Letter Against Celsus - Origen - Book IV
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Translated by the Rev. Frederick Crombie, D.D.
Text edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson and
first published by T&T Clark in Edinburgh in 1867. Additional
introductionary material and notes provided for the American
edition by A. Cleveland Coxe, 1886.
Book IV
Chapter I.
Having, in the three preceding books, fully stated what occurred to us by
way of answer to the treatise of Celsus, we now, reverend Ambrosius, with
prayer to God through Christ, offer this fourth book as a reply to what
follows. And we pray that words may be given us, as it is written in the
book of Jeremiah that the Lord said to the prophet: "Behold, I have put My
words in thy mouth as fire. See, I have set thee this day over the nations,
and over the kingdoms, to root out and to pull down, and to destroy, and to
throw down, and to build and to plant." [3432] For we need words now which
will root out of every wounded soul the reproaches uttered against the truth
by this treatise of Celsus, or which proceed from opinions like his. And we
need also thoughts which will pull down all edifices based on false
opinions, and especially the edifice raised by Celsus in his work which
resembles the building of those who said "Come, let us build us a city, and
a tower whose top shall reach to heaven." [3433] Yea, we even require a
wisdom which will throw down all high things that rise against the knowledge
of God, [3434] and especially that height of arrogance which Celsus displays
against us. And in the next place, as we must not stop with rooting out and
pulling down the hindrances which have just been mentioned, but must, in
room of what has been rooted out, plant the plants of "God's husbandry; "
[3435] mad in place of what has been pulled down, rear up the building of
God, and the temple of His glory,'we must for that reason pray also to the
Lord, who bestowed the gifts named in the book of Jeremiah, that He may
grant even to us words adapted both for building up the (temple) of Christ,
and for planting the spiritual law, and the prophetic words referring to the
same. [3436] And above all is it necessary to show, as against the
assertions of Celsus which follow those he has already made, that the
prophecies regarding Christ are true predictions. For, arraying himself at
the same time against both parties'against the Jews on the one hand, who
deny that the advent of Christ has taken place, but who expect it as future,
and against Christians on the other, who acknowledge that Jesus is the
Christ spoken of in prophecy'he makes the following statement:'
Chapter II.
"But that certain Christians and (all) Jews should maintain, the former that
there has already descended, the latter that there will descend, upon the
earth a certain God, or Son of a God, who will make the inhabitants of the
earth righteous, [3437] is a most shameless assertion, and one the
refutation of which does not need many words." Now here he appears to
pronounce correctly regarding not "certain" of the Jews, but all of them,
that they imagine that there is a certain (God) who will descend upon the
earth; and with regard to Christians, that certain of them say that He has
already come down. For he means those who prove from the Jewish Scriptures
that the advent of Christ has already taken place, and he seems to know that
there are certain heretical sects which deny that Christ Jesus was predicted
by the prophets. In the preceding pages, however, we have already discussed,
to the best of our ability, the question of Christ having been the subject
of prophecy, and therefore, to avoid tautology, we do not repeat much that
might be advanced upon this head. Observe, now, that if he had wished with a
kind of apparent force [3438] to subvert faith in the prophetic writings,
either with regard to the future or past advent of Christ, he ought to have
set forth the prophecies themselves which we Christians and Jews quote in
our discussions with each other. For in this way he would have appeared to
turn aside those who are carried away by the plausible character [3439] of
the prophetic statements, as he regards it, from assenting to their truth,
and from believing, on account of these prophecies, that Jesus is the
Christ; whereas now, being unable to answer the prophecies relating to
Christ, or else not knowing at all what are the prophecies relating to Him,
he brings forward no prophetic declaration, although there are countless
numbers which refer to Christ; but he thinks that he prefers an accusation
against the prophetic Scriptures, while he does not even state what he
himself would call their "plausible character!" He is not, however, aware
that it is not at all the Jews who say that Christ will descend as a God, or
the Son of a God, as we have shown in the foregoing pages. And when he
asserts that "he is said by us to have already come, but by the Jews that
his advent as Messiah [3440] is still future," he appears by the very charge
to censure our statement as one that is most shameless, and which needs no
lengthened refutation.
Chapter III.
And he continues: "What is the meaning of such a descent upon the part of
God? "not observing that, according to our teaching, the meaning of the
descent is pre-eminently to convert what are called in the Gospel the lost
"sheep of the house of Israel; "and secondly, to take away from them, on
account of their disobedience, what is called the "kingdom of God," and to
give to other husbandmen than the ancient Jews, viz. to the Christians, who
will render to God the fruits of His kingdom in due season (each action
being a "fruit of the kingdom"). [3441] We shall therefore, out of a
greater number, select a few remarks by way of answer to the question of
Celsus, when he says, "What is the meaning of such a descent upon the part
of God? "And Celsus here returns to himself an answer which would have been
given neither by Jews nor by us, when he asks, "Was it in order to learn
what goes on amongst men? "For not one of us asserts that it was in order to
learn what goes on amongst men that Christ entered into this life.
Immediately after, however, as if some would reply that it was "in order to
learn what goes on among men," he makes this objection to his own statement:
"Does he not know all things? "Then, as if we were to answer that He does
know all things, he raises a new question, saying, "Then he does know, but
does not make (men) better, nor is it possible for him by means of his
divine power to make (men) better." Now all this on his part is silly
talk; [3442] for God, by means of His word, which is continually passing
from generation to generation into holy souls, and constituting them friends
of God and prophets, does improve those who listen to His words; and by the
coming of Christ He improves, through the doctrine of Christianity, not
those who are unwilling, but those who have chosen the better life, and that
which is pleasing to God. I do not know, moreover, what kind of improvement
Celsus wished to take place when he raised the objection, asking, "Is it
then not possible for him, by means of his divine power, to make (men)
better, unless he send some one for that special purpose? " [3443] Would
he then have the improvement to take place by God's filling the minds of men
with new ideas, removing at once the (inherent) wickedness, and implanting
virtue (in its stead)? [3444] Another person now would inquire whether
this was not inconsistent or impossible in the very nature of things; we,
however, would say, "Grant it to be so, and let it be possible." Where,
then, is our free will? [3445] and what credit is there in assenting to
the truth? or how is the rejection of what is false praiseworthy? But even
if it were once granted that such a course was not only possible, but could
be accomplished with propriety (by God), why would not one rather inquire
(asking a question like that of Celsus) why it was not possible for God, by
means of His divine power, to create men who needed no improvement, but who
were of themselves virtuous and perfect, evil being altogether non-existent?
These questions may perplex ignorant and foolish individuals, but not him
who sees into the nature of things; for if you take away the spontaneity of
virtue, you destroy its essence. But it would need an entire treatise to
discuss these matters; and on this subject the Greeks have expressed
themselves at great length in their works on providence. They truly would
not say what Celsus has expressed in words, that "God knows (all things)
indeed, but does not make (men) better, nor is able to do so by His divine
power." We ourselves have spoken in many parts of our writings on these
points to the best of our ability, and the Holy Scriptures have established
the same to those who are able to understand them.
Chapter IV.
The argument which Celsus employs against us and the Jews will be turned
against himself thus: My good sir, does the God who is over all things know
what takes place among men, or does He not know? Now if you admit the
existence of a God and of providence, as your treatise indicates, He must of
necessity know. And if He does know, why does He not make (men) better? Is
it obligatory, then, on us to defend God's procedure in not making men
better, although He knows their state, but not equally binding on you, who
do not distinctly show by your treatise that you are an Epicurean, but
pretend to recognise a providence, to explain why God, although knowing all
that takes place among men, does not make them better, nor by divine power
liberate all men from evil? We are not ashamed, however, to say that God is
constantly sending (instructors) in order to make men better; for there are
to be found amongst men reasons [3446] given by God which exhort them to
enter on a better life. But there are many diversities amongst those who
serve God, and they are few in number who are perfect and pure ambassadors
of the truth, and who produce a complete reformation, as did Moses and the
prophets. But above all these, great was the reformation effected by Jesus,
who desired to heal not only those who lived in one corner of the world, but
as far as in Him lay, men in every country, for He came as the Saviour of
all men.
Chapter V.
The illustrious [3447] Celsus, taking occasion I know not from what, next
raises an additional objection against us, as if we asserted that "God
Himself will come down to men." He imagines also that it follows from this,
that "He has left His own abode; "for he does not know the power of God, and
that "the Spirit of the Lord filleth the world, and that which upholdeth all
things hath knowledge of the voice." [3448] Nor is he able to understand
the words, "Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." [3449] Nor
does he see that, according to the doctrine of Christianity, we all "in Him
live, and move, and have our being," [3450] as Paul also taught in his
address to the Athenians; and therefore, although the God of the universe
should through His own power descend with Jesus into the life of men, and
although the Word which was in the beginning with God, which is also God
Himself, should come to us, He does not give His place or vacate His own
seat, so that one place should be empty of Him, and another which did not
formerly contain Him be filled. But the power and divinity of God comes
through him whom God chooses, and resides in him in whom it finds a place,
not changing its situation, nor leaving its own place empty and filling
another: for, in speaking of His quitting one place and occupying another,
we do not mean such expressions to be taken topically; but we say that the
soul of the bad man, and of him who is overwhelmed in wickedness, is
abandoned by God, while we mean that the soul of him who wishes to live
virtuously, or of him who is making progress (in a virtuous life), or who is
already living conform-ably thereto, is filled with or becomes a partaker of
the Divine Spirit. It is not necessary, then, for the descent of Christ, or
for the coming of God to men, that He should abandon a greater seat, and
that things on earth should be changed, as Celsus imagines when he says, "If
you were to change a single one, even the least, of things on earth, all
things would be overturned and disappear." And if we must speak of a change
in any one by the appearing of the power of God, and by the entrance of the
word among men, we shall not be reluctant to speak of changing from a wicked
to a virtuous, from a dissolute to a temperate, and from a superstitious to
a religious life, the person who has allowed the word of God to find
entrance into his soul.
Chapter VI
But if you will have us to meet the most ridiculous among the charges of
Celsus, listen to him when he says: "Now God, being unknown amongst men, and
deeming himself on that account to have less than his due, [3451] would
desire to make himself known, and to make trial both of those who believe
upon him and of those who do not, like those of mankind who have recently
come into the possession of riches, and who make a display of their wealth;
and thus they testify to an excessive but very mortal ambition on the part
of God." [3452] We answer, then, that God, not being known by wicked men,
would desire to make Himself known, not because He thinks that He meets with
less than His due, but because the knowledge of Him will free the possessor
from unhappiness. Nay, not even with the desire to try those who do or who
do not believe upon Him, does He, by His unspeakable and divine power,
Himself take up His abode in certain individuals, or send His Christ; but He
does this in order to liberate from all their wretchedness those who do
believe upon Him, and who accept His divinity, and that those who do not
believe may no longer have this as a ground of excuse, viz., that their
unbelief is the consequence of their not having heard the word of
instruction. What argument, then, proves that it follows from our views that
God, according to our representations, is "like those of mankind who have
recently come into the possession of riches, and who make a display of their
wealth? "For God makes no display towards us, from a desire that we should
understand and consider His pre-eminence; but desiring that the blessedness
which results from His being known by us should be implanted in our souls,
He brings it to pass through Christ, and His ever-indwelling word, that we
come to an intimate fellowship [3453] with Him. No mortal ambition, then,
does the Christian doctrine testify as existing on the part of God.
Chapter VII.
I do not know how it is, that after the foolish remarks which he has made
upon the subject which we have just been discussing, he should add the
following, that "God does not desire to make himself known for his own sake,
but because he wishes to bestow upon us the knowledge of himself for the
sake of our salvation, in order that those who accept it may become virtuous
and be saved, while those who do not accept may be shown to be wicked and be
punished." And yet, after making such a statement, he raises a new
objection, saying: "After so long a period of time, [3454] then, did God
now bethink himself of making men live righteous lives, [3455] but neglect
to do so before? "To which we answer, that there never was a time when God
did not wish to make men live righteous lives; but He continually evinced
His care for the improvement of the rational animal, [3456] by affording
him occasions for the exercise of virtue. For in every generation the wisdom
of God, passing into those souls which it ascertains to be holy, converts
them into friends and prophets of God. And there may be found in the sacred
book (the names of) those who in each generation were holy, and were
recipients of the Divine Spirit, and who strove to convert their
contemporaries so far as in their power.
Chapter VIII.
And it is not matter of surprise that in certain generations there have
existed prophets who, in the reception of divine influence, [3457]
surpassed, by means of their stronger and more powerful (religious) life,
other prophets who were their contemporaries, and others also who lived
before and after them. And so it is not at all wonderful that there should
also have been a time when something of surpassing excellence [3458] took
up its abode among the human race, and which was distinguished above all
that preceded or even that followed. But there is an element of profound
mystery in the account of these things, and one which is incapable of being
received by the popular understanding. And in order that these difficulties
should be made to disappear, and that the objections raised against the
advent of Christ should be answered'viz., that, "after so long a period of
time, then, did God now bethink himself of making men live righteous lives,
but neglect to do so before? "'it is necessary to touch upon the narrative
of the divisions (of the nations), and to make it evident why it was, that
"when the Most High divided the nations, when He separated the sons of Adam,
He set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the angels of
God, and the portion of the Lord was His people Jacob, Israel the cord of
His inheritance; " [3459] and it will be necessary to state the reason why
the birth of each man took place within each particular boundary, under him
who obtained the boundary by lot, and how it rightly happened that "the
portion of the Lord was His people Jacob, and Israel the cord of His
inheritance," and why formerly the portion of the Lord was His people Jacob,
and Israel the cord of His inheritance. But with respect to those who come
after, it is said to the Saviour by the Father, "Ask of Me, and I will give
Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth
for Thy possession." [3460] For there are certain connected and related
reasons, bearing upon the different treatment of human souls, which are
difficult to state and to investigate. [3461]
Chapter IX.
There came, then, although Celsus may not wish to admit it, after the
numerous prophets who were the reformers of that well-known Israel, the
Christ, the Reformer of the whole world, who did not need to employ against
men whips, and chains, and tortures, as was the case under the former
economy. For when the sower went forth to sow, the doctrine sufficed to sow
the word everywhere. But if there is a time coming which will necessarily
circumscribe the duration of the world, by reason of its having had a
beginning, and if there is to be an end to the world, and after the end a
just judgment of all things, it will be incumbent on him who treats the
declarations of the Gospels philosophically, to establish these doctrines by
arguments of all kinds, not only derived directly from the sacred
Scriptures, but also by inferences deducible from them; while the more
numerous and simpler class of believers, and those who are unable to
comprehend the many varied aspects of the divine wisdom, must entrust
themselves to God, and to the Saviour of our race, and be contented with His
"ipse dixit," [3462] instead of this or any other demonstration whatever.
Chapter X.
In the next place, Celsus, as is his custom having neither proved nor
established anything, proceeds to say, as if we talked of God in a manner
that was neither holy nor pious, that "it is perfectly manifest that they
babble about God in a way that is neither holy nor reverential; "and he
imagines that we do these things to excite the astonishment of the ignorant,
and that we do not speak the truth regarding the necessity of punishments
for those who have sinned. And accordingly he likens us to those who "in the
Bacchic mysteries introduce phantoms and objects of terror." With respect to
the mysteries of Bacchus, whether there is any trustworthy [3463] account
of them, or none that is such, let the Greeks tell, and let Celsus and his
boon-companions [3464] listen. But we defend our own procedure, When we
say that our object is to reform the human race, either by the threats of
punishments which we are persuaded are necessary for the whole world,
[3465] and which perhaps are not without use [3466] to those who are to
endure them; or by the promises made to those who have lived virtuous lives,
and in which are contained the statements regarding the blessed termination
which is to be found in the kingdom of God, reserved for those who are
worthy of becoming His subjects.
Chapter XI.
After this, being desirous to show that it is nothing either wonderful or
new which we state regarding floods or conflagrations, but that, from
misunderstanding the accounts of these things which are current among Greeks
or barbarous nations, we have accorded our belief to our own Scriptures when
treating of them, he writes as follows: "The belief has spread among them,
from a misunderstanding of the accounts of these occurrences, that after
lengthened cycles of time, and the returns and conjunctions of planets,
conflagrations and floods are wont to happen, and because after the last
flood, which took place in the time of Deucalion, the lapse of time,
agreeably to the vicissitude of all things, requires a conflagration and
this made them give utterance to the erroneous opinion that God will
descend, bringing fire like a torturer." Now in answer to this we say, that
I do not understand how Celsus, who has read a great deal, and who shows
that he has perused many histories, had not his attention arrested [3467]
by the antiquity of Moses, who is related by certain Greek historians to
have lived about the time of Inachus the son of Phoroneus, and is
acknowledged by the Egyptians to be a man of great antiquity, as well as by
those who have studied the history of the Phoenicians. And any one who likes
may peruse the two books of Flavius Josephus on the antiquities of the Jews,
in order that he may see in what way Moses was more ancient than those who
asserted that floods and conflagrations take place in the world after long
intervals of time; which statement Celsus alleges the Jews and Christians to
have misunderstood, and, not comprehending what was said about a
conflagration, to have declared that "God will descend, bringing fire like a
torturer." [3468]
Chapter XII.
Whether, then, there are cycles of time, and floods, or conflagrations which
occur periodically or not, and whether the Scripture is aware of this, not
only in many passages, but especially where Solomon [3469] says, "What is
the thing which hath been? Even that which shall be. And what is the thing
which hath been done? Even that which shall be done," [3470] etc., etc.,
belongs not to the present occasion to discuss. For it is sufficient only to
observe, that Moses and certain of the prophets, being men of very great
antiquity, did not receive from others the statements relating to the
(future) conflagration of the world; but, on the contrary (if we must attend
to the matter of time [3471] ), others rather misunderstanding them, and
not inquiring accurately into their statements, invented the fiction of the
same events recurring at certain intervals, and differing neither in their
essential nor accidental qualities. [3472] But we do not refer either the
deluge or the conflagration to cycles and planetary periods; but the cause
of them we declare to be the extensive prevalence of wickedness, [3473]
and its (consequent) removal by a deluge or a conflagration. And if the
voices of the prophets say that God "comes down," who has said, "Do I not
fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord," [3474] the term is used in a
figurative sense. For God "comes down" from His own height and greatness
when He arranges the affairs of men, and especially those of the wicked. And
as custom leads men to say that teachers "condescend" [3475] to children,
and wise men to those youths who have just be-taken themselves to
philosophy, not by "descending" in a bodily manner; so, if God is said
anywhere in the holy Scriptures to "come down," it is understood as spoken
in conformity with the usage which so employs the word, and, in like manner
also with the expression "go up." [3476]
Chapter XIII.
But as it is in mockery that Celsus says we speak of "God coming down like a
torturer bearing fire," and thus compels us unseasonably to investigate
words of deeper meaning, we shall make a few remarks, sufficient to enable
our hearers to form an idea [3477] of the defence which disposes of the
ridicule of Celsus against us, and then we shall turn to what follows. The
divine word says that our God is "a consuming fire," [3478] and that "He
draws rivers of fire before Him; " [3479] nay, that He even entereth in as
"a refiner's fire, and as a fuller's herb," [3480] to purify His own
people. But when He is said to be a "consuming fire," we inquire what are
the things which are appropriate to be consumed by God. And we assert that
they are wickedness, and the works which result from it, and which, being
figuratively called "wood, hay, stubble," [3481] God consumes as a fire.
The wicked man, accordingly, is said to build up on the previously-laid
foundation of reason, "wood, and hay, and stubble." If, then, any one can
show that these words were differently understood by the writer, and can
prove that the wicked man literally [3482] builds up "wood, or hay, or
stubble," it is evident that the fire must be understood to be material, and
an object of sense. But if, on the contrary, the works of the wicked man are
spoken of figuratively under the names of "wood, or hay, or stubble," why
does it not at once occur (to inquire) in what sense the word "fire" is to
be taken, so that "wood" of such a kind should be consumed? for (the
Scripture) says: "The fire will try each man's work of what sort it is. If
any man's work abide. which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a
reward. If any man's work be burned, he shall suffer loss." [3483] But
what work can be spoken of in these words as being "burned," save all that
results from wickedness? Therefore our God is a "consuming fire" in the
sense in which we have taken the word; and thus He enters in as a
"refiner's fire," to refine the rational nature, which has been filled with
the lead of wickedness, and to free it from the other impure materials,
which adulterate the natural gold or silver, so to speak, of the soul.
[3484] And, in like manner, "rivers of fire" are said to be before God, who
will thoroughly cleanse away the evil which is intermingled throughout the
whole soul. [3485] But these remarks are sufficient in answer to the
assertion, "that thus they were made to give expression to the erroneous
opinion that God will come down bearing fire like a torturer."
Chapter XIV.
But let us look at what Celsus next with great ostentation announces in the
following fashion: "And again," he says, "let us resume the subject from the
beginning, with a larger array of proofs. And I make no new statement, but
say what has been long settled. God is good, and beautiful, and blessed, and
that in the best and most beautiful degree. [3486] But if he come down
among men, he must undergo a change, and a change from good to evil, from
virtue to vice, from happiness to misery, and from best to worst. Who, then,
would make choice of such a change? It is the nature of a mortal, indeed, to
undergo change and remoulding, but of an immortal to remain the same and
unaltered. God, then, could not admit of such a change." Now it appears to
me that the fitting answer has been returned to these objections, when I
have related what is called in Scripture the "condescension" [3487] of God
to human affairs; for which purpose He did not need to undergo a
transformation, as Celsus thinks we assert, nor a change from good to evil,
nor from virtue to vice, nor from happiness to misery, nor from best to
worst. For, continuing unchangeable in His essence, He condescends to human
affairs by the economy of His providence. [3488] We show, accordingly,
that the holy Scriptures represent God as unchangeable, both by such words
as "Thou art the same," [3489] and" I change not; " [3490] whereas the
gods of Epicurus, being composed of atoms, and, so far as their structure is
concerned, capable of dissolution, endeavour to throw off the atoms which
contain the elements of destruction. Nay, even the god of the Stoics, as
being corporeal, at one time has his whole essence composed of the guiding
principle [3491] when the conflagration (of the world) takes place; and at
another, when a re-arrangement of things occurs, he again becomes partly
material. [3492] For even the Stoics were unable distinctly to comprehend
the natural idea of God, as of a being altogether incorruptible and simple,
and uncompounded and indivisible.
Chapter XV.
And with respect to His having descended among men, He was "previously in
the form of God; " [3493] and through benevolence, divested Himself (of
His glory), that He might be capable of being received by men. But He did
not, I imagine, undergo any change from "good to evil," for "He did no sin;
" [3494] nor from "virtue to vice," for "He knew no sin." [3495] Nor did
He pass from "happiness to misery," but He humbled Himself, and nevertheless
was blessed, even when His humiliation was undergone in order to benefit our
race. Nor was there any change in Him from "best to worst," for how can
goodness and benevolence be of "the worst? "Is it befitting to say of the
physician, who looks on dreadful sights and handles unsightly objects in
order to cure the sufferers, that he passes from "good to evil," or from
"virtue to vice," or from "happiness to misery? "And yet the physician, in
looking on dreadful sights and handling unsightly objects, does not wholly
escape the possibility of being involved in the same fate. But He who heals
the wounds of our souls, through the word of God that is in Him, is Himself
incapable of admitting any wickedness. But if the immortal God'the Word
[3496] 'by assuming a mortal body and a human soul, appears to Celsus to
undergo a change and transformation, let him learn that the Word, still
remaining essentially the Word, suffers none of those things which are
suffered by the body or the soul; but, condescending occasionally to (the
weakness of) him who is unable to look upon the splendours and brilliancy of
Deity, He becomes as it were flesh, speaking with a literal voice, until he
who has received Him in such a form is able, through being elevated in some
slight degree by the teaching of the Word, to gaze upon what is, so to
speak, His real and pre-eminent appearance. [3497]
Chapter XVI.
For there are different appearances, as it were, of the Word, according as
He shows Himself to each one of those who come to His doctrine; and this in
a manner corresponding to the condition of him who is just becoming a
disciple, or of him who has made a little progress, or of him who has
advanced further, or of him who has already nearly attained to virtue, or
who has even already attained it. And hence it is not the case, as Celsus
and those like him would have it, that our God was transformed, and
ascending the lofty mountain, showed that His real appearance was something
different, and far more excellent than what those who remained below, and
were unable to follow Him on high, beheld. For those below did not possess
eyes capable of seeing the transformation of the Word into His glorious and
more divine condition. But with difficulty were they able to receive Him as
He was; so that it might be said of Him by those who were unable to behold
His more excellent nature: "We saw Him, and He had no form nor comeliness;
but His form was mean, [3498] and inferior to that of the sons of men."
[3499] And let these remarks be an answer to the suppositions of Celsus, who
does not understand the changes or transformations of Jesus, as related in
the histories, nor His mortal and immortal nature. [3500]
Chapter XVII.
But will not those narratives, especially when they are understood in their
proper sense, appear far more worthy of respect than the story that Dionysus
was deceived by the Titans, and expelled from the throne of Jupiter, and
torn in pieces by them, and his remains being afterwards put together again,
he returned as it were once more to life, and ascended to heaven? Or are the
Greeks at liberty to refer such stories to the doctrine of the soul, and to
interpret them figuratively, while the door of a consistent explanation, and
one everywhere in accord and harmony with the writings of the Divine Spirit,
who had His abode in pure souls, is closed against us? Celsus, then, is
altogether ignorant of the purpose of our writings, and it is therefore upon
his own acceptation of them that he casts discredit, and not upon their real
meaning; whereas, if he had reflected on what is appropriate [3501] to a
soul which is to enjoy an everlasting life, and on the opinion which we are
to form of its essence and principles, he would not so have ridiculed the
entrance of the immortal into a mortal body, which took place not according
to the metempsychosis of Plato, but agreeably to another and higher view of
things. And he would have observed one "descent," distinguished by its great
benevolence, undertaken to convert (as the Scripture mystically terms them)
the "lost sheep of the house of Israel," which had strayed down from the
mountains, and to which the Shepherd is said in certain parables to have
gone down, leaving on the mountains those "which had not strayed."
Chapter XVIII.
But Celsus, lingering over matters which he does not understand, leads us to
be guilty of tautology, as we do not wish even in appearance to leave any
one of his objections unexamined. He proceeds, accordingly, as follows: "God
either really changes himself, as these assert, into a mortal body, and the
impossibility of that has been already declared; Or else he does not undergo
a change, but only causes the beholders to imagine so, and thus deceives
them, and is guilty of falsehood. Now deceit and falsehood are nothing but
evils, and would only be employed as a medicine, either in the case of sick
and lunatic friends, with a view to their cure, or in that of enemies when
one is taking measures to escape danger. But no sick man or lunatic is a
friend of God, nor does God fear any one to such a degree as to shun danger
by leading him into error." Now the answer to these statements might have
respect partly to the nature of the Divine Word, who is God, and partly to
the soul of Jesus. As respects the nature of the Word, in the same way as
the quality of the food changes in the nurse into milk with reference to the
nature of the child, or is arranged by the physician with a view to the good
of his health in the case of a sick man or (is specially) prepared for a
stronger man, because he possesses greater vigour, so does God appropriately
change, in the case of each individual, the power of the Word to which
belongs the natural property of nourishing the human soul. And to one is
given, as the Scripture terms it, "the sincere milk of the word; "and to
another, who is weaker, as it were, "herbs; "and to another who is
full-grown, "strong meat." And the Word does not, I imagine, prove false to
His own nature, in contributing nourishment to each one, according as he is
capable of receiving Him. [3502] Nor does He mislead or prove false. But
if one were to take the change as referring to the soul of Jesus after it
had entered the body, we would inquire in what sense the term "change" is
used. For if it be meant to apply to its essence, such a supposition is
inadmissible, not only in relation to the soul of Jesus, but also to the
rational soul of any other being. And if it be alleged that it suffers
anything from the body when united with it, or from the place to which it
has come, then what inconvenience [3503] can happen to the Word who, in
great benevolence, brought down a Saviour to the human race?'seeing none of
those who formerly professed to effect a cure could accomplish so much as
that soul showed it could do, by what it performed, even by voluntarily
descending to the level of human destinies for the benefit of our race. And
the Divine Word, well knowing this, speaks to that effect in many passages
of Scripture, although it is sufficient at present to quote one testimony of
Paul to the following effect: "Let this mind be in you which was also in
Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be
equal with God, but made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the
form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in
fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even
the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and
given Him a name which is above every name." [3504]
Chapter XIX.
Others, then, may concede to Celsus that God does not undergo a change, but
leads the spectators to imagine that He does; whereas we who are persuaded
that the advent of Jesus among men was no mere appearance, but a real
manifestation, are not affected by this charge of Celsus. We nevertheless
will attempt a reply, because you assert, Celsus, do you not, that it is
sometimes allowable to employ deceit and falsehood by way, as it were, of
medicine? [3505] Where, then, is the absurdity, if such a saving result
were to be accomplished, that some such events should have taken place? For
certain words, when savouring of falsehood, produce upon such characters a
corrective effect (like the similar declarations of physicians to their
patients), rather than when spoken in the spirit of truth. This, however,
must be our defence against other opponents. For there is no absurdity in
Him who healed sick friends, healing the dear human race by means of such
remedies as He would not employ preferentially, but only according to
circumstances. [3506] The human race, moreover, when in a state of mental
alienation, had to be cured by methods which the Word saw would aid in
bringing back those so afflicted to a sound state of mind. But Celsus says
also, that "one acts thus towards enemies when taking measures to escape
danger. But God does not fear any one, so as to escape danger by leading
into error those who conspire against him." Now it is altogether unnecessary
and absurd to answer a charge which is advanced by no one against our
Saviour. And we have already replied, when answering other charges, to the
statement that "no one who is either in a state of sickness or mental
alienation is a friend of God." For the answer is, that such arrangements
have been made, not for the sake of those who, being already friends,
afterwards fell sick or became afflicted with mental disease, but in order
that those who were still enemies through sickness of the soul, and
alienation of the natural reason, might become the friends of God. For it is
distinctly stated that Jesus endured all things on behalf of sinners, that
He might free them from sin, and convert them to righteousness.
Chapter XX.
In the next place, as he represents the Jews accounting in a way peculiar to
themselves for their belief that the advent of Christ among them is still in
the future, and the Christians as maintaining in their way that the coming
of the Son of God into the life of men has already taken place, let us, as
far as we can, briefly consider these points. According to Celsus, the Jews
say that "(human) life, being filled with all wickedness, needed one sent
from God, that the wicked might be punished, and all things purified in a
manner analogous to the first deluge which happened." And as the Christians
are said to make statements additional to this, it is evident that he
alleges that they admit these. Now, where is the absurdity in the coming of
one who is, on account of the prevailing flood of wickedness, to purify the
world, and to treat every one according to his deserts? For it is not in
keeping with the character of God that the diffusion of wickedness should
not cease, and all things be renewed. The Greeks, moreover, know of the
earth's being purified at certain times by a deluge or a fire, as Plato,
too, says somewhere to this effect: "And when the gods overwhelm the earth,
purifying it with water, some of them on the mountains," [3507] etc., etc.
Must it be said, then, that if the Greeks make such assertions, they are to
be deemed worthy of respect and consideration, but that if we too maintain
certain of these views, which are quoted with approval by the Greeks, they
cease to be honourable? And yet they who care to attend to the connection
and truth of all our records, will endeavour to establish not only the
antiquity of the writers, but the venerable nature of their writings, and
the consistency of their several parts.
Chapter XXI.
But I do not understand how he can imagine the overturning of the tower (of
Babel) to have happened with a similar object to that of the deluge, which
effected a purification of the earth, according to the accounts both of Jews
and Christians. For, in order that the narrative contained in Genesis
respecting the tower may be held to convey no secret meaning, but, as Celsus
supposes, may be taken as true to the letter, [3508] the event does not on
such a view appear to have taken place for the purpose of purifying the
earth; unless, indeed, he imagines that the so-called confusion of tongues
is such a purificatory process. But on this point, he who has the
opportunity will treat more seasonably when his object is to show not only
what is the meaning of the narrative in its historical connection, but what
metaphorical meaning may be deduced from it. [3509] Seeing that he
imagines, however, that Moses, who wrote the account of the tower, and the
confusion of tongues, has perverted the story of the sons of Aloeus,
[3510] and referred it to the tower, we must remark that I do not think any
one prior to the time of Homer [3511] has mentioned the sons of Aloeus,
while I am persuaded that what is related about the tower has been recorded
by Moses as being much older not only than Homer, but even than the
invention of letters among the Greeks. Who, then, are the perverters of each
other's narratives? Whether do they who relate the story of the Aloadae
pervert the history of the time, or he who wrote the account of the tower
and the confusion of tongues the story of the Aloadae? Now to impartial
hearers Moses appears to be more ancient than Homer. The destruction by
fire, moreover, of Sodom and Gomorrah on account of their sins, related by
Moses in Genesis, is compared by Celsus to the story of Phaethon,'all these
statements of his resulting from one blunder, viz., his not attending to the
(greater) antiquity of Moses. [3512] For they who relate the story of
Phaethon seem to be younger even than Homer, who, again, is much younger
than Moses. We do not deny, then, that the purificatory fire and the
destruction of the world took place in order that evil might be swept away,
and all things be renewed; for we assert that we have learned these things
from the sacred books of the prophets. But since, as we have said in the
preceding pages, the prophets, in uttering many predictions regarding future
events, show that they have spoken the truth concerning many things that are
past, and thus give evidence of the indwelling of the Divine Spirit, it is
manifest that, with respect to things still future, we should repose faith
in them, or rather in the Divine Spirit that is in them.
Chapter XXII.
But, according to Celsus, "the Christians, making certain additional
statements to those of the Jews, assert that the Son of God has been already
sent on account of the sins of the Jews; and that the Jews hating chastised
Jesus, and given him gall to drink, have brought upon themselves the divine
wrath." And any one who likes may convict this statement of falsehood, if it
be not the case that the whole Jewish nation was overthrown within one
single generation after Jesus had undergone these sufferings at their hands.
For forty and two years, I think, after the date of the crucifixion of
Jesus, did the destruction of Jerusalem take place. Now it has never been
recorded, since the Jewish nation began to exist, that they have been
expelled for so long a period from their venerable temple-worship [3513]
and service, and enslaved by more powerful nations; for if at any time they
appeared to be abandoned because of their sins, they were notwithstanding
visited (by God), [3514] and returned to their own country, and recovered
their possessions, and performed unhindered the observances of their law.
One fact, then, which proves that Jesus was something divine and sacred,
[3515] is this, that Jews should have suffered on His account now for a
lengthened time calamities of such severity. And we say with confidence that
they will never be restored to their former condition. [3516] For they
committed a crime of the most unhallowed kind, in conspiring against the
Saviour of the human race in that city where they offered up to God a
worship containing the symbols of mighty mysteries. It accordingly behoved
that city where Jesus underwent these sufferings to perish utterly, and the
Jewish nation to be overthrown, and the invitation to happiness offered them
by God to pass to others,'the Christians, I mean, to whom has come the
doctrine of a pure and holy worship, and who have obtained new laws, in
harmony with the established constitution in all countries; [3517] seeing
those which were formerly imposed, as on a single nation which was ruled by
princes of its own race and of similar manners, [3518] could not now be
observed in all their entireness.
Chapter XXIII.
In the next place, ridiculing after his usual style the race of Jews and
Christians, he compares them all "to a flight of bats or to a swarm of ants
issuing out of their nest, or to frogs holding council in a marsh, or to
worms crawling together in the comer of a dunghill, and quarrelling with one
another as to which of them were the greater sinners, and asserting that God
shows and announces to us all things beforehand; and that, abandoning the
whole world, and the regions of heaven, [3519] and this great earth, he
becomes a citizen [3520] among us alone, and to us alone makes his
intimations, and does not cease sending and inquiring, in what way we may be
associated with him for ever." And in his fictitious representation, he
compares us to "worms which assert that there is a God, and that immediately
after him, we who are made by him are altogether like unto God, and that all
things have been made subject to us,'earth, and water, and air, and
stars,'and that all things exist for our sake, and are ordained to be
subject to us." And, according to his representation, the worms'that is, we
ourselves'say that "now, since certain amongst us commit sin, God will come
or will send his Son to consume the wicked with fire, that the rest of us
may have eternal life with him." And to all this he subjoins the remark,
that "such wranglings would be more endurable amongst worms and frogs than
betwixt Jews and Christians."
Chapter XXIV.
In reply to these, we ask of those who accept such aspersions as are
scattered against us, Do you regard all men as a collection of bats, or as
frogs, or as worms, in consequence of the pre-eminence of God or do you not
include the rest of mankind in this proposed comparison, but on account of
their possession of reason, and of the established laws, treat them as men,
while you hold cheap [3521] Christians and Jews, because their opinions
are distasteful to you, and compare them to the animals above mentioned? And
whatever answer you may return to our question, we shall reply by
endeavouring to show that such assertions are most unbecoming, whether
spoken of all men in general, or of us in particular. For, let it be
supposed that you say justly that all men, as compared with God, are
(rightly) likened to these worthless [3522] animals, since their
littleness is not at all to be compared with the superiority of God, what
then do you mean by littleness? Answer me, good sirs. If you refer to
littleness of body, know that superiority and inferiority, if truth is to be
judge, are not determined by a bodily standard. [3523] For, on such a
view, vultures [3524] and elephants would be superior to us men; for they
are larger, and stronger, and longer-lived than we. But no sensible person
would maintain that these irrational creatures are superior to rational
beings, merely on account of their bodies: for the possession of reason
raises a rational being to a vast superiority over all irrational creatures.
Even the race of virtuous and blessed beings would admit this, whether they
are, as ye say, good demons, or, as we are accustomed to call them, the
angels of God, or any other natures whatever superior to that of man, since
the rational faculty within them has been made perfect, and endowed with all
virtuous qualities. [3525]
Chapter XXV.
But if you depreciate the littleness of man, not on account of his body, but
of his soul, regarding it as inferior to that of other rational beings, and
especially of those who are virtuous; and inferior, because evil dwells in
it,'why should those among Christians who are wicked, and those among the
Jews who lead sinful lives, be termed a collection of bats, or ants, or
worms, or frogs, rather than those individuals among other nations who are
guilty of wickedness?'seeing, in this respect, any individual whatever,
especially if carried away by the tide of evil, is, in comparison with the
rest of mankind, a bat, and worm, and frog, and ant. And although a man may
be an orator like Demosthenes, yet, if stained with wickedness like his,
[3526] and guilty of deeds proceeding, like his, from a wicked nature; or an
Antiphon, who was also considered to be indeed an orator, yet who
annihilated the doctrine of providence in his writings, which were entitled
Concerning Truth, like that discourse of Celsus,'such individuals are
notwithstanding worms, rolling in a comer of the dung-heap of stupidity and
ignorance. Indeed, whatever be the nature of the rational faculty, it could
not reasonably be compared to a worm, because it possesses capabilities of
virtue. [3527] For these adumbrations [3528] towards virtue do not allow
of those who possess the power of acquiring it, and who are incapable of
wholly losing its seeds, to be likened to a worm. It appears, therefore,
that neither can men in general be deemed worms in comparison with God. For
reason, having its beginning in the reason of God, cannot allow of the
rational animal being considered wholly alien from Deity. Nor can those
among Christians and Jews who are wicked, and who, in truth, are neither
Christians nor Jews, be compared, more than other wicked men, to worms
rolling in a corner of a dunghill. And if the nature of reason will not
permit of such comparisons, it is manifest that we must not calumniate human
nature, which has been formed for virtue, even if it should sin through
ignorance, nor liken it to animals of the kind described.
Chapter XXVI.
But if it is on account of those opinions of the Christians and Jews-which
displease Celsus (and which he does not at all appear to understand) that
they are to be regarded as worms and ants, and the rest of mankind as
different, let us examine the acknowledged opinions of Christians and
Jews, [3529] and compare them with those of the rest of mankind, and see
whether it will not appear to those who have once admitted that certain men
are worms and ants, that they are the worms and ants and frogs who have
fallen away from sound views of God, and, under a vain appearance of
piety, [3530] worship either irrational animals, or images, or other
objects, the works of men's hands; [3531] whereas, from the beauty of
such, they ought to admire the Maker of them, and worship Him: while those
are indeed men, and more honourable than men (if there be anything that is
so), who, in obedience to their reason, are able to ascend from stocks and
stones, [3532] nay, even from what is reckoned the most precious of all
matter'silver and gold; and who ascend up also from the beautiful things in
the world to the Maker of all, and entrust themselves to Him who alone is
able to satisfy [3533] all existing things, and to overlook the thoughts
of all, and to hear the prayers of all; who send up their prayers to Him,
and do all things as in the presence of Him who beholds everything, and who
are careful, as in the presence of the Hearer of all things, to say nothing
which might not with propriety be reported to God. Will not such piety as
this'which can be overcome neither by labours, nor by the dangers of death,
nor by logical plausibilities [3534] 'be of no avail in preventing those
who have obtained it from being any longer compared to worms, even if they
had been so represented before their assumption of a piety so remarkable?
Will they who subdue that fierce longing for sexual pleasures which has
reduced the souls of many to a weak and feeble condition, and who subdue it
because they are persuaded that they cannot otherwise have communion with
God, unless they ascend to Him through the exercise of temperance, appear to
you to be the brothers of worms, and relatives of ants, and to bear a
likeness to frogs? What! is the brilliant quality of justice, which keeps
inviolate the rights common to our neighbour, and our kindred, and which
observes fairness, and benevolence, and goodness, of no avail in saving him
who practises it from being termed a bird of the night? And are not they who
wallow in dissoluteness, as do the majority of mankind, and they who
associate promiscuously with common harlots, and who teach that such
practices are not wholly contrary to propriety, worms who roll in
mire?'especially when they are compared with those who have been taught not
to take the "members of Christ," and the body inhabited by the Word, and
make them the "members of a harlot; "and who have already learned that the
body of the rational being, as consecrated to the God of all things, is the
temple of the God whom they worship, becoming such from the pure conceptions
which they entertain of the Creator, and who also, being careful not to
corrupt the temple of God by unlawful pleasure; practise temperance as
constituting piety towards God!
Chapter XXVII.
And I have not yet spoken of the other evils which prevail amongst men, from
which even those who have the appearance of philosophers are not speedily
freed, for in philosophy there are many pretenders. Nor do I say anything on
the point that many such evils are found to exist among those who are
neither Jews nor Christians. Of a truth, such evil practices do not at all
prevail among Christians, if you properly examine what constitutes a
Christian. Or, if any persons of that kind should be discovered, they are at
least not to be found among those who frequent the assemblies, and come to
the public prayers, without their being excluded from them, unless it should
happen, and that rarely, that some one individual of such a character
escapes notice in the crowd. We, then, are not worms who assemble together;
who take our stand against the Jews on those Scriptures which they believe
to be divine, and who show that He who was spoken of in prophecy has come,
and that they have been abandoned on account of the greatness of their sins,
and that we who have accepted the Word have the highest hopes in God, both
because of our faith in Him, and of His ability to receive us into His
communion pure from all evil and wickedness of life. If a man, then, should
call himself a Jew or a Christian, he would not say without qualification
that God had made the whole world, and the vault of heaven [3535] for us
in particular. But if a man is, as Jesus taught, pure in heart, and meek,
and peaceful, and cheerfully submits to dangers for the sake of his
religion, such an one might reasonably have confidence in God, and with a
full apprehension of the word contained in the prophecies, might say this
also: "All these things has God shown beforehand, and announced to us who
believe."
Chapter XXVIII.
But since he has represented those whom he regards as worms, viz., the
Christians, as saying that "God, having abandoned the heavenly regions, and
despising this great earth, takes up His abode amongst us alone, and to us
alone makes His announcements, and ceases not His messages and inquiries as
to how we may become His associates for ever," we have to answer that he
attributes to us words which we never uttered, seeing we both read and know
that God loves all existing things, and loathes [3536] nothing which He
has made, for He would not have created anything in hatred. We have,
moreover, read the declaration: "And Thou sparest all things, because they
ate Thine, O lover of souls. For Thine incorruptible Spirit is in all. And
therefore those also who have fallen away for a little time Thou rebukest,
and admonishest, reminding them of their sins." [3537] How can we assert
that "God, leaving the regions of heaven, and the whole world, and despising
this great earth, takes up His abode amongst us only," when we have found
that all thoughtful persons must say in their prayers, that "the earth is
full of the mercy of the Lord," [3538] and that "the mercy of the Lord is
upon all flesh; " [3539] and that God, being good, "maketh His sun to
arise upon the evil and the good, and sendeth His rain upon the just and the
unjust; " [3540] and that He encourages us to a similar course of action,
in order that we may become His sons, and teaches us to extend the benefits
which we enjoy, so far as in our power, to all men? For He Himself is said
to be the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe; [3541] and
His Christ to be the "propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but
also for the sins of the whole world." [3542] And this, then, is our
answer to the allegations of Celsus. Certain other statements, in keeping
with the character of the Jews, might be made by some of that nation, but
certainly not by the Christians, who have been taught that "God commendeth
His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us;
" [3543] and although "scarcely for a righteous man will one die, yet
peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die." [3544] But now
is Jesus declared to have come for the sake of sinners in all parts of the
world (that they may forsake their sin, and entrust themselves to God),
being called also, agreeably to an ancient custom of these Scriptures, the
"Christ of God."
Chapter XXIX.
But Celsus perhaps has misunderstood certain of those whom he has termed
"worms," when they affirm that "God exists, and that we are next to Him."
And he acts like those who would find fault with an entire sect of
philosophers, on account of certain words uttered by some rash youth who,
after a three days' attendance upon the lectures of a philosopher, should
exalt himself above other people as inferior to himself, and devoid of
philosophy. For we know that there are many creatures more honourable
[3545] than man; and we have read that "God standeth in the congregation of
gods," [3546] but of gods who are not worshipped by the nations, "for all
the gods of the nations are idols." [3547] We have read also, that "God,
standing in the congregation of the gods, judgeth among the gods." [3548]
We know, moreover, that "though there be that are called gods, whether in
heaven or in earth (as there be gods many and lords many), but to us there
is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in Him; and one Lord
Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by Him." [3549] And we know
that in this way the angels are superior to men; so that men, when made
perfect, become like the angels. "For in the resurrection they neither marry
nor are given in marriage, but the righteous are as the angels in
heaven," [3550] and also become "equal to the angels." [3551] We know,
too, that in the arrangement of the universe there are certain beings termed
"thrones," and others "dominions," and others "powers," and others
"principalities; "and we see that we men, who are far inferior to these, may
entertain the hope that by a virtuous life, and by acting in all things
agreeably to reason, we may rise to a likeness with all these. And, lastly,
because "it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like God, and shall see Him as He is." [3552]
And if any one were to maintain what is asserted by some (either by those
who possess intelligence or who do not, but have misconceived sound reason),
that "God exists, and we are next to Him," I would interpret the word
"we," by using in its stead, "We who act according to reason," or rather,
"We virtuous, who act according to reason." [3553] For, in our opinion,
the same virtue belongs to all the blessed, so that the virtue of man and of
God is identical. [3554] And therefore we are taught to become
"perfect," as our Father in heaven is perfect. [3555] No good and
virtuous man, then, is a "worm rolling in filth," nor is a pious man an
"ant," nor a righteous man a "frog; "nor could one whose soul is enlightened
with the bright light of truth be reasonably likened to a "bird of the
night."
Chapter XXX.
It appears to me that Celsus has also misunderstood this statement, "Let Us
make man in Our image and likeness; " [3556] and has therefore
represented the "worms" as saying that, being created by God, we altogether
resemble Him. If, however, he had known the difference between man being
created "in the image of God" and "after His likeness," and that God is
recorded to have said, "Let Us make man after Our image and likeness," but
that He made man "after the image" of God, but not then also "after His
likeness," [3557] he would not have represented us as saying that "we are
altogether like Him." Moreover, we do not assert that the stars are subject
to us; since the resurrection which is called the "resurrection of the
just," and which is understood by wise men, is compared to the sun, and
moon, and stars, by him who said, "There is one glory of the sun, and
another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star
differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the
dead." [3558] Daniel also prophesied long ago regarding these things.
[3559] Celsus says further, that we assert that "all things have been
arranged so as to be subject to us," having perhaps heard some of the
intelligent among us speaking to that effect, and perhaps also not
understanding the saying, that "he who is the greatest amongst us is the
servant of all." [3560] And if the Greeks say, "Then sun and moon are the
slaves of mortal men," [3561] they express approval of the statement, and
give an explanation of its meaning; but since such a statement is either not
made at all by us, or is expressed in a different way, Celsus here too
falsely accuses us. Moreover, we who, according to Celsus, are "worms," are
represented by him as saying that, "seeing some among us are guilty of sin,
God will come to us, or will send His own Son, that He may consume the
wicked, and that we other frogs may enjoy eternal life with Him." Observe
how this venerable philosopher, like a low buffoon, [3562] turns into
ridicule and mockery, and a subject of laughter, the announcement of a
divine judgment, and of the punishment of the wicked, and of the reward of
the righteous; and subjoins to all this the remark, that "such statements
would be more endurable if made by worms and flogs than by Christians and
Jews who quarrel with one another!" We shall not, however, imitate his
example, nor say similar things regarding those philosophers who profess to
know the nature of all things, and who discuss with each other the manner in
which all things were created, and how the heaven and earth originated, and
all things in them; and how the souls (of men), being either unbegotten, and
not created by God, are yet governed by Him, and pass from one body to
another; [3563] or being formed at the same time with the body, exist for
ever or pass away. For instead of treating with respect and accepting the
intention of those who have devoted themselves to the investigation of the
truth, one might mockingly and revilingly say that such men were "worms,"
who did not measure themselves by their comer of their dung-heap in human
life, and who accordingly gave forth their opinions on matters of such
importance as if they understood them, and who strenuously assert that they
have obtained a view of those things which cannot be seen without a higher
inspiration and a diviner power. "For no man knoweth the things of a man,
save the spirit of man which is in him: even so the things of God knoweth no
man, but the Spirit of God." [3564] We are not, however, mad, nor do we
compare such human wisdom (I use the word "wisdom" in the common
acceptation), which busies itself not about the affairs of the multitude,
but in the investigation of truth, to the wrigglings of worms or any other
such creatures; but in the spirit of truth, we testify of certain Greek
philosophers that they knew God, seeing "He manifested Himself to them,"
[3565] although "they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but
became vain in their imaginations; and professing themselves to be wise,
they became foolish, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an
image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts,
and creeping things." [3566]
Chapter XXXI.
After this, wishing to prove that there is no difference between Jews and
Christians, and those animals previously enumerated by him, he asserts that
the Jews were "fugitives from Egypt, who never performed anything worthy of
note, and never were held in any reputation or account." [3567] Now, on
the point of their not being fugitives, nor Egyptians, but Hebrews who
settled in Egypt, we have spoken in the preceding pages. But if he thinks
his statement, that "they were never held in any reputation or account," to
be proved, because no remarkable event in their history is found recorded by
the Greeks, we would answer, that if one will examine their polity from its
first beginning, and the arrangement of their laws, he will find that they
were men who represented upon earth the shadow of a heavenly life, and that
amongst them God is recognised as nothing else, save He who is over all
things, and that amongst them no maker of images was permitted to enjoy the
rights of citizenship. [3568] For neither painter nor image-maker existed
in their state, the law expelling all such from it; that there might be no
pretext for the construction of images,'an art which attracts the attention
of foolish men, and which drags down the eyes of the soul from God to
earth. [3569] There was, accordingly, amongst them a law to the following
effect: "Do not transgress the law, and make to yourselves a graven image,
any likeness of male or female; either a likeness of any one of the
creatures that are upon the earth, or a likeness of any winged fowl that
flieth under the heaven, or a likeness of any creeping thing that creepeth
upon the earth, or a likeness of any of the fishes which are in the waters
under the earth." [3570] The law, indeed, wished them to have regard to
the truth of each individual thing, and not to form representations of
things contrary to reality, feigning the appearance merely of what was
really male or really female, or the nature of animals, or of birds, or of
creeping things, or of fishes. Venerable, too, and grand was this
prohibition of theirs: "Lift not up thine eyes unto heaven, lest, when thou
seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and all the host of heaven, thou
shouldst be led astray to worship them, and serve them." [3571] And what
a regime [3572] was that under which the whole nation was placed, and
which rendered it impossible for any effeminate person to appear in
public; [3573] and worthy of admiration, too, was the arrangement by
which harlots were removed out of the state, those incentives to the
passions of the youth! Their courts of justice also were composed of men of
the strictest integrity, who, after having for a lengthened period set the
example of an unstained life, were entrusted with the duty of presiding over
the tribunals, and who, on account of the superhuman purity of their
character, [3574] were said to be gods, in conformity with an ancient
Jewish usage of speech. Here was the spectacle of a whole nation devoted to
philosophy; and in order that there might be leisure to listen to their
sacred laws, the days termed "Sabbath," and the other festivals which
existed among them, were instituted. And why need I speak of the orders of
their priests and sacrifices, which contain innumerable indications (of
deeper truths) to those who wish to ascertain the signification of things?
Chapter XXXII.
But since nothing belonging to human nature is permanent, this polity also
must gradually be corrupted and changed. And Providence, having remodelled
their venerable system where it needed to be changed, so as to adapt it to
men of all countries, gave to believers of all nations, in place of the
Jews, the venerable religion of Jesus, who, being adorned not only with
understanding, but also with a share of divinity, [3575] and having
overthrown the doctrine regarding earthly demons, who delight in
frankincense, and blood, and in the exhalations of sacrificial odours, and
who, like the fabled Titans or Giants, drag down men from thoughts of God;
and having Himself disregarded their plots, directed chiefly against the
better class of men, enacted laws which ensure happiness to those who live
according to them, and who do not flatter the demons by means of sacrifices,
but altogether despise them, through help of the word of God, which aids
those who look upwards to Him. And as it was the will of God that the
doctrine of Jesus should prevail amongst men, the demons could effect
nothing, although straining every nerve [3576] to accomplish the
destruction of Christians; for they stirred up both princes, and senates,
and rulers in every place,'nay, even nations themselves, who did not
perceive the irrational and wicked procedure of the demons,'against the
word, and those who believed in it; yet, notwithstanding, the word of God,
which is more powerful than all other things, even when meeting with
opposition, deriving from the opposition, as it were, a means of increase,
advanced onwards, and won many souls, such being the will of God. And we
have offered these remarks by way of a necessary digression. For we wished
to answer the assertion of Celsus concerning the Jews, that they were
"fugitives from Egypt, and that these men, beloved by God, never
accomplished anything worthy of note." And further, in answer to the
statement that "they were never held in any reputation or account," we say,
that living apart as a "chosen nation and a royal priesthood," and shunning
intercourse with the many nations around them, in order that their morals
might escape corruption, they enjoyed the protection of the divine power,
neither coveting like the most of mankind the acquisition of other kingdoms,
nor yet being abandoned so as to become, on account of their smallness, an
easy object of attack to others, and thus be altogether destroyed; and this
lasted so long as they were worthy of the divine protection. But when it
became necessary for them, as a nation wholly given to sin, to be brought
back by their sufferings to their God, they were abandoned (by Him),
sometimes for a longer, sometimes for a shorter period, until in the time of
the Romans, having committed the greatest of sins in putting Jesus to death,
they were completely deserted.
Chapter XXXIII.
Immediately after this, Celsus, assailing the contents of the first book of
Moses, which is entitled "Genesis," asserts that "the Jews accordingly
endeavoured to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and
deceivers, [3577] appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words,
whose meaning was veiled in obscurity, and which they misinterpreted
[3578] to the unlearned and ignorant, and that, too, when such a point had
never been called in question during the long preceding period." Now Celsus
appears to me in these words to have expressed very obscurely the meaning
which he intended to convey. It is probable, indeed, that his obscurity on
this subject is intentional, inasmuch as he saw the strength of the argument
which establishes the descent of the Jews from their ancestors; while again,
on the other hand, he wished not to appear ignorant that the question
regarding the Jews and their descent was one that could not be lightly
disposed of. It is certain, however, that the Jews trace their genealogy
back to the three fathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. And the names of these
individuals possess such efficacy, when united with the name of God, that
not only do those belonging to the nation employ in their prayers to God,
and in the exorcising of demons, the words, "God of Abraham, [3579] and
God of Isaac, and God of Jacob," but so also do almost all those who occupy
themselves with incantations and magical rites. For there is found in
treatises on magic in many countries such an invocation of God, and
assumption of the divine name, as implies a familiar use of it by these men
in their dealings with demons. These facts, then'adduced by Jews and
Christians to prove the sacred character of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob,
the fathers of the Jewish race'appear to me not to have been altogether
unknown to Celsus, but not to have been distinctly set forth by him, because
he was unable to answer the argument which might be founded on them.
Chapter XXXIV.
For we inquire of all those who employ such invocations of God, saying: Tell
us, friends, who was Abraham, and what sort of person was Isaac, and what
power did Jacob possess, that the appellation "God," when joined with their
name, could effect such wonders? And from whom have you learned, or can you
learn, the facts relating to these individuals? And who has occupied himself
with writing a history about them, either directly magnifying these men by
ascribing to them mysterious powers, or hinting obscurely at their
possession of certain great and marvellous qualities, patent to those who
are qualified to see them? [3580] And when, in answer to our inquiry, no
one can show from what history'whether Greek or Barbarian'or, if not a
history, yet at least from what mystical narrative, [3581] the accounts
of these men are derived, we shall bring forward the book entitled
"Genesis," which contains the acts of these men, and the divine oracles
addressed to them, and will say, Does not the use by you of the names of
these three ancestors of the race, establishing in the clearest manner that
effects not to be lightly regarded are produced by the invocation of them,
evidence the divinity of the men? [3582] And yet we know them from no
other source than the sacred books of the Jews! Moreover, the phrases, "the
God of Israel," and "the God of the Hebrews," and "the God who drowned in
the Red Sea the king of Egypt and the Egyptians," are formulae [3583]
frequently employed against demons and certain wicked powers. And we learn
the history of the names and their interpretation from those Hebrews, who in
their national literature and national tongue dwell with pride upon these
things, and explain their meaning. How, then, should the Jews attempt to
derive their origin from the first race of those whom Celsus supposed to be
jugglers and deceivers, and shamelessly endeavour to trace themselves and
their beginning back to these?'whose names, being Hebrew, are an evidence to
the Hebrews, who have their sacred books written in the Hebrew language and
letters, that their nation is akin to these men. For up to the present time,
the Jewish names belonging to the Hebrew language were either taken from
their writings, or generally from words the meaning of which was made known
by the Hebrew language.
Chapter XXXV.
And let any one who peruses the treatise of Celsus observe whether it does
not convey some such insinuation as the above, when he says: "And they
attempted to derive their origin from the first race of jugglers and
deceivers, appealing to the testimony of dark and ambiguous words, whose
meaning was veiled in obscurity." For these names are indeed obscure, and
not within the comprehension and knowledge of many, though not in our
opinion of doubtful meaning, even although assumed by those who are aliens
to our religion; but as, according to Celsus, they do not [3584] convey
any ambiguity, I am at a loss to know why he has rejected them. And yet, if
he had wished honestly to overturn the genealogy which he deemed the Jews to
have so shamelessly arrogated, in boasting of Abraham and his descendants
(as their progenitors), he ought to have quoted all the passages bearing on
the subject; and, in the first place, to have advocated his cause with such
arguments as he thought likely to be convincing, and in the next to have
bravely [3585] refuted, by means of what appeared to him to be the true
meaning, and by arguments in its favour, the errors existing on the subject.
But neither Celsus nor any one else will be able, by their discussions
regarding the nature of names employed for miraculous purposes, to lay down
the correct doctrine regarding them, and to demonstrate that those men were
to be lightly esteemed whose names merely, not among their countrymen alone,
but also amongst foreigners, could accomplish (such results). He ought to
have shown, moreover, how we, in misinterpreting [3586] the passages in
which these names are found, deceive our hearers, as he imagines, while he
himself, who boasts that he is not ignorant or unintelligent, gives the true
interpretation of them. And he hazarded the assertion, [3587] in speaking
of those names, from which the Jews deduce their genealogies, that "never,
during the long antecedent period, has there been any dispute about these
names, but that at the present time the Jews dispute about them with certain
others," whom he does not mention. Now, let him who chooses show who these
are that dispute with the Jews, and who adduce even probable arguments to
show that Jews and Christians do not decide correctly on the points relating
to these names, but that there are others who have discussed these questions
with the greatest learning and accuracy. But we are well assured that none
can establish anything of the sort, it being manifest that these names are
derived from the Hebrew language, which is found only among the Jews.
Chapter XXXVI.
Celsus in the next place, producing from history other than that of the
divine record, those passages which bear upon the claims to great antiquity
put forth by many nations, as the Athenians, and Egyptians, and Arcadians,
and Phrygians, who assert that certain individuals have existed among them
who sprang from the earth, and who each adduce proOfs of these assertions,
says: "The Jews, then, leading a grovelling life [3588] in some comer of
Palestine, and being a wholly uneducated people, who had not heard that
these matters had been committed to verse long ago by Hesiod and innumerable
other inspired men, wove together some most incredible and insipid
stories, [3589] viz., that a certain man was formed by the hands of God,
and had breathed into him the breath of life, and that a woman was taken
from his side, and that God issued certain commands, and that a serpent
opposed these, and gained a victory over the commandments of God; thus
relating certain old wives' fables, and most impiously representing God as
weak at the very beginning (of things), and unable to convince even a single
human being whom He Himself had formed." By these instances, indeed, this
deeply read and learned Celsus, who accuses Jews and Christians of ignorance
and want of instruction, clearly evinces the accuracy of his knowledge of
the chronology of the respective historians, whether Greek or Barbarian,
since he imagines that Hesiod and the "innumerable" others, whom he styles
"inspired" men, are older than Moses and his writings'that very Moses who is
shown to be much older than the time of the Trojan war! It is not the Jews,
then, who have composed incredible and insipid stories regarding the birth
of man from the earth, but these "inspired" men of Celsus, Hesiod and his
other "innumerable" companions, who, having neither learned nor heard of the
far older and most venerable accounts existing in Palestine, have written
such histories as their Theogonies, attributing, so far as in their power,
"generation" to their deities, and innumerable other absurdities. And these
are the writers whom Plato expels from his "State" as being corrupters of
the youth, [3590] 'Homer, viz., and those who have composed poems of a
similar description! Now it is evident that Plato did not regard as
"inspired" those men who had left behind them such works. But perhaps it was
from a desire to cast reproach upon us, that this Epicurean Celsus, who is
better able to judge than Plato (if it be the same Celsus who composed two
other books against the Christians), called those individuals "inspired"
whom he did not in reality regard as such.
Chapter XXXVII.
He charges us, moreover, with introducing "a man formed by the hands of
God," although the book of Genesis has made no mention of the "hands" of
God, either when relating the creation or the "fashioning" [3591] of the
man; white it is Job and David who have used the expression, "Thy hands have
made me and fashioned me; " [3592] with reference to which it would need
a lengthened discourse to point out the sense in which these words were
understood by those who used them, both as regards the difference between
"making" and "fashioning," and also the "hands" of God. For those who do not
understand these and similar expressions in the sacred Scriptures, imagine
that we attribute to the God who is over all things a form [3593] such as
that of man; and according to their conceptions, it follows that we consider
the body of God to be furnished with wings, since the Scriptures, literally
understood, attribute such appendages to God. The subject before us,
however, does not require us to interpret these expressions; for, in our
explanatory remarks upon the book of Genesis, these matters have been made,
to the best of our ability, a special subject of investigation. Observe next
the malignity [3594] of Celsus in what follows. For the Scripture,
speaking of the "fashioning" [3595] of the man, says, "And breathed into
his face the breath of life, and the man became a living soul." [3596]
Whereon Celsus, wishing maliciously to ridicule the "inbreathing into his
face of the breath of life," and not understanding the sense in which the
expression was employed, states that "they composed a story that a man was
fashioned by the hands of God, and was inflated by breath blown into
him," [3597] in order that, taking the word" inflated" to be used in a
similar way to the inflation of skins, he might ridicule the statement, "He
breathed into his face the breath of life,"'terms which are used
figuratively, and require to be explained in order to show that God
communicated to man of His incorruptible Spirit; as it is said, "For Thine
incorruptible Spirit is in all things." [3598]
Chapter XXXVIII.
In the next place, as it is his object to slander our Scriptures, he
ridicules the following statement: "And God caused a deep sleep to fall upon
Adam, and he slept: and He took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh
instead thereof. And the rib, which He had taken from the man, made He a
woman," [3599] and so on; without quoting the words, which would give the
hearer the impression that they are spoken with a figurative meaning. He
would not even have it appear that the words were used allegorically,
although he says afterwards, that "the more modest among Jews and Christians
are ashamed of these things, and endeavour to give them somehow an
allegorical signification." Now we might say to him, Are the statements of
your "inspired" Hesiod, which he makes regarding the woman in the form of a
myth, to be explained allegorically, in the sense that she was given by Jove
to men as an evil thing, and as a retribution for the theft of "the fire;
" [3600] while that regarding the woman who was taken from the side of
the man (after he had been buried in deep slumber), and was formed by God,
appears to you to be related without any rational meaning and secret
signification? [3601] But is it not uncandid, not to ridicule the former
as myths, but to admire them as philosophical ideas in a mythical dress, and
to treat with contempt [3602] the latter, as offending the understanding,
and to declare that they are of no account? For if, because of the mere
phraseology, we are to find fault with what is intended to have a secret
meaning, see whether the following lines of Hesiod, a man, as you say,"
inspired," are not better fitted to excite laughter:'
"Son of Iapetus!' with wrathful heart
Spake the cloud-gatherer: 'Oh, unmatched in art!
Exultest thou in this the flame retrieved,
And dost thou triumph in the god deceived?
But thou, with the posterity of man,
Shalt rue the fraud whence mightier ills began;
I will send evil for thy stealthy fire,
While all embrace it, and their bane desire.'
The sire, who rules the earth, and sways the pole,
Had said, and laughter fill'd his secret soul.
He bade the artist-god his best obey,
And mould with tempering waters ductile clay:
Infuse, as breathing life and form began,
The supple vigour, and the voice of man:
Her aspect fair as goddesses above,
A virgin's likeness, with the brows of love.
He bade Minerva teach the skill that dyes
The web with colours, as the shuttle flies;
He called the magic of Love's Queen to shed
A nameless grace around her courteous head;
Instil the wish that longs with restless aim,
And cares of dress that feed upon the frame:
Bade Hermes last implant the craft refined
Of artful manners, and a shameless mind.
He said; their king th' inferior powers obeyed:
The fictile likeness of a bashful maid
Rose from the temper'd earth, by Jove's behest,
Under the forming god; the zone and vest
Were clasp'd and folded by Minerva's hand:
The heaven-born graces, and persuasion bland
Deck'd her round limbs with chains of gold: the hours
Of loose locks twined her temples with spring flowers.
The whole attire Minerva's curious care
Form'd to her shape, and fitted to her air.
But in her breast the herald from above,
Full of the counsels of deep thundering Jove,
Wrought artful manners, wrought perfidious lies,
And speech that thrills the blood, and lulls the wise.
Her did th' interpreter of gods proclaim,
And named the woman with Pandora's name;
Since all the gods conferr'd their gifts, to charm,
For man's inventive race, this beauteous harm." [3603]
Moreover, what is said also about the casket is fitted of itself to excite
laughter; for example:'
"Whilome on earth the sons of men abode
From ills apart, and labour's irksome load,
And sore diseases, bringing age to man;
Now the sad life of mortals is a span.
The woman's hands a mighty casket bear;
She lifts the lid; she scatters griefs in air:
Alone, beneath the vessel's rims detained,
Hope still within th' unbroken cell remained,
Nor fled abroad; so will'd cloud-gatherer Jove:
The woman's hand had dropp'd the lid above." [3604]
Now, to him who would give to these lines a grave allegorical meaning
(whether any such meaning be contained in them or not), we would say: Are
the Greeks alone at liberty to convey a philosophic meaning in a secret
covering? or perhaps also the Egyptians, and those of the Barbarians who
pride themselves upon their mysteries and the truth (which is concealed
within them); while the Jews alone, with their lawgiver and historians,
appear to you the most unintelligent of men? And is this the only nation
which has not received a share of divine power, and which yet was so grandly
instructed how to rise upwards to the uncreated nature of God, and to gaze
on Him alone, and to expect from Him alone (the fulfilment of) their hopes?
Chapter XXXIX.
But as Celsus makes a jest also of the serpent, as counteracting the
injunctions given by God to the man, taking the narrative to be an old
wife's fable, [3605] and has purposely neither mentioned the paradise
[3606] of God, nor stated that God is said to have planted it in Eden
towards the east, and that there afterwards sprang up from the earth every
tree that was beautiful to the sight, and good for food, and the tree of
life in the midst of the paradise, and the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil, and the other statements which follow, which might of themselves lead
a candid reader to see that all these things had not inappropriately an
allegorical meaning, let us contrast with this the words of Socrates
regarding Eros in the Symposium of Plato, and which are put in the mouth of
Socrates as being more appropriate than what was said regarding him by all
the others at the Symposium. The words of Plato are as follow: "When
Aphrodite was born, the gods held a banquet, and there was present, along
with the others, Porus the son of Metis. And after they had dined, Penia
[3607] came to beg for something (seeing there was an entertainment), and
she stood at the gate. Porus meantime, having become intoxicated with the
nectar (for there was then no wine), went into the garden of Zeus, and,
being heavy with liquor, lay down to sleep. Penia accordingly formed a
secret plot, with a view of freeing herself from her condition of
poverty, [3608] to get a child by Porus, and accordingly lay down beside
him, and became pregnant with Eros. And on this account Eros has become the
follower and attendant of Aphrodite, having been begotten on her birthday
feast, [3609] and being at the same time by nature a lover of the
beautiful, because Aphrodite too is beautiful. Seeing, then, that Eros is
the son of Porus and Penia, the following is his condition. [3610] In the
first place, he is always poor, and far from being delicate and beautiful,
as most persons imagine; but is withered, and sunburnt, [3611] and
unshod, and without a home, sleeping always upon the ground, and without a
covering; lying in the open air beside gates, and on public roads;
possessing the nature of his mother, and dwelling continually with
indigence. [3612] But, on the other hand, in conformity with the
character of his father, he is given to plotting against the beautiful and
the good, being courageous, and hasty, and vehement; [3613] a keen
[3614] hunter, perpetually devising contrivances; both much given to
forethought, and also fertile in resources; [3615] acting like a
philosopher throughout the whole of his life; a terrible [3616] sorcerer,
and dealer in drugs, and a sophist as well; neither immortal by nature nor
yet mortal, but on the same day, at one time he flourishes and lives when he
has plenty, and again at another time dies, and once more is recalled to
life through possessing the nature of his father. But the supplies furnished
to him are always gradually disappearing, so that he is never at any time in
want, nor yet rich; and, on the other hand, he occupies an intermediate
position between wisdom and ignorance." [3617] Now, if those who read
these words were to imitate the malignity of Celsus'which be it far from
Christians to do!'they would ridicule the myth, and would turn this great
Plato into a subject of jest; but if, on investigating in a philosophic
spirit what is conveyed in the dress of a myth, they should be able to
discover the meaning of Plato, (they will admire) [3618] the manner in
which he was able to conceal, on account of the multitude, in the form of
this myth, the great ideas which presented themselves to him, and to speak
in a befitting manner to those who know how to ascertain from the myths the
true meaning of him who wove them together. Now I have brought forward this
myth occurring in the writings of Plato, because of the mention in it of the
garden of Zeus, which appears to bear some resemblance to the paradise of
God, and of the comparison between Penia and the serpent, and the plot
against Porus by Penia, which may be compared with the plot of the serpent
against the man. It is not very clear, indeed, whether Plato fell in with
these stories by chance, or whether, as some think, meeting during his visit
to Egypt with certain individuals who philosophized on the Jewish mysteries,
and learning some things from them, he may have preserved a few of their
ideas, and thrown others aside, being careful not to offend the Greeks by a
complete adoption of all the points of the philosophy of the Jews, who were
in bad repute with the multitude, on account of the foreign character of
their laws and their peculiar polity. The present, however, is not the
proper time for explaining either the myth of Plato, or the story of the
serpent and the paradise of God, and all that is related to have taken place
in it, as in our exposition of the book of Genesis we have especially
occupied ourselves as we best could with these matters.
Chapter XL.
But as he asserts that "the Mosaic narrative most impiously represents God
as in a state of weakness from the very commencement (of things), and as
unable to gain over (to obedience) even one single man whom He Himself had
formed," we say in answer that the objection [3619] is much the same as
if one were to find fault with the existence of evil, which God has not been
able to prevent even in the case of a single individual, so that one man
might be found from the very beginning of things who was born into the world
untainted by sin. For as those whose business it is to defend the doctrine
of providence do so by means of arguments which are not to be despised,
[3620] so also the subjects of Adam and his son will be philosophically
dealt with by those who are aware that in the Hebrew language Adam signifies
man; and that in those parts of the narrative which appear to refer to Adam
as an individual, Moses is discoursing upon the nature of man in general.
[3621] For "in Adam" (as the Scripture [3622] says) "all die," and were
condemned in the likeness of Adam's transgression, the word of God asserting
this not so much of one particular individual as of the whole human race.
For in the connected series of statements which appears to apply as to one
particular individual, the curse pronounced upon Adam is regarded as common
to all (the members of the race), and what was spoken with reference to the
woman is spoken of every woman without exception. [3623] And the
expulsion of the man and woman from paradise, and their being clothed with
tunics of skins (which God, because of the transgression of men, made for
those who had sinned), contain a certain secret and mystical doctrine (far
transcending that of Plato) of the souls losing its wings, [3624] and
being borne downwards to earth, until it can lay hold of some stable
resting-place.
Chapter XLI.
After this he continues as follows: "They speak, in the next place, of a
deluge, and of a monstrous [3625] ark, having within it all things, and
of a dove and a crow [3626] as messengers, falsifying and recklessly
altering [3627] the story of Deucalion; not expecting, I suppose, that
these things would come to light, but imagining that they were inventing
stories merely for young children." Now in these remarks observe the
hostility'so unbecoming a philosopher'displayed by this man towards this
very ancient Jewish narrative. For, not being able to say anything against
the history of the deluge, and not perceiving what he might have urged
against the ark and its dimensions,'viz., that, according to the general
opinion, which accepted the statements that it was three hundred cubits in
length, and fifty in breadth, and thirty in height, it was impossible to
maintain that it contained (all) the animals that were upon the earth,
fourteen specimens of every clean and four of every unclean beast,'he merely
termed it "monstrous, containing all things within it." Now wherein was its
"monstrous" character, seeing it is related to have been a hundred years in
building, and to have had the three hundred cubits of its length and the
fifty of its breadth contracted, until the thirty cubits of its height
terminated in a top one cubit long and one cubit broad? Why should we not
rather admire a structure which resembled an extensive city, if its
measurements be taken to mean what they are capable of meaning, [3628] so
that it was nine myriads of cubits long in the base, and two thousand five
hundred in breadth? [3629] And why should we not admire the design
evinced in having it so compactly built, and rendered capable of sustaining
a tempest which caused a deluge? For it was not daubed with pitch, or any
material of that kind, but was securely coated with bitumen. And is it not a
subject of admiration, that by the providential arrangement of God, the
elements of all the races were brought into it, that the earth might receive
again the seeds of all living things, while God made use of a most righteous
man to be the progenitor of those who were to be born after the deluge?
Chapter XLII.
In order to show that he had read the book of Genesis, Celsus rejects the
story of the dove, although unable to adduce any reason which might prove it
to be a fiction. In the next place, as his habit is, in order to put the
narrative in a more ridiculous light, he converts the "raven" into a
"crow," and imagines that Moses so wrote, having recklessly altered the
accounts related of the Grecian Deucalion; unless perhaps he regards the
narrative as not having proceeded from Moses, but from several individuals,
as appears from his employing the plural number in the expressions,
"falsifying and recklessly altering the story of Deucalion," [3630] as
well as from the words, "For they did not expect, I suppose, that these
things would come to light." But how should they, who gave their Scriptures
to the whole nation, not expect that they would come to light, and who
predicted, moreover, that this religion should be proclaimed to all nations?
Jesus declared, "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a
nation bringing forth the fruits thereof; " [3631] and in uttering these
words to the Jews, what other meaning did He intend to convey than this,
viz., that He Himself should, through his divine power, bring forth into
light the whole of the Jewish Scriptures, which contain the mysteries of the
kingdom of God? If, then, they peruse the Theogonies of the Greeks, and the
stories about the twelve gods, they impart to them an air of dignity, by
investing them with an allegorical signification; but when they wish to
throw contempt upon our biblical narratives, they assert that they are
fables, clumsily invented for infant children!
Chapter XLIII.
"Altogether absurd, and out of season," [3632] he continues, "is the
(account of the) begetting of children," where, although he has mentioned no
names, it is evident that he is referring to the history of Abraham and
Sarah. Cavilling also at the "conspiracies of the brothers," he allies
either to the story of Cain plotting against Abel, [3633] or, in
addition, to that of Esau against Jacob; [3634] and (speaking) of "a
father's sorrow," he probably refers to that of Isaac on account of the
absence of Jacob, and perhaps also to that of Jacob because of Joseph having
been sold into Egypt. And when relating the "crafty procedure of mothers," I
suppose he means the conduct of Rebecca, who contrived that the blessing of
Isaac should descend, not upon Esau, but upon Jacob. Now if we assert that
in all these cases God interposed in a very marked degree, [3635] what
absurdity do we commit, seeing we are persuaded that He never withdraws His
providence [3636] from those who devote themselves to Him in an
honourable and vigorous [3637] life? He ridicules, moreover, the
acquisition of property made by Jacob while living with Laban, not
understanding to what these words refer: "And those which had no spots were
Laban's, and those which were spotted were Jacob's; " [3638] and he says
that "God presented his sons with asses, and sheep, and camels," [3639]
and did not see that "all these things happened unto them for ensamples, and
were written for our sake, upon whom the ends of the world are come."
[3640] The varying customs (prevailing among the different nations) becoming
famous, [3641] are regulated by the word of God, being given as a
possession to him who is figuratively termed Jacob. For those who become
converts to Christ from among the heathen, are indicated by the history of
Laban and Jacob.
Chapter XLIV.
And erring widely from the meaning of Scripture, he says that "God gave
wells [3642] also to the righteous." Now he did not observe that the
righteous do not construct cisterns, [3643] but dig wells, seeking to
discover the inherent ground and source of potable blessings, [3644]
inasmuch as they receive in a figurative sense the commandment which
enjoins, "Drink waters from your own vessels, and from your own wells of
fresh water. Let not your water be poured out beyond your own fountain, but
let it pass into your own streets. Let it belong to you alone, and let no
alien partake with thee." [3645] Scripture frequently makes use of the
histories of real events, in order to present to view more important truths,
which are but obscurely intimated; and of this kind are the narratives
relating to the "wells," and to the "marriages," and to the various acts of
"sexual intercourse" recorded of righteous persons, respecting which,
however, it will be more seasonable to offer an explanation in the
exegetical writings referring to those very passages. But that wells were
constructed by righteous men in the land of the Philistines, as related in
the book of Genesis, [3646] is manifest from the wonderful wells which
are shown at Ascalon, and which are deserving of mention on account of their
structure, so foreign and peculiar compared with that of other wells.
Moreover, that both young women [3647] and female servants are to be
understood metaphorically, is not our doctrine merely, but one which we have
received from the beginning from wise men, among whom a certain one said,
when exhorting his hearers to investigate the figurative meaning: "Tell me,
ye that read the law, do ye not hear the law? For it is written that Abraham
had two sons; the one by a bond maid, the other by a free woman. But he who
was of the bond woman was born after the flesh; but he of the free woman was
by promise. Which things are an allegory: for these are the two covenants;
the one from the Mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar."
[3648] And a little after, "But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is
the mother of us all." And any one who will take up the Epistle to the
Galatians may learn how the passages relating to the "marriages," and the
intercourse with "the maid-servants," have been allegorized; the Scripture
desiring us to imitate not the literal acts of those who did these things,
but (as the apostles of Jesus are accustomed to call them) the spiritual.
Chapter XLV.
And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by
the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to
their discredit, [3649] and thus been led to accept the other and more
marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized
the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or
its figurative meaning) as "worse than the crimes of Thyestes." The
figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at
present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the
angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: "Look not behind
thee, neither stay thou in all the surrounding district; escape to the
mountain, lest thou be consumed; " [3650] nor what is intended by Lot and
his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his
daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him.
But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history.
The nature of actions'good, bad, and indifferent'has been investigated by
the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators [3651] lay down
the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or
bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly
speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming
end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said,
accordingly, in the section relating to" things indifferent," that, strictly
speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing
indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established
communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an
act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case
of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race
besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can
fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the
supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be
accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the
influential [3652] sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had
heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full
meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that
the only means left of rekindling the flame [3653] of human life lay in
their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the
desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse
than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics,
acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already
supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that
some have taken offence at the desire [3654] of Lot's daughters, and have
regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed
nations'Moab and Ammon'have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet
truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their
conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy.
Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of
a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
[3655]
Chapter XLVI.
Celsus, moreover, sneers at the "hatred" of Esau (to which, I suppose, he
refers) against Jacob, although he was a man who, according to the
Scriptures, is acknowledged to have been wicked; and not clearly stating the
story of Simeon and Levi, who sallied out (on the Shechemites) on account of
the insult offered to their sister, who had been violated by the son of the
Shechemite king, he inveighs against their conduct. And passing on, he
speaks of" brothers selling (one another)," alluding to the sons of Jacob;
and of "a brother sold," Joseph to wit; and of "a father deceived," viz.,
Jacob, because he entertained no suspicion of his sons when they showed him
Joseph's coat of many colours, but believed their statement, and mourned for
his son, who was a slave in Egypt, as if he were dead. And observe in what a
spirit of hatred and falsehood Celsus collects together the statements of
the sacred history; so that wherever it appeared to him to contain a ground
of accusation he produces the passage, but wherever there is any exhibition
of virtue worthy of mention' as when Joseph would not gratify the lust of
his mistress, refusing alike her allurements and her threats'he does not
even mention the circumstance! He should see, indeed, that the conduct of
Joseph was far superior to what is related of Bellerophon, [3656] since
the former chose rather to be shut up in prison than do violence to his
virtue. For although he might have offered a just defence against his
accuser, he magnanimously remained silent, entrusting his cause to God.
Chapter XLVII.
Celsus next, for form's sake, [3657] and with great want of precision,
speaks of "the dreams of the chief butler and chief baker, and of Pharaoh,
and of the explanation of them, in consequence of which Joseph was taken out
of prison in order to be entrusted by Pharaoh with the second place in
Egypt." What absurdity, then, did the history contain, looked at even in
itself, that it should be adduced as matter of accusation by this Celsus,
who gave the title of True Discourse to a treatise not containing doctrines,
but full of charges against Jews and Christians? He adds: "He who had been
sold behaved kindly to his brethren (who had sold him), when they were
suffering from hunger, and had been sent with their asses to purchase
(provisions); "although he has not related these occurrences (in his
treatise). But he does mention the circumstance of Joseph making himself
known to his brethren, although I know not with what view, or what absurdity
he can point out in such an occurrence; since it is impossible for Momus
himself, we might say, to find any reasonable fault with events which, apart
from their figurative meaning, present so much that is attractive. He
relates, further, that "Joseph, who had been sold as a slave, was restored
to liberty, and went up with a solemn procession to his father's funeral,"
and thinks that the narrative furnishes matter of accusation against us, as
he makes the following remark: "By whom (Joseph, namely) the illustrious and
divine nation of the Jews, after growing up in Egypt to be a multitude of
people, was commanded to sojourn somewhere beyond the limits of the kingdom,
and to pasture their flocks in districts of no repute." Now the words, "that
they were commanded to pasture their flocks in districts of no repute," are
an addition, proceeding from his own feelings of hatred; for he has not
shown that Goshen, the district of Egypt, is a place of no repute. The
exodus of the people from Egypt he calls a flight, not at all remembering
what is written in the book of Exodus regarding the departure of the Hebrews
from the land of Egypt. We have enumerated these instances to show that
what, literally considered, might appear to furnish ground of accusation,
Celsus has not succeeded in proving to be either objectionable or foolish,
having utterly failed to establish the evil character, as he regards it, of
our Scriptures.
Chapter XLVIII.
In the next place, as if he had devoted himself solely to the manifestation
of his hatred and dislike of the Jewish and Christian doctrine, he says:
"The more modest of Jewish and Christian writers give all these things an
allegorical meaning; "and, "Because they are ashamed of these things, they
take refuge in allegory." Now one might say to him, that if we must admit
fables and fictions, whether written with a concealed meaning or with any
other object, to be shameful narratives when taken in their literal
acceptation, [3658] of what histories can this be said more truly than of
the Grecian? In these histories, gods who are sons castrate the gods who are
their fathers, and gods who are parents devour their own children, and a
goddess-mother gives to the "father of gods and men" a stone to swallow
instead of his own son, and a father has intercourse with his daughter, and
a wife binds her own husband, having as her allies in the work the brother
of the fettered god and his own daughter! But why should I enumerate these
absurd stories of the Greeks regarding their gods, which are most shameful
in themselves, even though invested with an allegorical meaning? (Take the
instance) where Chrysippus of Soli, who is considered to be an ornament of
the Stoic sect, on account of his numerous and learned treatises, explains a
picture at Samos, in which Juno was represented as committing unspeakable
abominations with Jupiter. This reverend philosopher says in his treatises,
that matter receives the spermatic words [3659] of the god, and retains
them within herself, in order to ornament the universe. For in the picture
at Samos Juno represents matter, and Jupiter god. Now it is on account of
these, and of countless other similar fables, that we would not even in word
call the God of all things Jupiter, or the sun Apollo, or the moon Diana.
But we offer to the Creator a worship which is pure, and speak with
religious respect of His noble works of creation, not contaminating even in
word the things of God; approving of the language of Plato in the Philebus,
who would not admit that pleasure was a goddess, "so great is my reverence,
Protarchus," he says, "for the very names of the gods." We verily entertain
such reverence for the name of God, and for His noble works of creation,
that we would not, even under pretext of an allegorical meaning, admit any
fable which might do injury to the young.
Chapter XLIX.
If Celsus had read the Scriptures in an impartial spirit, he would not have
said that "our writings are incapable of admitting an allegorical
meaning." For from the prophetic Scriptures, in which historical events are
recorded (not from the historical), it is possible to be convinced that the
historical portions also were written with an allegorical purpose, and were
most skilfully adapted not only to the multitude of the simpler believers,
but also to the few who are able or willing to investigate matters in an
intelligent spirit. If, indeed, those writers at the present day who are
deemed by Celsus the "more modest of the Jews and Christians" were the
(first) allegorical interpreters of our Scriptures, he would have the
appearance, perhaps, of making a plausible allegation. But since the very
fathers and authors of the doctrines themselves give them an allegorical
signification, what other inference can be drawn than that they were
composed so as to be allegorically understood in their chief
signification? [3660] And we shall adduce a few instances out of very
many to show that Celsus brings an empty charge against the Scriptures, when
he says "that they are incapable of admitting an allegorical meaning." Paul,
the apostle of Jesus, says: "It is written in the law, Thou shalt not muzzle
the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen?
or saith He it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes, no doubt, this is
written, that he that plougheth should plough in hope, and he that thresheth
in hope of partaking." [3661] And in another passage the same Paul says:
"For it is written, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother
and shall be joined to his wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a
great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church." [3662] And
again, in another place: "We know that all our fathers were under the cloud,
and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized unto Moses in the
cloud, and in the sea." [3663] Then, explaining the history relating to
the manna, and that referring to the miraculous issue of the water from the
rock, he continues as follows: "And they did all eat the same spiritual
meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink. For they drank of that
spiritual Rock that followed them, and that Rock was Christ." [3664]
Asaph, moreover, who, in showing the histories in Exodus and Numbers to be
full of difficulties and parables, [3665] begins in the following manner,
as recorded in the book of Psalms, where he is about to make mention of
these things: "Give ear, O my people, to my law: incline your ears to the
words of my mouth. I will open my mouth in parables; I will utter dark
sayings of old, which we have heard and known, and our fathers have told
us." [3666]
Chapter L
Moreover, if the law of Moses had contained nothing which was to be
understood as hating a secret meaning, the prophet would not have said in
his prayer to God, "Open Thou mine eyes, and I will behold wondrous things
out of Thy law; " [3667] whereas he knew that there was a veil of
ignorance lying upon the heart of those who read but do not understand the
figurative meaning, which veil is taken away by the gift of God, when He
hears him who has done all that he can, [3668] and who by reason of habit
has his senses exercised to distinguish between good and evil, and who
continually utters the prayer, "Open Thou mine eyes, and I will behold
wondrous things out of Thy law." And who is there that, on reading of the
dragon that lives in the Egyptian river, [3669] and of the fishes which
lurk in his scales, or of the excrement of Pharaoh which fills the mountains
of Egypt, [3670] is not led at once to inquire who he is that fills the
Egyptian mountains with his stinking excrement, and what the Egyptian
mountains are; and what the rivers in Egypt are, of which the aforesaid
Pharaoh boastfully says, "The rivers are mine, and I have made them; "
[3671] and who the dragon is, and the fishes in its scales,'and this so as
to harmonize with the interpretation to be given of the rivers? But why
establish at greater length what needs no demonstration? For to these things
applies the saying: "Who is wise, and he shall understand these things? or
who is prudent, and he shall know them? " [3672] Now I have gone at some
length into the subject, because I wished to show the unsoundness of the
assertion of Celsus, that "the more modest among the Jews and Christians
endeavour somehow to give these stories an allegorical signification,
although some of them do not admit of this, but on the contrary are
exceedingly silly inventions." Much rather are the stories of the Greeks not
only very silly, but very impious inventions. For our narratives keep
expressly in view the multitude of simpler believers, which was not done by
those who invented the Grecian fables. And therefore not without propriety
does Plato expel from his state all fables and poems of such a nature as
those of which we have been speaking.
Chapter LI.
Celsus appears to me to have heard that there are treatises in existence
which contain allegorical explanations of the law of Moses. These however,
he could not have read; for if he had he would not have said: "The
allegorical explanations, however, which have been devised are much more
shameful and absurd than the fables themselves, inasmuch as they endeavour
to unite with marvellous and altogether insensate folly things which cannot
at all be made to harmonize." He seems to refer in these words to the works
of Philo, or to those of still older writers, such as Aristobulus. But I
conjecture that Celsus has not read their books, since it appears to me that
in many passages they have so successfully hit the meaning (of the sacred
writers), that even Grecian philosophers would have been captivated by their
explanations; for in their writings we find not only a polished style, but
exquisite thoughts and doctrines, and a rational use of what Celsus imagines
to be fables in the sacred writings. I know, moreover, that Numenius the
Pythagorean'a surpassingly excellent expounder of Plato, and who held a
foremost place as a teacher of the doctrines of Pythagoras'in many of his
works quotes from the writings of Moses and the prophets, and applies to the
passages in question a not improbable allegorical meaning, as in his work
called Epops, and in those which treat of "Numbers" and of "Place." And in
the third book of his dissertation on The Good, he quotes also a narrative
regarding Jesus'without, however, mentioning His name'and gives it an
allegorical signification, whether successfully or the reverse I may state
on another occasion. He relates also the account respecting Moses, and
Jannes, and Jambres. [3673] But we are not elated on account of this
instance, though we express our approval of Numenius, rather than of Celsus
and other Greeks, because he was willing to investigate our histories from a
desire to acquire knowledge, and was (duly) affected by them as narratives
which were to be allegorically understood, and which did not belong to the
category of foolish compositions.
Chapter LII.
After this, selecting from all the treatises which contain allegorical
explanations and interpretations, expressed in a language and style not to
be despised, the least important, [3674] such as might contribute,
indeed, to strengthen the faith of the multitude of simple believers, but
were not adapted to impress those of more intelligent mind, he continues:
"Of such a nature do I know the work to be, entitled Controversy between one
Papiscus and Jason, which is fitted to excite pity and hatred instead of
laughter. It is not my purpose, however, to confute the statements contained
in such works; for their fallacy is manifest to all, especially if any one
will have the patience to read the books themselves. Rather do I wish to
show that Nature teaches this, that God made nothing that is mortal, but
that His works, whatever they are, are immortal, and theirs mortal. And the
soul [3675] is the work of God, while the nature of the body is
different. And in this respect there is no difference between the body of a
bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man; for the matter [3676]
is the same, and their corruptible part is alike." Nevertheless I could wish
that every one who heard Celsus declaiming and asserting that the treatise
entitled Controversy between Jason and Papiscus regarding Christ was fitted
to excite not laughter, but hatred, could fake the work into his hands, and
patiently listen to its contents; that, finding in it nothing to excite
hatred, he might condemn Celsus out of the book itself. For if it be
impartially perused, it will be found that there is nothing to excite even
laughter in a work in which a Christian is described as conversing with a
Jew on the subject of the Jewish Scriptures, and proving that the
predictions regarding Christ fitly apply to Jesus; although the other
disputant maintains the discussion in no ignoble style, and in a manner not
unbecoming the character of a Jew.
Chapter LIII.
I do not know, indeed, how he could conjoin things that do not admit of
union, and which cannot exist together at the same time in human nature, in
saying, as he did, that "the above treatise deserved to be treated both with
pity and hatred." For every one will admit that he who is the object of pity
is not at the same moment an object of hatred, and that he who is the object
of hatred is not at the same time a subject of pity. Celsus, moreover, says
that it was not his purpose to refute such statements, because he thinks
that their absurdity is evident to all, and that, even before offering any
logical refutation, they will appear to be bad, and to merit both pity and
hatred. But we invite him who peruses this reply of ours to the charges of
Celsus to have patience, and to listen to our sacred writings themselves,
and, as far as possible, to form an opinion from their contents of the
purpose of the writers, and of their consciences and disposition of mind;
for he will discover that they are men who strenuously contend for what they
uphold, and that some of them show that the history which they narrate is
one which they have both seen and experienced, [3677] which was
miraculous, and worthy of being recorded for the advantage of their future
hearers. Will any one indeed venture to say that it is not the source and
fountain of all blessing [3678] (to men) to believe in the God of all
things, and to perform all our actions with the view of pleasing Him in
everything whatever, and not to entertain even a thought unpleasing to Him,
seeing that not only our words and deeds, but our very thoughts, will be the
subject of future judgment? And what other arguments would more effectually
lead human nature to adopt a virtuous life, than the belief or opinion that
the supreme God beholds all things, not only what is said and done, but even
what is thought by us? And let any one who likes compare any other system
which at the same time converts and ameliorates, not merely one or two
individuals, but, as far as in it lies, countless numbers, that by the
comparison of both methods he may form a correct idea of the arguments which
dispose to a virtuous life.
Chapter LIV.
But as in the words which I quoted from Celsus, which are a paraphrase from
the Timaeus, certain expressions occur, such as, "God made nothing mortal,
but immortal things alone, while mortal things are the works of others, and
the soul is a work of God, but the nature of the body is different, and
there is no difference between the body of a man and that of a bat, or of a
worm, or of a frog; for the matter is the same, and their corruptible part
alike,"'let us discuss these points for a little; and let us show that
Celsus either does not disclose his Epicurean opinions, or, as might be said
by one person, has exchanged them for better, or, as another might say, has
nothing in common save the name, with Celsus, the Epicurean. For he ought,
in giving expression to such opinions, and in proposing to contradict not
only us, but the by no means obscure sect of philosophers who are the
adherents of Zeno of Citium, to have proved that the bodies of animals are
not the work of God, and that the great skill displayed in their
construction did not proceed from the highest intelligence. And he ought
also, with regard to the countless diversities of plants, which are
regulated by an inherent, incomprehensible nature, [3679] and which have
been created for the by no means despicable [3680] use of man in general,
and of the animals which minister to man, whatever other reasons may be
adduced for their existence, [3681] not only to have stated his opinion,
but also to have shown us that it was no perfect intelligence which
impressed these qualities upon the matter of plants. And when he had once
represented (various) divinities as the creators of all the bodies, the soul
alone being the work of God, why did not he, who separated these great acts
of creation, and apportioned them among a plurality of creators, next
demonstrate by some convincing reason the existence of these diversities
among divinities, some of which construct the bodies of men, and
others'those, say, of beasts of burden, and others'those of wild animals?
And he who saw that some divinities were the creators of dragons, and of
asps, and of basilisks, and others of each plant and herb according to its
species, ought to have explained the causes of these diversities. For
probably, had he given himself carefully to the investigation of each
particular point, he would either have observed that it was one God who was
the creator of all, and who made each thing with a certain object and for a
certain reason; or if he had failed to observe this, he would have
discovered the answer which he ought to return to those who assert that
corruptibility is a thing indifferent in its nature; and that there was no
absurdity in a world which consists of diverse materials, being formed by
one architect, who constructed the different kinds of things so as to secure
the good of the whole. Or, finally, he ought to have expressed no opinion at
all on so important a doctrine, since he did not intend to prove what he
professed to demonstrate; unless, indeed, he who censures others for
professing a simple faith, would have us to believe his mere assertions,
although he gave out that he would not merely assert, but would prove his
assertions.
Chapter LV.
But I maintain that, if he had the patience (to use his own expression) to
listen to the writings of Moses and the prophets, he would have had his
attention arrested by the circumstance that the expression "God made" is
applied to heaven and earth, and to what is called the firmament, and also
to the lights and stars; and after these, to the great fishes, and to every
living thing among creeping animals which the waters brought forth after
their kinds, and to every fowl of heaven after its kind; and after these, to
the wild beasts of the earth after their kind, and the beasts after their
kind, and to every creeping thing upon the earth after its kind; and last of
all to man. The expression "made," however, is not applied to other things;
but it is deemed sufficient to say regarding light, "And it was light; "and
regarding the one gathering together of all the waters that are under the
whole heaven, "It was so." And in like manner also, with regard to what grew
upon the earth, where it is said, "The earth brought forth grass, and herb
yielding seed after its kind and after its likeness, and the fruit-tree
yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself, after its kind, upon the earth." He
would have inquired, moreover, whether the recorded commands of God
respecting the coming into existence of each part of the world were
addressed to one thing or to several; [3682] and he would not lightly
have charged with being unintelligible, and as having no secret meaning, the
accounts related in these books, either by Moses, or, as we would say, by
the Divine Spirit speaking in Moses, from whom also he derived the power of
prophesying; since he "knew both the present, and the future, and the
past," in a higher degree than those priests who are alleged by the poets to
have possessed a knowledge of these things.
Chapter LVI.
Moreover, since Celsus asserts that "the soul is the work of God, but that
the nature of body is different; and that in this respect there is no
difference between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that
of a man, for the matter is the same, and their corruptible part alike,"'we
have to say in answer to this argument of his, that if, since the same
matter underlies the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, or of a man,
these bodies will differ in no respect from one another, it is evident then
that these bodies also will differ in no respect from the sun, or the moon,
or the stars, or the sky, or any other thing which is called by the Greeks a
god, cognisable by the senses. [3683] For the same matter, underlying all
bodies, is, properly speaking, without qualities and without form, and
derives its qualities from some (other) source, I know not whence, since
Celsus will have it that nothing corruptible can be the work of God. Now the
corruptible part of everything whatever, being produced from the same
underlying matter, must necessarily be the same, by Celsus' own showing;
unless, indeed, finding himself here hard pressed, he should desert Plato,
who makes the soul arise from a certain bowl, [3684] and take refuge with
Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who maintain that the ether is
immaterial, [3685] and consists of a fifth nature, separate from the
other four elements, [3686] against which view both the Platonists and
the Stoics have nobly protested. And we too, who are despised by Celsus,
will contravene it, seeing we are required to explain and maintain the
following statement of the prophet: The heavens shall perish, but Thou
remainest: and they all shall wax old as a garment; and as a vesture shall
Thou fold them up, and they shall be changed: but Thou art the same."
[3687] These remarks, however, are sufficient in reply to Celsus, when he
asserts that "the soul is the work of God, but that the nature of body is
different; "for from his argument it follows that there is no difference
between the body of a bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a
heavenly [3688] being.
Chapter LVII.
See, then, whether we ought to yield to one who, holding such opinions,
calumniates the Christians, and thus abandon a doctrine which explains the
difference existing among bodies as due to the different qualities, internal
and external, which are implanted in them. For we, too, know that there are
"bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial; "and that "the glory of the
celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial another; "and that even
the glory of the celestial bodies is not alike: for "one is the glory of the
sun, and another the glory of the stars; "and among the stars themselves,
"one star differeth from another star in glory." [3689] And therefore, as
those who expect the resurrection of the dead, we assert that the qualities
which are in bodies undergo change: since some bodies, which are sown in
corruption, are raised in incorruption; and others, sown in dishonour, are
raised in glory; and others, again, sown in weakness, are raised in power;
and those which are sown natural bodies, are raised as spiritual. [3690]
That the matter which underlies bodies is capable of receiving those
qualities which the Creator pleases to bestow, is a point which all of us
who accept the doctrine of providence firmly hold; so that, if God so
willed, one quality is at the present time implanted in this portion of
matter, and afterwards another of a different and better kind. But since
there are, from the beginning of the world, laws [3691] established for
the purpose of regulating the changes of bodies, and which will continue
while the world lasts, I do not know whether, when a new and different order
of things has succeeded [3692] after the destruction of the world, and
what our Scriptures call the end [3693] (of the ages), it is not
wonderful that at the present time a snake should be formed out of a dead
man, growing, as the multitude affirm, out of the marrow of the back,
[3694] and that a bee should spring from an ox, and a wasp from a horse, and
a beetle from an ass, and, generally, worms from the most of bodies, Celsus,
indeed, thinks that this can be shown to be the consequence of none of these
bodies being the work of God, and that qualities (I know not whence it was
so arranged that one should spring out of another) are not the work of a
divine intelligence, producing the changes which occur in the qualities of
matter.
Chapter LVIII.
But we have something more to say to Celsus, when he declares that "the soul
is the work of God, and that the nature of body is different," and puts
forward such an opinion not only without proof, but even without clearly
defining his meaning; for he did not make it evident whether he meant that
every soul is the work of God, or only the rational soul. This, then, is
what we have to say: If every soul is the work of God, it is manifest that
those of the meanest irrational animals are God's work, so that the nature
of all bodies is different from that of the soul. He appears, however, in
what follows, where he says that "irrational animals are more beloved by God
than we, and have a purer knowledge of divinity," to maintain that not only
is the soul of man, but in a much greater degree that of irrational animals,
the work of God; for this follows from their being said to be more beloved
by God than we. Now if the rational soul alone be the work of God, then, in
the first place, he did not clearly indicate that such was his opinion; and
in the second place, this deduction follows from his indefinite language
regarding the soul'viz., whether not every one, but only the rational, is
the work of God'that neither is the nature of all bodies different (from the
soul). But if the nature of all bodies be not different, although the body
of each animal correspond to its soul, it is evident that the body of that
animal whose soul was the work of God, would differ from the body of that
animal in which dwells a soul which was not the work of God. And so the
assertion will be false, that there is no difference between the body of a
bat, or of a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man.
Chapter LIX.
For it would, indeed, be absurd that certain stones and buildings should be
regarded as more sacred or more profane than others, according as they were
constructed for the honour of God, or for the reception of dishonourable and
accursed persons; [3695] while bodies should not differ from bodies,
according as they are inhabited by rational or irrational beings, and
according as these rational beings are the most virtuous or most worthless
of mankind. Such a principle of distinction, indeed, has led some to deify
the bodies of distinguished men, [3696] as having received a virtuous
soul, and to reject and treat with dishonour those of very wicked
individuals. I do not maintain that such a principle has been always soundly
exercised, but that it had its origin in a correct idea. Would a wise man,
indeed, after the death of Anytus and Socrates, think of burying the bodies
of both with like honours? And would he raise the same mound or tomb to the
memory of both? These instances we have adduced because of the language of
Celsus, that "none of these is the work of God" (where the words "of
these" refer to the body of a man or to the snakes which come out of the
body and to that of an ox, or of the bees which come from the body of an ox;
and to that of a horse or of an ass, and to the wasps which come from a
horse, and the beetles which proceed from an ass); for which reason we have
been obliged to return to the consideration of his statement, that "the soul
is the work of God, but that the nature of body is different."
Chapter LX.
He next proceeds to say, that "a common nature pervades all the previously
mentioned bodies, and one which goes and returns the same amid recurring
changes." [3697] In answer to this it is evident from what has been
already said that not only does a common nature pervade those bodies which
have been previously enumerated, but the heavenly bodies as well. And if
this is the case, it is clear also that, according to Celsus (although I do
not know whether it is according to truth), it is one nature which goes and
returns the same through all bodies amid recurring changes. It is evident
also that this is the case in the opinion of those who hold that the world
is to perish; while those also who hold the opposite view will endeavour to
show, with out the assumption of a fifth substance, [3698] that in their
judgment too it is one nature "which goes and returns the same through all
bodies amid recurring changes." And thus, even that which is perishable
remains in order to undergo a change; [3699] for the matter which
underlies (all things), while its properties perish, stir abides according
to the opinion of those who hold it to be uncreated. If, however, it can be
shown by any arguments not to be uncreated, but to have been created for
certain purposes, it is clear that it will not have the same nature of
permanency which it would possess on the hypothesis of being uncreated. But
it is not our object at present, in answering the charges of Celsus, to
discuss these questions of natural philosophy.
Chapter LXI.
He maintains, moreover, that "no product of matter is immortal." Now, in
answer to this it may be said, that if no product of matter is immortal,
then either the whole world is immortal, and thus not a product of matter,
or it is not immortal. If, accordingly, the world is immortal (which is
agreeable to the view of those who say that the soul alone is the work of
God, and was produced from a certain bowl), let Celsus show that the world
was not produced from a matter devoid of qualities, remembering his own
assertion that "no product of matter is immortal." If, however, the world is
not immortal (seeing it is a product of matter), but mortal, does it also
perish, or does it not? For if it perish, it will perish as being a work of
God; and then, in the event of the world perishing, what will become of the
soul, which is also a work of God? Let Celsus answer this! But if,
perverting the notion of immortality, he will assert that, although
perishable, it is immortal, because it does not really perish; that it is
capable of dying, but does not actually die,'it is evident that, according
to him, there will exist something which is at the same time mortal and
immortal, by being capable of both conditions; and that which does not die
will be mortal, and that which is not immortal by nature will be termed in a
peculiar sense immortal, because it does not die! According to what
distinction, then, in the meaning of words, will he maintain that no product
of matter is immortal? And thus you see that the ideas contained in his
writings, when closely examined and tested, are proved not to be sound and
incontrovertible. [3700] And after making these assertions he adds: "On
this point these remarks are sufficient; and if any one is capable of
hearing and examining further, he will come to know (the truth)." Let us,
then, who in his opinion are unintelligent individuals, see what will result
from our being able to listen to him for a little, and so continue our
investigation.
Chapter LXII.
After these matters, then, he thinks that he can make us acquainted in a few
words with the questions regarding the nature of evil, which have been
variously discussed in many important treatises, and which have received
very opposite explanations. His words are: "There neither were formerly, nor
are there now, nor will there be again, more or fewer evils in the world
(than have always been). For the nature of all things is one and the same,
and the generation of evils is always the same." He seems to have
paraphrased these words from the discussions in the Theaetetus, where Plato
makes Socrates say: "It is neither possible for evils to disappear from
among men, nor for them to become established among the gods," and so on.
But he appears to me not to have understood Plato correctly, although
professing to include all truth [3701] in this one treatise, and giving
to his own book against us the title of A True Discourse. For the language
in the Timaeus, where it is said, "When the gods purify the earth with
water," shows that the earth, when purified with water, contains less evil
than it did before its purification. And this assertion, that there at one
time were fewer evils in the world, is one which we make, in harmony with
the opinion of Plato, because of the language in the Theaetetus, where he
says that "evils cannot disappear from among men." [3702]
Chapter LXIII.
I do not understand how Celsus, while admitting the existence of Providence,
at least so far as appears from the language of this book, can say that
there never existed (at any time) either more or fewer evils, but, as it
were, a fixed number; thus annihilating the beautiful doctrine regarding the
indefinite [3703] nature of evil, and asserting that evil, even in its
own nature, [3704] is infinite. Now it appears to follow from the
position, that there never have been, nor are now, nor ever will be, more or
fewer evils in the world; that as, according to the view of those who hold
the indestructibility of the world, the equipoise of the elements is
maintained by a Providence (which does not permit one to gain the
preponderance over the others, in order to prevent the destruction of the
world), so a kind of Providence presides, as it were, over evils (the number
of which is fixed), [3705] to prevent their being either increased or
diminished! In other ways, too, are the arguments of Celsus concerning evil
confuted, by those philosophers who have investigated the subjects of good
and evil, and who have proved also from history that in former times it was
without the city, and with their faces concealed by masks, that loose women
hired themselves to those who wanted them; that subsequently, becoming more
impudent, they laid aside their masks, though not being permitted by the
laws to enter the cities, they (still) remained without them, until, as the
dissoluteness of manners daily increased, they dared even to enter the
cities. Such accounts are given by Chrysippus in the introduction to his
work on Good and Evil. From this also it may be seen that evils both
increase and decrease, viz., that those individuals who were called
"Ambiguous" [3706] used formerly to present themselves openly to view,
suffering and committing all shameful things, while subserving the passions
of those who frequented their society; but recently they have been expelled
by the authorities. [3707] And of countless evils which, owing to the
spread of wickedness, have made their appearance in human life, we may say
that formerly they did not exist. For the most ancient histories, which
bring innumerable other accusations against sinful men, know nothing of the
perpetrators of abominable [3708] crimes.
Chapter LXIV.
And now, after these arguments, and others of a similar kind, how can Celsus
escape appearing in a ridiculous light, when he imagines that there never
has been in the past, nor will be in the future, a greater or less number of
evils? For although the nature of all things is one and the same, it does
not at all follow that the production of evils is a constant quantity.
[3709] For although the nature of a certain individual is one and the same,
yet his mind, and his reason, and his actions, are not always alike:
[3710] there being a time when he had not yet attained to reason; and
another, when, with the possession of reason, he had become stained with
wickedness, and when this increased to a greater or less degree; and again,
a time when he devoted himself to virtue, and made greater or less progress
therein, attaining sometimes the very summit of perfection, through longer
or shorter periods of contemplation. [3711] In like manner, we may make
the same assertion in a higher degree of the nature of the universe,
[3712] that although it is one and the same in kind, yet neither do exactly
the same things, nor yet things that are similar, occur in it; for we
neither have invariably productive nor unproductive seasons, nor yet periods
of continuous rain or of drought. And so in the same way, with regard to
virtuous souls, there are neither appointed periods of fertility nor of
barrenness; and the same is the case with the greater or less spread of
evil. And those who desire to investigate all things to the best of their
ability, must keep in view this estimate of evils, that their amount is not
always the same, owing to the working of a Providence which either preserves
earthly things, or purges them by means of floods and conflagrations; and
effects this, perhaps, not merely with reference to things on earth, but
also to the whole universe of things [3713] I which stands in need of
purification, when the wickedness that is in it has become great.
Chapter LXV.
After this Celsus continues: "It is not easy, indeed, for one who is not a
philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, though it is sufficient for
the multitude to say that they do not proceed from God, but cleave to
matter, and have their abode among mortal things; while the course [3714]
of mortal things being the same from beginning to end, the same things must
always, agreeably to the appointed cycles, [3715] recur in the past,
present, and future." Celsus here observes that it is not easy for one who
is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, as if it were an easy
matter for a philosopher to gain this knowledge, while for one who is not a
philosopher it was difficult, though still possible, for such an one,
although with great labour, to attain it. Now, to this we say, that the
origin of evils is a subject which is not easy even for a philosopher to
master, and that perhaps it is impossible even for such to attain a clear
understanding of it, unless it be revealed to them by divine inspiration,
both what evils are, and how they originated, and how they shall be made to
disappear. But although ignorance of God is an evil, and one of the greatest
of these is not to know how God is to be served and worshipped, yet, as even
Celsus would admit, there are undoubtedly some philosophers who have been
ignorant of this, as is evident from the views of the different
philosophical sects; whereas, according to our judgment, no one is capable
of ascertaining the origin of evils who does not know that it is wicked to
suppose that piety is preserved uninjured amid the laws that are established
in different states, in conformity with the generally prevailing ideas of
government. [3716] No one, moreover, who has not heard what is related of
him who is called "devil," and of his "angels," and what he was before he
became a devil, and how he became such, and what was the cause of the
simultaneous apostasy of those who are termed his angels, will be able to
ascertain the origin of evils. But he who would attain to this knowledge
must learn more accurately the nature of demons, and know that they are not
the work of God so far as respects their demoniacal nature, but only in so
far as they are possessed of reason; and also what their origin was, so that
they became beings of such a nature, that while converted into demons, the
powers of their mind [3717] remain. And if there be any topic of human
investigation which is difficult for our nature to grasp, certainly the
origin of evils may be considered to be such.
Chapter LXVI.
Celsus in the next place, as if he were able to tell certain secrets
regarding the origin of evils, but chose rather to keep silence, and say
only what was suitable to the multitude, continues as follows: "It is
sufficient to say to the multitude regarding the origin of evils, that they
do not proceed from God, but cleave to matter, and dwell among mortal
things." It is true, certainly, that evils do not proceed from God; for
according to Jeremiah, one of our prophets, it is certain that "out of the
mouth of the Most High proceedeth not evil and good." [3718] But to
maintain that matter, dwelling among mortal things, is the cause of evils,
is in our opinion not true. For it is the mind of each individual which is
the cause of the evil which arises in him, and this is evil (in the
abstract); [3719] while the actions which proceed from it are wicked, and
there is, to speak with accuracy, nothing else in our view that is evil. I
am aware, however, that this topic requires very elaborate treatment, which
(by the grace of Cod enlightening the mind) may be successfully attempted by
him who is deemed by God worthy to attain the necessary knowledge on this
subject.
Chapter LXVII.
I do not understand how Celsus should deem it of advantage, in writing a
treatise against us, to adopt an opinion which requires at least much
plausible reasoning to make it appear, as far as he can do so, that "the
course of mortal things is the same from beginning to end, and that the same
things must always, according to the appointed cycles, recur in the past,
present, and future." Now, if this be true, our free-will is annihilated.
[3720] For if, in the revolution of mortal things, the same events must
perpetually occur in the past, present, and future, according to the
appointed cycles, it is clear that, of necessity, Socrates will always be. a
philosopher, and be condemned for introducing strange gods and for
corrupting the youth. And Anytus and Melitus must always be his accusers,
and the council of the Areopagus must ever condemn him to death by hemlock.
And in the same way, according to the appointed cycles, Phalaris must always
play the tyrant, and Alexander of Pherae commit the same acts of cruelty,
and those condemned to the bull of Phalaris continually pour forth their
wailings from it. But if these things be granted, I do not see how our
free-will can be preserved, or how praise or blame can be administered with
propriety. We may say further to Celsus, in answer to such a view, that "if
the course of moral things be always the same from beginning to end, and if,
according to the appointed cycles, the same events must always occur in the
past, present, and future," then, according to the appointed cycles, Moses
must again come forth from Egypt with the Jewish people, and Jesus again
come to dwell in human life, and perform the same actions which (according
to this view) he has done not once, but countless times, as the periodshave
revolved. Nay, Christians too will be the same in the appointed cycles; and
Celsus will again write this treatise of his, which he has done innumerable
times before.
Chapter LXVIII.
Celsus, however, says that it is only "the course of mortal things which,
according to the appointed cycles, must always be the same in the past,
present, and future; "whereas the majority of the Stoics maintain that this
is the case not only with the course of mortal, but also with that of
immortal things, and of those whom they regard as gods. For after the
conflagration of the world, [3721] which has taken place countless times
in the past, and will happen countless times in the future, there has been,
and will be, the same arrangement of all things from the beginning to the
end. The Stoics, indeed, in endeavouring to parry, I don't know how, the
objections raised to their views, allege that as cycle after cycle returns,
all men will be altogether unchanged [3722] from those who lived in
former cycles; so that Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like
to Socrates, who will marry a wife exactly like Xanthippe, and will be
accused by men exactly like Anytus and Melitus. I do not understand,
however, how the world is to be always the same, and one individual not
different from another, and yet the things in it not the same, though
exactly alike. But the main argument in answer to the statements of Celsus
and of the Stoics will be more appropriately investigated elsewhere, since
on the present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose we have in
view to expatiate on these points.
Chapter LXIX.
He continues to say that "neither have visible things [3723] been given
to man (by God), but each individual thing comes into existence and perishes
for the sake of the safety of the whole passing agreeably to the change,
which I have already mentioned, from one thing to another." It is
unnecessary, however, to linger over the refutation of these statements,
which have been already refuted to the best of my ability. And the
following, too, has been answered, viz., that "there will neither be more
nor less good and evil among mortals." This point also has been referred to,
viz., that "God does not need to amend His work afresh." [3724] But it is
not as a man who has imperfectly designed some piece of workmanship, and
executed it unskilfully, that God administers correction to the world, in
purifying it by a flood or by a conflagration, but in order to prevent the
tide of evil from rising to a greater height; and, moreover, I am of opinion
that it is at periods which are precisely determined beforehand that He
sweeps wickedness away, so as to contribute to the good of the whole
world. [3725] If, however, he should assert that, after the disappearance
of evil, it again comes into existence, such questions will have to be
examined in a special treatise. [3726] It is, then, always in order to
repair what has become faulty [3727] that God desires to amend His work
afresh. For although, in the creation of the world, all things had been
arranged by Him in the most beautiful and stable manner, He nevertheless
needed to exercise some healing power upon those who were labouring under
the disease of wickedness, and upon a whole world, which was polluted as it
were thereby. But nothing has been neglected by God, or will be neglected by
Him; for He does at each particular juncture what it becomes Him to do in a
perverted and changed world. And as a husbandman performs different acts of
husbandry upon the soil and its productions, according to the varying
seasons of the year, so God administers entire ages of time, as if they
were, so to speak, so many individual years, performing during each one of
them what is requisite with a reasonable regard to the care of the world;
and this, as it is truly understood by God alone, so also is it accomplished
by Him.
Chapter LXX.
Celsus has made a statement regarding evils of the following nature, viz.,
that "although a thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain
that it is so; for you do not know what is of advantage to yourself, or to
another, or to the whole world." Now this assertion is made with a certain
degree of caution; [3728] and it hints that the nature of evil is not
wholly wicked, because that which may be considered so in individual cases,
may contain something which is of advantage to the whole community. However,
lest any one should mistake my words, and find a pretence of wrongdoing, as
if his wickedness were profitable to the world, or at least might be so, we
have to say, that although God, who preserves the free-will of each
individual, may make use of the evil of the wicked for the administration of
the world, so disposing them as to conduce to the benefit of the whole; yet,
notwithstanding, such an individual is deserving of censure, and as such has
been appointed for a use, which is a subject of loathing to each separate
individual, although of advantage to the whole community. [3729] It is as
if one were to say that in the case of a city, a man who had committed
certain crimes, and on account of these had been condemned to serve in
public works that were useful to the community, did something that was of
advantage to the entire city, while he himself was engaged in an abominable
task, [3730] in which no one possessed of moderate understanding would
wish to be engaged. Paul also, the apostle of Jesus, teaches us that even
the very wicked will contribute to the good of the whole, while in
themselves they will be amongst the vile, but that the most virtuous men,
too, will be of the greatest advantage to the world, and will therefore on
that account occupy the noblest position. His words are: "But in a great
house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of
earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge
himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the
Master's use, prepared unto every good work." [3731] These remarks I have
thought it necessary to make in reply to the assertion, that "although a
thing may seem to you to be evil, it is by no means certain that it is so,
for you do not know what is of advantage either to yourself or to
another," in order that no one may take occasion from what has been said on
the subject to commit sin, on the pretext that he will thus be useful to the
world.
Chapter LXXI.
But as, in what follows, Celsus, not understanding that the language of
Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthropopathic point of view,
[3732] ridicules those passages which speak of words of anger addressed to
the ungodly, and of threatenings directed against sinners, we have to say
that, as we ourselves, when talking with very young children, do not aim at
exerting our own power of eloquence, [3733] but, adapting ourselves to
the weakness of our charge, both say and do those thingS which may appear to
us useful for the correction and improvement of the children as children, so
the word of God appears to have dealt with the history, making the capacity
of the hearers, and the benefit which they were to receive, the standard of
the appropriateness of its announcements (regarding Him). And, generally,
with regard to such a style of speaking about God, we find in the book of
Deuteronomy the following: "The Lord thy God bare with your manners, as a
man would bear with the manners of his son." [3734] It is, as it were,
assuming the manners of a man in order to secure the advantage of men that
the Scripture makes use of such expressions; for it would not have been
suitable to the condition of the multitude, that what God had to say to them
should be spoken by Him in a manner more befitting the majesty of His own
person. And yet he who is anxious to attain a true understanding of holy
Scripture, will discover the spiritual truths which are spoken by it to
those who are called "spiritual," by comparing the meaning of what is
addressed to those of weaker mind with what is announced to such as are of
acuter understanding, both meanings being frequently found in the same
passage by him who is capable of comprehending it.
Chapter LXXII.
We speak, indeed, of the "wrath" of God. We do not, however, assert that it
indicates any "passion" on His part, but that it is something which is
asumed in order to discipline by stern means those sinners who have
committed many and grievous sins. For that which is called God's "wrath,"
and "anger," is a means of discipline; and that such a view is agreeable to
Scripture, is evident from what is said in the Psalms 6, "O Lord, rebuke me
not in Thine anger, neither chasten me in Thy hot displeasure; " [3735]
and also in jeremiah. "O Lord, correct me, but with judgment: not in Thine
anger, lest Thou bring me to nothing." [3736] Any one, moreover, who
reads in the second book of Kings of the "wrath" of God, inducing David to
number the people, and finds from the first book of Chronicles that it was
the devil who suggested this measure, will, on comparing together the two
statements, easily see for what purpose the "wrath" is mentioned, of which
"wrath," as the Apostle Paul declares, all men are children: "We were by
nature children of wrath, even as others." [3737] Moreover, that
"wrath" is no passion on the part of God, but that each one bringS it upon
himself by his sins, will be clear from the further statement of Paul: "Or
despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and
long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to
repentance? But after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto
thyself wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous
judgment of God." How, then, can any one treasure up for himself "wrath"
against a "day of wrath," if "wrath" be understood in the sense of "passion?
"or how can the "passion of wrath" be a help to discipline? Besides, the
Scripture, which tells us not to be angry at all, and which says in the
Psalms 37, "Cease from anger, and forsake wrath," [3738] and which
commands us by the mouth of Paul to "put off all these, anger, wrath,
malice, blasphemy, filthy communication," [3739] would not involve God in
the same passion from which it would have us to be altogether free. It is
manifest, further, that the language used regarding the wrath of God is to
be understood figuratively from what is related of His "sleep," from which,
as if awaking Him, the prophet says: "Awake, why sleepest Thou, Lord? "
[3740] and again: "Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleep, and like a
mighty man that shouteth by reason of wine." [3741] If, then, "sleep"
must mean something else, and not what the first acceptation of the word
conveys, why should not "wrath" also be understood in a similar way? The
"threatenings," again, are intimations of the (punishments) which are to
befall the wicked: for it is as if one were to call the words of a physician
"threats," when he tells his patients, "I will have to use the knife, and
apply cauteries, if you do not obey my prescriptions, and regulate your diet
and mode of life in such a way as I direct you." It is no human passions,
then, which we ascribe to God, nor impious opinions which we entertain of
Him; nor do we err when we present the various narratives concerning Him,
drawn from the Scriptures themselves, after careful comparison one with
another. For those who are wise ambassadors of the "word" have no other
object in view than to free as far as they can their hearers from weak
opinions, and to endue them with intelligence.
Chapter LXXIII.
And as a sequel to his non-understanding of the statements regarding the
"wrath" of God, he continues: "Is it not ridiculous to suppose that, whereas
a man, who became angry with the Jews, slew them all from the youth upwards,
and burned their city (so powerless were they to resist him), the mighty
God, as they say, being angry, and indignant, and uttering threats, should,
(instead of punishing them) send His own Son, who endured the sufferings
which He did? "If the Jews, then, after the treatment which they dared to
inflict upon Jesus, perished with all their youth, and had their city
consumed by fire, they suffered this punishment in consequence of no other
wrath than that which they treasured up for themselves; for the judgment of
God against them, which was determined by the divine appointment, is termed
"wrath" agreeably to a traditional usage of the Hebrews. And what the Son of
the mighty God suffered, He suffered voluntarily for the salvation of men,
as has been stated to the best of my ability in the preceding pages. He then
continues: "But that I may speak not of the Jews alone (for that is not my
object), but of the whole of nature, as I promised, I will bring out more
clearly what has been already stated." Now what modest man, on reading these
words, and knowing the weakness of humanity, would not be indignant at the
offensive nature of the promise to give an account of the "whole of
nature," and at an arrogance like that which prompted him to inscribe upon
his book the title which he ventured to give it (of a True Discourse)? But
let us see what he has to say regarding the "whole of nature," and what he
is to place "in a clearer light."
Chapter LXXIV.
He next, in many words, blames us for asserting that God made all things for
the sake of man. Because from the history of animals, and from the sagacity
manifested by them, he would show that all things came into existence not
more for the sake of man than of the irrational animals. And here he seems
to me to speak in a similar manner to those who, through dislike of their
enemies, accuse them of the same things for which their own friends are
commended. For as, in the instance referred to, hatred blinds these persons
from seeing that they are accusing their very dearest friends by the means
through which they think they are slandering their enemies; so in the same
way, Celsus also, becoming confused in his argument, does not see that he is
bringing a charge against the philosophers of the Porch, who, not amiss,
place man in the foremost rank, and rational nature in general before
irrational animals, and who maintain that Providence created all things
mainly on account of rational nature. Rational beings, then, as being the
principal ones, occupy the place, as it were, of children in the womb, while
irrational and soulless beings hold that of the envelope which is created
along with the child. [3742] I think, too, that as in cities the
superintendents of the goods and market discharge their duties for the sake
of no other than human beings, while dogs and other irrational animals have
the benefit of the superabundance; so Providence provides in a special
manner for rational creatures; while this l also follows, that irrational
creatures likewise enjoy the benefit of what is done for the sake of man.
And as he is in error who alleges that the superintendents of the markets
[3743] make provision in no greater degree for men than for dogs, because
dogs also get their share of the goods; so in a far greater degree are
Celsus and they who think with him guilty of impiety towards the God who
makes provision for rational beings, in asserting that His arrangements are
made in no greater degree for the sustenance of human beings than for that
of plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns.
Chapter LXXV.
For, in the first place, he is of opinion that "thunders, and lightnings,
and rains are not the works of God,"'thus showing more clearly at last his
Epicurean leanings; and in the second place, that "even if one were to grant
that these were the works of God, they are brought into existence not more
for the support of us who are human beings, than for that of plants, and
trees, and herbs, and thorns,"'maintaining, like a true Epicurean, that
these things are the product of chance, and not the work of Providence. For
if these things are of no more use to us than to plants, and trees, and
herbs, and thorns, it is evident either that they do not proceed from
Providence at all, or from a providence which does not provide for us in a
greater degree than for trees, and herbs, and thorns. Now, either of these
suppositions is impious in itself, and it would be foolish to refute such
statements by answering any one who brought against us the charge of
impiety; for it is manifest to every one, from what has been said, who is
the person guilty of impiety. In the next place, he adds: "Although you may
say that these things, viz., plants, and trees, and herbs, and thorns, grow
for the use of men, why will you maintain that they grow for the use of men
rather than for that of the most savage of irrational animals? "Let Celsus
then say distinctly that the great diversity among the products of the earth
is not the work of Providence, but that a certain fortuitous concurrence of
atoms [3744] gave birth to qualities so diverse, and that it was owing to
chance that so many kinds of plants, and trees, and herbs resemble one
another, and that no disposing reason gave existence to them, [3745] and
that they do not derive their origin from an understanding that is beyond
all admiration. We Christians, however, who are devoted to the worship of
the only God, who created these things, feel grateful for them to Him who
made them, because not only for us, but also (on our account) for the
animals which are subject to us, He has prepared such a home, [3746]
seeing "He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the
service of man, that He may bring forth food out of the earth, and wine that
maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread
which strengtheneth man's heart." [3747] But that He should have provided
food even for the most savage animals is not matter of surprise, for these
very animals are said by some who have philosophized (upon the subject) to
have been created for the purpose of affording exercise to the rational
creature. And one of our own wise men says somewhere: "Do not say, What is
this? or Wherefore is that? for all things have been made for their uses.
And do not say, What is this? or Wherefore is that? for everything shall be
sought out in its season." [3748]
Chapter LXXVI.
After this, Celsus, desirous of maintaining that Providence created the
products of the earth, not more on our account than on that of the most
savage animals, thus proceeds: "We indeed by labour and suffering earn a
scanty and toilsome subsistence, [3749] while all things are produced for
them without their sowing and ploughing." He does not observe that God,
wishing to exercise the human understanding in all countries (that it might
not remain idle and unacquainted with the arts), created man a being full of
wants, [3750] in order that by virtue of his very needy condition he
might be compelled to be the inventor of arts, some of which minister to his
subsistence, and others to his protection. For it was better that those who
would not have sought out divine things, nor engaged in the study of
philosophy, should be placed in a condition of want, in order that they
might employ their understanding in the invention of the arts, than that
they should altogether neglect the cultivation of their minds, because their
condition was one of abundance. The want of the necessaries of human life
led to the invention on the one hand of the art of husbandry, on the other
to that of the cultivation of the vine; again, to the art of gardening, and
the arts of carpentry and smithwork, by means of which were formed the tools
required for the arts which minister to the support of life. The want of
covering, again, introduced the art of weaving, which followed that of
wool-carding and spinning; and again, that of house-building: and thus the
intelligence of men ascended even to the art of architecture. The want of
necessaries caused the products also of other places to be conveyed, by
means of the arts of sailing and pilotage, [3751] to those who were
without them; so that even on that account one might admire the Providence
which made the rational being subject to want in a far higher degree than
the irrational animals, and yet all with a view to his advantage. For the
irrational animals have their food provided for them, because there is not
in them even an impulse [3752] towards the invention of the arts. They
have, besides, a natural covering; for they are provided either with hair,
or wings, or scales, or shells. Let the above, then, be our answer to the
assertions of Celsus, when he says that "we indeed by labour and suffering
earn a scanty and toilsome subsistence, while all things are produced for
them without their sowing and ploughing."
Chapter LXXVII.
In the next place, forgetting that his object is to accuse both Jews and
Christians, he quotes against himself an iambic verse of Euripides, which is
opposed to his view, and, joining issue with the words, charges them with
being an erroneous statement. His words are as follow: "But if you will
quote the saying of Euripides, that
'The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves, ' [3753] why should they be so
in a greater degree to us than to ants and flies? For the night is created
for them in order that they may rest, and the day that they may see and
resume their work." Now it is undoubted, that not only have certain of the
Jews and Christians declared that the sun and the heavenly bodies [3754]
are our servants; but he also has said this, who, according to some, is the
philosopher of the stage, [3755] and who was a hearer of the lectures on
the philosophy of nature delivered by Anaxagoras. But this man asserts that
all things in the world are subject to all rational beings,'one rational
nature being taken to represent all, On the principle of a part standing for
the whole; [3756] which, again, clearly appears from the verse:'
"The Sun and Night are to mortals slaves."Perhaps the tragic poet meant the
day when he said the sun, inasmuch as it is the cause of the day,'teaching
that those things which most need the day and night are the things which are
under the moon, and other things in a less degree than those which are upon
the earth. Day and night, then, are subject to mortals, being created for
the sake of rational beings. And if ants and flies, which labour by day and
rest by night, have, besides, the benefit of those things which were created
for the sake of men, we must not say that day and night were brought into
being for the sake of ants and flies, nor must we suppose that they were
created for the sake of nothing, but, agreeably to the design of Providence,
were formed for the sake of man.
Chapter LXXVIII.
He next proceeds further to object against himself [3757] what is said on
behalf of man, viz., that the irrational animals were created on his
account, saying: "If one were to call us the lords of the animal creation
because we hunt the other animals and live upon their flesh, we would say,
Why were not we rather created on their account, since they hunt and devour
us? Nay, we require nets and weapons, and the assistance of many persons,
along with dogs, when engaged in the chase; while they are immediately and
spontaneously provided by nature with weapons which easily bring us under
their power." And here we may observe, that the gift of understanding has
been bestowed upon us as a mighty aid, far superior to any weapon which wild
beasts may seem to possess. We, indeed, who are far weaker in bodily
strength than the beasts, and shorter in stature than some of them, yet by
means of our understanding obtain the mastery, and capture the huge
elephants. We subdue by our gentle treatment those animals whose nature it
is to be tamed, while with those whose nature is different, or which do not
appear likely to be of use to us when tamed, we take such precautionary
measures, that when we desire it, we keep such wild beasts shut up; and when
we need the flesh of their bodies for food, we slaughter them, as we do
those beasts which are not of a savage nature. The Creator, then, has
constituted all things the servants of the rational being and of his natural
understanding. For some purposes we require dogs, say as guardians of our
sheep-folds, or of our cattle-yards, or goat-pastures, or of our dwellings;
and for other purposes we need oxen, as for agriculture; and for others,
again, we make use of those which bear the yoke, or beasts of burden. And so
it may be said that the race of lions, and bears, and leopards, and wild
boars, and such like, has been given to us in order to call into exercise
the elements of the manly character that exists within us.
Chapter LXXIX.
In the next place, in answer to the human race, who perceive their own
superiority, which far exceeds that of the irrational animals, he says:
"With respect to your assertion, that God gave you the power to capture wild
beasts, and to make your own use of them, we would say that, in all
probability, before cities were built, and arts invented, and societies such
as now exist were formed, and weapons and nets employed, men were generally
caught and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were very seldom
captured by men." Now, in reference to this, observe that although men catch
wild beasts, and wild beasts make prey of men, there is a great difference
between the case of such as by means of their understanding obtain the
mastery over those whose superiority consists in their savage and cruel
nature, and that of those who do not make use of their understanding to
secure their safety from injury by wild beasts. But when Celsus gays,
"before cities were built, and arts invented, and societies such as now
exist were formed," he appears to have forgotten what he had before said,
that "the world was uncreated and incorruptible, and that it was only the
things on earth which underwent deluges and conflagrations, and that all
these things did not happen at the same time." Now let if be granted that
these admissions on his part are entirely in harmony with our views, though
not at all with him and his statements made above; yet what does it all
avail to prove that in the beginning men were mostly captured and devoured
by wild beasts, while wild beasts were never caught by men? For, since the
world was created in conformity with the will of Providence, and God
presided over the universe of things, it was necessary that the elements
[3758] of the human race should at the commencement of its existence be
placed under some protection of the higher powers, so that there might be
formed from the beginning a union of the divine nature with that of men. And
the poet of Ascra, perceiving this, sings:'
"For common then were banquets, and common were seats,
Alike to immortal gods and mortal men." [3759]
Chapter LXXX.
Those holy Scriptures, moreover, which bear the name of Moses, introduce the
first men as hearing divine voices and oracles, and beholding sometimes the
angels of God coming to visit them. [3760] For it was probable that in
the beginning of the world's existence human nature would be assisted to a
greater degree (than afterwards), until progress had been made towards the
attainment of understanding and the other virtues, and the invention of the
arts, and they should thus be able to maintain life of themselves, and no
longer stand in need of superintendents, and of those to guide them who do
so with a miraculous manifestation of the means which subserve the will of
God. Now it follows from this, that it is false that "in the beginning men
were captured and devoured by wild beasts, while wild beasts were very
seldom caught by men." And from this, too, it is evident that the following
statement of Celsus is untrue, that "in this way God rather subjected men to
wild beasts." For God did not subject men to wild beasts, but gave wild
beasts to be a prey to the understanding of man, and to the arts, which are
directed against them, and which are the product of the understanding. For
it was not without the help of God [3761] that men desired for themselves
the means of protection against wild beasts, and of securing the mastery
over them.
Chapter LXXXI.
Our noble opponent, however, not observing how many philosophers there are
who admit the existence of Providence, and who hold that Providence created
all things for the sake of rational beings, overturns as far as he can those
doctrines which are of use in showing the harmony that prevails in these
matters between Christianity and philosophy; nor does he see how great is
the injury done to religion from accepting the statement that before God
there is no difference between a man and an ant or a bee, but proceeds to
add, that "if men appear to be superior to irrational animals on this
account, that they have built cities, and make use of a political
constitution, and forms of government, and sovereignties, [3762] this is
to say nothing to the purpose, for ants and bees do the same. Bees, indeed,
have a sovereign, who has followers and attendants; and there occur among
them wars and victories, and slaughterings of the vanquished, [3763] and
cities and suburbs, and a succession of labours, and judgments passed upon
the idle and the wicked; for the drones are driven away and punished." Now
here he did not observe the difference that exists between what is done
after reason and consideration, and what is the result of an irrational
nature, and is purely mechanical. For the origin of these things is not
explained by the existence of any rational principle in those who make them,
because they do not possess any such principle; but the most ancient Being,
who is also the Son of God, and the King of all things that exist, has
created an irrational nature, which, as being irrational, acts as a help to
those who are deemed worthy of reason. Cities, accordingly, were established
among men, with many arts and well-arranged laws; while constitutions, and
governments, and sovereignties among men are either such as are properly so
termed, and which exemplify certain virtuous tendencies and workings, or
they are those which are improperly so called, and which were devised, so
far as could be done, in imitation of the former: for it was by
contemplating these that the most successful legislators established the
best constitutions, and governments, and sovereignties. None of these
things, however, can be found among irrational animals, although Celsus may
transfer rational names, and arrangements which belong to rational beings,
as cities and constitutions, and rulers and sovereignties, even to ants and
bees; in respect to which matters, however, ants and bees merit no approval,
because they do not act from reflection. But we ought to admire the divine
nature, which extended even to irrational animals the capacity, as it were,
of imitating rational beings, perhaps with a view of putting rational beings
to shame; so that by looking upon ants, for instance, they might become more
industrious and more thrifty in the management of their goods; while, by
considering the bees, they might place themselves in subjection to their
Ruler, and take their respective parts in those constitutional duties which
are of use in ensuring the safety of cities.
Chapter LXXXII.
Perhaps also the so-called wars among the bees convey instruction as to the
manner in which wars, if ever there arise a necessity for them, should be
waged in a just and orderly way among men. But the bees have no cities or
suburbs; while their hives and hexagonal cells, and succession of labours,
are for the sake of men, who require honey for many purposes, both for cure
of disordered bodies, and as a pure article of food. Nor ought we to compare
the proceedings taken by the bees against the drones with the judgments and
punishments inflicted on the idle and wicked in cities. But, as I formerly
said, we ought on the one hand in these things to admire the divine nature,
and on the other to express our admiration of man, who is capable of
considering and admiring all things (as co-operating with Providence), and
who executes not merely the works which are determined by the providence of
God, but also those which are the consequences of his own foresight.
Chapter LXXXIII.
After Celsus has finished speaking of the bees, in order to depreciate (as
far as he can) the cities, and constitutions, and governments, and
sovereignties not only of us Christians, but of all mankind, as well as the
wars which men undertake on behalf of their native countries, he proceeds,
by way of digression, to pass a eulogy upon the ants, in order that, while
praising them, he may compare the measures which men take to secure their
subsistence with those adopted by these insects, [3764] and so evince his
contempt for the forethought which makes provision for winter, as being
nothing higher than the irrational providence of the ants, as he regards it.
it. Now might not some of the more simple-minded, and such as know not how
to look into the nature of all things, be turned away (so far, at least, as
Celsus could accomplish it) from helping those who are weighed down with the
burdens (of life), and from sharing their toils, when he says of the ants,
that "they help one another with their loads, when they see one of their
number toiling under them? "For he who needs to be disciplined by the word,
but who does not at all understand [3765] its voice, will say: "Since,
then, there is no difference between us and the ants, even when we help
those who are weary with bearing their heavy burdens, why should we continue
to do so to no purpose? "And would not the ants, as being irrational
creature, be greatly puffed up, and think highly of themselves, because
their works were compared to those of men? while men, on the other hand, who
by means of their reason are enabled to hear how their philanthropy
[3766] towards others is contemned, would be injured, so far as could be
effected by Celsus and his arguments: for he does not perceive that, while
he wishes to turn away from Christianity those who read his treatise, he
turns away also the sympathy of those who are not Christians from those who
bear the heaviest burdens (of life). Whereas, had he been a philosopher, who
was capable of perceiving the good which men may do each other, he ought, in
addition to not removing along with Christianity the blessings which are
found amongst men, to have lent his aid to co-operate (if he had it in his
power) with those principles of excellence which are common to Christianity
and the rest of mankind. Moreover, even if the ants set apart in a place by
themselves those grains which sprout forth, that they may not swell into
bud, but may continue throughout the year as their food, this is not to be
deemed as evidence of the existence of reason among ants, but as the work of
the universal mother, Nature, which adorned even irrational animals, so that
even the most insignificant is not omitted, but bears traces of the reason
implanted in it by nature. Unless, indeed, by these assertions Celsus means
obscurely to intimate (for in many instances he would like to adopt Platonic
ideas) that all souls are of the same species, and that there is no
difference between that of a man and those of ants and bees, which is the
act of one who would bring down the soul from the vault of heaven, and cause
it to enter not only a human body, but that of an animal. Christians,
however, will not yield their assent to such opinions: for they have been
instructed before now that the human soul was created in the image of God;
and they see that it is impossible for a nature fashioned in the divine
image to have its (original) features altogether obliterated, and to assume
others, formed after I know not what likeness of irrational animals.
Chapter LXXXIV.
And since he asserts that, "when ants die, the survivors set apart a special
place (for their interment), and that their ancestral sepulchres such a
place is," we have to answer, that the greater the laudations which he heaps
upon irrational animals, so much the more does he magnify (although against
his will) the work of that reason which arranged all things in order, and
points out the skill [3767] which exists among men, and which is capable
of adorning by its reason even the gifts which are bestowed by nature on the
irrational creation. But why do I say "irrational," since Celsus is of
opinion that these animals, which, agreeably to the common ideas of all men,
are termed irrational, are not really so? Nor does he regard the ants as
devoid of reason, who professed to speak of "universal nature," and who
boasted of his truthfulness in the inscription of his book. For, speaking of
the ants conversing with one another, he uses the following language: "And
when they meet one another they enter into conversation, for which reason
they never mistake their way; consequently they possess a full endowment of
reason, and some common ideas on certain general subjects, and a voice by
which they express themselves regarding accidental things." [3768] Now
conversation between one man and another is carried on by means of a voice,
which gives expression to the meaning intended, and which also gives
utterances concerning what are called "accidental things; "but to say that
this was the case with ants would be a most ridiculous assertion.
Chapter LXXXV.
He is not ashamed, moreover, to say, in addition to these statements (that
the unseemly character [3769] of his opinions may be manifest to those
who will live after him): "Come now, if one were to look down from heaven
upon earth, in what respect would our actions appear to differ from those of
ants and bees? "Now does he who, according to his own supposition, looks
from heaven upon the proceedings of men and ants, look upon their bodies
alone, and not rather have regard to the controlling reason which is called
into action by reflection; [3770] while, on the other hand, the guiding
principle of the latter is irrational, and set in motion irrationally by
impulse and fancy, in conjunction with a certain natural apparatus?
[3771] But it is absurd to suppose that he who looks from heaven upon
earthly things would desire to look from such a distance upon the bodies of
men and ants, and would not rather consider the nature of the guiding
principles, and the source of impulses, whether that be rational or
irrational. And if he once look upon the source of all impulses, it is
manifest that he would behold also the difference which exists, and the
superiority of man, not only over ants, but even over elephants. For he who
looks from heaven will see among irrational creatures, however large their
bodies, no other principle [3772] than, so to speak, irrationality;
[3773] while amongst rational beings he will discover reason, the common
possession of men, and of divine and heavenly beings, and perhaps of the
Supreme God Himself, on account of which man is said to have been created in
the image of God, for the image of the Supreme God is his reason. [3774]
Chapter LXXXVI.
Immediately after this, as if doing his utmost to reduce the human race to a
still lower position, and to bring them to the level of the irrational
animals, and desiring to omit not a single circumstance related of the
latter which manifests their greatness, he declares that "in certain
individuals among the irrational creation there exists the power of sorcery;
"so that even in this particular men cannot specially pride themselves, nor
wish to arrogate a superiority over irrational creatures. And the following
are his words: "If, however, men entertain lofty notions because of their
possessing the power of sorcery, yet even in that respect are serpents and
eagles their superiors in wisdom; for they are acquainted with many
prophylactics against persons and diseases, and also with the virtues of
certain stones which help to preserve their young. If men, however, fall in
with these, they think that they have gained a wonderful possession." Now,
in the first place, I know not why he should designate as sorcery the
knowledge of natural prophylactics displayed by animals,'whether that
knowledge be the result of experience, or of some natural power of
apprehension; [3775] for the term "sorcery" has by usage been assigned to
something else. Perhaps, indeed, he wishes quietly, as an Epicurean, to
censure the entire use of such arts, as resting only on the professions of
sorcerers. However, let it be granted him that men do pride themselves
greatly upon the knowledge of such arts, whether they are sorcerers or not:
how can serpents be in this respect wiser than men, when they make use of
the well-known fennel [3776] to sharpen their power of vision and to
produce rapidity of movement, having obtained this natural power not from
the exercise of reflection, but from the constitution of their body,
[3777] while men do not, like serpents, arrive at such knowledge merely by
nature, but partly by experiment, partly by reason, and sometimes by
reflection and knowledge? So, if eagles, too, in order to preserve their
young in the nest, carry thither the eagle-stone [3778] when they have
discovered it, how does it appear that they are wise, and more intelligent
than men, who find out by the exercise of their reflective powers and of
their understanding what has been bestowed by nature upon eagles as a gift?
Chapter LXXXVII.
Let it be granted, however, that there are other prophylactics against
poisons known to animals: what does that avail to prove that it is not
nature, but reason, which leads to the discovery of such things among them?
For if reason were the discoverer, this one thing (or, if you will, one or
two more things) would not be (exclusive [3779] of all others) the sole
discovery made by serpents, and some other thing the sole discovery of the
eagle, and so on with the rest of the animals; but as many discoveries would
have been made amongst them as among men. But now it is manifest from the
determinate inclination of the nature of each animal towards certain kinds
of help, that they possess neither wisdom nor reason, but a natural
constitutional tendency implanted by the Logos [3780] towards such things
in order to ensure the preservation of the animal. And, indeed, if I wished
to join issue with Celsus in these matters, I might quote the words of
Solomon from the book of Proverbs, which run thus: "There be four things
which are little upon the earth, but these are wiser than the wise: The ants
are a people not strong, yet they prepare their meat in the summer; the
conies [3781] are but a feeble folk, yet make they their houses in the
rocks; the locusts have no king, yet go they forth in order at one command;
and the spotted lizard, [3782] though leaning upon its hands, and being
easily captured, dwelleth in kings' fortresses." [3783] I do not quote
these words, however, as taking them in their literal signification, but,
agreeably to the title of the book (for it is inscribed "Proverbs"), I
investigate them as containing a secret meaning. For it is the custom of
these writers (of Scripture) to distribute into many classes those writings
which express one sense when taken literally, [3784] but which convey a
different signification as their hidden meaning; and one of these kinds of
writing is "Proverbs." And for this reason, in our Gospels too, is our
Saviour described as saying: "These things have I spoken to you in proverbs,
but the time cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs."
[3785] It is not, then, the visible ants which are "wiser even than the
wise," but they who are indicated as such under the "proverbial" style of
expression. And such must be our conclusion regarding the rest of the animal
creation, although Celsus regards the books of the Jews and Christians as
exceedingly simple and commonplace, [3786] and imagines that those who
give them an allegorical interpretation do violence to the meaning of the
writers. By what we have said, then, let it appear that Celsus calumniates
us in vain, and let his assertions that serpents and eagles are wiser than
men also receive their refutation.
Chapter LXXXVIII.
And wishing to show at greater length that even the thoughts of God
entertained by the human race are not superior to those of all other mortal
creatures, but that certain of the irrational animals are capable of
thinking about Him regarding whom opinions so discordant have existed among
the most acute of mankind'Greeks and Barbarians'he continues: "If, because
man has been able to grasp the idea of God, he is deemed superior to the
other animals, let those who hold this opinion know that this capacity will
be claimed by many of the other animals; and with good reason: for what
would any one maintain to be more divine than the power of foreknowing and
predicting future events? Men accordingly acquire the art from the other
animals, and especially from birds. And those who listen to the indications
furnished by them, become possessed of the gift of prophecy. If, then,
birds, and the other prophetic animals, which are enabled by the gift of God
to foreknow events, instruct us by means of signs, so much the nearer do
they seem to be to the society of God, and to be endowed with greater
wisdom, and to be more beloved by Him. The more intelligent of men,
moreover, say that the animals hold meetings which are more sacred than our
assemblies, and that they know what is said at these meetings, and show that
in reality they possess this knowledge, when, having previously stated that
the birds have declared their intention of departing to some particular
place, and of doing this thing or the other, the truth of their assertions
is established by the departure of the birds to the place in question, and
by their doing what was foretold. And no race of animals appears to be more
observant of oaths than the elephants are, or to show greater devotion to
divine things; and this, I presume, solely because they have some knowledge
of God." See here now how he at once lays hold of, and brings forward as
acknowledged facts, questions which are the subject of dispute among those
philosophers, not only among the Greeks, but also among the Barbarians, who
have either discovered or learned from certain demons some things about
birds of augury and other animals, by which certain prophetic intimations
are said to be made to men. For, in the first place, it has been disputed
whether there is an art of augury, and, in general, a method of divination
by animals, or not. And, in the second place, they who admit that there is
an art of divination by birds, are not agreed about the manner of the
divination; since some maintain that it is from certain demons or gods of
divination [3787] that the animals receive their impulses to action'the
birds to flights and sounds of different kinds, and the other animals to
movements of one sort or another. Others, again, believe that their souls
are more divine in their nature, and fitted to operations of that kind,
which is a most incredible supposition.
Chapter LXXXIX.
Celsus, however, seeing he wished to prove by the foregoing statements that
the irrational animals are more divine and intelligent than human beings,
ought to have established at greater length the actual existence of such an
art of divination, and in the next place have energetically undertaken its
defence, and effectually refuted the arguments of those who would annihilate
such arts of divination, and have overturned in a convincing manner also the
arguments of those who say that it is from demons or from gods that animals
receive the movements which lead them to divination, and to have proved in
the next place that the soul of irrational animals is more divine than that
of man. For, had he done so, and manifested a philosophical spirit in
dealing with such things, we should to the best of our power have met his
confident assertions, refuting in the first place the allegation that
irrational animals are wiser than men, and showing the falsity of the
statement that they have ideas of God more sacred than ours, and that they
hold among themselves certain sacred assemblies. But now, on the contrary,
he who accuses us because we believe in the Supreme God, requires us to
believe that the souls of birds entertain ideas of God more divine and
distinct than those of men. Yet if this is true, the birds have clearer
ideas of God than Celsus himself; and it is not matter of surprise that it
should be so with him, who so greatly depreciates human beings. Nay, so far
as Celsus can make it appear, the birds possess grander and more divine
ideas than, I do not say we Christians do, or than the Jews, who use the
same Scriptures with ourselves, but even than are possessed by the
theologians among the Greeks, for they were only human beings. According to
Celsus, indeed, the tribe of birds that practise divination, forsooth,
understand the nature of the Divine Being better than Pherecydes, and
Pythagoras, and Socrates and Plato! We ought then to go to the birds as our
teachers, in order that as, according to the view of Celsus, they instruct
us by their power of divination in the knowledge of future events, so also
they may free men from doubts regarding the Divine Being, by imparting to
them the clear ideas which they have obtained respecting Him! It follows,
accordingly, that Celsus, who regards birds as superior to men, ought to
employ them as his instructors, and not one of the Greek philosophers.
Chapter XC.
But we have a few remarks to make, out of a larger number, in answer to
these statements of Celsus, that we may show the ingratitude towards his
Maker which is involved in his holding these false opinions. [3788] For
Celsus, although a man, and "being in honour," [3789] does not possess
understanding, and therefore he did not compare himself with the birds and
the other irrational animals, which he regards as capable of divining; but
yielding to them the foremost place, he lowered himself, and as far as he
could the whole human race with him (as entertaining lower and inferior
views of God than the irrational animals), beneath the Egyptians, who
worship irrational animals as divinities. Let the principal point of
investigation, however, be this: whether there actually is or not an art of
divination, by means of birds and other living things believed to have such
power. For the arguments which tend to establish either view are not to be
despised. On the one hand, it is pressed upon us not to admit such an art,
lest the rational being should abandon the divine oracles, and betake
himself to birds; and on the other, there is the energetic testimony of
many, that numerous individuals have been saved from the greatest dangers by
putting their trust in divination by birds. For the present, however, let it
be granted that an art of divination does exist, in order that I may in this
way show to those who are prejudiced on the subject, that if this be
admitted, the superiority of man over irrational animals, even over those
that are endowed with power of divination, is great, and beyond all reach of
comparison with the latter. We have then to say, that if there was in them
any divine nature capable of foretelling future events, and so rich (in that
knowledge) as out of its superabundance to make them known to any man who
wished to know them, it is manifest that they would know what concerned
themselves far sooner (than what concerned others); and had they possessed
this knowledge, they would have been upon their guard against flying to any
particular place where men had planted snares and nets to catch them, or
where archers took aim and shot at them in their flight. And especially,
were eagles aware beforehand of the designs formed against their young,
either by serpents crawling up to their nests and destroying them, or by men
who take them for their amusement, or for any other useful purpose or
service, they would not have placed their young in a spot where they were to
be attacked; and, in general, not one of these animals would have been
captured by men, because they were more divine and intelligent than they.
Chapter XCI.
But besides, if birds of augury converse with one another, [3790] as
Celsus maintains they do, the prophetic birds having a divine nature, and
the other rational animals also ideas of the divinity and foreknowledge of
future events; and if they had communicated this knowledge to others, the
sparrow mentioned in Homer would not have built her nest in the spot where a
serpent was to devour her and her young ones, nor would the serpent in the
writings of the same poet have failed to take precautions against being
captured by the eagle. For this wonderful poet says, in his poem regarding
the former:'
"A mighty dragon shot, of dire portent;
From Jove himself the dreadful sign was sent.
Straight to the tree his sanguine spires he rolled,
And curled around in many a winding fold.
The topmost branch a mother-bird possessed;
Eight callow infants filled the mossy nest;
Herself the ninth: the serpent, as he hung,
Stretched his black jaws, and crashed the dying young;
While hovering near, with miserable moan,
The drooping mother wailed her children gone.
The mother last, as round the nest she flew,
Seized by the beating wing, the monster slew:
Nor long survived: to marble turned, he stands
A lasting prodigy on Aulis' sands.
Such was the will of Jove; and hence we dare
Trust in his omen, and support the war." [3791]
And regarding the second'the bird'the poet says:'
"Jove's bird on sounding pinions beat the skies;
A bleeding serpent of enormous size,
His talons twined; alive, and curling round,
He stung the bird, whose throat received the wound.
Mad with the smart, he drops the fatal prey,
In airy circles wings his painful way,
Floats on the winds, and rends the heaven with cries;
Amidst the host, the fallen serpent lies.
They, pale with terror, mark its spires unrolled,
And Jove's portent with beating hearts behold." [3792]
Did the eagle, then, possess the power of divination, and the serpent (since
this animal also is made use of by the augurs) not? But as this distinction
can be easily refuted, cannot the assertion that both were capable of
divination be refuted also? For if the serpent had possessed this knowledge,
would not he have been on his guard against suffering what he did from the
eagle? And innumerable other instances of a similar character may be found,
to show that animals do not possess a prophetic soul, but that, according to
the poet and the majority of mankind, it is the "Olympian himself who sent
him to the light." And it is with a symbolical meaning [3793] that Apollo
employs the hawk [3794] as his messenger, for the hawk [3795] is
called the "swift messenger of Apollo." [3796]
Chapter XCII.
In my opinion, however, it is certain wicked demons, and, so to speak, of
the race of Titans or Giants, who have been guilty of impiety towards the
true God, and towards the angels in heaven, and who have fallen from it, and
who haunt the denser parts of bodies, and frequent unclean places upon
earth, and who, possessing some power of distinguishing future events,
because they are without bodies of earthly material, engage in an employment
of this kind, and desiring to lead the human race away from the true God,
secretly enter the bodies of the more rapacious and savage and wicked of
animals, and stir them up to do whatever they choose, and at whatever time
they choose: either turning the fancies of these animals to make flights and
movements of various kinds, in order that men may be caught by the divining
power that is in the irrational animals, and neglect to seek after the God
who contains all things; or to search after the pure worship of God, but
allow their reasoning powers to grovel on the earth, and amongst birds and
serpents, and even foxes and wolves. For it has been observed by those who
are skilled in such matters, that the clearest prognostications are obtained
from animals of this kind; because the demons cannot act so effectively in
the milder sort of animals as they can in these, in consequence of the
similarity between them in point of wickedness; and yet it is not
wickedness, but something like wickedness, [3797] which exist in these
animals.
Chapter XCIII.
For which reason, whatever else there may be in the writings of Moses which
excites my wonder, I would say that the following is worthy of admiration,
viz. that Moses, having observed the varying natures of animals, and having
either learned from God what was peculiar to them, and to the demons which
are kindred to each of the animals, or having himself ascertained these
things by his own wisdom, has, in arranging the different kinds of animals,
pronounced all those which are supposed by the Egyptians and the rest of
mankind to possess the power of divination to be unclean, and, as a general
rule, all that are not of that class to be clean. And amongst the unclean
animals mentioned by Moses are the wolf, and fox, and serpent, and eagle,
and hawk, and such like. And, generally speaking, you will find that not
only in the law, but also in the prophets, these animals are employed as
examples of all that is most wicked; and that a wolf or a fox is never
mentioned for a good purpose. Each species of demon, consequently, would
seem to possess a certain affinity with a certain species of animal. And as
among men there are some who are stronger than others, and this not at all
owing to their moral character, so, in the same way, some demons will be
more powerful in things indifferent than others; [3798] and one class of
them employs one kind of animal for the purpose of deluding men, in
accordance with the will of him who is called in our Scriptures the "prince
of this world," while others predict future events by means of another kind
of animal. Observe, moreover, to what a pitch of wickedness the demons
proceed, so that they even assume the bodies of weasels in order to reveal
the future! And now, consider with yourself whether it is better to accept
the belief that it is the Supreme God and His Son who stir up the birds and
the other living creatures to divination, or that those who stir up these
creatures, and not human beings (although they are present before them), are
wicked, and, as they are called by our Scriptures, unclean demons.
Chapter XCIV.
But if the soul of birds is to be esteemed divine because future events are
predicted by them, why should we not rather maintain, that when omens
[3799] are accepted by men, the souls of those are divine through which the
omens are heard? Accordingly, among such would be ranked the female slave
mentioned in Homer, who ground the corn, when she said regarding the
suitors:'
"For the very last time, now, will they sup here." [3800]
This slave, then, was divine, while the great Ulysses, the friend of
Homer's Pallas Athene, was not divine, but understanding the words spoken by
this "divine" grinder of corn as an omen, rejoiced, as the poet says:'
"The divine Ulysses rejoiced at the omen." [3801]
Observe, now, as the birds are possessed of a divine soul, and are capable
of perceiving God, or, as Celsus says, the gods, it is clear that when we
men also sneeze, we do so in consequence of a kind of divinity that is
within us, and which imparts a prophetic power to our soul. For this belief
is testified by many witnesses, and therefore the poet also says:'
"And while he prayed, he sneezed." [3802]
And Penelope, too, said:'
"Perceiv'st thou not that at every word my son did sneeze? " [3803]
Chapter XCV.
The true God, however, neither employs irrational animals, nor any
individuals whom chance may offer, [3804] to convey a knowledge of the
future; but, on the contrary, the most pure and holy of human souls, whom He
inspires and endows with prophetic power. And therefore, whatever else in
the Mosaic writings may excite our wonder, the following must be considered
as fitted to do so: "Ye shall not practise augury, nor observe the flight of
birds; " [3805] and in another place: "For the nations whom the Lord thy
God will destroy from before thy face, shall listen to omens and
divinations; but as for thee, the Lord thy God has not suffered thee to do
so." [3806] And he adds: "A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto
you from among your brethren." [3807] On one occasion, moreover, God,
wishing by means of an augur to turn away (His people) from the practice of
divination, caused the spirit that was in the augur to speak as follows:
"For there is no enchantment in Jacob, nor is there divination in Israel. In
due time will it be declared to Jacob and Israel what the Lord will do."
[3808] And now, we who knew these and similar sayings wish to observe this
precept with the mystical meaning, viz., "Keep thy heart with all
diligence," [3809] that nothing of a demoniacal nature may enter into our
minds, or any spirit of our adversaries turn our imagination whither it
chooses. But we pray that the light of the knowledge of the glory of God may
shine in our hearts, and that the Spirit of God may dwell in our
imaginations, and lead them to contemplate the things of God; for "as many
as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." [3810]
Chapter XCVI.
We ought to take note, however, that the power of foreknowing the future is
by no means a proof of divinity; for in itself it is a thing indifferent,
and is found occurring amongst both good and bad. Physicians, at any rate,
by means of their professional skill foreknow certain things, although their
character may happen to be bad. And in the same way also pilots, although
perhaps wicked men, are able to foretell the signs [3811] (of good or bad
weather), and the approach of violent tempests of wind, and atmospheric
changes, [3812] because they gather this knowledge from experience and
observation, although I do not suppose that on that account any one would
term them "gods" if their characters happened to be bad. The assertion,
then, of Celsus is false, when he says: "What could be called more divine
than the power of foreknowing and foretelling the future? "And so also is
this, that "many of the animals claim to have ideas of God; "for none of the
irrational animals possess any idea of God. And wholly false, too, is his
assertion, that "the irrational animals are nearer the society of God (than
men)," when even men who are still in a state of wickedness, however great
their progress in knowledge, are far removed from that society. It is, then,
those alone who are truly wise and sincerely religious who are nearer to
God's society; such persons as were our prophets, and Moses, to the latter
of whom, on account of his exceeding purity, the Scripture said: "Moses
alone shall come near the Lord, but the rest shall not come nigh." [3813]
Chapter XCVII.
How impious, indeed, is the assertion of this man, who charges us with
impiety, that "not only are the irrational animals wiser than the human
race, but that they are more beloved by God (than they)!" And who would not
be repelled (by horror) from paying any attention to a man who declared that
a serpent, and a fox, and a wolf, and an eagle, and a hawk, were more
beloved by God than the human race? For it follows from his maintaining such
a position, that if these animals be more beloved by God than human beings,
it is manifest that they are dearer to God than Socrates, and Plato, and
Pythagoras, and Pherecydes, and those theologians whose praises he had sung
a little before. And one might address him with the prayer: "If these
animals be dearer to God than men, may you be beloved of God along with
them, and be made like to those whom you consider as dearer to Him than
human beings!" And let no one suppose that such a prayer is meant as an
imprecation; for who would not pray to resemble in all respects those whom
he believes to be dearer to God than others, in order that he, like them,
may enjoy the divine love? And as Celsus is desirous to show that the
assemblies of the irrational animals are more sacred than ours, he ascribes
the statement to that effect not to any ordinary individuals, but to persons
of intelligence. Yet it is the virtuous alone who are truly wise, for no
wicked man is so. He speaks, accordingly, in the following style:
"Intelligent men say that these animals hold assemblies which are more
sacred than ours, and that they know what is spoken at them, and actually
prove that they are not without such knowledge, when they mention beforehand
that the birds have announced their intention of departing to a particular
place, or of doing this thing or that, and then show that they have departed
to the place in question, and have done the particular thing which was
foretold." Now, truly, no person of intelligence ever related such things;
nor did any wise man ever say that the assemblies of the irrational animals
were more sacred than those of men. But if, for the purpose of examining
(the soundness of) his statements, we look to their consequences, it is
evident that, in his opinion, the assemblies of the irrational animals are
more sacred than those of the venerable Pherecydes, and Pythagoras, and
Socrates, and Plato, and of philosophers in general; which assertion is not
only incongruous [3814] in itself, but full of absurdity. In order that
we may believe, however, that certain individuals do learn from the
indistinct sound of birds that they are about to take their departure, and
do this thing or that, and announce these things beforehand, we would say
that this information is imparted to men by demons by means of signs, with
the view of having men deceived by demons, and having their understanding
dragged down from God and heaven to earth, and to places lower still.
Chapter XCVIII.
I do not know, moreover, how Celsus could hear of the elephants' (fidelity
to) oaths, and of their great devotedness to our God, and of the knowledge
which they possess of Him. For I know many wonderful things which are
related of the nature of this animal, and of its gentle disposition. But I
am not aware that any one has spoken of its observance of oaths; unless
indeed to its gentle disposition, and its observance of compacts, so to
speak, when once concluded between it and man, he give the name of keeping
its oath, which statement also in itself is false. For although rarely, yet
sometimes it has been recorded that, after their apparent tameness, they
have broken out against men in the most savage manner, and have committed
murder, and have been on that account condemned to death, because no longer
of any use. And seeing that after this, in order to establish (as he thinks
he does) that the stork is more pious than any human being, he adduces the
accounts which are narrated regarding that creature's display of filial
affection [3815] in bringing food to its parents for their support, we
have to say in reply, that this is done by the storks, not from a regard to
what is proper, nor from reflection, but from a natural instinct; the nature
which formed them being desirous to show an instance among the irrational
animals which might put men to shame, in the matter of exhibiting their
gratitude to their parents. And if Celsus had known how great the difference
is between acting in this way from reason, and from an irrational natural
impulse, he would not have said that storks are more pious than human
beings. But further, Celsus, as still contending for the piety of the
irrational creation, quotes the instance of the Arabian bird the phoenix,
which after many years repairs to Egypt, and bears thither its parent, when
dead and buried in a ball of myrrh, and deposits its body in the Temple of
the Sun. Now this story is indeed recorded, and, if it be true, [3816] it
is possible that it may occur in consequence of some provision of nature;
divine providence freely displaying to human beings, by the differences
which exist among living things, the variety of constitution which prevails
in the world, and which extends even to birds, and in harmony with which He
has brought into existence one creature, the only one of its kind, in order
that by it men may be led to admire, not the creature, but Him who created
it.
Chapter XCIX.
In addition to all that he has already said, Celsus subjoins the following:
"All things, accordingly, were not made for man, any more than they were
made for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but that this world, as being God's
work, might be perfect and entire in all respects. For this reason all
things have been adjusted, not with reference to each other, but with regard
to their bearing upon the whole. [3817] And God takes care of the whole,
and (His) providence will never forsake it; and it does not become worse;
nor does God after a time bring it back to himself; nor is He angry on
account of men any more than on account of apes or flies; nor does He
threaten these beings, each one of which has received its appointed lot in
its proper place." Let us then briefly reply to these statements. I think,
indeed, that I have shown in the preceding pages that all things were
created for man, and every rational being, and that it was chiefly for the
sake of the rational creature that the creation took place. Celsus, indeed,
may say that this was done not more for man than for lions, or the other
creatures which he mentions; but we maintain that the Creator did not form
these things for lions, or eagles, or dolphins, but all for the sake of the
rational creature, and "in order that this world, as being God's work, might
be perfect and complete in all things." For to this sentiment we must yield
our assent as being well said. And God takes care, not, as Celsus supposes,
merely of the whole, but beyond the whole, in a special degree of every
rational being. Nor will Providence ever abandon the whole; for although it
should become more wicked, owing to the sin of the rational being, which is
a portion of the whole, He makes arrangements to purify it, and after a time
to bring back the whole to Himself. Moreover, He is not angry with apes or
flies; but on human beings, as those who have transgressed the laws of
nature, He sends judgments and chastisements, and threatens them by the
mouth of the prophets, and by the Saviour who came to visit the whole human
race, that those who hear the threatenings may be converted by them, while
those who neglect these calls to conversion may deservedly suffer those
punishments which it becomes God, in conformity with that will of His which
acts for the advantage of the whole, to inflict upon those who need such
painful discipline and correction. But as our fourth book has now attained
sufficient dimensions, we shall here terminate our discourse. And may God
grant, through His Son, who is God the Word, and Wisdom, and Truth, and
Righteousness, and everything else which the sacred Scriptures when speaking
of God call Him, that we may make a good beginning of the fifth book, to the
benefit of our readers, and may bring it to a successful conclusion, with
the aid of His word abiding in our soul.
Elucidation.
I
Stated in obscure terms, with advantage, p. 495.
Turn back to the Second Apology of Justin (cap. ix.), "Eternal punishment
not a mere threat; " [3818] also to Clement (Stromata, iv. cap. xxiv.),
"the reason and end of divine punishments." [3819] Now compare
Gieseler [3820] (vol. i. p. 212) for what he so sweepingly asserts. And
on the doctrine of Origen, let me quote a very learned and on such points a
most capable judge, the late erudite and pious half-Gallican Dr. Pusey. He
says:'
"Celsus and Origen are both witnesses that Christians believed in the
eternity of punishment. Celsus, to weaken the force of the argument from the
sufferings which the martyrs underwent sooner than abjure Christianity,
tells Origen that heathen priests taught the same doctrine of eternal
punishment as the Christians, and that the only question was, which was
right. [3821]
"Origen answers, 'I should say that the truth lies with those who are able
to induce their hearers to live as men convinced of the truth of what they
have heard. Jews and Christians have been thus affected by the doctrines
which they hold about the world to come, the rewards of the righteous, and
the punishments of the wicked. Who have been moved in this way, in regard to
eternal punishments, by the teaching of heathen priests and mystagogues? '
"Origen's answer acknowledges that the doctrine of eternal punishment had
been taught to Christians, that One [Christ] had taught it, and that it had
produced the effects He had [in view] in teaching it; viz., to set
Christians to strive with all their might to conquer the sin which produced
it." [3822]
On this most painful subject my natural feelings are much with Canon Farrar;
but, after lifelong application to the subject, I must think Dr. Pusey holds
with his Master, Christ. I feel willing to leave it all with Him who died
for sinners, and the cross shuts my mouth. "Herein is love; "and I cannot
dictate to such love, from my limited mind, and capacity, and knowledge of
His universe. Here let "every thought be brought into captivity to the
obedience of Christ." Let us sacrifice "imaginations and every high thing
that exalteth itself," and leave our Master alike supreme in our affections
and over our intellectual powers. He merits such subjection. Let us preach
His words, and leave Him to explain them when He shall "condemn every tongue
that shall rise against Him in judgment."
Let me also refer to Bledsoe's most solemn and searching reply to John
Foster; also to his answer to Lord Kames's effort to help the Lord out of a
supposed difficulty. [3823] I am sorry that Tillotson exposed himself to
a witty retort by the same author, in these words: "If the Almighty really
undertook to deceive the world for its own good, it is a pity He did not
take the precaution to prevent the archbishop from detecting the cheat,
not suffering his secret to get into the possession of one who has so
indiscreetly published it." The awful importance of the subject, and the
recently awakened interest in its discussion, have led me to enlarge this
annotation.
Footnotes
(Mostly in Greek. You can examine the SOURCE text to see them)
Also, see links to 3500 other Manuscripts:
/believe/txv/earlychs.htm
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