Writings of Alexander. Of the Manichaeans.
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Translated by the Rev. James B. H. Hawkins, M.a., Oxon.
Text edited by Rev. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson and
first published by T&T Clark in Edinburgh in 1867. Additional
introductionary material and notes provided for the American
edition by A. Cleveland Coxe, 1886.
Of the Manichaeans. [2123]
Chapter I.--The Excellence of the Christian Philosophy; The Origin of
Heresies Amongst Christians.
The philosophy of the Christians is termed simple. But it bestows very
great attention to the formation of manners, enigmatically insinuating
words of more certain truth respecting God; the principal of which, so
far as any earnest serious purpose in those matters is concerned, all
will have received when they assume an efficient cause, very noble and
very ancient, as the originator of all things that have existence. For
Christians leaving to ethical students matters more toilsome and
difficult, as, for instance, what is virtue, moral and intellectual;
and to those who employ their time in forming hypotheses respecting
morals, and the passions and affections, without marking out any
element by which each virtue is to be attained, and heaping up, as it
were, at random precepts less subtle--the common people, hearing
these, even as we learn by experience, make great progress in modesty,
and a character of piety is imprinted on their manners, quickening the
moral disposition which from such usages is formed, and leading them
by degrees to the desire of what is honourable and good. [2124]
But this being divided into many questions by the number of those who
come after, there arise many, just as is the case with those who are
devoted to dialectics, [2125] some more skilful than others, and, so
to speak, more sagacious in handling nice and subtle questions; so
that now they come forward as parents and originators of sects and
heresies. And by these the formation of morals is hindered and
rendered obscure; for those do not attain unto certain verity of
discourse who wish to become the heads of the sects, and the common
people is to a greater degree excited to strife and contention. And
there being no rule nor law by which a solution may be obtained of the
things which are called in question, but, as in other matters, this
ambitious rivalry running out into excess, there is nothing to which
it does not cause damage and injury.
Chapter II.--The Age of Manicaeus, or Manes; His First Disciples; The
Two Principles; Manichaean Matter.
So in these matters also, whilst in novelty of opinion each endeavours
to show himself first and superior, they brought this philosophy,
which is simple, almost to a nullity. Such was he whom they call
Manichaeus, [2126] a Persian by race, my instructor in whose doctrine
was one Papus by name, and after him Thomas, and some others followed
them. They say that the man lived when Valerian was emperor, and that
he served under Sapor, the king of the Persians, and having offended
him in some way, was put to death. Some such report of his character
and reputation has come to hie from those who were intimately
acquainted with him. He laid down two principles, God and Matter. God
he called good, and matter he affirmed to be evil. But God excelled
more in good than matter in evil. But he calls matter not that which
Plato calls it, [2127] which becomes everything when it has received
quality and figure, whence he terms it all-embracing--the mother and
nurse of all things; nor what Aristotle [2128] calls an element, with
which form and privation have to do, but something beside these. For
the motion which in individual things is incomposite, this he calls
matter, On the side of God are ranged powers, like handmaids, all
good; and likewise, on the side of matter are ranged other powers, all
evil. Moreover, the bright shining, the light, and the superior, all
these are with God; while the obscure, and the darkness, and the
inferior are with matter. God, too, has desires, but they are all
good; and matter, likewise, which are all evil.
Chapter III.--The Fancies of Manichaeus Concerning Matter.
It came to pass on a time that matter conceived a desire to attain to
the superior region; and when it had arrived there, it admired the
brightness and the light which was with God. And, indeed, it wished to
seize on for itself the place of pre-eminence, and to remove God from
His position. God, moreover, deliberated how to avenge Himself upon
matter, but was destitute of the evil necessary to do so, for evil
does not exist in the house and abode of God. He sent, therefore, the
power which we call the soul into matter, to permeate it entirely. For
it will be the death of matter, when at length hereafter this power is
separated from it. So, therefore, by the providence of God, the soul
was commingled with matter, an unlike thing with an unlike. Now by
this commingling the soul has contracted evil, and labours under the
same infirmity as matter. For, just as in a corrupted vessel, the
contents are oftentimes vitiated in quality, so, also the soul that is
in matter suffers some such change, and is deteriorated from its own
nature so as to participate in the evil of matter. But God had
compassion upon the soul, and sent forth another power, which we call
Demiurge [2129] that is, the Creator of all things; and when this
power had arrived, and taken in hand the creation of the world, it
separated from matter as much power as from the commingling had
contracted no vice and stain, and hence the sun and moon were first
formed; but that which had contracted some slight and moderate stain,
this became the J stars and the expanse of heaven. Of the matter from
which the sun and the moon was separated, part was cast entirely out
of the world, and is that fire in which, indeed, there is the power of
burning, although in itself it is dark and void of light, being
closely similar to night. But in the rest of the elements, both animal
and vegetable, in those the divine power is unequally mingled. And
therefore the world was made, and in it the sun and moon who preside
over the birth and death of things, by separating the divine virtue
from matter, and transmitting it to God.
Chapter IV.--The Moon's Increase and Wane; The Manichaean Trifling
Respecting It; Their Dreams About Man and Christ; Their Foolish System
of Abstinence.
He ordained this, forsooth, to supply to the Demiurge, [2130] or
Creator, another power which might attract to the splendour of the
sun; and the thing is manifest, as one might say, even to a blind
person. For the moon in its increase receives the virtue which is
separated from matter, and during the time of its augmentation comes
forth full of it. But when it is full, in its wanings, it remits it to
the sun, and the sun goes back to God. And when it has done this, it
waits again to receive from another full moon a migration of the soul
to itself, and receiving this in the same way, it suffers it to pass
on to God. And this is its work continually, and in every age. And in
the sun some such image is seen, as is the form of man. And matter
ambitiously strove to make man from itself by mingling together all
its virtue, so that it might have some portion of soul. But his form
contributed much to man's obtaining a greater share, and one beyond
all other animals, in the divine virtue. For he is the image of the
divine virtue, but Christ is the intelligence. Who, when He had at
length come from the superior region, dismissed a very great part of
this virtue to God. And at length being crucified, in this way He
furnished knowledge, and fitted the divine virtue to be crucified in
matter. Because, therefore, it is the Divine will and decree that
matter should perish, they abstain from those things which have life,
and feed upon vegetables, and everything which is void of sense. They
abstain also from marriage and the rites of Venus, and the procreation
of children, that virtue may not strike its root deeper in matter by
the succession of race; nor do they go abroad, seeking to purify
themselves from the stain which virtue has contracted froth its
admixture with matter.
Chapter V.--The Worship of the Sun and Moon Under God; Support Sought
for the Manichaeans in the Grecian Fables; The Authority of the
Scriptures and Faith Despised by the Manichaeans.
These things are the principal of what they say and think. And they
honour very especially the sun and moon, not as gods, but as the way
by which it is possible to attain unto God. But when the divine virtue
has been entirely separated off, they say that the exterior fire will
fall, and burn up both itself and all else that is left of matter.
Those of them who are better educated, and not unacquainted with Greek
literature, instruct us from their own resources. From the ceremonies
and mysteries, for instance: by Bacchus, who was cut out from the
womb, is signified that the divine virtue is divided into matter by
the Titans, as they say; from the poet's fable of the battle with the
Giants, is indicated that not even they were ignorant of the rebellion
of matter against God. I indeed will not deny, that these things are
not sufficient to lead away the minds of those who receive words
without examining them, since the deception caused by discourse of
this sort has drawn over to itself some of those who have pursued the
study of philosophy with me; but in what manner I should approach the
thing to examine into it, I am at a loss indeed. For their hypotheses
do not proceed by any legitimate method, so that one might institute
an examination in accordance with these; neither are there any
principles of demonstrations, so that we may see what follows on
these; but theirs is the rare discovery of those who are simply said
to philosophize. These men, taking to themselves the Old and New
Scriptures, though they lay it down that these are divinely inspired,
draw their own opinions from thence; and then only think they are
refuted, when it happens that anything not in accordance with these is
said or done by them. And what to those who philosophize after the
manner of the Greeks, as respects principles of demonstration, are
intermediate propositions; this, with them, is the voice of the
prophets. But here, all these things being eliminated, and since those
matters, which I before mentioned, are put forward without any
demonstration, and since it is necessary to give an answer in a
rational way, and not to put forward other things more plausible, and
which might prove more enticing, my attempt is rather troublesome, and
on this account the more arduous, because it is necessary to bring
forward arguments of a varied nature. For the more accurate arguments
will escape the observation of those who have been convinced
beforehand by these men without proof, if, when it comes to
persuasion, they fall into the same hands. For they imagine that they
proceed from like sources. There is, therefore, need of much and great
diligence, and truly of God, to be the guide of our argument.
Chapter VI.--The Two Principles of the Manichaeans; Themselves
Controverted; The Pythagorean Opinion Respecting First Principles;
Good and Evil Contrary; The Victory on the Side of Good.
They lay down two principles, God and Matter. If he (Manes) separates
that which comes into being from that which really exists, the
supposition is not so faulty in this, that neither does matter create
itself, nor does it admit two contrary qualities, in being both active
and passive; nor, again, are other such theories proposed concerning
the creative cause as it is not lawful to speak of. And yet God does
not stand in need of matter in order to make things, since in His mind
all things substantially exist, so far as the possibility of their
coming into being is concerned. But if, as he seems rather to mean,
the unordered motion of things really existent under Him is matter,
first, then, he unconsciously sets up another creative cause (and yet
an evil one), nor does he perceive what follows from this, namely,
that if it is necessary that God and matter should be supposed, some
other matter must be supposed to God; so that to each of the creative
causes there should be the subject matter. Therefore, instead of two,
he will be shown to give us four first principles. Wonderful, too, is
the distinction. For if he thinks this to be God, which is good, and
wishes to conceive of something opposite to Him, why does he not, as
some of the Pythagoreans, set evil over against Him? It is more
tolerable, indeed, that two principles should be spoken of by them,
the good and the evil, and that these are continually striving, but
the good prevails. For if the evil were to prevail, all things would
perish. Wherefore matter, by itself, is neither body, nor is it
exactly incorporeal, nor simply any particular thing; but it is
something indefinite, which, by the addition of form, comes to be
defined; as, for instance, fire is a pyramid, air an octahedron, water
an eikosahedron, and earth a cube; how, then, is matter the unordered
motion of the elements? By itself, indeed, it does not subsist, for if
it is motion, it is in that which is moved; but matter does not seem
to be of such a nature, but rather the first subject, and unorganized,
from which other things proceed. Since, therefore, matter is unordered
motion, was it always conjoined with that which is moved, or was it
ever separate from it? For, if it were ever by itself, it would not be
in existence; for there is no motion without something moved. But if
it was always in that which is moved, then, again, there will be two
principles--that which moves, and that which is moved. To which of
these two, then, will it be granted that it subsists as a primary
cause along with God?
Chapter VII.--Motion Vindicated from the Charge of Irregularity;
Circular; Straight; Of Generation and Corruption; Of Alteration, and
Quality Affecting Sense.
There is added to the discourse an appendix quite foreign to it.
[2131] For you may reasonably speak of motion not existing. And what,
also, is the matter of motion? Is it straight or circular? Or does it
take place by a process of change, or by a process of generation and
corruption? The circular motion, indeed, is so orderly and composite,
that it is ascribed to the order of all created things; nor does this,
in the Manichaean system, appear worthy to be impugned, in which move
the sun and the moon, whom alone, of the gods, they say that they
venerate. But as regards that which is straight: to this, also, there
is a bound when it reaches its own place. For that which is earthly
ceases entirely from motion, as soon as it has touched the earth. And
every animal and vegetable makes an end of increasing when it has
reached its limit. Therefore the stoppage of these things would be
more properly the death of matter, than that endless death, which is,
as it were, woven for it by them. But the motion which arises by a
process of generation and corruption it is impossible to think of as
in harmony with this hypothesis, for, according to them, matter is
unbegotten. But if they ascribe to it the motion of alteration, as
they term it, and that by which we suffer change by a quality
affecting the sense, it is worth while to consider how they come to
say this. For this seems to be the principal thing that they assert,
since by matter it comes to pass, as they say, that manners are
changed, and that vice arises in the soul. For in altering, it will
always begin from the beginning; and, proceeding onwards, it will
reach the middle, and thus will it attain unto the end. But when it
has reached the end, it will not stand still, at least if alteration
is its essence. But it will again, by the same route, return to the
beginning, and from thence in like manner to the end; nor will it ever
cease from doing this. As, for instance, if a and g suffer alteration,
and the middle is b, a by being changed, will arrive at b, and from
thence will go on to g. Again returning from the extreme g to b, it
will at some time or other arrive at a; and this goes on continuously.
As in the change from black, the middle is dun, and the extreme,
white. Again, in the contrary direction, from white to dun, and in
like manner to black; and again from white the change begins, and goes
the same round.
Chapter VIII.--Is Matter Wicked? of God and Matter.
Is matter, in respect of alteration, an evil cause? It is thus proved
that it is not more evil than good. For let the beginning of the,
change be from evil. Thus the change is from this to good through that
which is indifferent. But let the alteration be from good. Again the
beginning goes on through that which is indifferent. Whether the
motion be to one extreme or to the other, the method is the same, and
this is abundantly set Forth. All motion has to do with quantity; but
quality is the guide in virtue and vice. Now we know that these two
are generically distinguished. But are God and matter alone
principles, or floes there remain anything else which is the mean
between these two? For it there is nothing, these things remain
unintermingled one with another. And it is well said that if the
extremes are intermingled, there is a necessity for some thing
intermediate to connect them. But if something else exists, it is
necessary that that something be either body or incorporeal, and thus
a third adventitious principle makes its appearance. First, therefore,
if we suppose God and matter to be both entirely incorporeal, so that
neither is in the other, except as the science of grammar is in the
soul; to understand this of God and matter is absurd. But if, as in a
vacuum, as some say, the vacuum is [surrounded by this universe; the
other, again, is without substance, for the substance of a vacuum is
nothing. But if as accidents, first, indeed, this is impossible; for
the thing that wants sub stance cannot be in any place; for substance
is, as it were, the vehicle underlying the accident. But if both are
bodies, it is necessary for both to be either heavy or light, or
middle; or one heavy, and another light, or intermediate. If, then,
both are heavy, it is plainly necessary that these should be the same,
both among light things and those things which are of the middle sort;
or if they alternate, the one will be altogether separate from the
other. For that which is heavy has one place, and that which is middle
another, and the light another. To one belongs the superior, to the
other the inferior, and to the third the middle. Now in every
spherical figure the inferior part is the middle; for from this to all
the higher parts, even to the topmost superficies, the distance is
every way equal, and, again, all heavy bodies are borne from all sides
to it. Wherefore, also, it occurs to me to laugh when I hear that
matter moving without order,--for this belongs to it by nature,--came
to the region of God, or to light and brightness, and such--like. But
if one be body, and the other incorporeal, first, indeed, that which
is body is alone capable of motion And then if they are not
intermingled, each is separate from the other according to its proper
nature. But if one be mixed up with the other, they will be either
mind or soul or accident. For so only it happens that things
incorporeal are mixed up with bodies.
Chapter IX.--The Ridiculous Fancies of the Manichaeans About the
Motion of Matter Towards God; God the Author of the Rebellion of
Matter in the Manichaean Sense; The Longing of Matter for Light and
Brightness Good; Divine Good None the Less for Being Communicated.
But in what manner, and from what cause, was matter brought to the
region of God? for to it by nature belong the lower place and
darkness, as they say; and the upper region and light are contrary to
its nature. Wherefore there is then attributed to it a supernatural
motion; and something of the same sort happens to it, as if a man were
to throw a stone or a lump of earth upwards; in this way, the thing
being raised a little by the force of the person throwing, when it has
reached the upper regions, falls back again into the same place. Who,
then, hath raised matter to the upper region? Of itself, indeed, and
from itself, it would not be moved by that motion which belongs to it.
It is necessary, then, that some force should be applied to it for it
to be borne aloft, as with the stone and the lump of earth. But they
leave nothing else to it but God. It is manifest, therefore, what
follows from their argument. That God, according to them, by force and
necessity, raised matter aloft to Himself. But if matter be evil, its
desires are altogether evil. Now the desire of evil is evil, but the
desire of good is altogether good. Since, then, matter has desired
brightness and light, its desire is not a bad one; just as it is not
bad for a man living in vice, afterwards to come to desire virtue. On
the contrary, he is not guiltless who, being good, coupes to desire
what is evil. As if any one should say that God desires the evils
which are attaching to matter. For the good things of God are not to
be so esteemed as great wealth and large estates, and a large quantity
of gold, a lesser portion of which remain with the owner, if one
effect a transfer of them to another. But if an image of these things
must be formed in the mind, I think one would adduce as examples
wisdom and the sciences. As, therefore, neither wisdom suffers
diminution nor science, and he who is endowed with these experiences
no loss if another lie made partaker of them; so, in the same way, it
is contrary to reason to think that God grudges matter the desire of
what is good; if, indeed, with them we allow that it desires it.
Chapter X.--The Mythology Respecting the Gods; The Dogmas of the
Manchaeans Resemble This: the Homeric Allegory of the Battle of the
Gods; Envy and Emulation Existing; In God According to the Manichaean
Opinion; These Vices are to Be Found in No Good Man, and are to Be
Accounted Disgraceful.
Moreover, they far surpass the mythologists in fables, those, namely,
who either make Coelus suffer mutilation, or idly tell of the plots
laid for Saturn by his son, in order that that son might attain the
sovereignty; or those again who make Saturn devour his sons and to
have been cheated of his purpose by the image of a stone that was
presented to him. For how are these things which they put forward
dissimilar to those? When they speak openly of the war between God and
matter, and say not these things either in a mythological sense, as
Homer in the Iliad; [2132] when he makes Jupiter to rejoice in the
strife and war of the gods with each other, thus obscurely signifying
that the world is formed of unequal elements, fitted one into another,
and either conquering or submitting to a conqueror. And this has been
advanced by me, because I know that people of this sort, when they are
at a loss for demonstration, bring together from all sides passages
from poems, and seek from them a support for their own opinions. Which
would not be the case with them if they had only read what they fell
in with some reflection. But, when all evil is banished from the
company of the gods, surely emulation and envy ought especially to
have been got rid of. Yet these men leave these things with God, when
they say that God formed designs against matter, because it felt a
desire for good. But with which of those things which God possessed
could He have swished to take vengeance on matter? In truth, I think
it to be more accurate doctrine to say that God is of a simple nature,
than what they advance. Nor, indeed, as in the other things, is the
enunciation of this fancy easy. For neither is it possible to
demonstrate it simply and with words merely, but with much instruction
and labour. But we all know this, that anger and rage, and the desire
of revenge upon matter, are passions in him who is so agitated. And of
such a sort, indeed, as it could never happen to a good man to be
harassed by them, much less then can it be that they are connected
with the Absolute Good.
Chapter XI.--The Transmitted Virtue of the Manichaens; The Virtues of
Matter Mixed with Equal or Less Amount of Evil.
To other things, therefore, our discourse has come round about again.
For, because they say that God sent virtue into matter, it is worth
our while to consider whether this virtue, so far as it pertains to
good, in respect of God is less, or whether it is on equal terms with
Him. For if it is less, what is the cause? For the things which are
with God admit of no fellowship with matter. But good alone is the
characteristic of God, and evil alone of matter. But if it is on equal
terms with Him, what is the reason that He, as a king, issues His
commands, and it involuntarily undertakes this labour? Moreover, with
regard to matter, it shall be inquired whether, with respect to evil,
the virtues are alike or less. For if they are less, they are
altogether of less evil. By, fellowship therefore with the good it is
that they become so. For there being two evils, the less has plainly
by its fellowship with the good attained to be what it is. But they
leave nothing good around matter. Again, therefore. another question
arises. For if some other virtue, in respect of evil, excels the
matter which is prevailing, it becomes itself the presiding principle.
For that which is more evil will hold the sway in its own dominion.
Chapter XII.--The Destruction of Evil by the Immission of Virtue
Rejected; Because from It Arises No Diminution of Evil; Zeno's Opinion
Discarded, that the World Will Be Burnt Up by Fire from the Sun.
But that God sent virtue into matter is asserted without any proof,
and it altogether wants probability. Yet it is right that this should
have its own explanation. The reason of this they assert, indeed, to
be that there might be no more evil, but that all things should become
good. It was necessary for virtue to be intermingled with evil, after
the manner of the athletes, who, clasped in a firm embrace, overcome
their adversaries, in order that, by conquering evil, it might make it
to cease to exist. But I think it far more dignified and worthy of the
excellence of God, at the first conception of things existent, to have
abolished matter. But I think they could not allow this, because that
something evil is found existing, which they call matter. But it is
not any the more possible that things should cease to be such as they
are, in order that one should admit that some things are changed into
that which is worse. And it is necessary that there should be some
perception of this, because these present things have in some manner
or other suffered diminution, in order that we might have better hopes
for the future. For well has it been answered to the opinion of Zeno
of Citium, who thus argued that the world would be destroyed by fire:
"Everything which has anything to burn will not cease from burning
until it has consumed the whole; and the sun is a fire, and will it
not burn what it has? "Whence he made out, as he imagined, that the
universe would be destroyed by fire. But to him a facetious fellow is
reported to have said, "But I indeed yesterday, and the year before,
and a long time ago, have seen, and now in like manner do I see, that
no injury has been experienced by the sun; and it is reasonable that
this should happen in time and by degrees, so that we may believe that
at some time or other the whole will be burnt up. And to the doctrine
of Manichaeus, although it rests upon no proof, I think that the same
answer is apposite, namely, that there has been no diminution in the
present condition of things, but what was before in the time of the
first man, when brother killed brother, even now continues to be; the
same wars, and more diverse desires. Now it would be reasonable that
these things, if they did not altogether cease, should at least be
diminished, if we are to imagine that they are at some time to cease.
But while the same things come from them, what is our expectation of
them for the future?
Chapter XIII.--Evil by No Means Found in the Stars and Constellations;
All the Evils of Life Vain in the Manichaean Opinion, Which Bring on
the Extinction of Life; Their Fancy Having Been Above Explained
Concerning the Transportation of Souls from the Moon to the Sun.
But what things does he call evil? As for the sun and moon, indeed,
there is nothing lacking; but with respect to the heavens and the
stars, whether he says that there is some such thing, and what it is,
it is right that we should next in order examine. But irregularity is
according to them evil, and unordered motion, but these things are
always the same, and in the same manner; nor will any one have to
blame any of the planets for venturing to delay at any time in the
zodiac beyond the fixed period; nor again any of the fixed stars, as
if it did not abide in the same seat and position, and did not by
circumvolution revolve equally around the world, moving as it were one
step backward in a hundred years. But on the earth, if he accuses the
roughness of some spots, or if pilots are offended at the storms on
the sea; first, indeed, as they think, these things have a share of
good in them. For should nothing germinate upon earth, all the animals
must presently perish. But this result will send on much of the virtue
which is intermingled with matter to God, and there will be a
necessity for many moons, to accommodate the great multitude that
suddenly approaches. And the same language they hold with respect to
the sea. For it is a piece of unlooked-for luck to perish, in order
that those things which perish may pursue the road which leads most
quickly to God. And the wars which are upon the earth, and the
famines, and everything which tends to the destruction of life, are
held in very great honour by them. For everything which is the cause
of good is to be had in honour. But these things are the cause of
good, because of the destruction which accompanies them, if they
transmit to God the virtue which is separated from those who perish.
Chapter XIV.--Noxious Animals Worshipped by the Egyptians; Man by Arts
an Evil-Doer; Lust and Injustice Corrected by Laws and Discipline;
Contingent and Necessary Things in Which There is No Stain.
And, as it seems, we have been ignorant that the Egyptians rightly
worship the crocodile and the lion and the wolf, because these animals
being stronger than the others devour their prey, and entirely destroy
it; the eagle also and the hawk, because they slaughter the weaker
animals both in the air and upon the earth. But perhaps also,
according to them, man is for this reason held in especial honour,
because most of all, by his subtle inventions and arts, he is wont to
subdue most of the animals. And lest he himself should have no portion
in this good, he becomes the food of others. Again, therefore, those
generations are, in their opinion, absurd, which from a small and
common seed produce what is great; and it is much more becoming, as
they think, that these should be destroyed by God, in order that the
divine virtue may be quickly liberated from the troubles incident to
living in this world. But what shall we say with respect to lust, and
injustice, and things of this sort, Manichaeus will ask. Surely
against these things discipline and law come to the rescue.
Discipline, indeed, using careful forethought that nothing of this
sort may have place amongst men; but law inflicting punishment upon
any one who has been caught in the commission of anything unjust. But,
then, why should it be imputed to the earth as a fault, if the
husbandman has neglected to subdue it? because the sovereignty of God,
which is according to right, suffers diminution, when some parts of it
are productive of fruits, and others not so; or when it has happened
that when the winds are sweeping, according to another cause, some
derive benefit therefrom, whilst others against their will have to
sustain injuries? Surely they must necessarily be ignorant of the
character of the things that are contingent, and of those that are
necessary. For they would not else thus account such things as
prodigies.
Chapter XV.--The Lust and Desire of Sentient Things; Demons; Animals
Sentient; So Also the Sun and the Moon and Stars; The Platonic
Doctrine, Not the Christian.
Whence, then, come pleasure and desire? For these are the principal
evils that they talk of and hate. Nor does matter appear to be
anything else. That these things, indeed, only belong to animals which
are endowed with sense, and that nothing else but that which has sense
perceives desire and pleasure, is manifest. For what perception of
pleasure and pain is there in a plant? What in the earth, water, or
air? And the demons, if indeed they are living beings endowed with
sense, for this reason, perhaps, are delighted with what has been
instituted in; regard to sacrifices, and take it ill when these are
wanting to them; but nothing of this sort can be imagined with respect
to God. Therefore those who say, "Why are animals affected by pleasure
and pain? "should first make the complaint, "Why are these animals
endowed with sense, or why do they stand in need of food? "For if
animals were immortal, they would have been set free from corruption
and increase; such as the sun and moon and stars, although they are
endowed with sense. They are, however, beyond the power of these, and
of such a complaint. But man, being able to perceive and to judge, and
being potentially wise,--for he has the power to become so,--when he
has received what is peculiar to himself, treads it under foot.
Chapter XVI.--Because Some are Wise, Nothing Prevents Others from
Being So; Virtue is to Be Acquired by Diligence and Study; By a
Sounder Philosophy Men are to Be Carried Onwards to the Good; The
Common Study of Virtue Has by Christ Been Opened Up to All.
In general, it is worth while to inquire of these men, "Is it possible
for no man to become good, or is it in the power of any one? "For if
no man is wise, what of Manichaeus himself? I pass over the fact that
he not only calls others good, but he also says that they are able to
make others such. But if one individual is entirely good, what
prevents all from becoming good? For what is possible for one is
possible also for all. I And by the means by which one has become
virtuous, by the same all may become so, unless they assert that the
larger share of this virtue is intercepted by such. Again, therefore,
first, What necessity is there for labour in submitting to discipline
(for even whilst sleeping we may become virtuous), or what cause is
there for these men rousing their hearers to hopes of good? For even
though wallowing in the mire with harlots, they can obtain their
proper good. But if discipline, and better instruction and diligence
in acquiring virtue, make a man to become virtuous, let all become so,
and that oft-repeated phrase of theirs, the unordered motion of
matter, is made void. But it would be much better for them to say that
wisdom is an instrument given by God to man, in order that by bringing
round by degrees to good that which arises to them, from the fact of
their being endowed with sense, out of desire or pleasure, it might
remove from them the absurdities that flow from them. For thus they
themselves who profess to be teachers of virtue would be objects of
emulation for their purpose. and for their mode of life, and there
would be great hopes that one day evils will cease, when all men have
become wise. And this it seems to me that Jesus took into
consideration; add in order that husbandmen, carpenters, builders, and
other artisans, might Bet be driven away from good, He convened a
common council of them altogether, and by simple and easy
conversations He both raised them to a sense of God, and brought them
to desire what was good.
Chapter XVII.--The Manichaean Idea of Virtue in Matter Scouted; If One
Virtue Has Been Created Immaterial, the Rest are Also Immaterial;
Material Virtue an Exploded Notion.
Moreover, how do they say, did God send divine virtue into matter? For
if it always was, and neither is God to be understood as existing
prior to it, nor matter either, then again, according to Manichaeus,
there are three first principles. Perhaps also, a little further on,
there will appear to be many more. But if it be adventitious, and
something which has come into existence afterwards, how is it void of
matter? And if they make it to be a part of God, first, indeed, by
this conception, they, assert that God is composite and corporeal. But
this is absurd, and impossible. And if He fashioned it, and is without
matter, I wonder that they have not considered, neither the man
himself, nor his disciples, that if (as the orthodox say, the things
that come next in order subsist while God remains) God created this
virtue of His own free-will, how is it that He is not the author of
all oilier things that are made without the necessity of any
pre-existent matter? The consequences, in truth, of this opinion are
evidently absurd; but what does follow is put down next in order. Was
it, then, the nature of this virtue to diffuse itself into matter? If
it was contrary to its nature, in what manner is it intermingled with
it? But if this was in accordance with its nature, it was altogether
surely and always with matter. But if this be so, how is it that they
call matter evil, which, from the beginning, was intermingled with the
divine virtue? In what manner, too, will it be destroyed, the divine
virtue which was mingled with it at some thee or other seceding to
itself? For that it preserves safely what is good, and likely to be
productive of some other good to those to whom it is present, is more
reasonable than that it should bring destruction or some other evil
upon them.
Chapter XVIII.--Dissolution and Inherence According to the
Manichaeans; This is Well Put, a.d.Hominem, with Respect to Manes, Who
is Himself in Matter.
This then is the wise assertion which is made by them--namely, that as
we see that the body perishes when the soul is separated from it, so
also, when virtue has left matter, that which is left, which is
matter, will be dissolved and perish. First, indeed, they do not
perceive that nothing existent can be destroyed into a nonexistent.
For that which is non-existent does not exist. But when bodies are
disintegrated, and experience a change, a dissolution of them takes
place; so that a part of them goes to earth, a part to air, and a part
to something else. Besides, they do not remember that their doctrine
is, that matter is unordered motion. But that which moves of itself,
and of which motion is the essence, and not a thing accidentally
belonging to it--how is it reasonable to say that when virtue departs,
that which was, even before virtue descended into it, should cease to
be? Nor do they see the difference, that every body which is devoid of
soul is immoveable. For plants also have a vegetable soul. But motion
tin the assert to itself, and yet unordered motion they be the essence
of matter. But it were better, that just as in a lyre which sounds out
of tune, by the addition of harmony, everything is brought into
concord; so the divine virtue when intermixed with that unordered
motion, which, according to them, is matter, should add a certain
order to it in the place of its innate disorder, land should always
add it suitably to the divine thee. For I ask, how was it that
Manichaeus himself became fitted to treat of these matters, and when
at length did he enunciate them? For they allow that he himself was an
admixture of matter, and of the virtue received into it. Whether
therefore being so, he said these things in unordered motion, surely
the opinion is faulty; or whether he said them by means of the divine
virtue, the dogma is dubious and uncertain; for on the one side, that
of the divine virtue, he participates in the truth; whilst on the side
of unordered motion, he is a partaker in the other part, and changes
to falsehood.
Chapter XIX.--The Second Virtue of the Manichaeans Beset with the
Former, and with New Absurdities; Virtue, Active and Passive, the
Fashioner of Matter, and Concrete with It; Bodies Divided by
Manichaeus into Three Parts.
But if it had been said that divine virtue both hath adorned and does
adorn matter, it would have been far more wisely said, and in a manner
more conducing to conciliate faith in the doctrine and discourses of
Manichaeus. But God hath sent down another virtue. What has been
already said with respect to the former virtue, may be equally said
with respect to this, and all the absurdities which follow on the
teaching about their first virtue, the same may be brought forward in
the present case. But another, who will tolerate? For why did not God
send some one virtue which could effect everything? If the human mind
is so various towards all things, so that the same man is endowed with
a knowledge of geometry, of astronomy, of the carpenter's art, and the
like, is it then impossible for God to find one such virtue which
should be sufficient for him in all respects, so as not to stand in
need of a first and second? And why has one virtue the force rather of
a creator, and another that of the patient and recipient, so as to be
well fitted for admixture with matter. For I do not again see here the
cause of good order, and of that excess which is contrary to it. If it
was evil, it was not in the house of God. For since God is the only
good, and matter the only evil, we must necessarily say that the other
things are of a middle nature, and placed as it were in the middle.
But there is found to be a different framer of those things which are
of a middle nature, when they say that one cause is creative, and
another admixed with matter? Perhaps, therefore, it is that primary
antecedent cause which more recent writers speak of in the book peri`
ton diaphoron. But when the creative virtue took in hand the making of
the world, then they say that there was separated from matter that
which, even in the admixture, remained in its own virtue, and from
this the sire and the moon had their beginning. But that which to a
moderate and slight degree had contracted vice and evil, this formed
the heaven and the constellations. Lastly came the rest encompassed
within these, just as they might happen, which are admixtures of the
divine virtue and of matter.
Chapter XX.--The Divine Virtue in the View of the Same Manichaeus
Corporeal and Divisible; The Divine Virtue Itself Matter Which Becomes
Everything; This is Not Fitting.
I, indeed, besides all these things, wonder that they do not perceive
that they are making the divine virtue to be corporeal, and dividing
it, as it were, into parts. For why, as in the case of matter, is not
the divine virtue also passible and divisible throughout, and from one
of its parts the sun made, and from another the moon? For clearly this
is what they assert to belong to the divine virtue; and this is what
we said was the property of matter, which by itself is nothing, but
when it has received form and qualities, everything is made which is
divided and distinct. If, therefore, as from one subject, the divine
virtue, only the sun and the moon have their beginning, and these
things are different, why was anything else made? But if all things
are made, what follows is manifest, that divine virtue is matter, and
that, too, such as is made into forms. But if nothing else but the sun
and moon are what was created by the divine virtue, then what is
intermixed with all things is the sun and moon; and each of the stars
is the sun and moon, and each individual animal of. those who live on
land, and of fowls, and of creatures amphibious. But this, not even
those who exhibit juggling tricks would admit, as, I think, is evident
to every one.
Chap XXI.--Some Portions of the Virtue Have Good in Them, Others More
Good; In the Sun and the Moon It is Incorrupt, in Other Things
Depraved; An Improbable Opinion.
But if any one were to apply his mind to what follows, the road would
not appear to be plain and straightforward, but more arduous even than
that which has been passed. For they say that the sun and moon have
contracted no stain from their admixture with matter. And now they
cannot say how other things have become deteriorated contrary to their
own proper nature. For if, when it was absolute and by itself, the
divine virtue was so constituted that one portion of it was good, and
another had a greater amount of goodness in it, according to the old
tale of the centaurs, who as far as the breast were men, and in the
lower part horses, which are both good animals, but the man is the
better of the two; so also, in the divine virtue, it is to be
understood that the one portion of it is the better and the more
excellent, and the other will occupy the second and inferior place.
And in the same way, with respect to matter, the one portion
possesses, as it were, an excess of evil; while others again are
different, and about that other the language will be different.
[2133] For it is possible to conceive that from the beginning the sun
and moon, by a more skilful and prudent judgment, chose for themselves
the parts of matter that were less evil for the purposes of add
mixture, that they might remain in their own perfection and virtue;
but in the lapse of thee, when the evils lost their force and became
old, they brought out so much of the excess in the good, while the
rest of its parts fell away, not, indeed, without foresight, and yet
not with the same foresight, did each object share according to its
quantity in the evil that was in matter. But since, with respect to
this virtue, nothing of a different kind is asserted by them, but it
is to be understood throughout to be alike and of the same nature,
their argument is improbable; because in the admixture part remains
pure and incorrupt, while the other has contracted some share of evil.
Chapter XXII.--The Light of the Moon from the Sun; The Inconvenience
of the Opinion that Souls are Received in It; The Two Deluges of the
Greeks.
Now, they say that the sun and the moon having by degrees separated
the divine virtue from matter, transmit it to God. But if they had
only to a slight degree frequented the schools of the astronomers, it
would not have happened to them to fall into these fancies, nor would
they have been ignorant that the moon, which, according to the opinion
of some, is itself without light, receives its light from the sun, and
that its configurations are just in proportion to its distance from
the sun, and that it is then full moon when it is distant from the sun
one hundred and eighty degrees. It is in conjunction when it is in the
same degree with the sun. Then, is it not wonderful how it comes to
pass that there should be so many souls, and from such diverse
creatures? For there is the soul of the world itself, and of the
animals, of plants, of nymphs, and demons, and amongst these are
distinguished by appearance those of fowls, of land animals, and
animals amphibious; but in the moon one like body is always seen by
us. And what of the continuity of this body? When the moon is
half-full, it appears a semicircle, and when it is in its third
quarter, the same again. How then, and with what figure, are they
assumed into the moon? For if it be light as fire, it is probable that
they would not only ascend as far as the moon, but even higher,
continually; but if it be heavy, it would not be possible for them at
all to reach the moon. And what is the reason that that which first
arrives at the moon is not immediately transmitted to the sun, but
waits for the full moon until the rest of the souls arrive? When then
the moon, from having been full, decreases, where does the virtue
remain during that thee? until the moon, which has been emptied of the
former souls, just as a desolated city, shall receive again a fresh
colony. For a treasure-house should have been marked out in some part
of the earth, or of the clouds, or in some other place, where the
congregated souls might stand ready for emigration to the moon. But,
again, a second question arises. What then is the cause that it is not
full immediately? or why does it again wait fifteen days? Nor is this
less to be wondered at than that which has been said, that never
within the memory of man has the moon become full after the fifteen
days. Nay, not even--in the thee of the deluge of Deucalion, nor in
that of Phoroneus, when all things, so to speak, which were upon the
face of the earth perished, and it happened that a great quantity of
virtue was separated from matter. And, besides these things, one must
consider the productiveness of generations, and their barrenness, and
also the destruction of them; and since these things do not happen in
order, neither ought the order of the full moon, nor the these of the
waning moon, to be so carefully observed.
Chapter XXIII.--The Image of Matter in the Sun, After Which Man is
Formed; Trifling Fancies; It is a Mere Fancy, Too, that Man. Is Formed
from Matter; Man is Either a. Composite Being, or a Soul, or Mind and
Understanding.
Neither is this to be regarded with slight attention. For if the
divine virtue which is in matter be infinite, those things cannot
diminish it which the sun and moon fashion. For that which remains
from that finite thing which has been assumed is infinite. But if it
is finite, it would be perceived by the senses in intervals
proportionate to the amount of its virtue that had been subtracted
from the world. But all things remain as they were. Now what
understanding do these things not transcend in their incredibleness,
when they assert that man was created and formed after the image of
matter that is seen in the sun? For images are the forms of their
archetypes. But if they include man's image in the sun, where is the
exemplar after which his image is formed? For, indeed, they are not
going to say that man is really man, or divine virtue; for this,
indeed, they mix up with matter, And they say that the image is seen
in the sun, which, as they think, was formed afterwards from the
secretion of matter. Neither can they bring forward the creative cause
of all things, for this they say was sent to preserve safety to the
divine virtue: so that, in their opinion, this must be altogether
ascribed to the sun; for this reason, doubtless, that it happens by
his arrival and presence that the sun and moon are separated from
matter.
Moreover, they assert that the image is seen in the star; but they say
that matter fashioned man. In what manner, and by what means? For it
is not possible that this should fashion him. For besides that, thus
according to them, man is the empty form of an empty form, and having
no real existence, it has not as yet been possible to conceive how man
can be the product of matter. For the use of reason and sense belongs
not to that matter which they assume. Now what, according to them, is
man? Is he a mixture of soul and body? Or another thing, or that which
is superior to the entire soul, the mind? But if he is mind, how can
the more perfect and the better part be the product of that which is
worse; or if he be soul (for this they say is divine virtue), how can
they, when they have taken away from God the divine virtue, subject
this to the creating workmanship of matter? Put if they leave to him
body alone, let them remember again that it is by itself immovable,
and that they say that the essence of matter is motion. Neither do
they think that anything of itself, and its own genius, is attracted
to matter. Nor is it reasonable to lay it down, that what is composed
of these things is the product of this. To think, indeed, that that
which is fashioned by any one is inferior to its fashioner seems to be
beyond controversy. For thus the world is inferior to its Creator or
Fashioner, and the works of art inferior to the artificer. If then
than be the product of matter, he must surely be inferior to it. Now,
men leave nothing inferior to matter; and it is not reasonable that
the divine virtue should be commingled with matter, and with that
which is inferior to it. But the things which they assert out of
indulgence, as it were, and by way of dispensation, these they do not
seem to understand. For what is the reason of their thinking that
matter has bound the image of God to the substance of man? Or, why is
not the image sufficient, as in a mirror, that than should appear? Or,
as the sun himself is sufficient for the origination and destruction
of all things that are made, hath he imitated an image in the work of
their creation? With which of those things which he possessed? Was it
with the divine virtue which was mingled with it, so that the divine
virtue should have the office of an instrument in respect of matter?
Is it by unordered motion that he will thus give matter a form? But
all like things, in exquisite and accurate order, by imitating, attain
their end. For they do not suppose that a house, or a ship, or any
other product of art, is effected by disorder; nor a statue which art
has fashioned to imitate man.
Chapter XXIV.--Christ is Mind, According to the Manichaeans; What is
He in the View of the Church? Incongruity in Their Idea of Christ;
That He Suffered Only in Appearance, a Dream of the Manichaeans;
Nothing is Attributed to the Word by Way of Fiction.
Christ, too, they do not acknowledge; yet they speak of Christ, but
they take some other element, and giving to the Word, designating His
sacred person, some other signification than that in which it is
rightly received, they say that He is mind. But if, when they speak of
Him as that which is known, and that which knows, and wisdom as having
the same meaning, they are found to agree with those things which the
Church doctors say of Him, how comes it then that they reject all that
is called ancient history? But let us see whether they make Him to be
something adventitious and new, and which has come on from without,
and by accident, as the opinion of some is. For they who hold this
opinion say, as seems very plausible, that the seventh year, when the
powers of perception became distinct, He made His entrance into the
body. But if Christ be mind, as they imagine, then will He be both
Christ and not Christ. For before that mind and sense entered, He was
not. But if Christ, as they will have it, be mind, then into Him
already existing does the mind make its entrance, and thus, again,
according to their opinion, will it be mind. Christ, therefore, is and
is not at the same time. But if, according to the more approved sect
of them, mind is all things which are, since they assume matter to be
not produced, and coeval so to speak with God, this first mind and
matter they hold to be Christ; if, indeed, Christ be the mind, which
is all things, and matter is one of those things which are, and is
itself not produced.
They say it was by way of appearance, and in this manner, that the
divine virtue in matter was affixed to the cross; and that He Himself
did not undergo this punishment, since it was impossible that He
should suffer this; which assertion Manichaeus himself has taken in
hand to teach in a book written upon the subject, that the divine
virtue was enclosed in matter, and again departs from it. the mode of
this they invent. That it should be said, indeed, in the doctrine of
the Church, that He gave Himself up for the remission of sins, obtains
credit from the vulgar, and appears likewise in the Greek histories,
which say that some "surrendered themselves to death in order to
ensure safety to their countrymen." And of this doctrine the Jewish
history has an example, which prepares the son of Abraham as a
sacrifice to God. [2134] But to subject Christ to His passion merely
for the sake of display, betrays great ignorance, for the Word is
God's representative, to teach and inform us of actual verities.
Chapter XXV.--The Manichaean Abstinence from Living Things Ridiculous;
Their Madness in Abhorring Marriage; The Mythology of the Giants; Too
Allegorical an Exposition.
They abstain also from living things. If, indeed, the reason of their
abstinence were other than it is, it ought not to be too curiously
investigated. But if they do so for this reason, that the divine
virtue is more or less absent or present to them, this their meaning
is ridiculous. For if plants be more material, how is it in accordance
with reason to use that which is inferior for food and sustenance? or,
if there be more of the divine virtue in them, how are things of this
sort useful as food, when the soul's faculty of nourishing and making
increase is more corporeal? Now in that they abstain from marriage and
the rites of Venus, fearing lest by the succession of the race the
divine virtue should dwell more in matter. I wonder how in thinking so
they allow of themselves? For if neither the providence of God
suffices, both by generations and by those things which are always and
in the same manner existent, to separate off the divine virtue from
matter, what can the cunning and subtlety of Manichaeus effect for
that purpose? For assuredly by no giant's co-operation does assistance
come to God, in order by the removal of generations to make the
retreat of the divine virtue from matter quick and speedy. But what
the poets say about the giants is manifestly a fable. For those who
lay it down about these, bring forward such matters in allegories, by
a species of fable hiding the majesty of their discourse; as, for
instance, when the Jewish history relates that angels came down to
hold [2135] intercourse with the daughters of men; for this saying
signifies that the nutritive powers of the soul descended from heaven
to earth. But the poets who say that they, when they had emerged in
full armour from the earth, perished immediately after they stirred up
rebellion against the gods, in order that they might insinuate the
frail and quickly-perishing constitution of the body, adorn their
poetry in this way for the sake of refreshing the soul by the
strangeness of the occurrence. But these, understanding nothing of all
this, wheresoever they can get hold of a paralogism from whatsoever
quarter it comes, greedily seize on it as a God-send, and strive with
all their arts to overturn truth by any means.
Chapter XXVI.--The Much-Talked-of Fire of the Manichaeans; That Fire
Matter Itself.
That fire, endowed indeed with the power of burning, yet possessing no
light, which is outside the world, in what region has it place? For if
it is in the world, why does the world hitherto continue safe? For if
at some thee or other it is to destroy it, by approaching it, now also
it is conjoined with it. But if it be apart from it, as it were on
high in its own region, what will hereafter happen to make it descend
upon the world? Or in what way will it leave its own place, and by
what necessity and violence? And what substance of fire can be
conceived without fuel, and how can what is moist serve as fuel to it,
unless what is rather physiologically said about this does not fall
within the province of our present disquisition? But this is quite
manifest from what has been said. For the fire existing outside the
world is just that which they call matter, since the sun and the moon,
being the purest of the pure, by their divine virtue, are separate and
distinct from that fire, no part of them being left in it. This fire
is matter itself, absolutely and per se, entirely removed from all
admixture with the divine virtue. Wherefore when the world has been
emptied of all the divine virtue which is opposed to it, and again a
fire of this sort shall be left remaining, how then shall the fire
either destroy anything, or be consumed by it? For, from that which is
like, I do not see in what way corruption is to take place. For what
matter will become when the divine virtue has been separated from it,
this it was before that the divine virtue was corn-mingled with it. If
indeed matter is to perish when it is bereft of the divine virtue, why
did it not perish before it came in contact with the divine virtue, or
any creative energy? Was it in order that matter might successively
perish, and do this ad infinitum? And what is the use of this? For
that which had not place from the first volition, how shall this have
place from one following? or what reason is there for God to put off
things which, not even in the case of a man, appears to be well? For
as regards those who deliberate about what is impossible, this is said
to happen to them, that they do not wish for that which is possible.
But if nothing else, they speak of God transcending substance, and
bring Him forward as some new material, and that not such as
intelligent men always think to be joined with Him, but that which
investigation discovers either to be not existing at all, or to be the
extreme of all things, and which can with difficulty be conceived of
by the human mind. For this fire, devoid of light, is it of more force
than matter, which is to be left desolate by divine virtue, or is it
of less? And if it is of less, how will it overcome that which is of
more? but if it is of more, it will be able to bring it back to
itself, being of the same nature; yet will it not destroy it, as
neither does the Nile swallow up the streams that are divided off from
it.
Elucidations.
If anything could be more dreary than the Manichaean heresy itself, it
may be questioned whether it be not the various views that have been
entertained concerning our author. I have often remarked the
condensation of valuable information given by Dr. Murdock in his notes
upon Mosheim, but he fails to get in the half that needs to be
noted. [2136] He tells us that "Alexander of Lycopolis flourished
probably about a.d. 350." He adds, "Fabricius supposes that he was
first a Pagan and a Manichee, and afterwards a Catholic Christian.
Cave is of the same opinion. Beausobre thinks he was a mere pagan.
[2137] Lardner thinks he was a Gentile, but well acquainted with the
Manichees and other Christians, [2138] and that he had some
knowledge of the Old and New Testaments, to which he occasionally
refers. He speaks with respect of Christ and the Christian philosophy,
and appears to have been "a learned and candid man." Of an eminent
Christian bishop, all this seems very puzzling; and I feel it a sort
of duty to the youthful student to give the statements of the learned
Lardner in an abridged form, with such references to the preceding
pages as may serve in place of a series of elucidations.
According to this invaluable critic, the learned are not able to agree
concerning Alexander. Some think he was a Christian, others believe
that he was a heathen. Fabricius, who places him in the fourth
century, holds to this latter opinion; [2139] all which agrees with
our Cave. [2140] Photius makes him Archbishop of Nicopolis. [2141]
Tillemont thinks [2142] he was a pagan philosopher, who wrote to
persuade his friends to prefer "the doctrine of the churches" to that
of Manes. Combefis, his editor, [2143] thinks him very ancient,
because he appears to have learned the principles of this heresy from
the immediate disciples of the heretic. Beausobre, [2144] the
standard authority, is of like opinion, and Mosheim approves his
reasoning.
Nothing in his work, according to Lardner, proves that our author
wrote near the beginning of the fourth century, and he decides upon
the middle of that century as his epoch.
Alexander gives a very honourable character to the genuine Christian
philosophy, and asserts its adaptation to the common people, and,
indeed, to all sorts of men. [2145] He certainly is not mute as to
Christ. His tribute to the Saviour is, if not affectionate, yet a just
award to Him. [2146] By the "council of all together," he intends
the College of the Apostles, [2147] made up of fishermen and
publicans and tent-makers, in which he sees a design of the blessed
Jesus to meet this class, and, in short, all classes. It is clear
enough that Alexander has some knowledge of Christ, some knowledge of
the received doctrine of the churches, [2148] or orthodox
Christians; and he appears to blame the Manichees for not receiving
the Scripture of the Old Testament. [2149]
He argues against their absurd opinion that Christ was "Mind;"
[2150] also that, though crucified, He did not suffer: [2151] and he
affirms [2152] that it would be more reasonable to say, agreeably to
the ecclesiastical doctrine, that "He gave Himself for the remission
of sins." He refers to the sacrifice of Isaac, [2153] and to the
story of Cain and Abel; [2154] also to the mysterious subject of the
angels and the daughters of men. [2155] Like an Alexandrian
theologian, he expounds this, however, against the literal sense, as
an allegory.
My reader will be somewhat amused with the terse summing-up of
Lardner: "I am rather inclined to think he was a Gentile.... He was
evidently a learned and rational man. His observations concerning the
Christian philosophy deserve particular notice. To me this work of
Alexander appears very curious."
Footnotes
[2123] A treatise on their tenets by Alexander of Lycopolis, who first
turned from paganism to the Manichaean opinions.
[2124] [Note the practical character of Christian ethics, which he so
justly contrasts with the ethical philosophy of the heathen. This has
been finely pointed out by the truly illustrious William Wilberforce
in his Practical View, cap. ii. (Latin note), p. 25, ed. London,
1815.]
[2125] en tois eristikois. The philosophers of the Megarean school,
who were devoted to dialectics, were nicknamed hoi 'Eistikoi'. See
Diog. Laertius.
[2126] Manes, or Manichaeus, lived about A.D. 240. He was a Persian by
birth, and this accounts for the Parseeism which can be detected in
his teaching. He was probably ordained a priest, but was afterwards
expelled from the Christian community, and put to death by the Persian
government. His tenets spread considerably, and were in early youth
embraced by St. Augustine. [See Confess., iii. 6.]
[2127] Plato, Timaeus, 51.
[2128] In substance, but not in words, Aristotle, Met., Book A 4
(1070´ b).
[2129] demiourgo`s.
[2130] demiourgo`s.
[2131] to` atakton.
[2132] 0 Hom., Il., xx. 23-54.
[2133] This passage and the following sentences are corrupt.
Possibly something is wanting.--Tr.
[2134] Gen.. xxii. 1.
[2135] Gen. vi. 2.
[2136] Mosheim, E. H., vol. i. p 383, note 5, Murdock's edition,
New York, 1844. His references to Lardner in this case do not accord
with my copy.
[2137] Histoire des Manichéens (Lardner's reference), pp. 236-237.
[2138] Credib., vol. vii. p. 574, ed. London, 1829.
[2139] Lardner's reference is: Bib. G., lib. v. c. 1, tom. 5, p.
290.
[2140] Long extract from Cave ubi supra. He quotes the Latin of
Cave's Diss. on Writers of Uncertain Date.
[2141] Lardner's reference is to Photius, Contra Manich., i. cap.
11.
[2142] 0 Lardner quotes from the Hist. des Manich., art. 16.,
Memoires, etc., tom. iv.
[2143] Reference defective. See Lardner, Credib., vol. iii. 269.
Here will be found (p. 252) a learned examination of Archelaus, and
what amounts to a treatise on these Manichaeans.
[2144] For Beausobre's summary of Alexander's deficiencies, see
condensed statement in Lardner, vol. iii. p. 575.
[2145] Cap. i. p. 241, supra. A beautiful exordium. A recent
writer, speaking of Potamiaena and Herais, virgin martyrs, and
catechumens of Origen, remarks, that "the number of young women of
high character who appreciated the teachings of this great master,
many of whom were employed as copyists of his works, is creditable to
the state of Christian society at that period " (Mahan, Church Hist.,
p. 237). It was to avoid scandal as well as temptation in his
relations with these that he fell into his heroic mistake.
[2146] Cap. xxiv. p. 251, supra. Who can imagine that the author of
this chapter is not a Christian? Observe what he says of "the Word."
[2147] Cap. xvi. p. 247.
[2148] Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2149] Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2150] Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2151] Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2152] 0 Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2153] Cap. xxiv. p. 251.
[2154] Note the reference to the Old and New Testaments entire, p.
243, supra
[2155] Cap. xxv. p. 252, supra
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