev. vi. 14.
[6470] Matt. xxiv. 35.
[6471] Rev. xxi. 1.
[6472] Rev. xx. 11.
[6473] Ps. cii. 25, 26.
[6474] Acerba sua "grossos suos" (Rigalt.). So our marginal reading.
[6475] Rev. vi. 13.
[6476] Ps. xcvii. 5.
[6477] Isa. ii. 19.
[6478] Isa. xlii. 15.
[6479] Isa. xli. 17.
[6480] Etiam mare hactenus, Rev. xxi. 1.
[6481] Causam.
[6482] Etiam.
[6483] Emortuam.
[6484] In hoc, ut esset. Contrasted with the "non erat" of the previous
sentance, this must be the meaning, as if it were "ut fieret."
[6485] Ista.
[6486] Interim.
[6487] De substantiis duntaxat.
[6488] Age nunc sit: "But grant that there is this third state."
[6489] Subicit.
[6490] Other than "the right reason" above named.
[6491] Adversus.
[6492] The original, "Adversus renuntiationem reciprocationis illius,"
is an obscure expression. Oehler, who gives this reading in his edition,
after the editio princeps, renders the term "reciprocationis" by the phrase
"negative conversion" of the proposition that Matter is corporeal and
incorporeal (q.d. "Matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal"). Instead,
however, of the reading "reciprocationis," Oehler would gladly read "rectae
rationin," after most of the editions. He thinks that this allusion to "the
right reason," of which Hermogenes boasted, and of which the absurd
conclusion is exposed in the context, very well suits the sarcastic style of
Tertullian. If this, the general reading, be adopted, we must render the
whole clause this: "For it will be corporeal and incorporeal, in spite of
the declaration of that right reason (of Hermogenes), which is plainly
ehough above giving any reason," etc. etc.
[6493] Inconditum. See above ch. xviii., in the middle. Notwithstanding
the absurdity of Hermogenes idea, it is impossible to translate this word
irregular as it has been proposed to do by Genoude.
[6494] Rectior.
[6495] Bardior.
[6496] Actus: being driven.
[6497] Actus ejus est motus.
[6498] Sicut tu.
[6499] Denique.
[6500] Solius.
[6501] Res.
[6502] Officia.
[6503] Habitum.
[6504] Quid enim?
[6505] Si placuisset tibi.
[6506] See below, ch. xli., p. 500.
[6507] Compositionem Dei.
[6508] Non accepisset translationem.
[6509] Subostendis.
[6510] Affinem.
[6511] Matt. iii. 9.
[6512] Subicis.
[6513] This is the force of the subjunctive verb.
[6514] Te confessum.
[6515] De situ.
[6516] Oehler here restores the reading "quod et de modo," instead of
"de motu," for which Pamelius contends. Oehler has the mss. on his side, and
Fr. Junius, who interprets "modo" here to mean "mass or quantity." Pamelius
wishes to suit the passage to the preceding context (see ch. xxxvi.); Junius
thinks it is meant rather to refer to what follows, by which it is
confirmed.
[6517] In loco.
[6518] Determinatur.
[6519] Lineam extremam.
[6520] Modo corporis: or "bulk."
[6521] Nec tota fabricatur, sed partes ejus. This perhaps means: "It is
not its entirety, but its parts, which are used in creation."
[6522] Obduceris: here a verb of the middle voice.
[6523] In reference to the opinion above mentioned, "Matter is not
fabricated as whole, but in parts."
[6524] Ut exemplarium antiquitatis.
[6525] Rectius.
[6526] Definitiva.
[6527] Ut quae fabricatur, inquis, a Deo.
[6528] Lineis. Tertullian often refers to Hermogenes' profession of
painting.
[6529] In partes venire.
[6530] Omnia ex omnibus.
[6531] i.e. of Matter.
[6532] Dinoscatur ex.
[6533] Utique ex pristinis.
[6534] Aliter habeant.
[6535] In melius reformatam.
[6536] Speculum.
[6537] Mulus.
[6538] Speciatum: "arranged in specific forms."
[6539]
[6540] Inornatae: unfurnished with forms of beauty.
[6541] Non totam eam fabricatam.
[6542] Recesserunt a forma ejus.
[6543] From which he has digressed since ch. xxxvi., p. 497.
[6544] Subjacens materia.
[6545] Aequalis momenti motum.
[6546] Passivitas.
[6547] Determinabilem.
[6548] In loco facis: "you localise."
[6549] In loco.
[6550] Denique.
[6551] Cum corpori accedunt: or, "when they are added to a body."
[6552] Loca: "places;" one to each.
[6553] Cum ab utraque regione suspendis: equally far from good and evil.
[6554] Dispersisti omnia.
[6555] Inconditrum.
[6556] "Communionem."
[6557] Ornari: "to be adorned."
[6558] Ornari: "to be adorned."
[6559] Composite.
[6560] Incondite.
[6561] Concretus.
[6562] Certaminis.
[6563] Compositionem: "arrangement."
[6564] See above, ch. xxxvii. p. 498.
[6565] Ornata.
[6566] Cessavit a.
[6567] Cessavit.
[6568] Facit quid decor.
[6569] Certe.
[6570] Retro.
[6571] Dan. iii. 21.
[6572] Prov. viii. 22, 23.
[6573] John i. 3.
[6574] Spiritu Ipsius: "by His Spirit." See Ps. xxxiii. 6.
[6575] Isa. xlviii. 13.
[6576] Ps. cii. 25.
[6577] Isa. xl. 12 and xlviii. 13.
[6578] Jer. li. 15.
[6579] Ps. lxiv. 7.
[6580] Aut si.
[6581] Atquin.
[6582] Ubique conveniri.
[6583] Rom. i. 20.
[6584] Nescio quae.
[6585] Sensualia.
[6586] Rom. xi. 34.
[6587] Ver. 33.
[6588] Nec competat.
[6589] Nisi quod.
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