Writings of Augustine. On Two Souls, Against the Manichæans.
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St. Augustin,
On Two Souls, Against the Manichæans.
[de duabus animabus contra manichæos].
A.D. 391. [190]
translated by Albert H. Newman, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Church History and Comparative Religion, in Toronto
Baptist (Theological) College, Toronto, Canada.
Published in 1886 by Philip Schaff,
New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co.
One Book.
Chapter 1.--By What Course of Reasoning the Error of the Manichæans
Concerning Two Souls, One of Which is Not from God, is Refuted. Every
Soul, Inasmuch as It is a Certain Life, Can Have Its Existence Only
from God the Source of Life.
1. Through the assisting mercy of God, the snares of the Manichæans
having been broken to pieces and left behind, having been restored at
length to the bosom of the Catholic Church, I am disposed now at least
to consider and to deplore my recent wretchedness. For there were
many things that I ought to have done to prevent the seeds of the most
true religion wholesomely implanted in me from boyhood, from being
banished from my mind, having been uprooted by the error and fraud of
false and deceitful men. For, in the first place, if I had soberly
and diligently considered, with prayerful and pious mind, those two
kinds of souls to which they attributed natures and properties so
distinct that they wished one to be regarded as of the very substance
of God, but were not even willing that God should be accepted as the
author of the other; perhaps it would have appeared to me, intent on
learning, that there is no life whatsoever, which, by the very fact of
its being life and in so far as it is life at all, does not pertain to
the supreme source and beginning of life, [191] which we must
acknowledge to be nothing else than the supreme and only and true
God. Wherefore there is no reason why we should not confess, that
those souls which the Manichæans call evil are either devoid of life
and so not souls, neither will anything positively or negatively,
neither follow after nor flee from anything; or, if they live so that
they can be souls, and act as the Manichæans suppose, in no way do
they live unless by life, and if it be an established fact, as it is,
that Christ has said: "I am the life," [192] that all souls seeing
that they cannot be souls except by living were created and fashioned
by Christ, that is, by the Life.
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Footnotes
[190] Scarcely any one of his earlier treatises was more
unsatisfactory to Augustin in his later Anti-Pelagian years than that
Concerning Two Souls. In his Retractations, Book I., chapter xv., he
recognizes the rashness of some of his statements and points out the
sense in which they are tenable or the reverse. As regards the
occasion of the writing, the following may be quoted: "After this
book [De Utilitate Credendi] I wrote, while still a presbyter, against
the Manichæans Concerning Two Souls, of which they say that one part
is of God, the other from the race of darkness, which God did not
found, and which is coeternal with God, and they rave about both these
souls, the one good, the other evil, being in one man, saying forsooth
that the evil soul on the one hand belongs to the flesh, which flesh
also they say is of the race of darkness; but that the good soul is
from the part of God that came forth, combated the race of darkness,
and mingled with the latter; and they attribute all good things in man
to that good soul, and all evil things to that evil soul."--A.H.N.]
[191] In his Retractations, Augustin explains this proposition as
follows: "I said this in the sense in which the creature is known to
pertain to the Creator, but not in the sense that it is of Him, so as
to be regarded as part of Him."--A.H.N.
[192] John xiv. 6.
Chapter 2.--If the Light that is Perceived by Sense Has God for Its
Author, as the Manichæans Acknowledge, Much More The Soul Which is
Perceived by Intellect Alone.
2. But if at that time [193] my thought was not able to bear and
sustain the question concerning life and partaking of life, which is
truly a great question, and one that requires much calm discussion
among the learned, I might perchance have had power to discover that
which to every man considering himself, without a study of the
individual parts, is perfectly evident, namely, that everything we are
said to know and to understand, we comprehend either by bodily sense
or by mental operation. That the five bodily senses are commonly
enumerated as sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, than all of which
intellect is immeasurably more noble and excellent, who would have
been so ungrateful and impious as not to concede to me; which being
established and confirmed, we should have seen how it follows, that
whatsoever things are perceived by touch or sight or in any bodily
manner at all, are by so much inferior to those things that we
comprehend intellectually as the senses are inferior to the
intellect. Wherefore, since all life, and so every soul, can be
perceived by no bodily sense, but by the intellect alone, whereas
while yonder sun and moon and every luminary that is beheld by these
mortal eyes, the Manichæans themselves also say must be attributed to
the true and good God, it is the height of madness to claim that that
belongs to God which we observe bodily; but, on the other hand, to
think that what we receive not only by the mind, but by the highest
form of mind, [194] namely, reason and intellect, [195] that is life,
whatsoever it may be called, nevertheless life, should be deprived and
bereft of the same God as its author. For if having invoked God, I
had asked myself what living is, how inscrutable it is to every bodily
sense, how absolutely incorporeal it is, could not I have answered?
Or would not the Manichæans also confess not only that the souls they
detest live, but that they live also immortally? and that Christ's
saying: "Send the dead to bury their dead," [196] was uttered not
with reference to those not living at all, but with reference to
sinners, which is the only death of the immortal soul; as when Paul
writes: "The widow that giveth herself to pleasure is dead while she
liveth," [197] he says that she at the same time is dead, and alive.
Wherefore I should have directed attention not to the great degree of
contamination in which the sinful soul lives, but only to the fact
itself that it lives. But if I cannot perceive except by an act of
intelligence, I believe it would have come into the mind, that by as
much as any mind whatever is to be preferred to the light which we see
through these eyes, by so much we should give to intellect the
preference over the eyes themselves.
Footnotes
[193] It will aid the reader in following the thread of Augustin's
argument, if he will bear in mind that throughout this treatise the
writer considers the points of antagonism between Manichæism and
Catholicism from the point of view of his early entanglement in
Manichæan error. Considering the opportunities that he had for
knowing the truth, the helps to have been expected from God in answer
to prayer, the capacities of the unperverted intellect to arrive at
truth, he inquires how he should have guarded himself from the
insinuation of Manichæan error, how he should have defended the truth,
and how he should have been the means of liberating others.--A.H.N.
[194] Sublimitate animi.
[195] Mente atque intelligentia.
[196] Matt. viii. 22.
[197] 1 Tim. v. 6.
Chapter 3.--How It is Proved that Every Body Also is from God. That
the Soul Which is Called Evil by the Manichæans is Better Than Light.
They also affirm that the light is from the Father of Christ: should
I then have doubted that every soul is from Him? But not even then,
as a man forsooth so inexperienced and so youthful as I was, should I
have been in doubt as to the derivation not only of the soul, but also
of the body, nay of everything whatsoever, from Him, if I had
reverently and cautiously reflected on what form is, or what has been
formed, what shape is and what has been endued with shape.
3. But not to speak at present concerning the body, I lament
concerning the soul, concerning spontaneous and vivid movement,
concerning action, concerning life, concerning immortality; in fine, I
lament that I, miserable, should have believed that anything could
have all these properties apart from the goodness of God, which
properties, great as they are, I sadly neglected to consider; this I
think, should be to me a matter of groaning and of weeping. I should
have inwardly pondered these things, I should have discussed them with
myself, I should have referred them to others, I should have
propounded the inquiry, what the power of knowing is, seeing there is
nothing in man that we can compare to this excellency? And as men, if
only they had been men, would have granted me this, I should have
inquired whether seeing with these eyes is knowing? In case they had
answered negatively, I should first have concluded, that mental
intelligence is vastly inferior to ocular sensation; then I should
have added, that what we perceive by means of a better thing must
needs be judged to be itself better. Who would not grant this? I
should have gone on to inquire, whether that soul which they call evil
is an object of ocular sensation or of mental intelligence? They
would have acknowledged that the latter is the case. All which things
having been agreed upon and confirmed between us, I should have shown
how it follows, that that soul forsooth which they execrate, is better
than that light which they venerate, since the former is an object of
mental knowledge, the latter an object of corporeal sense perception.
But here perhaps they would have halted, and would have refused to
follow the lead of reason, so great is the power of inveterate opinion
and of falsehood long defended and believed. But I should have
pressed yet more upon them halting, not harshly, not in puerile
fashion, not obstinately; I should have repeated the things that had
been conceded, and have shown how they must be conceded. I should
have exhorted that they consult in common, that they may see clearly
what must be denied to us; whether they think it false that
intellectual perception is to be preferred to these carnal organs of
sight, or that what is known by means of the excellency of the mind is
more excellent than what is known by vile corporeal sensation; whether
they would be unwilling to confess that those souls which they think
heterogenous, can be known only by intellectual perception, that is,
by the excellency itself of the mind; whether they would wish to deny
that the sun and the moon are made known to us only by means of these
eyes. But if they had replied that no one of these things could be
denied otherwise than most absurdly and most impudently, I should have
urged that they ought not to doubt but that the light whose worthiness
of worship they proclaim, is viler than that soul which they admonish
men to flee.
Chapter 4.--Even the Soul of a Fly is More Excellent Than the Light.
4. And here, if perchance in their confusion they had inquired of me
whether I thought that the soul even of a fly [198] surpasses that
light, I should have replied, yes, nor should it have troubled me that
the fly is little, but it should have confirmed me that it is alive.
For it is inquired, what causes those members so diminutive to grow,
what leads so minute a body here and there according to its natural
appetite, what moves its feet in numerical order when it is running,
what regulates and gives vibration to its wings when flying? This
thing whatever it is in so small a creature towers up so prominently
to one well considering, that it excels any lightning flashing upon
the eyes.
Footnotes
[198] Neither Augustin nor the Manichæans seem to have recognized the
distinction in kind between the human soul and animal life.--A.H.N.
Chapter 5.--How Vicious Souls, However Worthy of Condemnation They May
Be, Excel the Light Which is Praiseworthy in Its Kind.
Certainly nobody doubts that whatever is an object of intellectual
perception, by virtue of divine laws surpasses in excellence every
sensible object and consequently also this light. For what, I ask, do
we perceive by thought, if not that it is one thing to know with the
mind, and another thing to experience bodily sensations, and that the
former is incomparably more sublime than the latter, and so that
intelligible things must needs be preferred to sensible things, since
the intellect itself is so highly exalted above the senses?
5. Hence this also I should perchance have known, which manifestly
follows, since injustice and intemperance and other vices of the mind
are not objects of sense, but of intellect, how it comes about that
these too which we detest and consider condemnable, yet in as much as
they are objects of intellect, can outrank this light however
praiseworthy it may be in its kind. For it is borne in upon the mind
subjecting itself well to God, that, first of all, not everything that
we praise is to be preferred to everything that we find fault with.
For in praising the purest lead, I do not therefore put a higher value
upon it than upon the gold that I find fault with. For everything
must be considered in its kind. I disapprove of a lawyer ignorant of
many statutes, yet I so prefer him to the most approved tailor, that I
should think him incomparably superior. But I praise the tailor
because he is thoroughly skilled in his own craft, while I rightly
blame the lawyer because he imperfectly fulfills the functions of his
profession. Wherefore I should have found out that the light which in
its own kind is perfect, is rightly to be praised; yet because it is
included in the number of sensible things, which class must needs
yield to the class of intelligible things, it must be ranked below
unjust and intemperate souls, since these are intelligible; although
we may without injustice judge these to be most worthy of
condemnation. For in the case of these we ask that they be reconciled
to God, not that they be preferred to that lightning. Wherefore, if
any one had contended that this luminary is from God, I should not
have opposed; but rather I should have said, that souls, even vicious
ones, not in so far as they are vicious, but in so far as they are
souls, must be acknowledged to be creatures of God.
Chapter 6.--Whether Even Vices Themselves as Objects of Intellectual
Apprehension are to Be Preferred to Light as an Object of Sense
Perception, and are to Be Attributed to God as Their Author. Vice of
the Mind and Certain Defects are Not Rightly to Be Counted Among
Intelligible Things. Defects Themselves Even If They Should Be
Counted Among Intelligible Things Should Never Be Put Before Sensible
Things. If Light is Visible by God, Much More is the Soul, Even If
Vicious, Which in So Far as It Lives is an Intelligible Thing.
Passages of Scripture are Adduced by the Manichæans to the Contrary.
At this point, in case some one of them, cautious and watchful, now
also more studious than pertinacious, had admonished me that the
inquiry is not about vicious souls but about vices themselves, which,
seeing that they are not known by corporeal sense, and yet are known,
can only be received as objects of intellectual apprehension, which if
they excel all objects of sense, why can we not agree in attributing
light to God as its author, but only a sacrilegious person would say
that God is the author of vices; I should have replied to the man, if
either on the spur of the moment, as is customary to the worshippers
of the good God, a solution of this question had darted like lightning
from on high, or a solution had been previously prepared. If I had
not deserved or was unable to avail myself of either of these methods,
I should have deferred the undertaking, and should have confessed that
the thing propounded was difficult to discern and arduous. I should
have withdrawn to myself, prostrated myself before God, groaned aloud
asking Him not to suffer me to halt in mid space, when I should have
moved forward with assured arguments, asking Him that I might not be
compelled by a doubtful question either to subordinate intelligible
things to sensible, and to yield, or to call Himself the author of
vices; since either of these alternatives would have been absolutely
full of falsehood and impiety. I can by no means suppose that He
would have deserted me in such a frame of mind. Rather, in His own
ineffable way, He would have admonished me to consider again and again
whether vices of mind concerning which I was so troubled should be
reckoned among intelligible things. But that I might find out, on
account of the weakness of my inner eye, which rightly befell me on
account of my sins, I should have devised some sort of stage for
gazing upon spiritual things in visible things themselves, of which we
have by no means a surer knowledge, but a more confident familiarity.
Therefore I should straightway have inquired, what properly pertains
to the sensation of the eyes. I should have found that it is the
color, the dominion of which the light holds. For these are the
things that no other sense touches, for the motions and magnitudes and
intervals and figures of bodies, although they also can be perceived
by the eyes, yet to perceive such is not their peculiar function, but
belongs also to touch. Whence I should have gathered that by as much
as yonder light excels other corporeal and sensible things, by so much
is sight more noble than the other senses. The light therefore having
been selected from all the things that are perceived by bodily sense,
by this [light] I should have striven, and in this of necessity I
should have placed that stage of my inquiry. I should have gone on to
consider what might be done in this way, and thus I should have
reasoned with myself: If yonder sun, conspicuous by its brightness
and sufficing for day by its light, should little by little decline in
our sight into the likeness of the moon, would we perceive anything
else with our eyes than light however refulgent, yet seeking light by
reason of not seeing what had been, and using it for seeing what was
present? Therefore we should not see the decline, but the light that
should survive the decline. But since we should not see, we should
not perceive; for whatever we perceive by sight must necessarily be
seen; wherefore if that decline were perceived neither by sight nor by
any other sense, it cannot be reckoned among objects of sense. For
nothing is an object of sense that cannot be perceived by sense. Let
us apply now the consideration to virtue, by whose intellectual light
we most fittingly say the mind shines. Again, a certain decline from
this light of virtue, not destroying the soul, but obscuring it, is
called vice. Therefore also vice can by no means be reckoned among
objects of intellectual perception, as that decline of light is
rightly excluded from the number of objects of sense perception. Yet
what remains of soul, that is that which lives and is soul is just as
much an object of intellectual perception as that is an object of
sense perception which should shine in this visible luminary after any
imaginable degree of decline. And so the soul, in so far as it is
soul and partakes of life, without which it can in no way be soul, is
most correctly to be preferred to all objects of sense perception.
Wherefore it is most erroneous to say that any soul is not from God,
from whom you boast that the sun and moon have their existence.
7. But if now it should be thought fit to designate as objects of
sense perception not only all those things that we perceive by the
senses, but also all those things that though not perceiving by the
senses we judge of by means of the body, as of darkness through the
eyes, of silence through the ears,--for not by seeing darkness and not
by hearing silence do we know of their existence,--and again, in the
case of objects of intellectual perception, not those things only
which we see illuminated by the mind, as is wisdom itself, but also
those things which by the illumination itself we avoid, such as
foolishness, which I might fittingly designate mental darkness; I
should have made no controversy about a word, but should have
dissolved the whole question by an easy division, and straightway I
should have proved to those giving good attention, that by the divine
law of truth intelligible subsistences are to be preferred to sensible
subsistences, not the decline of these subsistences, even though we
should choose to call these intelligible, those sensible. Wherefore,
that those who acknowledge that these visible luminaries and those
intelligible souls are subsistences, are in every way compelled to
grant and to attribute the sublimer part to souls; but that defects of
either kind cannot be preferred the one to the other, for they are
only privative and indicate nonexistence, and therefore have precisely
the same force as negations themselves. For when we say, It is not
gold, and, It is not virtue, although there is the greatest possible
difference between gold and virtue, yet there is no difference between
the negations that we adjoin to them. But that it is worse indeed not
to be virtue than not to be gold, no sane man doubts. Who does not
know that the difference lies not in the negations themselves, but in
the things to which they are adjoined? For by as much as virtue is
more excellent than gold, by so much is it more wretched to be in want
of virtue than of gold. Wherefore, since intelligible things excel
sensible things, we rightly feel greater repugnance towards defect in
intelligible than in sensible things, esteeming not the defects, but
the things that are deficient more or less precious. From which now
it appears, that defect of light, which is intelligible, is far more
wretched than defect of the sensible light, because, forsooth, life
which is known is by far more precious than yonder light which is
seen.
8. This being the case, who will dare, while attributing sun and
moon, and whatever is refulgent in the stars, nay in this fire of ours
and in this visible earthly life, to God, to decline to grant that any
souls whatsoever, which are not souls except by the fact of their
being perfectly alive, since in this fact alone life has the
precedence of light, are from God. And since he speaks truth who
says, In as far as a thing shines it is from God, would I speak
falsely, mighty God, if I should say, In so far as a thing lives it is
from God? Let not, I beseech thee, blindness of intellect and
perversions of mind be increased to such an extent that men may fail
to know these things. But however great their error and pertinacity
might have been, trusting in these arguments and armed therewith, I
believe that when I should have laid the matter before them thus
considered and canvassed, and should have calmly conferred with them,
I should have feared lest any one of them should have seemed to me to
be of any consequence, should he endeavor to subordinate or even to
compare to bodily sense, or to those things that pertain to bodily
sense as objects of knowledge, either intellect or those things that
are perceived (not by way of defect) by the intellect. Which point
having been settled, how would he or any other have dared to deny that
such souls as he would consider evil, yet since they are souls, are to
be reckoned in the number of intelligible things, nor are objects of
intellectual perception by way of defect? This is on the supposition
that souls are souls only by being alive. For if they were
intellectually perceived as vicious through defect, being vicious by
lack of virtue, yet they are perceived as souls not through defect,
for they are souls by reason of being alive. Nor can it be maintained
that presence of life is a cause of defect, for by as much as anything
is defective, by so much is it severed from life.
9. Since therefore it would have been every way evident that no souls
can be separated from that Author from whom yonder light is not
separated, whatever they might have now adduced I should not have
accepted, and should rather have admonished them that they should
choose with me to follow those who maintain that whatever is, since it
is, and in whatever degree it is, has its existence from the one God.
Chapter 7.--How Evil Men are of God, and Not of God.
They might have cited against me those words of the gospel: "Ye
therefore do not hear, because ye are not of God;" "Ye are of your
father the devil." [199]I also should have cited: "All things were
made by Him and without Him was not anything made," [200] and this of
the Apostle: "One God of whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus
Christ through whom are all things," [201] and again from the same
Apostle: "Of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in
whom are all things, to Him be glory." [202]I should have exhorted
those men (if indeed I had found them men), that we should presume
upon nothing as if we had found it out, but should rather inquire of
the masters who would demonstrate the agreement and harmony of those
passages that seem to be discordant. For when in one and the same
Scriptural authority we read: "All things are of God," [203] and
elsewhere: "Ye are not of God," since it is wrong rashly to condemn
books of Scripture, who would not have seen that a skilled teacher
should be found who would know a solution of this problem, from whom
assuredly if endowed with good intellectual powers, and a "spiritual
man," as is said by divine inspiration [204] (for he would necessarily
have favored the true arguments concerning the intelligible and
sensible nature, which, as far as I can, I have conducted and handled,
nay he would have disclosed them far better and more convincingly); we
should have heard nothing else concerning this problem, except, as
might happen, that there is no class of souls but has its existence
from God, and that it is yet rightly said to sinners and unbelievers:
"Ye are not of God." For we also, perchance, Divine aid having been
implored, should have been able easily to see, that it is one thing to
live and another to sin, and (although life in sin may be called death
in comparison with just life, [205] and while in one man it may be
found, that he is at the same time alive and a sinner) that so far as
he is alive, he is of God, so far as he is a sinner he is not of God.
In which division we use that alternative that suits our sentiment; so
that when we wish to insist upon the omnipotence of God as Creator, we
may say even to sinners that they are of God. For we are speaking to
those who are contained in some class, we are speaking to those having
animal life, we are speaking to rational beings, we are speaking
lastly--and this applies especially to the matter in hand--to living
beings, all which things are essentially divine functions. But when
our purpose is to convict evil men, we rightly say: "Ye are not of
God." For we speak to them as averse to truth, unbelieving, criminal,
infamous, and, to sum up all in one term--sinners, all of which things
are undoubtedly not of God. Therefore what wonder is it, if Christ
says to sinners, convicting them of this very thing that they were
sinners and did not believe in Him: "Ye are not of God;" and on the
other hand, without prejudice to the former statement: "All things
were made through Him," and "All things are of God?" For if not to
believe Christ, to repudiate Christ's advent, not to accept Christ,
was a sure mark of souls that are not of God; and so it was said: "Ye
therefore hear not, because ye are not of God;" how would that saying
of the apostle be true that occurs in the memorable beginning of the
gospel: "He came unto his own things, and his own people did not
receive him?" [206]Whence his own if they did not receive him; or
whence therefore not his own because they did not receive him, unless
that sinners by virtue of being men belong to God, but by virtue of
being sinners belong to the devil? He who says: "His own people
received him not" had reference to nature; but he who says: "Ye are
not of God." had reference to will; for the evangelist was commending
the works of God, Christ was censuring the sins of men.
Footnotes
[199] John viii. 47 and 44.
[200] John i. 3.
[201] 1 Cor. viii. 6.
[202] Rom. xi. 36.
[203] 1 Cor. xi. 12.
[204] 1 Cor. ii. 15.
[205] 1 Tim. v. 6.
[206] John i. 11.
Chapter 8.--The Manichæans Inquire Whence is Evil and by This Question
Think They Have Triumphed. Let Them First Know, Which is Most Easy to
Do, that Nothing Can Live Without God. Consummate Evil Cannot Be
Known Except by the Knowledge of Consummate Good, Which is God.
Here perchance some one may say: Whence are sins themselves, and
whence is evil in general? If from man, whence is man? if from an
angel, whence is the angel? When it is said, however truly and
rightly, that these are from God, it nevertheless seems to those
unskillful and possessed of little power to look into recondite
matters, that evils and sins are thereby connected, as by a sort of
chain, to God. By this question they think themselves triumphant, as
if forsooth to ask were to know;--would it were so, for in that case
no one would be more knowing than myself. Yet very often in
controversy the propounder of a great question, while impersonating
the great teacher, is himself more ignorant in the matter concerning
which he would frighten his opponent, than he whom he would frighten.
These therefore suppose that they are superior to the common run,
because the former ask questions that the latter cannot answer. If
therefore when I most unfortunately was associated with them, not in
the position in which I have now for some time been, they had raised
these objections when I had brought forward this argument, I should
have said: I ask that you meanwhile agree with me, which is most
easy, that if nothing can shine without God, much less can anything
live without God. Let us not persist in such monstrous opinions as to
maintain that any souls whatsoever have life apart from God. For
perchance it may so happen that with me you are ignorant as to this
thing, namely whence is evil, let us then learn either simultaneously
or in any order, I care not what. For what if knowledge of the
perfection of evil is impossible to man without knowledge of the
perfection of good? For we should not know darkness if we were always
in darkness. But the notion of light does not allow its opposite to
be unknown. But the highest good is that than which there is nothing
higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can be higher. God
therefore is the highest good. Let us therefore together so recognize
God, and thus what we seek too hastily will not be hidden from us. Do
you suppose then that the knowledge of God is a matter of small
account or desert. For what other reward is there for us than life
eternal, which is to know God? For God the Master says: "But this is
life eternal, that they might know Thee the only and true God, and
Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." [207]For the soul, although it
is immortal, yet because aversion from the knowledge of God is rightly
called its death, when it is converted to God, the reward of eternal
life to be attained is that knowledge; so that this is, as has been
said, eternal life. But no one can be converted to God, except he
turn himself away from this world. This for myself I feel to be
arduous and exceedingly difficult, whether it is easy to you, God
Himself would have seen. I should have been inclined to think it easy
to you, had I not been moved by the fact, that, since the world from
which we are commanded to turn away is visible, and the apostle says:
"The things that are seen are temporal, but the things that are unseen
are eternal," [208] you ascribe more importance to the judgment of
these eyes than to that of the mind, asserting and believing as you do
that there is no shining feather that does not shine from God; and
that there are living souls that do not live from God. These and like
things I should either have said to them or considered with myself,
for even then, supplicating God with all my bowels, so to speak, and
examining as attentively as possible the Scriptures, I should
perchance have been able either to say such things or to think them,
so far as was necessary for my salvation.
Footnotes
[207] John xvii. 3.
[208] 2 Cor. iv. 18.
Chapter 9.--Augustin Deceived by Familiarity with the Manichæans, and
by the Succession of Victories Over Ignorant Christians Reported by
Them. The Manichæans are Likewise Easily Refuted from the Knowledge
of Sin and the Will.
But two things especially, which easily lay hold upon that unwary age,
urged me through wonderful circuits. One of these was familiarity,
suddenly, by a certain false semblance of goodness, wrapped many times
around my neck as a certain sinuous chain. The other was, that I was
almost always noxiously victorious in arguing with ignorant Christians
who yet eagerly attempted, each as he could, to defend their faith.
[209]By which frequent success the ardor of youth was kindled, and
by its own impulse rashly verged upon the great evil of stubbornness.
For this kind of wrangling, after I had become an auditor among them,
whatever I was able to do either by my own genius, such as it was, or
by reading the works of others, I most gladly devoted to them alone.
Accordingly from their speeches ardor in disputations was daily
increased, from success in disputations love for them [the
Manichæans]. Whence it resulted that whatever they said, as if
affected by certain strange disorders, I approved of as true, not
because I knew it to be true, but because I wished it to be. So it
came about that, however slowly and cautiously, yet for a long time I
followed men that preferred a sleek straw to a living soul.
12. So be it, I was not able at that time to distinguish and discern
sensible from intelligible things, carnal forsooth from spiritual. It
did not belong to age, nor to discipline, nor even to any habit, nor,
finally, to any deserts; for it is a matter of no small joy and
felicitation: had I not thus been able at length even to grasp that
which in the judgment of all men nature itself by the laws of the most
High God has established?
Footnotes
[209] Nothing is more certain than that Christianity has suffered more
at the hands of injudicious and ignorant defenders than from its most
astute and determined foes. Little attention would be paid to the
blatant infidels of the present day were it not for the interest
aroused and sustained by weak attempts to refute their arguments. And
as the youthful, ardent Augustin was encouraged and confirmed in his
errors by the inability of his opponents, so are errors confirmed at
the present day. The philosophical defence of Christianity is a
matter of the utmost delicacy, and should be undertaken with fear and
trembling.--A.H.N.
Chapter 10.--Sin is Only from the Will. His Own Life and Will Best
Known to Each Individual. What Will is.
For let any men whatever, if only no madness has broken them loose
from the common sense of the human race, bring whatever zeal they like
for judging, whatever ignorance, nay whatever slowness of mind, I
should like to find out what they would have replied to me had I
asked, whether a man would seem to them to have sinned by whose hand
while he was asleep another should have written something
disgraceful? Who doubts that they would have denied that it is a sin,
and have exclaimed against it so vehemently that they might perchance
have been enraged that I should have thought them proper objects of
such a question? Of whom reconciled and restored to equanimity, as
best I could do it, I should have begged that they would not take it
amiss if I asked them another thing just as manifest, just as
completely within the knowledge of all. Then I should have asked, if
some stronger person had done some evil thing by the hand of one not
sleeping but conscious, yet with the rest of his members bound and in
constraint, whether because he knew it, though absolutely unwilling,
he should be held guilty of any sin? And here all marvelling that I
should ask such questions, would reply without hesitation, that he had
absolutely not sinned at all. Why so? Because whoever has done
anything evil by means of one unconscious or unable to resist, the
latter can by no means be justly condemned. And precisely why this is
so, if I should inquire of the human nature in these men, I should
easily bring out the desired answer, by asking in this manner:
Suppose that the sleeper already knew what the other would do with his
hand, and of purpose aforethought, having drunk so much as would
prevent his being awakened, should go to sleep, in order to deceive
some one with an oath. Would any amount of sleep suffice to prove his
innocence? What else than a guilty man would one pronounce him? But
if he has also willingly been bound that he may deceive some one by
this pretext, in what respect then would those chains profit as a
means of relieving him of sin? Although bound by these he was really
not able to resist, as in the other case the sleeper was absolutely
ignorant of what he was then doing. Is there therefore any
possibility of doubting that both should be judged to have sinned?
Which things having been conceded, I should have argued, that sin is
indeed nowhere but in the will, [210] since this consideration also
would have helped me, that justice holds guilty those sinning by evil
will alone, although they may have been unable to accomplish what they
willed.
13. For who could have said that, in adducing these considerations, I
was dwelling upon obscure and recondite things, where on account of
the fewness of those able to understand, either fraud or suspicion of
ostentation is accustomed to arise? Let that distinction between
intelligible and sensible things withdraw for a little: let me not be
found fault with for following up slow minds with the stimuli of
subtle disputations. Permit me to know that I live, permit me to know
that I will to live. If in this the human race agrees, as our life is
known to us, so also is our will. Nor when we become possessed of
this knowledge, is there any occasion to fear lest any one should
convince us that we may be deceived; for no one can be deceived as to
whether he does not live, or wishes nothing. I do not think that I
have adduced anything obscure, and my concern is rather lest some
should find fault with me for dwelling on things that are too
manifest. But let us consider the bearing of these things.
14. Sinning therefore takes place only by exercise of will. But our
will is very well known to us; for neither should I know that I will,
if I did not know what will itself is. Accordingly, it is thus
defined: will is a movement of mind, no one compelling, either for
not losing or for obtaining something. [211]Why therefore could not
I have so defined it then? Was it difficult to see that one unwilling
is contrary to one willing, just as the left hand is contrary to the
right, not as black to white? For the same thing cannot be at the
same time black and white. But whoever is placed between two men is
on the left hand with reference to one, on the right with reference to
the other. One man is both on the right hand and on the left hand at
the same time, but by no means both to the one man. So indeed one
mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot be
at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the
same thing. For when any one unwillingly does anything; if you ask
him whether he wished to do it, he says that he did not. Likewise if
you ask whether he wished not to do it, he replies that he did. So
you will find him unwilling with reference to doing, willing with
reference to not doing, that is to say, one mind at the same time
having both attitudes, but each referring to different things. Why do
I say this? Because if we should again ask wherefore though unwilling
he does this, he will say that he is compelled. For every one also
who does a thing unwillingly is compelled, and every one who is
compelled, if he does a thing, does it only unwillingly. It follows
that he that is willing is free from compulsion, even if any one
thinks himself compelled. And in this manner every one who willingly
does a thing is not compelled, and whoever is not compelled, either
does it willingly or not at all. Since nature itself proclaims these
things in all men whom we can interrogate without absurdity, from the
boy even to the old man, from literary sport even to the throne of the
wise, why then should I not have seen that in the definition of will
should be put, "no one compelling," which now as if with greater
experience most cautiously I have done. But if this is everywhere
manifest, and promptly occurs to all not by instruction but by nature,
what is there left that seems obscure, unless perchance it be
concealed from some one, that when we wish for something, we will, and
our mind is moved towards it, and we either have it or do not have it,
and if we have it we will to retain it, if we have it not, to acquire
it? Wherefore everyone who wills, wills either not to lose something
or to obtain it. Hence if all these things are clearer than day, as
they are, nor are they given to my conception alone, but by the
liberality of truth itself to the whole human race, why could I not
have said even at that time: Will is a movement of the mind, no one
compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something?
Footnotes
[210] The Pelagians used this statement with considerable effect in
their polemics against its author. In his Retractations Augustin has
this to say by way of explanation: "The Pelagians may think that thus
was said in their interest, on account of young children whose sin
which is remitted to them in baptism they deny on the ground that they
do not yet use the power of will. As if indeed the sin, which we say
they derive originally from Adam, that is, that they are implicated in
his guilt and on this account are held obnoxious to punishment, could
ever be otherwise than in will, by which will it was committed when
the transgression of the divine precept was accomplished. Our
statement, that `there is never sin but in will,' may be thought false
for the reason that the apostle says: `If what I will not this I do,
it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.' For this
sin is to such an extent involuntary, that he says: `What I will not
this I do.' How, therefore, is there never sin but in the will? But
this sin concerning which the apostle has spoken is called sin,
because by sin it was done, and it is the penalty of sin; since this
is said concerning carnal concupiscence, which he discloses in what
follows saying: `I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no
good; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish that which is
good, is not.' (Rom. vii. 16-18). Since the perfection of good is,
that not even the concupiscence of sin should be in man, to which
indeed when one lives well the will does not consent; nevertheless man
does not accomplish the good because as yet concupiscence is in him,
to which the will is antagonistic, the guilt of which concupiscence is
loosed by baptism, but the infirmity remains, against which until it
is healed every believer who advances well most earnestly struggles.
But sin, which is never but in will, must especially be known as that
which is followed by just condemnation. For this through one man
entered into the world; although that sin also by which consent is
yielded to concupiscence is not committed but by will. Wherefore also
in another place I have said: `Not therefore except by will is sin
committed.'"--A.H.N. On this matter Augustin's still earlier treatise
De Libero Arbitrio, and his interesting Retractations on the same,
should be compared. The reader of these earlier treatises in
comparison with the Anti-Pelagian treatises can hardly fail to
recognize a marked change of base on Augustin's part. His efforts to
show the consistency of his earlier with his later modes of thought
are to be pronounced only partially successful. The fact is, that in
the Anti-Manichæan time he went too far in maintaining the absolute
freedom of the will and the impossibility of sin apart from personal
will in the sinner; while in the Anti-Pelagian time he ventured too
near to the fatalism that he so earnestly combated in the
Manichæans.--A.H.N.
[211] This dictum also Augustin thought it needful to explain: "This
was said that by this definition a willing person might be
distinguished from one not willing, and so the intention might be
referred to those who first in Paradise were the origin of evil to the
human race, by sinning no one compelling, that is by sinning with free
will, because also knowingly they sinned against the command, and the
tempters persuaded, did not compel, that this should be done. For he
who ignorantly sinned may not incongruously be said to have sinned
unwillingly, although not knowing what he did, yet willingly he did
it. So not even the sin of such a one could be without will, which
will assuredly, as it has been defined, was a `movement of the mind,
no one compelling, either for not losing or for obtaining something.'
For he was not compelled to do what if he had been unwilling he would
not have done. Because he willed, therefore he did it, even if he did
not sin because he willed, being ignorant that what he did is sin. So
not even such a sin could be without will, but by will of deed not by
will of sin, which deed was yet sin; for this deed is what ought not
to have taken place. But whoever knowingly sins, if he can without
sin resist the one compelling him to sin, yet resists not, assuredly
sins willingly. For he who can resist is not compelled to yield. But
he who cannot by good will resist cogent covetousness, and therefore
does what is contrary to the precepts of righteousness, this now is
sin in the sense of being the penalty of sin. Wherefore it is most
true that sin cannot be apart from will." It is needless to say that
such reasoning would not have answered Augustin's purpose in writing
against the Manichæans.--A.H.N.
Chapter 11.--What Sin is.
Some one will say: What assistance would this have furnished you
against the Manichæans? Wait a moment; permit me first also to define
sin, which, every mind reads divinely written in itself, cannot exist
apart from will. Sin therefore is the will to retain and follow after
what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain. [212]
Although if it be not free, it is not will. But I have preferred to
define more roughly than precisely. Should I not also have carefully
examined those obscure books, whence I might have learned that no one
is worthy of blame or punishment who either wills what justice does
not prohibit him from willing, or does not do what he is not able to
do? Do not shepherds on mountains, poets in theatres, unlearned in
social intercourse, learned in libraries, masters in schools, priests
in consecrated places, and the human race throughout the whole world,
sing out these things? But if no one is worthy of blame and
condemnation, who either does not act against the prohibition of
justice, or who does not do what he cannot do, yet every sin is
blameworthy and condemnable, who doubts then that it is sin, when
willing is unjust, and not willing is free. And hence that definition
is both true and easy to understand, and not only now but then also
could have been spoken by me: Sin is the will of retaining or of
obtaining, what justice forbids, and whence it is free to abstain?
Footnotes
[212] Here also Augustin guards himself in his Retractations: "The
definition is true, inasmuch as that is defined which is only sin, and
not also that which is the penalty of sin."--A.H.N.
Chapter 12.--From the Definitions Given of Sin and Will, He Overthrows
the Entire Heresy of the Manichæans. Likewise from the Just
Condemnation of Evil Souls It Follows that They are Evil Not by Nature
But by Will. That Souls are Good By Nature, to Which the Pardon of
Sins is Granted.
16. Come now, let us see in what respect these things would have
aided us. Much every way, so that I should have desired nothing more;
for they end the whole cause; for whoever consulting in the inner
mind, where they are more pronounced and assured, the secrets of his
own conscience, and the divine laws absolutely imposed upon nature,
grants that these two definitions of will and sin are true, condemns
without any hesitation by the fewest and the briefest, but plainly the
most invincible reasons, the whole heresy of the Manichæans. Which
can be thus considered. They say that there are two kinds of souls,
the one good, which is in such a way from God, that it is said not to
have been made by Him out of any material or out of nothing, but to
have proceeded as a certain part from the very substance itself of
God; the other evil, which they believe and strive to get others to
believe pertains to God in no way whatever; and so they maintain that
the one is the perfection of good, but the other the perfection of
evil, and that these two classes were at one time distinct but are now
commingled. The character and the cause of this commingling I had not
yet heard; but nevertheless I could have inquired whether that evil
kind of souls, before it was mingled with the good, had any will. For
if not, it was without sin and innocent, and so by no means evil.
[213]But if evil in such a way, that though without will, as fire,
yet if it should touch the good it would violate and corrupt it; how
impious it is to believe that the nature of evil is powerful enough to
change any part of God, and that the Highest Good is corruptible and
violable! But if the will was present, assuredly there was present,
no one compelling, a movement of the mind either towards not losing
something or obtaining something. But this something was either good,
or was thought to be good, for not otherwise could it be earnestly
desired. But in supreme evil, before the commingling which they
maintain, there never was any good. Whence then could there be in it
either the knowledge or the thought of good? Did they wish for
nothing that was in themselves, and earnestly desire that true good
which was without? That will must truly be declared worthy of
distinguished and great praise by which is earnestly desired the
supreme and true good. Whence then in supreme evil was this movement
of mind most worthy of so great praise? Did they seek it for the sake
of injuring it? In the first place, the argument comes to the same
thing. For he who wishes to injure, wishes to deprive another of some
good for the sake of some good of his own. There was therefore in
them either a knowledge of good or an opinion of good, which ought by
no means to belong to supreme evil. In the second place, whence had
they known, that good placed outside of themselves, which they
designed to injure, existed at all. If they had intellectually
perceived it, what is more excellent than such a mind? Is there
anything else for which the whole energy of good men is put forth
except the knowledge of that supreme and sincere good? What therefore
is now scarcely conceded to a few good and just men, was mere evil, no
good assisting, then able to accomplish? But if those souls bore
bodies and saw the supreme good with their eyes, what tongues, what
hearts, what intellects suffice for lauding and proclaiming those
eyes, with which the minds of just men can scarcely be compared? How
great good things we find in supreme evil! For if to see God is evil,
God is not a good; but God is a good; therefore to see God is good;
and I know not what can be compared to this good. Since to see
anything is good, whence can it be made out that to be able to see is
evil? Therefore whatever in those eyes or in those minds brought it
about, that the divine essence could be seen by them, brought about a
great thing and a good thing most worthy of ineffable praise. But if
it was not brought about, but it was such in itself and eternal, it is
difficult to find anything better than this evil.
17. Lastly, that these souls may have nothing of these praiseworthy
things which by the reasonings of the Manichæans they are compelled to
have, I should have asked, whether God condemns any or no souls. If
none, there is no judgment of rewards and punishments, no providence,
and the world is administered by chance rather than by reason, or
rather is not administered at all. For the name administration must
not be given to chances. But if it is impious for all those that are
bound by any religion to believe this, it remains either that there is
condemnation of some souls, or that there are no sins. But if there
are no sins, neither is there any evil. Which if the Manichæans
should say, they would slay their heresy with a single blow.
Therefore they and I agree that some souls are condemned by divine law
and judgment. But if these souls are good, what is that justice? If
evil, are they so by nature, or by will? But by nature souls can in
no way be evil. Whence do we teach this. From the above definitions
of will and sin. For to speak of souls, and that they are evil, and
that they do not sin, is full of madness; but to say that they sin
without will, is great craziness, and to hold any one guilty of sin
for not doing what he could not do, belongs to the height of iniquity
and insanity. Wherefore whatever these souls do, if they do it by
nature not by will, that is, if they are wanting in a movement of mind
free both for doing and not doing, if finally no power of abstaining
from their work is conceded to them; we cannot hold that the sin is
theirs. [214]But all confess both that evil souls are justly, and
souls that have not sinned are unjustly condemned; therefore they
confess that those souls are evil that sin. But these, as reason
teaches, do not sin. Therefore the extraneous class of evil souls of
the Manichæans, whatever it may be, is a non-entity.
18. Let us now look at that good class of souls, which again they
exalt to such a degree as to say that it is the very substance of
God. But how much better it is that each one should recognize his own
rank and merit, nor be so puffed up with sacrilegious pride as to
believe that as often as he experiences a change in himself it is the
substance of that supreme good, which devout reason holds and teaches
to be unchangeable! For behold! since it is manifest that souls do
not sin in not being such as they cannot be; it follows that these
supposititious souls, whatever they may be, do not sin at all, and
moreover that they are absolutely non-existent; it remains that since
there are sins, they find none to whom to attribute them except the
good class of souls and the substance of God. But especially are they
pressed by Christian authority; for never have they denied that
forgiveness of sins is granted when any one has been converted to God;
never have they said (as they have said of many other passages) that
some corrupter has interpolated this into the divine Scriptures. To
whom then are sins attributed? If to those evil souls of the alien
class, these also can become good, can possess the kingdom of God with
Christ. Which denying, they [the Manichæans] have no other class
except those souls which they maintain are of the substance of God.
It remains that they acknowledge that not only these latter also, but
these alone sin. But I make no contention about their being alone in
sinning; yet they sin. But are they compelled to sin by being
commingled with evil? If so compelled that there was no power of
resisting, they do not sin. If it is in their power to resist, and
they voluntarily consent, we are compelled to find out through their
[the Manichæan] teaching, why so great good things in supreme evil,
why this evil in supreme good, unless it be that neither is that which
they bring into suspicion evil, nor is that which they pervert by
superstition supreme good?
Footnotes
[213] In his Retractations, Augustin replies to the Pelagian denial of
the sinfulness of infants, in support of which they had quoted the
above sentence. "They [infants] are held guilty not by propriety of
will but by origin. For what is every earthly man in origin but
Adam?" The will of the whole human race was in Adam, and when Adam
sinned the whole race voluntarily sinned, seems to be his
meaning.--A.H.N.
[214] In his Retractations, Augustin explains that by nature is to be
understood the state in which we were created without vice. He
transfers the entire argument from the actual condition of man to the
primitive Adamic condition. It is evident, however, that this was not
his meaning when he combated the Manichæans. The question of infant
sinfulness arises here also, and is discussed in the usual
Anti-Pelagian way.--A.H.N.
Chapter 13.--From Deliberation on the Evil and on the Good Part It
Results that Two Classes of Souls are Not to Be Held to. A Class of
Souls Enticing to Shameful Deeds Having Been Conceded, It Does Not
Follow that These are Evil by Nature, that the Others are Supreme
Good.
19. But if I had taught, or at any rate had myself learned, that they
rave and err regarding those two classes of souls, why should I have
thenceforth thought them worthy of being heard or consulted about
anything? That I might learn hence, that these two kinds of souls are
pointed out, which in the course of deliberation assent puts now on
the evil side, now on the good? Why is not this rather the sign of
one soul which by free will can be borne here and there, swayed hither
and thither? For it was my own experience to feel that I am one,
considering evil and good and choosing one or the other, but for the
most part the one pleases, the other is fitting, placed in the midst
of which we fluctuate. Nor is it to be wondered at, for we are now so
constituted that through the flesh we can be affected by sensual
pleasure, and through the spirit by honorable considerations. Am I
not therefore compelled to acknowledge two souls? Nay, we can better
and with far less difficulty recognize two classes of good things, of
which neither is alien from God as its author, one soul acted upon
from diverse directions, the lower and the higher, or to speak more
correctly, the external and the internal. These are the two classes
which a little while ago we considered under the names sensible and
intelligible, which we now prefer to call more familiarly carnal and
spiritual. But it has been made difficult for us to abstain from
carnal things, since our truest bread is spiritual. For with great
labor we now eat this bread. For neither without punishment for the
sin of transgression have we been changed from immortal into mortal.
So it happens, that when we strive after better things, habit formed
by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to
militate against us and to put obstacles in our way, some foolish
persons with most obtuse superstition suspect that there is another
kind of souls which is not of God.
20. However even if it be conceded to them that we are enticed to
shameful deeds by another inferior kind of souls, they do not thence
make it evident that those enticing are evil by nature, or those
enticed, supremely good. For it may be, the former of their own will,
by striving after what was not lawful, that is, by sinning, from being
good have become evil; and again they may be made good, but in such
manner that for a long time they remain in sin, and by a certain
occult suasion traduce to themselves other souls. Then, they may not
be absolutely evil, but in their own kind, however inferior, they may
exercise their own functions without any sin. But those superior
souls to whom justice, the directress of things, has assigned a far
more excellent activity, if they should wish to follow and to imitate
those inferior ones, become evil, not because they imitate evil souls,
but because they imitate in an evil way. By the evil souls is done
what is proper to them, by the good what is alien to them is striven
after. Hence the former remain in their own grade, the latter are
plunged into a lower. It is as when men copy after beasts. For the
four-footed horse walks beautifully, but if a man on all fours should
imitate him, who would think him worthy even of chaff for food?
Rightly therefore we generally disapprove of one who imitates, while
we approve of him whom he imitates. But we disapprove not because he
has not succeeded, but for wishing to succeed at all. For in the
horse we approve of that to which by as much as we prefer man, by so
much are we offended that he copies after inferior creatures. So
among men, however well the crier may do in sending forth his voice,
would not the senator be insane, if he should do it even more clearly
and better than the crier? Take an illustration from the heavenly
bodies: The moon when shining is praised, and by its course and its
changes is quite pleasing to those that pay attention to such things.
But if the sun should wish to imitate it (for we may feign that it has
desires of this sort [215] ), who would not be greatly and rightly
displeased. From which illustrations I wish it to be understood, that
even if there are souls (which meanwhile is left an open question
[216] ) devoted to bodily offices not by sin but by nature, and even
if they are related to us, however inferior they may be, by some inner
affinity, they should not be esteemed evil simply because we are evil
ourselves in following them and in loving corporeal things. For we
sin by loving corporeal things, because by justice we are required and
by nature we are able to love spiritual things, and when we do this we
are, in our kind, the best and the happiest. [217]
21. Wherefore what proof does deliberation, violently urged in both
directions, now prone to sin, now borne on toward right conduct,
furnish, that we are compelled to accept two kinds of souls, the
nature of one of which is from God, of the other not; when we are free
to conjecture so many other causes of alternating states of mind? But
that these things are obscure and are to no purpose pried into by
blear-eyed minds, whoever is a good judge of things sees. Wherefore
those things rather which have been said regarding the will and sin,
those things, I say, that supreme justice permits no man using his
reason to be ignorant of, those things which if they were taken from
us, there is nothing whence the discipline of virtue may begin,
nothing whence it may rise from the death of vices, those things I say
considered again and again with sufficient clearness and lucidity
convince us that the heresy of the Manichæans is false.
Footnotes
[215] Augustin's carefulness to explain that he is only indulging in
personification is doubtless due to the fact that with the Manichæans
the sun and the moon were objects of worship.--A.H.N.
[216] In his Retractations, Augustin explains that he did not really
regard this as an open question, but speaks of it as such only so far
as this particular discussion is concerned. He simply declines to
enter upon a consideration of it in this connection.--A.H.N.
[217] Here also the use of the word "nature" gave Augustin trouble in
his later years. He claims in the Retractations that he uses the word
in the sense of "nature that has been healed" and that "cannot be
vitiated," and seeks to show that he did not mean to exclude divine
grace.--A.H.N.
Chapter 14.--Again It is Shown from the Utility of Repenting that
Souls are Not by Nature Evil. So Sure a Demonstration is Not
Contradicted Except from the Habit of Erring.
22. Like the foregoing considerations is what I shall now say about
repenting. For as among all sane people it is agreed, and this the
Manichæans themselves not only confess but also teach, that to repent
of sin is useful. Why shall I now, in this matter, collect the
testimonies of the divine Scriptures, which are scattered throughout
their pages? It is also the voice of nature; notice of this thing has
escaped no fool. We should be undone, if this were not deeply
imbedded in our nature. Some one may say that he does not sin; but no
barbarity will dare to say, that if one sins he should not repent of
it. This being the case, I ask to which of the two kinds of souls
does repenting pertain? I know indeed that it can pertain neither to
him who does ill nor to him who cannot do well. Wherefore, that I may
use the words of the Manichæans, if a soul of darkness repent of sin,
it is not of the substance of supreme evil, if a soul of light, it is
not of the substance of supreme good; that disposition of repenting
which is profitable testifies alike that the penitent has done ill,
and that he could have done well. How, therefore, is there from me
nothing of evil, if I have acted unadvisedly, or how can I rightly
repent if I have not so done? Hear the other part. How is there from
me nothing of good, if in me there is good will, or how do I rightly
repent if there is not? Wherefore, either let them deny that there is
great utility in repenting, so that they may be driven not only from
the Christian name, but from every even imaginary argument for their
views, or let them cease to say and to teach that there are two kinds
of souls, one of which has nothing of evil, the other nothing of good;
for that whole sect is propped up by this two-headed [218] or rather
headlong [219] variety of souls.
23. And to me indeed it is sufficient thus to know that the
Manichæans err, that I know that sin must be repented of; and yet if
now by right of friendship I should accost some one of my friends who
still thinks that they are worthy of being listened to, and should say
to him: Do you not know that it is useful, when any one has sinned,
to repent? Without hesitation he will swear that he knows. If then I
shall have convinced you that Manichæism is false, will you not desire
anything more? Let him reply what more he can desire in this matter.
Very well, so far. But when I shall have begun to show the sure and
necessary arguments which, bound to it with adamantine chains, as the
saying is, follow that proposition, and shall have conducted to its
conclusion the whole process by which that sect is overthrown, he will
deny perhaps that he knows the utility of repenting, which no learned
man, no unlearned, is ignorant of, and will rather contend, when we
hesitate and deliberate, that two souls in us furnish each its own
proper help to the solution of the different parts of the question. O
habit of sin! O accompanying penalty of sin! Then you turned me away
from the consideration of things so manifest, but you injured me when
I did not discern. But now, among my most familiar acquaintances who
do not discern, you wound and torment me discerning.
Footnotes
[218] Bicipiti.
[219] Præcipiti.
Chapter 15.--He Prays for His Friends Whom He Has Had as Associates in
Error.
24. Give heed to these things, I beseech you, dearly beloved. Your
dispositions I have well known. If you now concede to me the mind and
the reason of any sort of man, these things are far more certain than
the things that we seemed to learn or rather were compelled to
believe. Great God, God omnipotent, God of supreme goodness, whose
right it is to be believed and known to be inviolable and
unchangeable. Trinal Unity, whom the Catholic Church worships, as one
who have experienced in myself Thy mercy, I supplicate Thee, that Thou
wilt not permit those with whom from boyhood I have lived most
harmoniously in every relation to dissent from me in Thy worship. I
see how it was especially to be expected in this place that I should
either even then have defended the Catholic Scriptures attacked by the
Manichæans, if as I say, I had been cautious; or I should now show
that they can be defended. But in other volumes God will aid my
purpose, for the moderate length of this, as I suppose, already asks
to be spared. [220]
Footnotes
[220] This purpose Augustin accomplished in several works. See
especially Contra Adimantum, and Contra Faustum Manichæum. On
Augustin's defense of the Old Testament Scriptures, see Mozley's
Ruling Ideas in Early Ages, last chapter.--A.H.N.
.
St. Augustin,
Acts or Disputation Against Fortunatus the Manichæan.
[acta seu disputatio contra fortunatum manichæum].
A.D. 392. [221]
translated by Albert H. Newman, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Church History and Comparative Religion, in Toronto
Baptist (Theological) College, Toronto, Canada.
.
Disputation of the First Day.
On the fifth of September, the most renowned men Arcadius Augustus
(the second time) and Rufinus being consuls, a disputation against
Fortunatus, an elder of the Manichæans, was held in the city of Hippo
Regius, in the baths of Sossius, in the presence of the people.
1. Augustin said: I now regard as error what formerly I regarded as
truth. I desire to hear from you who are present whether my
supposition is correct. First of all I regard it as the height of
error to believe that Almighty God, in whom is our one hope, is in any
part either violable, or contaminable, or corruptible. This I know
your heresy affirms, not indeed in the words that I now use; for when
you are questioned you confess that God is incorruptible, and
absolutely inviolable, and incontaminable; but when you begin to
expound the rest of your system, we are compelled to declare Him
corruptible, penetrable, contaminable. For you say that another race
of darkness, whatever it may be, has rebelled against the kingdom of
God; but that Almighty God, when He saw what ruin and desolation
threatened his domains, unless he should make some opposition to the
adverse race and resist it, sent this virtue, from whose commingling
with evil and the race of darkness the world was framed. Hence it is
that here good souls labor, serve, err, are corrupted: that they may
see the need of a liberator, who should purge them from error, loose
them from this commingling with evil, and liberate them from
servitude. I think it impious to believe that Almighty God ever
feared any adverse race, or was under necessity to precipitate us into
afflictions.
Fortunatus said: Because I know that you have been in our midst, that
is, have lived as an adherent among the Manichæans, these are the
principles of our faith. The matter now to be considered is our mode
of living, the falsely alleged crimes for which we are maltreated.
Therefore let the good men present hear from you whether these things
with which we are charged and which we have thrown in our teeth are
true or false. For from your instruction, and from your exposition
and explanation, they will have been able to gain more correct
information about our mode of life, if it shall have been set forth by
you.
2. Augustin said: I was among you, but faith and morals are
different questions. I proposed to discuss faith. But if those
present prefer to hear about morals, I do not decline that question.
Fortunatus said: I wish first to purge myself in your conscience in
which we are polluted, by the testimony of a competent man, (who even
now is competent for me), and in view of the future examination of
Christ, the just judge, whether he saw in us, or himself practiced by
imitation, the things that are now thrown in our teeth?
3. Augustin said: You call me to something else, when I had proposed
to discuss faith, but concerning your morals only those who are your
Elect can fully know. But you know that I was not your Elect, but an
Auditor. Hence though I was present at your prayer meetings, [222] as
you have asked (whether separately among yourselves you have any
prayer meetings, God alone and yourselves can know); yet in your
prayer meetings where I have been present I have seen nothing shameful
take place; but only that the faith that I afterwards learned and
approved is denounced, and that you perform your services facing the
sun. Besides this I found out nothing new in your meetings, but
whoever raises any question of morals against you, raises it against
your Elect. But what you who are Elect do among yourselves, I have no
means of knowing. For I have often heard from you that you receive
the Eucharist. But since the time of receiving it was concealed from
me, how could I know what you receive? [223]So keep the question
about morals, if you please, for discussion among your Elect, if it
can be discussed. You gave me a faith that I today disapprove. This
I proposed to discuss. Let a response be made to my proposition.
Fortunatus said: And our profession is this very thing: that God is
incorruptible, lucid, unapproachable, intenible, impassible, that He
inhabits His own eternal lights, that nothing corruptible proceeds
from Him, neither darkness, demons, Satan, nor anything adverse can be
found in His kingdom. But that He sent forth a Saviour like Himself;
that the Word born from the foundation of the world, when He had
formed the world, after the formation of the world came among men;
that He has chosen souls worthy of Himself according to His own holy
will, sanctified by celestial command, imbued with the faith and
reason of celestial things; that under His leadership those souls will
return hence again to the kingdom of God according to the holy promise
of Him who said: "I am the way, the truth, and the door;" [224] and
"No one can come unto the Father, except through me." These things we
believe because otherwise, that is, through another mediator, souls
cannot return to the kingdom of God, unless they find Him as the way,
the truth, and the door. For Himself said: "He that hath seen me,
hath seen my Father also;" [225] and "whosoever shall have believed on
me shall not taste death forever, but has passed from death unto life,
and shall not come into judgment." [226]These things we believe and
this is the reason of our faith, and according to the strength of our
mind we endeavor to act according to His commandments, following after
the one faith of this Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. [227]
4. Augustin said: What was the cause of those souls being
precipitated into death, whom you confess come through Christ from
death to life?
Fortunatus said: Hence now deign to go on and to contradict, if there
is nothing besides God.
5. Augustin said: Nay, do you deign to answer the question put to
you: What cause has given these souls to death?
Fortunatus said: Nay but do you deign to say whether there is
anything besides God, or all things are in God.
6. Augustin said: This I can reply, that the Lord wished me to know
that God cannot suffer any necessity, nor be violated or corrupted in
any part. Which, since you also acknowledge, I ask by what necessity
He sent hither souls that you say return through Christ?
Fortunatus said: What you have said: that thus far God has revealed
to you, that He is incorruptible, as He has also revealed to me; the
reason must be sought, how and wherefore souls have come into this
world, so that now of right God should liberate them from this world
through his Son only begotten and like Himself, if besides Himself
there is nothing?
7. Augustin said: We ought not to disappoint those present, being
men of note, and from the question proposed for discussion go to
another. So we both confess, so we concede to ourselves, that God is
incorruptible and inviolable, and could have in no way suffered. From
which it follows, that your heresy is false, which says that God, when
He saw desolation and ruin threaten His kingdom, sent forth a power
that should do battle with the race of darkness, and that out of this
commingling our souls are laboring. My argument is brief, and as I
suppose, perfectly clear to any one. If God could have suffered
nothing from the race of darkness because He is inviolable, without
cause He sent us hither that we might here suffer distress. But if
anything can suffer, it is not inviolable, and you deceive those to
whom you say that God is inviolable. For this your heresy denies when
you expound the rest of it.
Fortunatussaid: We are of that mind in which the Apostle Paul
instructs us, who says: "Let this mind be in you that was also in
Christ Jesus, who when He had been constituted in the form of God,
thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but emptied Himself
receiving the form of a servant, having been made in the likeness of
men, and having been found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself,
and was made obedient even unto death." [228]We have this mind
therefore about ourselves, which we have also about Christ, who when
He was constituted in the form of God, was made obedient even unto
death that He might show the similitude of our souls. And like as He
showed in Himself the similitude of death, and having been raised from
the midst of the dead showed that He was from the Father, in the same
manner we think it will be with our souls, because through Him we
shall have been able to be freed from this death, which is either
alien from God, or if it belongs to God, His mercy ceases, and the
name of liberator, and the works of Him who liberates. [229]
8. Augustin said: I ask how we came into death, and you tell how we
may be liberated from death.
Fortunatus said: So the apostle said that we ought to have that mind
concerning ourselves which Christ has shown us. If Christ was in
suffering and death, so also are we.
9. Augustin said: It is known to all that the Catholic faith is to
the effect that our Lord, that is the Power and Wisdom of God, [230]
and the Word through whom all things have been made and without whom
was not anything made, [231] took upon Himself man to liberate us. In
the man whom He took upon Himself, He demonstrated those things that
you spoke of. But we now ask concerning the substance of God Himself
and of Unspeakable Majesty, whether anything can injure it or not.
For if anything can injure it, He is not inviolable. If nothing can
injure the substance of God, what was the race of darkness about to do
to it, against which you say war was waged by God before the
foundation of the world; in which war you assert that we, that is
souls that are now manifestly in need of a liberator, have been
commingled with every evil and implicated in death. For I return to
that very brief statement: If He could be injured, He is not
inviolable; if He could not, He acted cruelly in sending us hither to
suffer these things.
Fortunatus said: Does the soul belong to God, or not?
10. Augustin said: If it is just that you should fail to respond to
my questions, and that I should be questioned, I will reply.
Fortunatus said: Does the soul act independently? This I ask of you.
11. Augustin said: I indeed will tell what you have asked; only
remember this, that while you have refused to respond to my questions,
I have responded to yours. If you ask whether the soul descended from
God, it is indeed a great question; but whether it descends from God
or not, I make this reply concerning the soul, that it is not God;
that God is one thing, the soul another. That God is inviolable,
incorruptible, and impenetrable, and incontaminable, who also could be
corrupted in no part and to whom no injury can be done in any part.
But we see also that the soul is sinful, and is conversant with
misery, and seeks the truth, and is in want of a liberator. This
changing condition of the soul shows me that the soul is not God. For
if the soul is the substance of God, the substance of God errs, the
substance of God is corrupted, the substance of God is violated, the
substance of God is deceived; which it is impious to say.
Fortunatus said: Therefore you have denied that the soul is of God,
so long as it serves sins, and vices, and earthly things, and is led
by error, because it cannot happen that either God or His substance
should suffer this thing. For God is incorruptible and His substance
immaculate and holy. But here it is inquired of you whether the soul
is of God, or not? Which we confess, and show from the advent of the
Saviour, from His holy preaching, from His election; while He pitied
souls, and the soul is said to have come according to His will, that
He might free it from death and might bring it to eternal glory, and
restore it to the Father. But what do you say and hope concerning the
soul; is it from God or not? Can the substance of God, from which you
deny that the soul has its being, be subject to no passions?
12. Augustin said: I have denied that the soul is the substance of
God in the sense of its being God; but yet I hold that it is from God
as its author, because it was made by God. The Maker is one thing,
the thing made is another. He who made cannot be corruptible at all,
but what He made cannot be at all equal to Him who made it.
Fortunatus said: Nor have I said that the soul is like God. But
because you have said that the soul is an artificial thing, and that
there is nothing besides God, I ask whence then God invented the
substance of the soul?
13. Augustin said: Only bear in mind that I reply to your
interrogations, but that you do not reply to mine. I say that the
soul was made by God as all other things that were made by God; and
that among the things that God Almighty made the principal place was
given to the soul. But if you ask whence God made the soul, remember
that you and I agree in confessing that God is almighty. But he is
not almighty who seeks the assistance of any material whence he may
make what he will. From which it follows, that according to our
faith, all things that God made through His Word and Wisdom, He made
out of nothing. For so we read: "He ordered and they were made; He
commanded and they were created." [232]
Fortunatus said: Do all things have their existence from God's
command?
14. Augustin said: So I believe, but all things which were made.
Fortunatus said: As things made they agree, but because they are
unsuitable to themselves, therefore on this account it follows, that
there is not one substance, although from the same order of the One
they came to the composition and fashioning of this world. But it is
plain in the things themselves that there is no similarity between
darkness and light, truth and falsehood, death and life, soul and
body, and other similar things which differ from each other both in
names and appearances. And for good reason did our Lord say: "The
tree which my heavenly Father has not planted shall be rooted up and
cast into the fire, because it brings not forth good fruit:" [233]
and that the tree has been rooted up. Hence truly it follows from the
reason of things that there are two substances in this world which
agree in forms and in names, of which one belongs to corporeal
natures, but the other is the eternal substance of the omnipotent
Father, which we believe to be God's substance.
15. Augustin said: Those contrary things that move you so that we
think adversely, have happened on account of our sin, that is, on
account of the sin of man. For God made all things good, and ordered
them well; but He did not make sin, and our voluntary sin is the only
thing that is called evil. There is another kind of evil, which is
the penalty of sin. Since therefore there are two kinds of evil, sin
and the penalty of sin, sin does not pertain to God; the penalty of
sin pertains to the avenger. For as God is good who constituted all
things, so He is just in taking vengeance on sin. Since therefore all
things are ordered in the best possible way, which seem to us now to
be adverse, it has deservedly happened to fallen man who was unwilling
to keep the law of God. For God gave free will to the rational soul
which is in man. For thus it would have been possible to have merit,
if we should be good voluntarily and not of necessity. Since
therefore it behooves us to be good not of necessity but voluntarily,
it behooved God to give to the soul free will. But to this soul
obeying His laws, He subjected all things without adversity, so that
the rest of the things that God made should serve it, if also the soul
itself had willed to serve God. But if it should refuse to serve God,
those things that served it should be converted into its punishment.
Wherefore if all things are rightly ordered by God, and are good,
neither does God suffer evil.
Fortunatus said: He does not suffer, but prevents evil.
16. Augustin said: From whom then was He about to suffer it?
Fortunatus said: This is my point, that He wished to prevent it, not
rashly, but by power and prescience. But deny evil to be apart from
God, when other precepts can be shown which are done apart from His
will. A precept is not introduced, unless where there is
contrariety. The free faculty of living is not given except where
there is a fall according to the argument of the apostle who says:
"And you did he quicken, when ye were dead in your trespasses and
sins, wherein aforetime ye walked according to the rulership of this
world, according to the prince of the power of the air, of the spirit
that now worketh in the souls of disobedience; among whom we also all
once lived in the lusts of our flesh, doing the desires of the
counsels of the flesh, and were by nature children of wrath, even as
the rest: but God, who is rich in all mercy, had mercy on us. And
when we were dead by sins, quickened us together in Christ, by whose
grace ye have been saved; and at the same time also raised us up, and
made us to sit with Him in the heavenly places with Christ Jesus, that
in the ages to come He might show the exceeding riches of his grace in
kindness toward us in Christ Jesus. For by grace have ye been saved
through faith; and that not of yourselves, for it is a gift of God;
not of works, lest any one should glory. For we are his workmanship
created in Christ Jesus in good works, which God prepared that we
should walk in them. Wherefore remember, that aforetime ye were
Gentiles in the flesh, who are called uncircumcision, by that which is
called circumcision in flesh made by hands, because ye were at that
time without Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and
strangers of the covenant, having no hope of the promise, and without
God in this world. But now in Christ Jesus, ye that once were far off
are made nigh in the blood of Christ. For He is our peace, who made
both one, and breaking down the middle wall of partition, the enmities
in His flesh, making void by His decrees the law of commandments, that
in Himself He might unite the two into one new man, making peace, that
He might reconcile them both in one body unto God through the cross,
slaying the enmities in Himself. And He came and preached peace unto
you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh. For through
Him we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father." [234]
17. Augustin said: This passage from the apostle, which you have
thought fit to recite, if I mistake not, makes very strongly for my
faith and against yours. In the first place, because free will
itself, on which I have said that the possibility of the soul's
sinning depends, is here sufficiently expressed, when sins are
mentioned, and it is said that our reconciliation with God takes place
through Jesus Christ. For by sinning we were brought into opposition
to God; but by holding to the precepts of Christ we are reconciled to
God; so that we who were dead in sins may be made alive by keeping His
precepts, and may have peace with Him in one Spirit, from whom we were
alienated, by failure to keep His precepts; as is set forth in our
faith concerning the man who was first created. I ask of you,
therefore, according to that passage which has been read, how can we
have sins if contrary nature compels us to do what we do? For he who
is compelled by nature to do anything, does not sin. But he who sins,
sins by free will. Wherefore would repentance be enjoined upon us, if
we have done nothing evil, but only the race of darkness? Likewise, I
ask, to whom is forgiveness of sins granted, to us or to the race of
darkness? If to the race of darkness, their race will also reign with
Him, receiving the forgiveness of sin; but if to us it is manifest
that we have sinned voluntarily. For it is the height of folly for
him to be pardoned who has done no evil. But he has done no evil, who
has done nothing of his own will. Therefore the soul that today
promises itself forgiveness of sins and reconciliation to God, if it
should cease to sin, and repent of past sins: if it should answer
according to your faith and should say: In what have I sinned? In
what am I guilty? Why hast Thou expelled me from Thy domains, that I
might do battle with some sort of race? I have been trodden under
foot, I have been mixed up, I have been corrupted, I am worn out,
[235] my free will has not been preserved. Thou knowest the necessity
by which I am preserved: Why dost Thou impute to me the wounds that I
have received? Wherefore dost Thou compel me to repentance when Thou
art the cause of my wounds; when Thou knowest what I have suffered,
what the race of darkness has done against me, Thou being the author
who couldst suffer no harm and yet wishing to save the domains which
nothing could injure, Thou didst thrust me down into these miseries.
If indeed I am a part of Thee, who have proceeded from Thy bowels, if
I am from Thy kingdom and Thy mouth, I ought not to suffer anything in
this race of darkness, so that I being uncorrupted that race should be
subjected, if I was a part of the Lord. But now since it cannot be
controlled except by my corruption, how can I either be said to be a
part of Thee, or Thou remain inviolable, or not be cruel in wishing me
to suffer for those domains, that could in no way be injured by that
race of darkness? Respond to this if you please, and deign also to
explain to me how it was said by the apostle, "We were by nature
children of wrath," who, he says, have been reconciled to God. If
therefore they were by nature children of wrath, how do you say that
the soul is by nature a daughter and portion of God?
Fortunatussaid: If with regard to the soul the apostle had said that
we are by nature children of wrath, the soul would have been alienated
by the mouth of the apostle from God. From this argument you only
show that the soul does not belong to God, because, the apostle says,
"We are by nature children of wrath." But if it is said in view of
the fact that the apostle [236] was held by the law, descending as he
himself testifies, from the seed of Abraham, it follows that he has
said corporeally, that we [i.e., Jews] were children of wrath even as
the rest of mankind. But he shows that the substance of the soul is
of God, and that the soul cannot otherwise be reconciled to God than
through the Master, who is Christ Jesus. For the enmity having been
slain, the soul seemed to God unworthy to have existed. But that it
was sent, this we confess, by God yet omnipotent, both deriving its
origin from Him and sent for the sealing of His will. In the same way
we believe also that Christ the Saviour came from heaven to fulfill
the will of the Father. Which will of the Father was this, to free
our souls from the same enmity, this enmity having been slain, which
if it had not been opposed to God could neither be called enmity where
there was unity, nor could slaying be spoken of or take place where
there was life.
18. Augustin said: Remember that the apostle said that we are
alienated from God by our manner of life.
Fortunatus said: I submit, that there were two substances. In the
substance of light, as we have above said, God is to be held
incorruptible; but that there was a contrary nature of darkness, that
which I also today confess is vanquished by the power of God, and that
Christ has been sent forth as a Saviour for my restoration, as
previously the same apostle says.
19. Augustin said: That we should discuss on rational grounds the
belief in two natures, has been made obligatory by those who are
hearing us. But inasmuch as you have again betaken yourself to the
Scriptures, I descend to them, and demand that nothing be passed by,
lest using certain statements we should bring confusion into the minds
of those to whom the Scriptures are not well known. Let us therefore
consider a statement that the apostle has in his epistle to the
Romans. For on the first page is what is strongly against you. For
he says: "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle,
separated unto the gospel of God, which He promised aforetime by His
prophets in the Holy Scriptures, concerning his Son, who was made unto
Him of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestinated
to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness
from the resurrection from the dead of our Lord Jesus Christ." [237]
We see that the apostle teaches us concerning our Lord Jesus Christ
that before the flesh he was predestinated by the power of God, and
according to the flesh was made unto Him of the seed of David. Since
you have always denied and always will deny this, how do you so
earnestly demand the Scriptures that we should discuss rather
according to them.
Fortunatussaid: You assert that according to the flesh Christ was of
the seed of David, when it should be asserted that he was born of a
virgin, [238] and should be magnified as Son of God. For this cannot
be, unless as what is from spirit may be held to be spirit, so also
what is from flesh may be known to be flesh. [239]Against which is
the authority of the Gospel in which it is said, that "flesh and blood
shall not inherit the kingdom of God, neither shall corruption inherit
incorruption." [240]
Here a clamor was made by the audience who wished the argument to be
conducted on rational grounds, because they saw that Fortunatus was
not willing to receive all things that are written in the Codex of the
apostle. Then little discussions began to be held here and there by
all, until Fortunatus said that the Word of God has been fettered in
the race of darkness. At which, when those present had expressed
their horror, the meeting was closed. [241]
Footnotes
[221] This Disputation seems to have occurred shortly after the
writing of the preceding treatise. It appears from the Retractations
that Fortunatus had lived for a considerable time at Hippo, and had
secured so large a number of followers that it was a delight to him to
dwell there. The Disputation is supposed to be a verbatim report of
what Augustin and Fortunatus said during a two days' discussion. The
subject is the origin of evil. Augustin maintains that evil, so far
as man is concerned, has arisen from a free exercise of the will on
man's part; Fortunatus, on the other hand, maintains that the nature
of evil is co-eternal with God. Fortunatus shows considerable
knowledge of the New Testament, but no remarkable dialectic powers.
He appears at great disadvantage beside his great antagonist. In
fact, he is far from saying the best that can be said in favor of
dualism. We may say that he was fairly vanquished in the argument,
and at the close confessed himself at a loss what to say, and
expressed an intention of more carefully examining the problems
discussed, in view of what Augustin had said. Augustin is more
guarded in this treatise than in the preceding in his statements about
free will. He found little occasion here, therefore, to retract or
explain. Fortunatus often expresses himself vaguely and obscurely.
If some sentences are difficult to understand in the translation, they
will be found equally so in the Latin.--A.H.N.
[222] The word used is oratio, by which is evidently meant the
religious services to which Auditors were admitted, prayer (oratio)
being the prominent feature.--A.H.N.
[223] The allusion here is doubtless to the probably slanderous charge
that the Manichæans were accustomed to partake of human semen as a
Eucharist. The Manichæan view of the relation of the substance
mentioned to the light, and their well-known opposition to
procreation, give a slight plausibility to the charge. Compare the
Morals of the Manichæans, ch. xviii., where Augustin expresses his
suspicions of Manichæan shamelessness. See also further references in
the Introduction.--A.H.N.
[224] This is, of course, a mixture of two passages of
Scripture.--A.H.N.
[225] John xiv. 8, 9.
[226] John v. 24.
[227] As remarked in the Introduction, the Manichæans of the West, in
Augustin's time, sustained a far more intimate relation to
Christianity than did Mani and his immediate followers. Far as
Fortunatus may have been from using the above language in the ordinary
Christian sense, yet he held, by profession at least, enough of
Christian truth to beguile the unwary.--A.H.N.
[228] Philipp. ii. 5-8.
[229] Fortunatus could not surely have used this language with any
proper conception of its meaning. He seems, against Mani, to have
identified in some sense the Jesus that suffered with Christ. Yet
even in this statement his docetism is manifest.--A.H.N.
[230] 1 Cor. i. 24.
[231] John i. 3.
[232] Ps. cxlviii. 5.
[233] Matt. xv. 13, and iii. 10.
[234] Eph. ii. 1-18. There are several somewhat important variations
from the Greek text in this long extract. The attentive reader can
get a good idea of the nature of the variations by comparing this
literal translation with the revised English version.--A.H.N.
[235] There are three readings here, "wearied out," "deceived," and
"worn out." The latter is preferred by the Benedictine
editors.--A.H.N.
[236] Rom. xi. 1.
[237] Rom. i. 1-4.
[238] Isa. vii. 14.
[239] John iii. 6.
[240] 1 Cor. xv. 50.
[241] This little side remark lends reality to the discussion, and
enables us to form a vivid conception of what doctrinal debates were
in the age of Augustin.--A.H.N.
.
Disputation of the Second Day.
The next day, a notary having again been summoned, the discussion was
conducted as follows:
Fortunatus said: I say that God Almighty brings forth from Himself
nothing evil, and that the things that are His remain incorrupt,
having sprung and being born from an inviolable source; but other
contrary things which have their being in this world, do not flow from
God nor have appeared in this world with God as their author; that is
to say, they do not derive their origin from God. These things
therefore we have received in the belief that evil things are foreign
to God.
20. Augustin said: And our faith is this, that God is not the
progenitor of evil things, neither has He made any evil nature. But
since both of us agree that God is incorruptible and incontaminable,
it is the part of the prudent and faithful to consider, which faith is
purer and worthier of the majesty of God; that in which it is asserted
that either the power of God, or some part of God, or the Word of God,
can be changed, violated, corrupted, fettered; or that in which it is
said that Almighty God and His entire nature and substance can never
be corrupted in any part, but that evils have their being by the
voluntary sin of the soul, to which God gave free will. Which free
will if God had not given, there could be no just penal judgment, nor
merit of righteous conduct, nor divine instruction to repent of sins,
nor the forgiveness of sins itself which God has bestowed upon us
through our Lord Jesus Christ. Because he who sins not voluntarily,
sins not at all. This I suppose to be open and perspicuous to all.
Wherefore it ought not to trouble us if according to our deserts we
suffer some inconveniences in the things God has made. For as He is
good, that He should constitute all things; so He is just, that He may
not spare sins, which sins, as I have said, unless free will were in
us, would not be sins. For if any one, so to speak, should be bound
by some one in his other members, and with his hand something false
should be written without his own will, I ask whether if this were
laid open before a judge, he could condemn this one for the crime of
falsehood. Wherefore, if it is manifest that there is no sin where
there is not free exercise of will, [242] I wish to hear what evil the
soul which you call either part, or power, or word, or something else,
of God, has done, that it should be punished by God, or repent of sin,
or merit forgiveness, since it has in no way sinned?
Fortunatus said: I proposed concerning substances, that God is to be
regarded as creator only of good things, but as the avenger of evil
things, for the reason that evil things are not of Him. Therefore for
good reason I think this, and that God avenges evil things because
they are not of Himself. But if they were from Him, either He would
give them license to sin, as you say that God has given free will, He
would be already found a participator in my fault, because He would be
the author of my fault; or ignorant what I should be, he left me whom
he did not constitute worthy of Himself. This therefore is proposed
by me, and what I ask now is, whether God instituted evil or not? and
whether He Himself instituted the end of evils. For it appears from
these things, and the evangelical faith teaches, that the things which
we have said were made by God Himself as God the Creator, as having
been created and begotten by Him, are to be esteemed incorruptible.
These things I also proposed which belong to our belief, and which can
be confirmed by you in that profession of ours, without prejudice to
the authority of the Christian faith. And because I can in no way
show that I rightly believe, unless I should confirm that belief by
the authority of the Scriptures, this is therefore what I have
insinuated, what I have said. Either if evil things have appeared in
the world with God as their author, deign to say so yourself; or if it
is right to believe that evil things are not of God, this also the
contemplation of those present ought to honor and receive. I have
spoken about substances, not about sin that dwells in us. For if what
we think to make faults had no origin, we should not be compelled to
come to sin or to fault. For because we sinned unwillingly, and are
compelled by a substance contrary and hostile to ourselves, therefore
we follow the knowledge of things. By which knowledge the soul
admonished and restored to pristine memory, recognizes the source from
which it derives its existence, in what evil it dwells, by what good
works emending again that in which unwillingly it sinned, it may be
able through the emendation of its faults, for the sake of good works,
to secure for itself the merit of reconciliation with God, our Saviour
being the author of it, who teaches us also to practice good things
and to flee from evil. For you ask us to believe that not by some
contrary nature, but by his own choice, man either serves
righteousness or becomes involved in sins; since, no contrary race
existing, if the soul, to which as you say God has given free will,
having been constituted in the body, dwells alone, it would be without
sin, nor would it become involved in sins.
21. Augustin said: I say it is not sin, if it be not committed by
one's own will; hence also there is reward, because of our own will we
do right. Or if he who sins unwillingly deserves punishment, he who
unwillingly does well ought to deserve reward. But who doubts that
reward is only bestowed upon him who does something of good will?
From which we know that punishment also is inflicted upon him who does
something of ill will. But since you recall me to primordial natures
and substances, my faith is that God Almighty--which must especially
be attended to and fixed in the mind--that God Almighty has made good
things. But the things made by Him cannot be such as is He who made
them. For it is unjust and foolish to believe that works are equal to
the workman, things made to the maker. Wherefore if it is reverential
to believe that God made all good things, than which nevertheless He
is by far more excellent and by far more pre-eminent; the origin and
head of evil is sin, as the apostle said: "Covetousness is the root
of all evils; which some following after have made shipwreck of the
faith, and have pierced themselves through with many sorrows." [243]
For if you seek the root of all evils, you have the apostle saying
that covetousness is the root of all evils. But the root of a root I
cannot seek. Or if there is another evil, whose root covetousness is
not, covetousness will not be the root of all evils. But if it is
true that covetousness is the root of all evils, in vain do we seek
some other kind of evil. But as regards that contrary nature of yours
which you introduce, since I have responded to your objections, I ask
that you deign to tell me whether it is wholly evil, whether there can
be no sin apart from it, whether by this alone punishment is deserved,
not by the soul by which no sin has been committed. But if you say
that this contrary nature alone deserves punishment, and not the soul,
I ask to which is repentance, which is commanded, vouchsafed. If the
soul is commanded to repent, sin is from the soul, and the soul has
sinned voluntarily. For if the soul is compelled to do evil, that
which it does is not evil. Is it not foolish and most absurd to say
that the race of darkness has sinned and that I repent of the sins.
Is it not most absurd to say that the race of darkness has sinned and
that forgiveness of sins is vouchsafed to me, who according to your
faith may well say: What have I done? What have I committed? I was
with Thee, I was in a state of integrity, I was contaminated with no
pollution. Thou didst send me hither, Thou didst suffer necessity,
Thou didst protect Thy domains when great pollution and desolation
threatened them. Since therefore Thou knowest the necessity by which
I have been here oppressed, by reason of which I could not breathe,
which I could not resist; why dost Thou accuse me as if sinning? or
why dost Thou promise forgiveness of sins? Reply to this without
evasion, if you please, as I have replied to you.
Fortunatussaid: We say this, that the soul is compelled by contrary
nature to transgress, for which transgression you maintain there is no
root save the evil that dwells in us; for it is certain that apart
from our bodies evil things dwell in the whole world. For not those
things alone that we have in our bodies, dwell in the whole world, and
are known by their names as good; an evil root also inheres. For your
dignity said that this covetousness that dwells in our bodies is the
root of evils; since therefore there is no desire of evil out of our
bodies, from that source contrary nature dwells in the whole world.
For the apostle designated that, namely covetousness, as the root of
evils, not one evil which you have called the root of all evils. But
not in one manner is covetousness, which you have said is the root of
all evils, understood, as if of that which dwells in our bodies alone;
for it is certain that this evil which dwells in us descends from an
evil author and that this root as you call it is a small portion of
evil, so that it is not the root itself, but is a small portion of
evil, of that evil which dwells everywhere. Which root and tree our
Lord called evil, as never bearing good fruit, which his Father did
not plant, and which is deservedly rooted up and cast into the fire.
[244]For as you say, that sin ought to be imputed to the contrary
nature, that nature belongs to evil; and that this is sin of the soul,
if after the warning of our Saviour and his wholesome instruction, the
soul shall have segregated itself from its contrary and hostile race,
adorning itself also with purer things; that otherwise it cannot be
restored to its own substance. For it is said: "If I had not come
and spoken unto them, they had not had sin. But now that I have come
and spoken, and they have refused to believe me, they shall have no
excuse for their sin." [245] Whence it is perfectly plain, that
repentance has been given after the Saviour's advent, and after this
knowledge of things, by which the soul can, as if washed in a divine
fountain from the filth and vices as well of the whole world as of the
bodies in which the same soul dwells, be restored to the kingdom of
God whence it has gone forth. For it is said by the apostle, that
"the mind of the flesh is hostile to God; is not subject to the law of
God, neither indeed can be." [246]Therefore it is evident from
these things that the good soul seems to sin not voluntarily, but by
the doing of that which is not subject to the law of God. For it
likewise follows that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the
spirit against the flesh; so that ye may not do the things that ye
will." [247]Again: "I see another law in my members, warring
against the law of my mind and leading me captive in the law of sin
and of death. Therefore I am a miserable man; who shall deliver me
from the body of this death, unless it be the grace of God through our
Lord Jesus Christ," [248] "through whom the world has been crucified
to me and I to the world?" [249]
22. Augustin said: I recognize and embrace the testimonies of the
divine Scriptures, and I will show in a few words, as God may deign to
grant, how they are consistent with my faith. I say that there was
free exercise of will in that man who was first formed. He was so
made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed
to keep the precepts of God. But after he voluntarily sinned, we who
have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity. But each
one of us can by a little consideration find that what I say is true.
For today in our actions before we are implicated by any habit, we
have free choice of doing anything or not doing it. But when by that
liberty we have done something and the pernicious sweetness and
pleasure of that deed has taken hold upon the mind, by its own habit
the mind is so implicated that afterwards it cannot conquer what by
sinning it has fashioned for itself. We see many who do not wish to
swear, but because the tongue has already become habituated, they are
not able to prevent those things from going forth from the mouth which
we cannot but ascribe to the root of evil. For that I may discuss
with you those words, which as they do not withdraw from your mouth so
may they be understood by your heart: you swear by the Paraclete. If
therefore you wish to find out experimentally whether what I say is
true, determine not to swear. You will see, that that habit is borne
along as it has become accustomed to be. And this is what wars
against the soul, habit formed in the flesh. This is indeed the mind
of the flesh, which, as long as it cannot thus be subject to the law
of God, so long is it the mind of the flesh; but when the soul has
been illuminated it ceases to be the mind of the flesh. For thus it
is said the mind of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God,
just as if it were said, that snow cannot be warm. For so long as it
is snow, it can in no way be warm. But as the snow is melted by heat,
so that it may become warm, so the mind of the flesh, that is, habit
formed with the flesh, when our mind has become illuminated, that is,
when God has subjected for Himself the whole man to the choice of the
divine law, instead of the evil habit of the soul, makes a good
habit. Accordingly it is most truly said by the Lord of the two
trees, the one good and the other evil, which you have called to mind,
that they have their own fruits; that is, neither can the good tree
yield evil fruit, nor the evil tree good fruit, but so long as it is
evil. Let us take two men, a good and a bad. As long as he is good
he cannot yield evil fruit; as long as he is bad he cannot yield good
fruit. But that you may know that those two trees are so placed by
the Lord, that free choice may be there signified, that these two
trees are not natures but our wills, He Himself says in the gospel:
"Either make the tree good, or make the tree evil." [250]Who is it
that can make nature? If therefore we are commanded to make a tree
either good or evil, it is ours to choose what we will. Therefore
concerning that sin of man and concerning that habit of soul formed
with the flesh the apostle says: "Let no one seduce you;" [251]
"Every creature that has been made by God is good." [252]The same
apostle whom you also have cited says: "As through the disobedience
of the one the many were constituted sinners; so also through the
obedience of the one the many are constituted righteous." [253]
"Since through man is death, through man also is resurrection of the
dead." As long therefore as we bear the image of the earthly man,
[254] that is, as long as we live according to the flesh, which is
also called the old man, we have the necessity of our habit, so that
we may not do what we will. But when the grace of God has breathed
the divine love into us and has made us subject to His will, to us it
is said: "Ye are called for freedom," [255] and "the grace of God has
made me free from the law of sin and of death." [256]But the law of
sin is that whoever has sinned shall die. From this law we are freed
when we have begun to be righteous. The law of death is that by which
it was said to man: "Earth thou art and into earth thou shalt go."
[257]For from this very fact we are all so born, because we are
earth, and from the fact that we are all so born because we are earth,
we shall all go into earth on account of the desert of the sins of the
first man. But on account of the grace of God, which frees us from
the law of sin and of death, having been converted to righteousness we
are freed; so that afterwards this same flesh tortures us with its
punishment so long as we remain in sins, is subjected to us in
resurrection, and shakes us by no adversity from keeping the law of
God and His precepts. Whence, since I have replied to your questions,
deign to reply as I desire, how it can happen, that if nature is
contrary to God, sin should be imputed to us, who were sent into that
nature not voluntarily, but by God Himself, whom nothing could injure?
Fortunatussaid: Just as also the Lord said to His disciples: "Behold
I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves." [258]Hence it must be
known that not with hostile intent did our Saviour send forth His
lambs, that is His disciples, into the midst of wolves, unless there
had been some contrariety, which He would indicate by the similitude
of wolves, where also He had sent His disciples; that the souls which
perchance might be deceived in the midst of wolves might be recalled
to their proper substance. Hence also may appear the antiquity of our
times to which we return, and of our years, that before the foundation
of the world souls were sent in this way against the contrary nature,
that subjecting the same by their passion, victory might be restored
to God. For the same apostle said, that not only there should be a
struggle against flesh and blood, but also against principalities and
powers, and the spiritual things of wickedness, and the domination of
darkness." [259]If therefore in both places evils dwell and are
esteemed wickednesses, not only now is evil in our bodies, but in the
whole world, where souls appear to dwell, which dwell beneath yonder
heaven and are fettered.
23. Augustin said: The Lord sent His lambs into the midst of wolves,
that is, just men into the midst of sinners for the preaching of the
gospel received in the time of man from the inestimable divine Wisdom,
that He might call us from sin to righteousness. But what the apostle
says, that our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against
principalities and powers, and the other things that have been quoted,
this signifies that the devil and his angels, as also we, have fallen
and lapsed by sin, and have secured possession of earthly things, that
is, sinful men, who, as long as we are sinners, are under their yoke,
just as when we shall be righteous, we shall be under the yoke of
righteousness; and against them we have a struggle, that passing over
to righteousness we may be freed from their dominion. Do you also
therefore deign to reply to the one question that I ask: Could God
suffer injury, or not? But I ask you to reply: He could not.
Fortunatus said: He could not suffer injury.
24. Augustin said: Wherefore then did He send us hither, according
to your faith?
Fortunatus said: My profession is this, that God could not be
injured, and that He directed us hither. But since this is contrary
to your view, do you tell how you account for the soul being here,
which our God desires to liberate both by His commandments and by His
own Son whom He has sent.
25. Augustin said: Since I see that you cannot answer my inquiries,
and wish to ask me something, behold I satisfy you, provided only that
you bear in mind that you have not replied to my question. Why the
soul is here in this world involved in miseries has been explained by
me not just now, but again and again a little while ago. The soul
sinned, and therefore is miserable. It accepted free choice, used
free choice, as it willed; it fell, was cast out from blessedness, was
implicated in miseries. As bearing upon this I recited to you the
testimony of the apostle who says: "As through one man death, so also
through one man came the resurrection of the dead." What more do you
ask? Hence do you reply, wherefore did He, who could not suffer
injury, send us hither?
Fortunatus said: The cause must be sought, why the soul came hither,
or wherefore God desires hence to liberate the soul that lives in the
midst of evils?
26. Augustin said: This cause I ask of you, that is, if God could
not suffer injury, wherefore He sent us hither?
Fortunatus said: It is inquired of us, if evil cannot injure God,
wherefore the soul was sent hither, or for what reason was it mingled
with the world? Which is manifest in what the apostle says: "Shall
the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou formed me
thus?" [260]If therefore this cause must be pleaded, He must be
asked, why He sent the soul, no necessity compelling Him. But if
there was necessity for sending the soul, of right is there also the
will of liberating it.
27. Augustin said: Then God is pressed by necessity, is He?
Fortunatus said: Now this is it. Do not seek to bring odium upon
what has been said because we do not make God subject to necessity,
but to have voluntarily sent the soul.
28. Augustin said: Recall what was said above. And it runs: "But
if there was necessity for sending the soul, of right is there also
the will of liberating it. Augustin said: We have heard: But if
there was necessity for sending the soul, of right is there also the
will of liberating it." You, therefore, said that there was necessity
for sending the soul. But if you only wish to say "a will to send," I
add this also: He who could suffer no injury, had the cruel will to
send the soul to so great miseries. Because I speak for the sake of
refuting this statement, I ask pardon from the mercy of that One in
whom we have hope of liberation from all the errors of heretics.
Fortunatus said: You asseverate that we say that God is cruel in
sending the soul, but that God made man, breathed into him a soul
which assuredly He foreknew to be involved in future misery, and not
to be able by reason of evils to be restored to its inheritance. This
belongs either to one who is ignorant, or who gives the soul up to
these aforesaid evils. This I have cited because you said not long
since, that God adopted the soul, not that it is from Him; for to
adopt is a different matter.
29. Augustin said: Concerning adoption I remember that I spoke some
days ago according to the testimony of the apostle, who says that we
have been called into the adoption of sons. [261]This was not my
reply, therefore, but the apostle's, concerning which thing, that is,
that adoption, we may inquire, if we please, in its own time; and
concerning that I will reply without delay, when you shall have
answered my objections.
Fortunatus said: I say that there was a going forth of the soul
against a contrary nature, which nature could not injure God.
30. Augustin said: What need was there for that going forth, when
God whom nothing could injure had nothing to protect?
Fortunatus said: Do you conscientiously hold that Christ came from
God?
31. Augustin said: Again you are questioning me. Reply to my
inquiries.
Fortunatus said: So I have received in faith, that by the will of God
He came hither.
32. Augustin said: And I say: Why did God, omnipotent, inviolable,
immutable, whom nothing could injure, send hither the soul, to
miseries, to error, to those things that we suffer?
Fortunatussaid: For it has been said: "I have power to lay down my
soul and I have power to take it again." [262]Now He said that by
the will of God the soul went forth.
33. Augustin said: I ask for the reason why God, when He can in no
way suffer injury, sent the soul hither?
Fortunatus said: We have already said that God can in no way suffer
injury, and we have said that the soul is in a contrary nature,
therefore that it imposes a limit on the contrary nature. The
restraint having been imposed on the contrary nature, God takes the
same. For He Himself said, "I have power to lay down my soul and
power to take it." The Father gave to me the power of laying down my
soul, and of taking it. To what soul, therefore, did God who spoke in
the Son refer? Evidently our soul, which is held in these
bodies,which came of His will, and of His will is again taken up.
34. Augustin said: Why our Lord said: "I have power to lay down my
soul and power to take it," is known to all; because He was about to
suffer and to rise again. But I ask of you again and again, If God
could in no way suffer injury, why did he send souls hither?
Fortunatus said: To impose a limit on contrary nature.
35. Augustin said: And did God omnipotent, merciful and supreme,
that He might impose a restraint on contrary nature, wish it to be
limited so that He might make us unrestrained?
Fortunatus said: But so He calls us back to Himself.
36. Augustin said: If He recalls to Himself from an unrestrained
state, if from sin, from error, from misery, what need was there for
the soul to suffer so great evils through so long a time till the
world ends? since God by whom you say it was sent could in no way
suffer injury.
Fortunatus said: What then am I to say?
37. Augustin said: I know that you have nothing to say, and that I,
when I was among you, never found anything to say on this question,
and that I was thus admonished from on high to leave that error and to
be converted to the Catholic faith or rather to recall it, by the
indulgence of Him who did not permit me to inhere forever in this
fallacy. But if you confess that you have nothing to reply, I will
expound the Catholic faith to all those hearing and investigating,
seeing that they are believers, if they permit and wish.
Fortunatus said: Without prejudice to my profession I might say:
when I shall have reconsidered with my superiors the things that have
been opposed by you, if they fail to respond to this question of mine,
which is now in like manner proposed to me by you, it will be in my
contemplation (since I desire my soul to be liberated by an assured
faith) to come to the investigation of this thing that you have
proposed to me and that you promise you will show.
Augustin said: Thanks be to God.
Footnotes
[242] Liberum voluntatis arbitrium.
[243] 1 Tim. vi. 10.
[244] Matt. xv. 13, and iii. 10.
[245] John xv. 22.
[246] Rom. viii. 7.
[247] Gal. v. 17.
[248] Rom. vii. 23-25.
[249] Gal. v. 14.
[250] Matt. xii. 35.
[251] Eph. v. 6.
[252] 1 Tim. iv. 4.
[253] Rom. v. 19.
[254] 1 Cor. xv. 21, 49.
[255] Gal. v. 13.
[256] Rom. viii. 2.
[257] Gen. iii. 19.
[258] Matt. x. 16.
[259] Eph. v. 12.
[260] Rom. ix. 20.
[261] Eph. i. 5.
[262] John x. 18.
.
St. Augustin,
Against the Epistle of Manichæus, called Fundamental.
[contra epistolam manichæi quam vocant fundamentum]. [263]
A.D. 397.
translated by Rev. Richard Stothert, M.A., Bombay
Chapter 1.--To Heal Heretics is Better Than to Destroy Them.
1. My prayer to the one true, almighty God, of whom, and through
whom, and in whom are all things, has been, and is now, that in
opposing and refuting the heresy of you Manichæans, as you may after
all be heretics more from thoughtlessness than from malice, He would
give me a mind calm and composed, and aiming at your recovery rather
than at your discomfiture. For while the Lord, by His servants,
overthrows the kingdoms of error, His will concerning erring men, as
far as they are men, is that they should be amended rather than
destroyed. And in every case where, previous to the final judgment,
God inflicts punishment, whether through the wicked or the righteous,
whether through the unintelligent or through the intelligent, whether
in secret or openly, we must believe that the designed effect is the
healing of men, and not their ruin; while there is a preparation for
the final doom in the case of those who reject the means of recovery.
Thus, as the universe contains some things which serve for bodily
punishment, as fire, poison, disease, and the rest, and other things,
in which the mind is punished, not by bodily distress, but by the
entanglements of its own passions, such as loss, exile, bereavement,
reproach, and the like; while other things, again, without tormenting
are fitted to comfort and soothe the languishing, as, for example,
consolations, exhortations, discussions, and such things; in all these
the supreme justice of God makes use sometimes even of wicked men,
acting in ignorance, and sometimes of good men, acting intelligently.
It is ours, accordingly, to desire in preference the better part, that
we might attain our end in your correction, not by contention, and
strife, and persecutions, but by kindly consolation, by friendly
exhortation, by quiet discussion; as it is written, "The servant of
the Lord must not strive; but be gentle toward all men, apt to teach,
patient; in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves." [264]
It is ours, I say, to desire to obtain this part in the work; it
belongs to God to give what is good to those who desire it and ask for
it.
Footnotes
[263] Written about the year 397. In his Retractations (ii. 2)
Augustin says: "The book against the Epistle of Manichæus, called
Fundamental, refutes only its commencement; but on the other parts of
the epistle I have made notes, as required, refuting the whole, and
sufficient to recall the argument, had I ever had leisure to write
against the whole." [The Fundamental Epistle seems to have been a
sort of hand-book for Manichæan catechumens or Auditors. In making
this document the basis of his attack, Augustin felt that he had
selected the best-known and most generally accepted standard of the
Manichæan faith. The tone of the work is conciliatory, yet some very
sharp thrusts are made at Manichæan error. The claims of Mani to be
the Paraclete are set aside, and the absurd cosmological fancies of
Mani are ruthlessly exposed. Dualism is combated with substantially
the same weapons as in the treatise Concerning Two Souls. We could
wish that the author had found time to finish the treatise, and had
thus preserved for us more of the Fundamental Epistle itself. This
work was written after the author had become Bishop of Hippo.--A.H.N.]
[264] 2 Tim. ii. 24, 25.
Chapter 2.--Why the Manichæans Should Be More Gently Dealt with.
2. Let those rage against you who know not with what labor the truth
is to be found and with what difficulty error is to be avoided. Let
those rage against you who know not how rare and hard it is to
overcome the fancies of the flesh by the serenity of a pious
disposition. Let those rage against you who know not the difficulty
of curing the eye of the inner man that he may gaze upon his Sun,--not
that sun which you worship, and which shines with the brilliance of a
heavenly body in the eyes of carnal men and of beasts,--but that of
which it is written through the prophet, "The Sun of righteousness has
arisen upon me;" [265] and of which it is said in the gospel, "That
was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the
world." [266]Let those rage against you who know not with what
sighs and groans the least particle of the knowledge of God is
obtained. And, last of all, let those rage against you who have never
been led astray in the same way that they see that you are.
Footnotes
[265] Mal. iv. 2.
[266] John i. 9.
Chapter 3.--Augustin Once a Manichæan.
3. For my part, I,--who, after much and long-continued bewilderment,
attained at last, to the discovery of the simple truth, which is
learned without being recorded in any fanciful legend; who, unhappy
that I was, barely succeeded, by God's help, in refuting the vain
imaginations of my mind, gathered from theories and errors of various
kinds; who so late sought the cure of my mental obscuration, in
compliance with the call and the tender persuasion of the all-merciful
Physician; who long wept that the immutable and inviolable Existence
would vouchsafe to convince me inwardly of Himself, in harmony with
the testimony of the sacred books; by whom, in fine, all those
fictions which have such a firm hold on you, from your long
familiarity with them, were diligently examined, and attentively
heard, and too easily believed, and commended at every opportunity to
the belief of others, and defended against opponents with
determination and boldness,--I can on no account rage against you; for
I must bear with you now as formerly I had to bear with myself, and I
must be as patient towards you as my associates were with me, when I
went madly and blindly astray in your beliefs.
4. On the other hand, all must allow that you owe it to me, in
return, to lay aside all arrogance on your part too, that so you may
be the more disposed to gentleness, and may not oppose me in a hostile
spirit, to your own hurt. Let neither of us assert that he has found
truth; let us seek it as if it were unknown to us both. For truth can
be sought with zeal and unanimity if by no rash presumption it is
believed to have been already found and ascertained. But if I cannot
induce you to grant me this, at least allow me to suppose myself a
stranger now for the first time hearing you, for the first time
examining your doctrines. I think my demand a just one. And it must
be laid down as an understood thing that I am not to join you in your
prayers, or in holding conventicles, or in taking the name of
Manichæus, unless you give me a clear explanation, without any
obscurity, of all matters touching the salvation of the soul.
Chapter 4.--Proofs of the Catholic Faith.
5. For in the Catholic Church, not to speak of the purest wisdom, to
the knowledge of which a few spiritual men attain in this life, so as
to know it, in the scantiest measure, indeed, because they are but
men, still without any uncertainty (since the rest of the multitude
derive their entire security not from acuteness of intellect, but from
simplicity of faith,)--not to speak of this wisdom, which you do not
believe to be in the Catholic Church, there are many other things
which most justly keep me in her bosom. The consent of peoples and
nations keeps me in the Church; so does her authority, inaugurated by
miracles, nourished by hope, enlarged by love, established by age.
The succession of priests keeps me, beginning from the very seat of
the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord, after His resurrection, gave it
in charge to feed His sheep, down to the present episcopate. And so,
lastly, does the name itself of Catholic, which, not without reason,
amid so many heresies, the Church has thus retained; so that, though
all heretics wish to be called Catholics, yet when a stranger asks
where the Catholic Church meets, no heretic will venture to point to
his own chapel or house. Such then in number and importance are the
precious ties belonging to the Christian name which keep a believer in
the Catholic Church, as it is right they should, though from the
slowness of our understanding, or the small attainment of our life,
the truth may not yet fully disclose itself. But with you, where
there is none of these things to attract or keep me, the promise of
truth is the only thing that comes into play. Now if the truth is so
clearly proved as to leave no possibility of doubt, it must be set
before all the things that keep me in the Catholic Church; but if
there is only a promise without any fulfillment, no one shall move me
from the faith which binds my mind with ties so many and so strong to
the Christian religion.
Chapter 5.--Against the Title of the Epistle of Manichæus.
6. Let us see then what Manichæus teaches me; and particularly let us
examine that treatise which he calls the Fundamental Epistle, in which
almost all that you believe is contained. For in that unhappy time
when we read it we were in your opinion enlightened. The epistle
begins thus:--"Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the
providence of God the Father. These are wholesome words from the
perennial and living fountain." Now, if you please, patiently give
heed to my inquiry. I do not believe Manichæus to be an apostle of
Christ. Do not, I beg of you, be enraged and begin to curse. For you
know that it is my rule to believe none of your statements without
consideration. Therefore I ask, who is this Manichæus? You will
reply, An apostle of Christ. I do not believe it. Now you are at a
loss what to say or do; for you promised to give knowledge of the
truth, and here you are forcing me to believe what I have no knowledge
of. Perhaps you will read the gospel to me, and will attempt to find
there a testimony to Manichæus. But should you meet with a person not
yet believing the gospel, how would you reply to him were he to say, I
do not believe? For my part, I should not believe the gospel except
as moved by the authority of the Catholic Church. [267]So when
those on whose authority I have consented to believe in the gospel
tell me not to believe in Manichæus, how can I but consent? Take your
choice. If you say, Believe the Catholics: their advice to me is to
put no faith in you; so that, believing them, I am precluded from
believing you;--If you say, Do not believe the Catholics: you cannot
fairly use the gospel in bringing me to faith in Manichæus; for it was
at the command of the Catholics that I believed the gospel;--Again, if
you say, You were right in believing the Catholics when they praised
the gospel, but wrong in believing their vituperation of Manichæus:
do you think me such a fool as to believe or not to believe as you
like or dislike, without any reason? It is therefore fairer and safer
by far for me, having in one instance put faith in the Catholics, not
to go over to you, till, instead of bidding me believe, you make me
understand something in the clearest and most open manner. To
convince me, then, you must put aside the gospel. If you keep to the
gospel, I will keep to those who commanded me to believe the gospel;
and, in obedience to them, I will not believe you at all. But if
haply you should succeed in finding in the gospel an incontrovertible
testimony to the apostleship of Manichæus, you will weaken my regard
for the authority of the Catholics who bid me not to believe you; and
the effect of that will be, that I shall no longer be able to believe
the gospel either, for it was through the Catholics that I got my
faith in it; and so, whatever you bring from the gospel will no longer
have any weight with me. Wherefore, if no clear proof of the
apostleship of Manichæus is found in the gospel, I will believe the
Catholics rather than you. But if you read thence some passage
clearly in favor of Manichæus, I will believe neither them nor you:
not them, for they lied to me about you; nor you, for you quote to me
that Scripture which I had believed on the authority of those liars.
But far be it that I should not believe the gospel; for believing it,
I find no way of believing you too. For the names of the apostles, as
there recorded, [268] do not include the name of Manichæus. And who
the successor of Christ's betrayer was we read in the Acts of the
Apostles; [269] which book I must needs believe if I believe the
gospel, since both writings alike Catholic authority commends to me.
The same book contains the well-known narrative of the calling and
apostleship of Paul. [270]Read me now, if you can, in the gospel
where Manichæus is called an apostle, or in any other book in which I
have professed to believe. Will you read the passage where the Lord
promised the Holy Spirit as a Paraclete, to the apostles? Concerning
which passage, behold how many and how great are the things that
restrain and deter me from believing in Manichæus.
Footnotes
[267] [This is one of the earliest distinct assertions of the
dependence of the Scriptures for authority on the Church.--A.H.N.]
[268] Matt. x. 2-4; Mark iii. 13-19; Luke vi. 13-18.
[269] Acts i. 26.
[270] Acts ix.
Chapter 6.--Why Manichæus Called Himself an Apostle of Christ.
7. For I am at a loss to see why this epistle begins, "Manichæus, an
apostle of Jesus Christ," and not Paraclete, an apostle of Jesus
Christ. Or if the Paraclete sent by Christ sent Manichæus, why do we
read, "Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ," instead of Manichæus,
an apostle of the Paraclete? If you say that it is Christ Himself who
is the Holy Spirit, you contradict the very Scripture, where the Lord
says, "And I will send you another Paraclete." [271]Again, if you
justify your putting of Christ's name, not because it is Christ
Himself who is also the Paraclete, but because they are both of the
same substance,--that is, not because they are one person, but one
existence [non quia unus est, sed quia unum sunt],--Paul too might
have used the words, Paul, an apostle of God the Father; for the Lord
said, "I and the Father are one." [272]Paul nowhere uses these
words; nor does any of the apostles write himself an apostle of the
Father. Why then this new fashion? Does it not savor of trickery of
some kind or other? For if he thought it made no difference, why did
he not for the sake of variety in some epistles call himself an
apostle of Christ, and in others of the Paraclete? But in every one
that I know of, he writes, of Christ; and not once, of the Paraclete.
What do we suppose to be the reason of this, but that pride, the
mother of all heretics, impelled the man to desire to seem to have
been sent by the Paraclete, but to have been taken into so close a
relation as to get the name of Paraclete himself? As the man Jesus
Christ was not sent by the Son of God, that is, the power and wisdom
of God--by which all things were made, but, according to the Catholic
faith, was taken into such a relation as to be Himself the Son of
God--that is, that in Himself the wisdom of God was displayed in the
healing of sinners,--so Manichæus wished it to be thought that he was
so taken up by the Holy Spirit, whom Christ promised, that we are
henceforth to understand that the names Manichæus and Holy Spirit
alike signify the apostle of Jesus Christ,--that is, one sent by Jesus
Christ, who promised to send him. Singular audacity this! and
unutterable sacrilege!
Footnotes
[271] John xiv. 16.
[272] John x. 30.
Chapter 7.--In What Sense the Followers of Manichæus Believe Him to Be
the Holy Spirit.
8. Besides, you should explain how it is that, while the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are united in equality of nature, as you also
acknowledge, you are not ashamed to speak of Manichæus, a man taken
into union with the Holy Spirit, as born of ordinary generation; and
yet you shrink from believing that the man taken into union with the
only-begotten Wisdom of God was born of a Virgin. If human flesh, if
generation [concubitus viri], if the womb of a woman could not
contaminate the Holy Spirit, how could the Virgin's womb contaminate
the Wisdom of God? This Manichæus, then, who boasts of a connection
with the Holy Spirit, and of being spoken of in the gospel, must
produce his claim to either of these two things,--that he was sent by
the Spirit, or that he was taken into union with the Spirit. If he
was sent, let him call himself the apostle of the Paraclete; if taken
into union, let him allow that He whom the only-begotten Son took upon
Himself had a human mother, since he admits a human father as well as
mother in the case of one taken up by the Holy Spirit. Let him
believe that the Word of God was not defiled by the virgin womb of
Mary, since he exhorts us to believe that the Holy Spirit could not be
defiled by the married life of his parents. But if you say that
Manichæus was united to the Spirit, not in the womb or before
conception, but after his birth, still you must admit that he had a
fleshly nature derived from man and woman. And since you are not
afraid to speak of the blood and the bodily substance of Manichæus as
coming from ordinary generation, or of the internal impurities
contained in his flesh, and hold that the Holy Spirit, who took on
Himself, as you believe, this human being, was not contaminated by all
those things, why should I shrink from speaking of the Virgin's womb
and body undefiled, and not rather believe that the Wisdom of God in
union with the human being in his mother's flesh still remained free
from stain and pollution? Wherefore, as, whether your Manichæus
professes to be sent by or to be united with the Paraclete, neither
statement can hold good, I am on my guard, and refuse to believe
either in his mission or in his susception.
Chapter 8.--The Festival of the Birth-Day of Manichæus.
9. In adding the words, "by the providence of God the Father," what
else did Manichæus design but that, having got the name of Jesus
Christ, whose apostle he calls himself, and of God the Father, by
whose providence he says he was sent by the Son, we should believe
himself, as the Holy Spirit, to be the third person? His words are:
"Manichæus, an apostle of Jesus Christ, by the providence of God the
Father." The Holy Spirit is not named, though He ought specially to
have been named by one who quotes to us in favor of his apostleship
the promise of the Paraclete, that he may prevail upon ignorant people
by the authority of the gospel. In reply to this, you of course say
that in the name of the Apostle Manichæus we have the name of the Holy
Spirit, the Paraclete, because He condescended to come into
Manichæus. Why then, I ask again, should you cry out against the
doctrine of the Catholic Church, that He in whom divine Wisdom came
was born of a virgin, when you do not scruple to affirm the birth by
ordinary generation of him in whom you say the Holy Spirit came? I
cannot but suspect that this Manichæus, who uses the name of Christ to
gain access to the minds of the ignorant, wished to be worshipped
instead of Christ Himself. I will state briefly the reason of this
conjecture. At the time when I was a student of your doctrines, to my
frequent inquiries why it was that the Paschal feast of the Lord was
celebrated generally with no interest, though sometimes there were a
few languid worshippers, but no watchings, no prescription of any
unusual fast,--in a word, no special ceremony,--while great honor is
paid to your Bema, that is, the day on which Manichæus was killed,
when you have a platform with fine steps, covered with precious cloth,
placed conspicuously so as to face the votaries,--the reply was, that
the day to observe was the day of the passion of him who really
suffered, and that Christ, who was not born, but appeared to human
eyes in an unreal semblance of flesh, only feigned suffering, without
really bearing it. Is it not deplorable, that men who wish to be
called Christians are afraid of a virgin's womb as likely to defile
the truth, and yet are not afraid of falsehood? But to go back to the
point, who that pays attention can help suspecting that the intention
of Manichæus in denying Christ's being born of a woman, and having a
human body, was that His passion, the time of which is now a great
festival all over the world, might not be observed by the believers in
himself, so as to lessen the devotion of the solemn commemoration
which he wished in honor of the day of his own death? For to us it
was a great attraction in the feast of the Bema that it was held
during Pascha, since we used all the more earnestly to desire that
festal day [the Bema], that the other which was formerly most sweet
had been withdrawn.
Chapter 9.--When the Holy Spirit Was Sent.
10. Perhaps you will say to me, When, then, did the Paraclete
promised by the Lord come? As regards this, had I nothing else to
believe on the subject, I should rather look for the Paraclete as
still to come, than allow that He came in Manichæus. But seeing that
the advent of the Holy Spirit is narrated with perfect clearness in
the Acts of the Apostles, where is the necessity of my so gratuitously
running the risk of believing heretics? For in the Acts it is written
as follows: "The former treatise have we made, O Theophilus, of all
that Jesus began both to do and teach, in the day in which He chose
the apostles by the Holy Spirit, and commanded them to preach the
gospel. By those to whom He showed Himself alive after His passion by
many proofs in the daytime, He was seen forty days, teaching
concerning the kingdom of God. And how He conversed with them, and
commanded them that they should not depart from Jerusalem, but wait
for the promise of the Father, which, saith He, ye have heard of me.
For John indeed baptized with water, but ye shall begin to be baptized
with the Holy Spirit, whom also ye shall receive after not many days,
that is, at Pentecost. When they had come, they asked him, saying,
Lord, wilt Thou at this time manifest Thyself? And when will be the
kingdom of Israel? And He said unto them, No one can know the time
which the Father hath put in His own power. But ye shall receive the
power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and ye shall be witnesses
unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judæa, and in Samaria, and unto
the uttermost part of the earth." [273]Behold you have here the
Lord reminding His disciples of the promise of the Father, which they
had heard from His mouth, of the coming of the Holy Spirit. Let us
now see when He was sent; for shortly after we read as follows: "And
when the day of Pentecost was fully come, they were all with one
accord in one place. And suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as
of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were
sitting. And there appeared unto them cloven tongues, like as of
fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the
Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues, as the Spirit gave
them utterance. And there were dwelling at Jerusalem Jews, devout
men, out of every nation under heaven. And when the sound was heard,
the multitude came together, and were confounded, because every man
heard them speak in his own language. And they were all amazed, and
marvelled, saying one to another, Are not all these which speak
Galilæans? and how heard we every man in our own tongue, wherein we
were born? Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in
Mesopotamia, in Armenia, and in Cappadocia, in Pontus, Asia, Phrygia,
and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the regions of Africa about Cyrene,
and strangers of Rome, Jews, natives, Cretes, and Arabians, they heard
them speak in their own tongues the wonderful works of God. And they
were all amazed, and were in doubt on account of what had happened,
saying, What meaneth this? But others, mocking, said, These men are
full of new wine." [274]You see when the Holy Spirit came. What
more do you wish? If the Scriptures are credible, should not I
believe most readily in these Acts, which have the strongest testimony
in their support, and which have had the advantage of becoming
generally known, and of being handed down and of being publicly taught
along with the gospel itself, which contains the promise of the Holy
Spirit, which also we believe? On reading, then, these Acts of the
Apostles, which stand, as regards authority, on a level with the
gospel, I find that not only was the Holy Spirit promised to these
true apostles, but that He was also sent so manifestly, that no room
was left for errors on this subject.
Footnotes
[273] Acts i. 1-8.
[274] Acts ii. 1-13.
Chapter 10.--The Holy Spirit Twice Given.
11. For the glorification of our Lord among men is His resurrection
from the dead and His ascension to heaven. For it is written in the
Gospel according to John: "The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because
that Jesus was not yet glorified." [275]Now if the reason why He
was not given was that Jesus was not yet glorified, He was given
immediately on the glorification of Jesus. And since that
glorification was twofold, as regards man and as regards God, twice
also was the Holy Spirit given: once, when, after His resurrection
from the dead, He breathed on the face of His disciples, saying,
"Receive ye the Holy Ghost;" [276] and again, ten days after His
ascension to heaven. This number ten signifies perfection; for to the
number seven which embraces all created things, is added the trinity
of the Creator. [277]On these things there is much pious and sober
discourse among spiritual men. But I must keep to my point; for my
business at present is not to teach you, which you might think
presumptuous, but to take the part of an inquirer, and learn from you,
as I tried to do for nine years without success. Now, therefore, I
have a document to believe on the subject of the Holy Spirit's advent;
and if you bid me not to believe this document, as your usual advice
is not to believe ignorantly, without consideration, [278] much less
will I believe your documents. Away, then, with all books, and
disclose the truth with logical clearness, so as to leave no doubt in
my mind; or bring forward books where I shall find not an imperious
demand for my belief, but a trustworthy statement of what I may
learn. Perhaps you say this epistle is also of this character. Let
me, then, no longer stop at the threshold: let us see the contents.
Footnotes
[275] John vii. 39.
[276] John xx. 22.
[277] [This is, of course, fanciful; but is quite in accordance with
the exegetical methods of the time.--A.H.N.]
[278] [The Manichæans assumed the role of rationalists, and scorned
the credulity of ordinary believers. Yet they required in their
followers an amount of credulity which only persons of a peculiar turn
of mind could furnish. The same thing applies to modern rationalistic
anti-Christian systems. The fact is, that it requires infinitely less
credulity to believe in historical Christianity than to disbelieve in
it.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 11.--Manichæus Promises Truth, But Does Not Make Good His
Word.
12. "These," he says, "are wholesome words from the perennial and
living fountain; and whoever shall have heard them, and shall have
first believed them, and then shall have observed the truths they set
forth, shall never suffer death, but shall enjoy eternal life in
glory. For he is to be judged truly blessed who has been instructed
in this divine knowledge, by which he is made free and shall abide in
everlasting life." And this, as you see, is a promise of truth, but
not the bestowal of it. And you yourselves can easily see that any
errors whatever might be dressed up in this fashion, so as under cover
of a showy exterior to steal in unawares into the minds of the
ignorant. Were he to say, These are pestiferous words from a
poisonous fountain; and whoever shall have heard them, and shall have
first believed them, and then have observed what they set forth, shall
never be restored to life, but shall suffer a woful death as a
criminal: for assuredly he is to be pronounced miserable who falls
into this infernal error, in which he will sink so as to abide in
everlasting torments;--were he to say this, he would say the truth;
but instead of gaining any readers for his book, he would excite the
greatest aversion in the minds of all into whose hands the book might
come. Let us then pass on to what follows; nor let us be deceived by
words which may be used alike by good and bad, by learned and
unlearned. What, then, comes next?
13. "May the peace," he says, "of the invisible God, and the
knowledge of the truth, be with the holy and beloved brethren who both
believe and also yield obedience to the divine precepts." Amen, say
we. For the prayer is a most amiable and commendable one. Only we
must bear in mind that these words might be used by false teachers as
well as by good ones. So, if he said nothing more than this, all
might safely read and embrace it. Nor should I disapprove of what
follows: "May also the right hand of light protect you, and deliver
you from every hostile assault, and from the snares of the world." In
fact, I have no fault to find with the beginning of this epistle, till
we come to the main subject of it. For I wish not to spend time on
minor points. Now, then, for this writer's plain statement of what is
to be expected from him.
Chapter 12.--The Wild Fancies of Manichæus. The Battle Before the
Constitution of the World.
14. "Of that matter," he says, "beloved brother of Patticus, of which
you told me, saying that you desired to know the manner of the birth
of Adam and Eve, whether they were produced by a word or sprung from
matter, I will answer you as is fit. For in various writings and
narratives we find different assertions made and different
descriptions given by many authors. Now the real truth on the subject
is unknown to all peoples, even to those who have long and frequently
treated of it. For had they arrived at a clear knowledge of the
generation of Adam and Eve, they would not have remained liable to
corruption and death." Here, then, is a promise to us of clear
knowledge of this matter, so that we shall not be liable to corruption
and death. And if this does not suffice, see what follows:
"Necessarily," he says, "many things have to be said by way of
preface, before a discovery of this mystery free from all uncertainty
can be made." This is precisely what I asked for, to have such
evidence of the truth as to free my knowledge of it from all
uncertainty. And even were the promise not made by this writer
himself, it was proper for me to demand and to insist upon this, so
that no opposition should make me ashamed of becoming a Manichæan from
a Catholic Christian, in view of such a gain as that of perfectly
clear and certain truth. Now, then, let us hear what he has to state.
15. "Accordingly," he says, "hear first, if you please, what happened
before the constitution of the world, and how the battle was carried
on, that you may be able to distinguish the nature of light from that
of darkness." Such are the utterly false and incredible statements
which this writer makes. Who can believe that any battle was fought
before the constitution of the world? And even supposing it credible,
we wish now to get something to know, not to believe. For to say that
the Persians and Scythians long ago fought with one another is a
credible statement; but while we believe it when we read or hear it,
we cannot know it as a fact of experience or as a truth of the
understanding. So, then, as I would repudiate any such statement on
the ground that I have been promised something, not that I must
believe on authority, but that I shall understand without any
ambiguity; still less will I receive statements which are not only
uncertain, but incredible. But what if he have some evidence to make
these things clear and intelligible? Let us hear, then, if we can,
what follows with all possible patience and forbearance.
Chapter 13.--Two Opposite Substances. The Kingdom of Light.
Manichæus Teaches Uncertainties Instead of Certainties.
16. "In the beginning, then," he says, "these two substances were
divided. The empire of light was held by God the Father, who is
perpetual in holy origin, magnificent in virtue, true in His very
nature, ever rejoicing in His own eternity, possessing in Himself
wisdom and the vital senses, by which He also includes the twelve
members of His light, which are the plentiful resources of his
kingdom. Also in each of His members are stored thousands of untold
and priceless treasures. But the Father Himself, chief in praise,
incomprehensible in greatness, has united to Himself happy and
glorious worlds, incalculable in number and duration, along with which
this holy and illustrious Father and Progenitor resides, no poverty or
infirmity being admitted in His magnificent realms. And these
matchless realms are so founded on the region of light and bliss, that
no one can ever move or disturb them." [279]
17. Where is the proof of all this? And where did Manichæus learn
it? Do not frighten me with the name of the Paraclete. For, in the
first place, I have come not to put faith in unknown things, but to
get the knowledge of undoubted truths, according to the caution
enjoined on me by yourselves. For you know how bitterly you taunt
those who believe without consideration. And what is more, this
writer, who here begins to tell of very doubtful things, himself
promised a little before to give complete and well-grounded knowledge.
Footnotes
[279] [Compare the fuller account from the Fihrist in the
Introduction.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 14.--Manichæus Promises the Knowledge of Undoubted Things, and
Then Demands Faith in Doubtful Things.
In the next place, if faith is what is required of me, I should prefer
to keep to the Scripture, which tells me that the Holy Spirit came and
inspired the apostles, to whom the Lord had promised to send Him. You
must therefore prove, either that what Manichæus says is true, and so
make clear to me what I am unable to believe; or that Manichæus is the
Holy Spirit, and so lead me to believe in what you cannot make clear.
For I profess the Catholic faith, and by it I expect to attain certain
knowledge. Since, then, you try to overthrow my faith, you must
supply me with certain knowledge, if you can, that you may convict me
of having adopted my present belief without consideration. You make
two distinct propositions,--one when you say that the speaker is the
Holy Spirit, and another when you say that what the speaker teaches is
evidently true. I might fairly ask undeniable proof for both
propositions. But I am not greedy and require to be convinced only of
one. Prove this person to be the Holy Spirit, and I will believe what
he says to be true, even without understanding it; or prove that what
he says is true, and I will believe him to be the Holy Spirit, even
without evidence. Could anything be fairer or kinder than this? But
you cannot prove either one or other of these propositions. You can
find nothing better than to praise your own faith and ridicule mine.
So, after having in my turn praised my belief and ridiculed yours,
what result do you think we shall arrive at as regards our judgment
and our conduct, but to part company with those who promise the
knowledge of indubitable things, and then demand from us faith in
doubtful things? while we shall follow those who invite us to begin
with believing what we cannot yet fully perceive, that, strengthened
by this very faith, we may come into a position to know what we
believe by the inward illumination and confirmation of our minds, due
no longer to men, but to God Himself.
18. And as I have asked this writer to prove these things to me, I
ask him now where he learned them himself. If he replies that they
were revealed to him by the Holy Spirit, and that his mind was
divinely enlightened that he might know them to be certain and
evident, he himself points to the distinction between knowing and
believing. The knowledge is his to whom these things are fully made
known as proved; but in the case of those who only hear his account of
these things, there is no knowledge imparted, but only a believing
acquiescence required. Whoever thoughtlessly yields this becomes a
Manichæan, not by knowing undoubted truth, but by believing doubtful
statements. Such were we when in our inexperienced youth we were
deceived. Instead, therefore, of promising knowledge, or clear
evidence, or the settlement of the question free from all uncertainty,
Manichæus ought to have said that these things were clearly proved to
him, but that those who hear his account of them must believe him
without evidence. But were he to say this, who would not reply to
him, If I must believe without knowing, why should I not prefer to
believe those things which have a widespread notoriety from the
consent of learned and unlearned, and which among all nations are
established by the weightiest authority? From fear of having this
said to him, Manichæus bewilders the inexperienced by first promising
the knowledge of certain truths, and then demanding faith in doubtful
things. And then, if he is asked to make it plain that these things
have been proved to himself, he fails again, and bids us believe this
too. Who can tolerate such imposture and arrogance?
Chapter 15.--The Doctrine of Manichæus Not Only Uncertain, But False.
His Absurd Fancy of a Land and Race of Darkness Bordering on the Holy
Region and the Substance of God. The Error, First of All, of Giving
to the Nature of God Limits and Borders, as If God Were a Material
Substance, Having Extension in Space.
19. What if I shall have shown, with the help of God and of our Lord,
that this writer's statements are false as well as uncertain? What
more unfortunate thing can be found than that superstition which not
only fails to impart the knowledge and the truth which it promises,
but also teaches what is directly opposed to knowledge and truth?
This will appear more clearly from what follows: "In one direction on
the border of this bright and holy land there was a land of darkness
deep and vast in extent, where abode fiery bodies, destructive races.
Here was boundless darkness, flowing from the same source in
immeasurable abundance, with the productions properly belonging to
it. Beyond this were muddy turbid waters with their inhabitants; and
inside of them winds terrible and violent with their prince and their
progenitors. Then again a fiery region of destruction, with its
chiefs and peoples. And similarly inside of this a race full of smoke
and gloom, where abode the dreadful prince and chief of all, having
around him innumerable princes, himself the mind and source of them
all. Such are the five natures of the pestiferous land."
20. To speak of God as an aerial or even as an ethereal body is
absurd in the view of all who, with a clear mind, possessing some
measure of discernment, can perceive the nature of wisdom and truth as
not extended or scattered in space, but as great, and imparting
greatness without material size, nor confined more or less in any
direction, but throughout co-extensive with the Father of all, nor
having one thing here and another there, but everywhere perfect,
everywhere present. [280]
Footnotes
[280] [This exalted view of God Augustin held in common with the
Neo-Platonists.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 16.--The Soul, Though Mutable, Has No Material Form. It is
All Present in Every Part of the Body.
But why speak of truth and wisdom which surpass all the powers of the
soul, when the nature of the soul itself, which is known to be
mutable, still has no kind of material extension in space? For
whatever consists of any kind of gross matter must necessarily be
divisible into parts, having one in one place, and another in
another. Thus, the finger is less than the whole hand, and one finger
is less than two; and there is one place for this finger, and another
for that, and another for the rest of the hand. And this applies not
to organized bodies only, but also to the earth, each part of which
has its own place, so that one cannot be where the other is. So in
moisture, the smaller quantity occupies a smaller space, and the
larger quantity a larger space; and one part is at the bottom of the
cup, and another part near the mouth. So in air, each part has its
own place; and it is impossible for the air in this house to have
along with itself, in the same house at the same moment, the air that
the neighbors have. And even as regards light itself, one part pours
through one window, and another through another; and a greater through
the larger, and a smaller through the smaller. Nor, in fact, can
there be any bodily substance, whether celestial or terrestrial,
whether aerial or moist, which is not less in part than in whole, or
which can possibly have one part in the place of another at the same
time; but, having one thing in one place and another in another, its
extension in space is a substance which has distinct limits and parts,
or, so to speak, sections. The nature of the soul, on the other hand,
though we leave out of account its power of perceiving truth, and
consider only its inferior power of giving unity to the body, and of
sensation in the body, does not appear to have any material extension
in space. For it is all present in each separate part of its body
when it is all present in any sensation. There is not a smaller part
in the finger, and a larger in the arm, as the bulk of the finger is
less than that of the arm; but the quantity everywhere is the same,
for the whole is present everywhere. For when the finger is touched,
the whole mind feels, though the sensation is not through the whole
body. No part of the mind is unconscious of the touch, which proves
the presence of the whole. And yet it is not so present in the finger
or in the sensation as to abandon the rest of the body, or to gather
itself up into the one place where the sensation occurs. For when it
is all present in the sensation in a finger, if another part, say the
foot, be touched, it does not fail to be all present in this sensation
too: so that at the same moment it is all present in different
places, without leaving one in order to be in the other, and without
having one part in one, and another in the other; but by this power
showing itself to be all present at the same moment in separate
places. Since it is all present in the sensations of these places, it
proves that it is not bound by the conditions of space. [281]
Footnotes
[281] [Modern mental physiologists differ among themselves as regards
the presence of the mind throughout the entire nervous system; some
maintaining the view here presented, and others making the brain to be
the seat of sensation, and the nerves telegraphic lines, so to speak,
for the communication of impressions from the various parts of the
body to the brain. Compare Carpenter: Mental Physiology, and
Calderwood: Mind and Brain.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 17.--The Memory Contains the Ideas of Places of the Greatest
Size.
Again, if we consider the mind's power of remembering not the objects
of the intellect, but material objects, such as we see brutes also
remembering (for cattle find their way without mistake in familiar
places, and animals return to their cribs, and dogs recognize the
persons of their masters, and when asleep they often growl, or break
out into a bark, which could not be unless their mind retained the
images of things before seen or perceived by some bodily sense), who
can conceive rightly where these images are contained, where they are
kept, or where they are formed? If, indeed, these images were no
larger than the size of our body, it might be said that the mind
shapes and retains them in the bodily space which contains itself.
But while the body occupies a small material space, the mind revolves
images of vast extent, of heaven and earth, with no want of room,
though they come and go in crowds; so that clearly, the mind is not
diffused through space: for instead of being contained in images of
the largest spaces, it rather contains them; not, however, in any
material receptacle, but by a mysterious faculty or power, by which it
can increase or diminish them, can contract them within narrow limits,
or expand them indefinitely, can arrange or disarrange them at
pleasure, can multiply them or reduce them to a few or to one.
Chapter 18.--The Understanding Judges of the Truth of Things, and of
Its Own Action.
What, then, must be said of the power of perceiving truth, and of
making a vigorous resistance against these very images which take
their shape from impressions on the bodily senses, when they are
opposed to the truth? This power discerns the difference between, to
take a particular example, the true Carthage and its own imaginary
one, which it changes as it pleases with perfect ease. It shows that
the countless worlds of Epicurus, in which his fancy roamed without
restraint, are due to the same power of imagination, and, not to
multiply examples, that we get from the same source that land of
light, with its boundless extent, and the five dens of the race of
darkness, with their inmates, in which the fancies of Manichæus have
dared to usurp for themselves the name of truth. What then is this
power which discerns these things? Clearly, whatever its extent may
be, it is greater than all these things, and is conceived of without
any such material images. Find, if you can, space for this power;
give it a material extension; provide it with a body of huge size.
Assuredly if you think well, you cannot. For of everything of this
corporeal nature your mind forms an opinion as to its divisibility,
and you make of such things one part greater and another less, as much
as you like; while that by which you form a judgment of these things
you perceive to be above them, not in local loftiness of place, but in
dignity of power.
Chapter 19.--If the Mind Has No Material Extension, Much Less Has God.
21. So then, if the mind, so liable to change, whether from a
multitude of dissimilar desires, or from feelings varying according to
the abundance or the want of desirable things, or from these endless
sports of the fancy, or from forgetfulness and remembrance, or from
learning and ignorance; if the mind, I say, exposed to frequent change
from these and the like causes, is perceived to be without any local
or material extension, and to have a vigor of action which surmounts
these material conditions, what must we think or conclude of God
Himself, who remains superior to all intelligent beings in His freedom
from perturbation and from change, giving to every one what is due?
Him the mind dares to express more easily than to see; and the clearer
the sight, the less is the power of expression. And yet this God, if,
as the Manichæan fables are constantly asserting, He were limited in
extension in one direction and unlimited in others, could be measured
by so many subdivisions or fractions of greater or less size, as every
one might fancy; so that, for example, a division of the extent of two
feet would be less by eight parts than one of ten feet. For this is
the property of all natures which have extension in space, and
therefore cannot be all in one place. But even with the mind this is
not the case; and this degrading and perverted idea of the mind is
found among people who are unfit for such investigations.
Chapter 20.--Refutation of the Absurd Idea of Two Territories.
22. But perhaps, instead of thus addressing carnal minds, we should
rather descend to the views of those who either dare not or are as yet
unfit to turn from the consideration of material things to the study
of an immaterial and spiritual nature, and who thus are unable to
reflect upon their own power of reflection, so as to see how it forms
a judgment of material extension without itself possessing it. Let us
descend then to these material ideas, and let us ask in what
direction, and on what border of the shining and sacred territory, to
use the expressions of Manichæus, was the region of darkness? For he
speaks of one direction and border, without saying which, whether the
right or the left. In any case, it is clear that to speak of one side
implies that there is another. But where there are three or more
sides, either the figure is bounded in all directions, or if it
extends infinitely in one direction, still it must be limited in the
directions where it has sides. If,then, on one side of the region of
light there was the race of darkness, what bounded it on the other
side or sides? The Manichæans say nothing in reply to this; but when
pressed, they say that on the other sides the region of light, as they
call it, is infinite, that is, extends throughout boundless space.
They do not see, what is plain to the dullest understanding, that in
that case there could be no sides? For the sides are where it is
bounded. What, then, he says, though there are no sides? But what
you said of one direction or side, implied of necessity the existence
of another direction and side, or other directions and sides. For if
there was only one side, you should have said, on the side, not on one
side; as in reference to our body we say properly, By one eye, because
there is another; or on one breast, because there is another. But if
we spoke of a thing as being on one nose, or one navel, we should be
ridiculed by learned and unlearned, since there is only one. But I do
not insist on words, for you may have used one in the sense of the
only one.
Chapter 21.--This Region of Light Must Be Material If It is Joined to
the Region of Darkness. The Shape of the Region of Darkness Joined to
the Region of Light.
What, then, bordered on the side of the region which you call shining
and sacred? The region, you reply, of darkness. Do you then allow
this latter region to have been material? Of course you must, since
you assert that all bodies derive their origin from it. How then is
it that, dull and carnal as you are, you do not see that unless both
regions were material, they could not have their sides joined to one
another? How could you ever be so blinded in mind as to say that only
the region of darkness was material, and that the so-called region of
light was immaterial and spiritual? My good friends, let us open our
eyes for once, and see, now that we are told of it, what is most
obvious, that two regions cannot be joined at their sides unless both
are material.
23. Or if we are too dull and stupid to see this, let us hear whether
the region of darkness too has one side, and is boundless in the other
directions, like the region of light. They do not hold this from fear
of making it seem equal to God. Accordingly they make it boundless in
depth and in length; but upwards, above it, they maintain that there
is an infinity of empty space. And lest this region should appear to
be a fraction equal in amount to half of that representing the region
of light, they narrow it also on two sides. As if, to give the
simplest illustration, a piece of bread were made into four squares,
three white and one black; then suppose the three white pieces joined
as one, and conceive them as infinite upwards and downwards, and
backwards in all directions: this represents the Manichæan region of
light. Then conceive the black square infinite downwards and
backwards, but with infinite emptiness above it: this is their region
of darkness. But these are secrets which they disclose to very eager
and anxious inquirers.
Chapter 22.--The Form of the Region of Light the Worse of the Two.
Well, then, if this is so, the region of darkness is clearly touched
on two sides by the region of light. And if it is touched on two
sides, it must touch on two. So much for its being on one side, as we
were told before.
24. And what an unseemly appearance is this of the region of
light!--like a cloven arch, with a black wedge inserted below, bounded
only in the direction of the cleft, and having a void space interposed
where the boundless emptiness stretches above the region of darkness.
Indeed, the form of the region of darkness is better than that of the
region of light: for the former cleaves, the latter is cloven; the
former fills the gap which is made in the latter; the former has no
void in it, while the latter is undefined in all directions, except
that where it is filled up by the wedge of darkness. In an ignorant
and greedy notion of giving more honor to a number of pans than to a
single one, so that the region of light should have six, three upwards
and three downwards, they have made this region be split up, instead
of sundering the other. For, according to this figure, though there
may be no commixture of darkness with light, there is certainly
penetration.
Chapter 23.--The Anthropomorphites Not So Bad as the Manichæans.
25. Compare, now, not spiritual men of the Catholic faith, whose
mind, as far as is possible in this life, perceives that the divine
substance and nature has no material extension, and has no shape
bounded by lines, but the carnal and weak of our faith, who, when they
hear the members of the body used figuratively, as, when God's eyes or
ears are spoken of, are accustomed, in the license of fancy, to
picture God to themselves in a human form; compare these with the
Manichæans, whose custom it is to make known their silly stories to
anxious inquirers as if they were great mysteries: and consider who
have the most allowable and respectable ideas of God, --those who
think of Him as having a human form which is the most excellent of its
kind, or those who think of Him as having boundless material
extension, yet not in all directions, but with three parts infinite
and solid, while in one part He is cloven, with an empty void, and
with undefined space above, while the region of darkness is inserted
wedge-like below. Or perhaps the proper expression is, that He is
unconfined above in His own nature, but encroached on below by a
hostile nature. I join with you in laughing at the folly of carnal
men, unable as yet to form spiritual conceptions, who think of God as
having a human form. Do you too join me, if you can, in laughing at
those whose unhappy conceptions represent God as having a shape cloven
or cut in such an unseemly and unbecoming way, with such an empty gap
above, and such a dishonorable curtailment below. Besides, there is
this difference, that these carnal people, who think of God as having
a human form, if they are content to be nourished with milk from the
breast of the Catholic Church, and do not rush headlong into rash
opinions, but cultivate in the Church the pious habit of inquiry, and
there ask that they may receive, and knock that it may be opened to
them, begin to understand spiritually the figures and parables of the
Scriptures, and gradually to perceive that the divine energies are
suitably set forth under the name, sometimes of ears, sometimes of
eyes, sometimes of hands or feet, or even of wings and feathers a
shield too, and sword, and helmet, and all the other innumerable
things. And the more progress they make in this understanding, the
more are they confirmed as Catholics. The Manichæans, on the other
hand, when they abandon their material fancies, cease to be
Manichæans. For this is the chief and special point in their praises
of Manichæus, that the divine mysteries which were taught figuratively
in books from ancient times were kept for Manichæus, who was to come
last, to solve and demonstrate; and so after him no other teacher will
come from God, for he has said nothing in figures or parables, but has
explained ancient sayings of that kind, and has himself taught in
plain, simple terms. Therefore, when the Manichæans hear these words
of their founder, on one side and border of the shining and sacred
region was the region of darkness, they have no interpretations to
fall back on. Wherever they turn, the wretched bondage of their own
fancies brings them upon clefts or sudden stoppages and joinings or
sunderings of the most unseemly kind, which it would be shocking to
believe as true of any immaterial nature, even though mutable, like
the mind, not to speak of the immutable nature of God. And yet if I
were unable to rise to higher things, and to bring my thoughts from
the entanglement of false imaginations which are impressed on the
memory by the bodily senses, into the freedom and purity of spiritual
existence, how much better would it be to think of God as in the form
of a man, than to fasten that wedge of darkness to His lower edge,
and, for want of a covering for the boundless vacuity above to leave
it void and unoccupied throughout infinite space! What notion could
be worse than this? What darker error can be taught or imagined?
Chapter 24.--Of the Number of Natures in the Manichæan Fiction.
26. Again, I wish to know, when I read of God the Father and His
kingdoms founded on the shining and happy region, whether the Father
and His kingdoms, and the region, are all of the same nature and
substance. If they are, then it is not another nature or sort of body
of God which the wedge of the race of darkness cleaves and penetrates,
which itself is an unspeakably revolting thing, but it is actually the
very nature of God which undergoes this. Think of this, I beseech
you: as you are men, think of it, and flee from it; and if by tearing
open your breasts you can cast out by the roots such profane fancies
from your faith, I pray you to do it. Or will you say that these
three are not of one and the same nature, but that the Father is of
one, the kingdoms of another, and the region of another, so that each
has a peculiar nature and substance, and that they are arranged
according to their degree of excellence? If this is true, Manichæus
should have taught that there are four natures, not two; or if the
Father and the kingdoms have one nature, and the region only one of
its own, he should have made three. Or if he made only two, because
the region of darkness does not belong to God, in what sense does the
region of light belong to God? For if it has a nature of its own, and
if God neither generated nor made it, it does not belong to Him, and
the seat of His kingdom is in what belongs to another. Or if it
belongs to Him because of its vicinity, the region of darkness must do
so too; for it not only borders on the region of light, but penetrates
it so as to sever it in two. Again, if God generated it, it cannot
have a separate nature. For what is generated by God must be what God
is, as the Catholic Church believes of the only begotten Son. So you
are brought back of necessity to that shocking and detestable
profanity, that the wedge of darkness sunders not a region distinct
and separate from God, but the very nature of God. Or if God did not
generate, but make it, of what did He make it? Or if of Himself, what
is this but to generate? If of some other nature, was this nature
good or evil? If good, there must have been some good nature not
belonging to God; which you will scarcely have the boldness to
assert. If evil, the race of darkness cannot have been the only evil
nature. Or did God take a part of that region and turn it into a
region of light, in order to found His kingdom upon it? If He had, He
would have taken the whole, and there would have been no evil nature
left. If God, then, did not make the region of light of a substance
distinct from His own, He must have made it of nothing. [282]
Footnotes
[282] [There is sufficient reason to think that Mani identified God
with the kingdom and the region of light. See Introduction.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 25.--Omnipotence Creates Good Things Differing in Degree. In
Every Description Whatsoever of the Junction of the Two Regions There
is Either Impropriety or Absurdity.
27. If, then, you are now convinced that God is able to create some
good thing out of nothing, come into the Catholic Church, and learn
that all the natures which God has created and founded in their order
of excellence from the highest to the lowest are good, and some better
than others; and that they were made of nothing, though God, their
Maker, made use of His own wisdom as an instrument, so to speak, to
give being to what was not, and that as far as it had being it might
be good, and that the limitation of its being might show that it was
not begotten by God, but made out of nothing. If you examine the
matter, you will find nothing to keep you from agreeing to this. For
you cannot make your region of light to be what God is, without making
the dark section an infringement on the very nature of God. Nor can
you say that it was generated by God, without being reduced to the
same enormity, from the necessity of concluding that as begotten of
God, it must be what God is. Nor can you say that it was distinct
from Him, lest you should be forced to admit that God placed His
kingdom in what did not belong to Him, and that there are three
natures. Nor can you say that God made it of a substance distinct
from His own, without making something good besides God, or something
evil besides the race of darkness. It remains, therefore that you
must confess that God made the region of light out of nothing: and
you are unwilling to believe this; because if God could make out of
nothing some great good which yet was inferior to Himself, He could
also, since He is good, and grudges no good, make another good
inferior to the former, and again a third inferior to the second, and
so on, in order down to the lowest good of created natures, so that
the whole aggregate, instead of extending indefinitely without number
or measure should have a fixed and definite consistency. Again, if
you will not allow this either, that God made the region of light out
of nothing, you will have no escape from the shocking profanities to
which your opinions lead.
28. Perhaps, since the carnal imagination can fancy any shapes it
likes, you might be able to devise some other form for the junction of
the two regions, instead of presenting to the mind such a disagreeable
and painful description as this, that the region of God, whether it be
of the same nature as God or not, where at least God's kingdoms are
founded, lies through immensity in such a huge mass that its members
stretch loosely to an infinite extent, and that on their lower part
that wedge of the region of darkness, itself of boundless size
encroaches upon them. But whatever other form you contrive for the
junction of these two regions, you cannot erase what Manichæus has
written. I refer not to other treatises where a more particular
description is given,--for perhaps, because they are in the hands of
only a few, there might not be so much difficulty with them,--but to
this Fundamental Epistle which we are now considering, with which all
of you who are called enlightened are usually quite familiar. Here
the words are: "On one side the border of the shining and sacred
region was the region of darkness, deep and boundless in extent."
Chapter 26.--The Manichæans are Reduced to the Choice of a Tortuous,
or Curved, or Straight Line of Junction. The Third Kind of Line Would
Give Symmetry and Beauty Suitable to Both Regions.
What more is to be got? we have now heard what is on the border. Make
what shape you please, draw any kind of lines you like, it is certain
that the junction of this boundless mass of the region of darkness to
the region of light must have been either by a straight line, or a
curved, or a tortuous one. If the line of junction is tortuous the
side of the region of light must also be tortuous; otherwise its
straight side joined to a tortuous one would leave gaps of infinite
depth, instead of having vacuity only above the land of darkness, as
we were told before. And if there were such gaps, how much better it
would have been for the region of light to have been still more
distant, and to have had a greater vacuity between, so that the region
of darkness might not touch it at all! Then there might have been
such a gap of bottomless depth, that, on the rise of any mischief in
that race, although the chiefs of darkness might have the foolhardy
wish to cross over, they would fall headlong into the gap (for bodies
cannot fly without air to support them); and as there is infinite
space downwards, they could do no more harm, though they might live
for ever, for they would be for ever falling. Again, if the line of
junction was a curved one, the region of light must also have had the
disfigurement of a curve to answer it. Or if the land of darkness
were curved inwards like a theatre, there would be as much
disfigurement in the corresponding line in the region of light. Or if
the region of darkness had a curved line, and the region of light a
straight one, they cannot have touched at all points. And certainly,
as I said before, it would have been better if they had not touched,
and if there was such a gap between that the regions might be kept
distinctly separate, and that rash evildoers might fall headlong so as
to be harmless. If, then, the line of junction was a straight one,
there remain, of course, no more gaps or grooves, but, on the
contrary, so perfect a junction as to make the greatest possible peace
and harmony between the two regions. What more beautiful or more
suitable than that one side should meet the other in a straight line,
without bends or breaks to disturb the natural and permanent
connection throughout endless space and endless duration? And even
though there was a separation, the straight sides of both regions
would be beautiful in themselves, as being straight; and besides, even
in spite of an interval, their correspondence, as running parallel,
though not meeting, would give a symmetry to both. With the addition
of the junction, both regions become perfectly regular and harmonious;
for nothing can be devised more beautiful in description or in
conception than this junction of two straight lines. [283]
Footnotes
[283] [This discussion of the lines bounding the Kingdom of Light and
the Kingdom of Darkness seems very much like trifling, but Augustin's
aim was to bring the Manichæan representations into ridicule.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 27.--The Beauty of the Straight Line Might Be Taken from the
Region of Darkness Without Taking Anything from Its Substance. So
Evil Neither Takes from Nor Adds to the Substance of the Soul. The
Straightness of Its Side Would Be So Far a Good Bestowed on the Region
of Darkness by God the Creator.
29. What is to be done with unhappy minds, perverse in error, and
held fast by custom? These men do not know what they say when they
say those things; for they do not consider. Listen to me; no one
forces you, no one quarrels with you, no one taunts you with past
errors, unless some one who has not experienced the divine mercy in
deliverance from error: all we desire is that the errors should some
time or other be abandoned. Think a little without animosity or
bitterness. We are all human beings: let us hate, not one another,
but errors and lies. Think a little, I pray you. God of mercy, help
them to think, and kindle in the minds of inquirers the true light.
If anything is plain, is not this, that right is better than wrong?
Give me, then, a calm and quiet answer to this, whether making crooked
the right line of the region of darkness which joins on to the right
line of the region of light, would not detract from its beauty. If
you will not be dogged, you must confess that not only is beauty taken
from it by its being made crooked, but also the beauty which it might
have had from connection with the right line of the region of light.
Is it the case, then, that in this loss of beauty, in which right is
made crooked, and harmony becomes discord, and agreement disagreement,
there is any loss of substance? Learn, then, from this that substance
is not evil; but as in the body, by change of form for the worse,
beauty is lost, or rather lessened, and what was called fair before is
said to be ugly, and what was pleasing becomes displeasing, so in the
mind the seemliness of a right will, which makes a just and pious
life, is injured when the will changes for the worse; and by this sin
the mind becomes miserable, instead of enjoying as before the
happiness which comes from the ornament of a right will, without any
gain or loss of substance.
30. Consider, again, that though we admit that the border of the
region of darkness was evil for other reasons, such as that it was dim
and dark, or any other reason, still it was not evil in being
straight. So, if I admit that there was some evil in its color, you
must admit that there was some good in its straightness. Whatever the
amount of this good, it is not allowable to attribute it to any other
than God the Maker, from whom we must believe that all good in
whatsoever nature comes, if we are to escape deadly error. It is
absurd, then, to say that this region is perfect evil, when in its
straightness of border is found the good of not a little beauty of a
material kind; and also to make this region to be altogether
estranged, from the almighty and good God, when this good which we
find in it can be attributed to no other but the author of all good
things. But this border, too, we are told, was evil. Well, suppose
it evil: it would surely have been worse had it been crooked instead
of straight. And how can that be the perfection of evil than which
something worse than itself can be thought of? And to be worse
implies that there is some good, the want of which makes the thing
worse. Here the want of straightness would make the line worse.
Therefore its straightness is something good. And you will never
answer the question whence this goodness comes, without reference to
Him from whom we must acknowledge that all good things come, whether
small or great. But now we shall pass on from considering this border
to something else.
Chapter 28.--Manichæus Places Five Natures in the Region of Darkness.
31. "There dwelt," he says, "in that region fiery bodies, destructive
races." By speaking of dwelling, he must mean that those bodies were
animated and in life. But, not to appear to cavil at a word, let us
see how he divides into five classes all these inhabitants of this
region. "Here," he says, "was boundless darkness, flowing from the
same source in immeasurable abundance, with the productions properly
belonging to it. Beyond this were muddy turbid waters, with their
inhabitants; and inside of them winds terrible and violent, with their
prince and their progenitors. Then, again, a fiery region of
destruction, with its chiefs and peoples. And, similarly, inside of
this a race full of smoke and gloom, where abode the dreadful prince
and chief of all, having around him innumerable princes, himself the
mind and source of them all. Such are the five natures of the
pestiferous region." We find here five natures mentioned as part of
one nature, which he calls the pestiferous region. The natures are
darkness, waters, winds, fire, smoke; which he so arranges as to make
darkness first, beginning at the outside. Inside of darkness he puts
the waters; inside of the waters, the winds; inside of the winds, the
fire; inside of the fire, the smoke. And each of these natures had
its peculiar kind of inhabitants, which were likewise five in number.
For to the question, Whether there was only one kind in all, or
different kinds corresponding to the different natures; the reply is,
that they were different: as in other books we find it stated that
the darkness had serpents; the waters swimming creatures, such as
fish; the winds flying creatures, such as birds; the fire quadrupeds,
such as horses, lions, and the like; the smoke bipeds, such as men.
Chapter 29.--The Refutation of This Absurdity.
32. Whose arrangement, then, is this? Who made the distinctions and
the classification? Who gave the number, the qualities, the forms,
the life? For all these things are in themselves good, nor could each
of the natures have them except from the bestowal of God, the author
of all good things. For this is not like the descriptions or
suppositions of poets about an imaginary chaos, as being a shapeless
mass, without form, without quality, without measurement, without
weight and number, without order and variety; a confused something,
absolutely destitute of qualities, so that some Greek writers call it
apoion. So far from being like this is the Manichæan description of
the region of darkness, as they call it, that, in a directly contrary
style, they add side to side, and join border to border; they number
five natures; they separate, arrange, and assign to each its own
qualities. Nor do they leave the natures barren or waste, but people
them with their proper inhabitants; and to these, again, they give
suitable forms, and adapted to their place of habitation, besides
giving the chief of all endowments, life. To recount such good things
as these, and to speak of them as having no connection with God, the
author of all good things, is to lose sight of the excellence of the
order in the things, and of the great evil of the error which leads to
such a conclusion.
Chapter 30.--The Number of Good Things in Those Natures Which
Manichæus Places in the Region of Darkness.
33. "But," is the reply, "the orders of beings inhabiting those five
natures were fierce and destructive." As if I were praising their
fierceness and destructiveness. I, you see, join with you in
condemning the evils you attribute to them; join you with me in
praising the good things which you ascribe to them: so it will appear
that there is a mixture of good and evil in what you call the last
extremity of evil. If I join you in condemning what is mischievous in
this region, you must join with me in praising what is beneficial.
For these beings could not have been produced, or nourished, or have
continued to inhabit that region, without some salutary influence. I
join with you in condemning the darkness; join with me in praising the
productiveness. For while you call the darkness immeasurable, you
speak of "suitable productions." Darkness, indeed, is not a real
substance, and means no more than the absence of light, as nakedness
means the want of clothing, and emptiness the want of material
contents: so that darkness could produce nothing, although a region
in darkness--that is, in the absence of light--might produce
something. But passing over this for the present, it is certain that
where productions arise there must be a beneficent adaptation of
substances, as well as a symmetrical arrangement and construction in
unity of the members of the beings produced,--a wise adjustment making
them agree with one another. And who will deny that all these things
are more to be praised than darkness is to be condemned? If I join
with you in condemning the muddiness of the waters, you must join with
me in praising the waters as far as they possessed the form and
quality of water, and also the agreement of the members of the
inhabitants swimming in the waters, their life sustaining and
directing their body, and every particular adaptation of substances
for the benefit of health. For though you find fault with the waters
as turbid and muddy, still, in allowing them the quality of producing
and maintaining their living inhabitants, you imply that there was
some kind of bodily form, and similarity of parts, giving unity and
congruity of character; otherwise there could be no body at all: and,
as a rational being, you must see that all these things are to be
praised. And however great you make the ferocity of these
inhabitants, and their massacrings and devastations in their assaults,
you still leave them the regular limits of form, by which the members
of each body are made to agree together, and their beneficial
adaptations, and the regulating power of the living principle binding
together the parts of the body in a friendly and harmonious union.
And if all these are regarded with common sense it will be seen that
they are more to be commended than the faults are to be condemned. I
join with you in condemning the frightfulness of the winds; join with
me in praising their nature, as giving breath and nourishment, and
their material form in its continuousness and diffusion by the
connection of its parts: for by these things these winds had the
power of producing and nourishing, and sustaining in vigor these
inhabitants you speak of; and also in these inhabitants--besides the
other things which have already been commended in all animated
creatures--this particular power of going quickly and easily whence
and whither they please, and the harmonious stroke of their wings in
flight, and their regular motion. I join with you in condemning the
destructiveness of fire; join with me in commending the productiveness
of this fire, and the growth of these productions, and the adaptation
of the fire to the beings produced, so that they had coherence, and
came to perfection in measure and shape, and could live and have their
abode there: for you see that all these things deserve admiration and
praise, not only in the fire which is thus habitable, but in the
inhabitants too. I join with you in condemning the denseness of
smoke, and the savage character of the prince who, as you say, abode
in it; join with me in praising the similarity of all the parts in
this very smoke, by which it preserves the harmony and proportion of
its parts among themselves, according to its own nature, and has an
unity which makes it what it is: for no one can calmly reflect on
these things without wonder and praise. Besides, even to the smoke
you give the power and energy of production, for you say that princes
inhabited it; so that in that region the smoke is productive, which
never happens here, and, moreover, affords a wholesome dwelling place
to its inhabitants.
Chapter 31.--The Same Subject Continued.
34. And even in the prince of smoke himself, instead of mentioning
only his ferocity as a bad quality, ought you not to have taken notice
of the other things in his nature which you must allow to be
commendable? For he had a soul and a body; the soul life-giving, and
the body endowed with life. Since the soul governed and the body
obeyed, the soul took the lead and the body followed; the soul gave
consistency, the body was not dissolved; the soul gave harmonious
motion, and the body was constructed of a well-proportioned framework
of members. In this single prince are you not induced to express
approval of the orderly peace or the peaceful order? And what applies
to one applies to all the rest. You say he was fierce and cruel to
others. This is not what I commend, but the other important things
which you will not take notice of. Those things, when perceived and
considered,--after advice by any one who has without consideration put
faith in Manichæus,--lead him to a clear conviction that, in speaking
of those natures, he speaks of things good in a sense, not perfect and
un-created, like God the one Trinity, nor of the higher rank of
created things, like the holy angels and the ever-blessed powers; but
of the lowest class, and ranked according to the small measure of
their endowments. These things are thought to be blameworthy by the
uninstructed when they compare them with higher things; and in view of
their want of some good, the good they have gets the name of evil,
because it is defective. My reason also for thus discussing the
natures enumerated by Manichæus is that the things named are things
familiar to us in this world. We are familiar with darkness, waters,
winds, fire, smoke; we are familiar, too, with animals, creeping,
swimming, flying; with quadrupeds and biped. With the exception of
darkness (which, as I have said already, is nothing but the absence of
light, and the perception of it is only the absence of sight, as the
perception of silence is the absence of hearing; not that darkness is
anything, but that light is not, as neither that silence is anything,
but that sound is not), all the other things are natural qualities and
are familiar to all; and the form of those natures, which is
commendable and good as far as it exists, no wise man attributes to
any other author than God, the author of all good things. [284]
Footnotes
[284] [This portion of the argument is conducted with great
adroitness. Augustin takes the inhabitants of the region of darkness,
as Mani describes them, and proves that they possess so much of good
that they can have no other author than God.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 32.--Manichæus Got the Arrangement of His Fanciful Notions
from Visible Objects.
35. For in giving to these natures which he has learned from visible
things, an arrangement according to his fanciful ideas, to represent
the race of darkness, Manichæus is clearly in error. First of all, he
makes darkness productive, which is impossible. But, he replies, this
darkness was unlike what you are familiar with. How, then, can you
make me understand about it? After so many promises to give
knowledge, will you force me to take your word for it? Suppose I
believe you, this at least is certain, that if the darkness had no
form, as darkness usually has not, it could produce nothing; if it had
form, it was better than ordinary darkness: whereas, when you call it
different from the ordinary kind, you wish us to believe that it is
worse. You might as well say that silence, which is the same to the
ear as darkness to the eyes, produced some deaf or dumb animals in
that region; and then, in reply to the objection that silence is not a
nature, you might say that it was different silence from ordinary
silence; in a word, you might say what you pleased to those whom you
have once misled into believing you. No doubt, the obvious facts
relating to the origin of animal life led Manichæus to say that
serpents were produced in darkness. However, there are serpents which
have such sharp sight, and such pleasure in light, that they seem to
give evidence of the most weighty kind against this idea. Then the
idea of swimming things in the water might easily be got here, and
applied to the fanciful objects in that region; and so of flying
things in the winds, for the motion of the lower air in this world,
where birds fly, is called wind. Where he got the idea of the
quadrupeds in fire, no one can tell. Still he said this deliberately,
though without sufficient thought, and from great misconception. The
reason usually given is, that quadrupeds are voracious and salacious.
But many men surpass any quadruped in voracity, though they are
bipeds, and are called children of the smoke, and not of fire. Geese,
too, are as voracious as any animal; and though he might place them in
fire as bipeds, or in the water because they love to swim, or in the
winds because they have wings and sometimes fly, they certainly have
nothing to do with fire in this classification. As regards
salaciousness, I suppose he was thinking of neighing horses, which
sometimes bite through the bridle and rush at the mares; and writing
hastily, with this in his mind, he forgot the common sparrow, in
comparison of which the hottest stallion is cold. The reason they
give for assigning bipeds to the smoke is, that bipeds are conceited
and proud, for men are derived from this class; and the idea, which is
a plausible one, is that smoke resembles proud people in rising up
into the air, round and swelling. This idea might warrant a
figurative description of proud men, or an allegorical expression or
explanation, but not the belief that bipeds are born in smoke and of
smoke. They might with equal reason be said to be born in dust, for
it often rises up to the heaven with a similar circling and lofty
motion; or in the clouds, for they are often drawn up from the earth
in such a way, that those looking from a distance are uncertain
whether they are clouds or smoke. Once more, why, in the case of the
waters and the winds, does he suit the inhabitants to the character of
the place, as we see swimming things in water, and flying things in
the wind; whereas, in the face of fire and smoke, this bold liar is
not ashamed to assign to these places the most unlikely inhabitants?
For fire burns quadrupeds, and consumes them, and smoke suffocates and
kills bipeds. At least he must acknowledge that he has made these
natures better in the race of darkness than they are here, though he
wishes us to think everything to be worse. For, according to this,
the fire there produced and nourished quadrupeds, and gave them a
lodging not only harmless, but most convenient. The smoke, too,
provided room for the offspring of its own benign bosom, and cherished
them up to the rank of prince. Thus we see that these lies, which
have added to the number of heretics, arose from the perception by
carnal sense, only without care or discernment, of visible objects in
this world, and when thus conceived, were brought forth by fancy, and
then presumptuously written and published.
Chapter 33.--Every Nature, as Nature, is Good.
36. But the consideration we wish most to urge is the truth of the
Catholic doctrine, if they can understand it, that God is the author
of all natures. I urged this before when I said, I join with you in
your condemnation of destructiveness, of blindness, of dense
muddiness, of terrific violence, of perishableness, of the ferocity of
the princes, and so on; join with me in commending form,
classification, arrangement, harmony, unity of structure, symmetry and
correspondence of members, provision for vital breath and nourishment,
wholesome adaptation, regulation and control by the mind, and the
subjection of the bodies, and the assimilation and agreement of parts
in the natures, both those inhabiting and those inhabited, and all the
other things of the same kind. From this, if they would only think
honestly, they would understand that it implies a mixture of good and
evil, even in the region where they suppose evil to be alone and in
perfection: so that if the evils mentioned were taken away, the good
things will remain, without anything to detract from the commendation
given to them; whereas, if the good things are taken away, no nature
is left. From this every one sees, who can see, that every nature, as
far as it is nature, is good; since in one and the same thing in which
I found something to praise, and he found something to blame, if the
good things are taken away, no nature will remain; but if the
disagreeable things are taken away, the nature will remain
unimpaired. Take from waters their thickness and muddiness, and pure
clear water remains; take from them the consistence of their parts,
and no water will be left. If then, after the evil is removed, the
nature remains in a purer state, and does not remain at all when the
good is taken away, it must be the good which makes the nature of the
thing in which it is, while the evil is not nature, but contrary to
nature. Take from the winds their terribleness and excessive force,
with which you find fault, you can conceive of winds as gentle and
mild; take from them the similarity of their parts which gives them
continuity of substance, and the unity essential to material
existence, and no nature remains to be conceived of. It would be
tedious to go through all the cases; but all who consider the subject
free from party spirit must see that in their list of natures the
disagreeable things mentioned are additions to the nature; and when
they are removed, the natures remain better than before. This shows
that the natures, as far as they are natures, are good; for when you
take from them the good instead of the evil, no natures remain. And
attend, you who wish to arrive at a correct judgment, to what is said
of the fierce prince himself. If you take away his ferocity, see how
many excellent things will remain; his material frame, the symmetry of
the members on one side with those on the other, the unity of his
form, the settled continuity of his parts, the orderly adjustment of
the mind as ruling and animating, and the body as subject and
animated. The removal of these things, and of others I may have
omitted to mention, will leave no nature remaining.
Chapter 34.--Nature Cannot Be Without Some Good. The Manichæans Dwell
Upon the Evils.
37. But perhaps you will say that these evils cannot be removed from
the natures, and must therefore be considered natural. The question
at present is not what can be taken away, and what cannot; but it
certainly helps to a clear perception that these natures, as far as
they are natures, are good, when we see that the good things can be
thought of without these evil things, while without these good things
no nature can be conceived of. I can conceive of waters without muddy
commotion; but without settled continuity of parts no material form is
an object of thought or of sensation in any way. Therefore even these
muddy waters could not exist without the good which was the condition
of their material existence. As to the reply that these evil things
cannot be taken from such natures, I rejoin that neither can the good
things be taken away. Why, then, should you call these things natural
evils, on account of the evil things which you suppose cannot be taken
away, and yet refuse to call them natural good things, on account of
the good things which, as has been proved, cannot be taken away?
38. You may next ask, as you usually do for a last resource, whence
come these evils which I have said that I too disapprove of. I shall
perhaps tell you, if you first tell me whence are those good things
which you too are obliged to commend, if you would not be altogether
unreasonable. But why should I ask this, when we both acknowledge
that all good things whatever, and how great soever, are from the one
God, who is supremely good? You must therefore yourselves oppose
Manichæus who has placed all these important good things which we have
mentioned and justly commended,--the continuity and agreement of parts
in each nature, the health and vigor of the animated creatures, and
the other things which it would be wearisome to repeat,--(in an
imaginary region of darkness, so as to separate them altogether from
that God whom he allows to be the author of all good things.) He lost
sight of those good things, while taking notice only of what was
disagreeable; as if one, frightened by a lion's roaring, and seeing
him dragging away and tearing the bodies of cattle or human beings
which he had seized, should from childish pusillanimity be so
overpowered with fear as to see nothing but the cruelty and ferocity
of the lion; and overlooking or disregarding all the other qualities,
should exclaim against the nature of this animal as not only evil, but
a great evil, his fear adding to his vehemence. But were he to see a
tame lion, with its ferocity subdued, especially if he had never been
frightened by a lion, he would have leisure, in the absence of danger
and terror, to observe and admire the beauty of the animal. My only
remark on this is one closely connected with our subject: that any
nature may be in some case disagreeable, so as to excite hatred
towards the whole nature; though it is clear that the form of a real
living beast, even when it excites terror in the woods, is far better
than that of the artificial imitation which is commended in a painting
on the wall. We must not then be misled into this error by Manichæus,
or be hindered from observing the forms of the natures, by his finding
fault with some things in them in such a way as to make us disapprove
of them entirely, when it is impossible to show that they deserve
entire disapproval. And when our minds are thus composed and prepared
to form a just judgment, we may ask whence come those evils which I
have said that I condemn. It will be easier to see this if we class
them all under one name.
Chapter 35.--Evil Alone is Corruption. Corruption is Not Nature, But
Contrary to Nature. Corruption Implies Previous Good.
39. For who can doubt that the whole of that which is called evil is
nothing else than corruption? Different evils may, indeed, be called
by different names; but that which is the evil of all things in which
any evil is perceptible is corruption. So the corruption of an
educated mind is ignorance; the corruption of a prudent mind is
imprudence; the corruption of a just mind, injustice; the corruption
of a brave mind, cowardice; the corruption of a calm, peaceful mind,
cupidity, fear, sorrow, pride. Again, in a living body, the
corruption of health is pain and disease; the corruption of strength
is exhaustion; the corruption of rest is toil. Again, in any
corporeal thing, the corruption of beauty is ugliness; the corruption
of straightness is crookedness; the corruption of order is confusion;
the corruption of entireness is disseverance, or fracture, or
diminution. It would be long and laborious to mention by name all the
corruptions of the things here mentioned, and of countless other
things; for in many cases the words may apply to the mind as well as
to the body, and in innumerable cases the corruption has a distinct
name of its own. But enough has been said to show that corruption
does harm only as displacing the natural condition; and so, that
corruption is not nature, but against nature. And if corruption is
the only evil to be found anywhere, and if corruption is not nature,
no nature is evil.
40. But if, perchance, you cannot follow this, consider again, that
whatever is corrupted is deprived of some good: for if it were not
corrupted, it would be incorrupt; or if it could not in any way be
corrupted, it would be incorruptible. Now, if corruption is an evil,
both incorruption and incorruptibility must be good things. We are
not, however, speaking at present of incorruptible nature, but of
things which admit of corruption, and which, while not corrupted, may
be called incorrupt, but not incorruptible. That alone can be called
incorruptible which not only is not corrupted, but also cannot in any
part be corrupted. Whatever things, then, being incorrupt, but liable
to corruption, begin to be corrupted, are deprived of the good which
they had as incorrupt. Nor is this a slight good, for corruption is a
great evil. And the continued increase of corruption implies the
continued presence of good, of which they may be deprived.
Accordingly, the natures supposed to exist in the region of darkness
must have been either corruptible or incorruptible. If they were
incorruptible, they were in possession of a good than which nothing is
higher. If they were corruptible, they were either corrupted or not
corrupted. If they were not corrupted, they were incorrupt, to say
which of anything is to give it great praise. If they were corrupted,
they were deprived of this great good of incorruption; but the
deprivation implies the previous possession of the good they are
deprived of; and if they possessed this good, they were not the
perfection of evil, and consequently all the Manichæan story is a
falsehood.
Chapter 36.--The Source of Evil or of Corruption of Good.
41. After thus inquiring what evil is, and learning that it is not
nature, but against nature, we must next inquire whence it is. If
Manichæus had done this, he might have escaped falling into the snare
of these serious errors. Out of time and out of order, he began with
inquiring into the origin of evil, without first asking what evil was;
and so his inquiry led him only to the reception of foolish fancies,
of which the mind, much fed by the bodily senses, with difficulty rids
itself. Perhaps, then, some one, desiring no longer argument, but
delivery from error, will ask, Whence is this corruption which we find
to be the common evil of good things which are not incorruptible?
Such an inquirer will soon find the answer if he seeks for truth with
great earnestness, and knocks reverently with sustained assiduity.
For while man can use words as a kind of sign for the expression of
his thoughts, teaching is the work of the incorruptible Truth itself,
who is the one true, the one internal Teacher. He became external
also, that He might recall us from the external to the internal; and
taking on Himself the form of a servant, that He might bring down His
height to the knowledge of those rising up to Him, He condescended to
appear in lowliness to the low. In His name let us ask, and through
Him let us seek mercy of the Father while making this inquiry. For to
answer in a word the question, Whence is corruption? it is hence,
because these natures that are capable of corruption were not begotten
by God, but made by Him out of nothing; and as we already proved that
those natures are good, no one can say with propriety that they were
not good as made by God. If it is said that God made them perfectly
good, it must be remembered that the only perfect good is God Himself,
the maker of those good things.
Chapter 37.--God Alone Perfectly Good.
42. What harm, you ask, would follow if those things too were
perfectly good? Still, should any one, who admits and believes the
perfect goodness of God the Father, inquire what source we should
reverently assign to any other perfectly good thing, supposing it to
exist, our only correct reply would be, that it is of God the Father,
who is perfectly good. And we must bear in mind that what is of Him
is born of Him, and not made by Him out of nothing, and that it is
therefore perfectly, that is, incorruptibly, good like God Himself.
So we see that it is unreasonable to require that things made out of
nothing should be as perfectly good as He who was begotten of God
Himself, and who is one as God is one, otherwise God would have
begotten something unlike Himself. Hence it shows ignorance and
impiety to seek for brethren for this only-begotten Son through whom
all good things were made by the Father out of nothing, except in
this, that He condescended to appear as man. Accordingly in Scripture
He is called both only-begotten and first-begotten; only-begotten of
the Father, and first-begotten from the dead. "And we beheld," says
John, "His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father,
full of grace and truth." [285]And Paul says, "that He might be the
first-born among many brethren." [286]
43. But should we say, These things made out of nothing are not good
things, but only God's nature is good, we shall be unjust to good
things of great value. And there is impiety in calling it a defect in
anything not to be what God is, and in denying a thing to be good
because it is inferior to God. Pray submit then, thou nature of the
rational soul, to be somewhat less than God, but only so far less,
that after Him nothing else is above thee. Submit, I say, and yield
to Him, lest He drive thee still lower into depths where the
punishment inflicted will continually detract more and more from the
good which thou hast. Thou exaltest thyself against God, if thou art
indignant at His preceding thee; and thou art very contumacious in thy
thoughts of Him, if thou dost not rejoice unspeakably in the
possession of this good, that He alone is above thee. This being
settled as certain, thou art not to say, God should have made me the
only nature: there should be no good thing after me. It could not be
that the next good thing to God should be the last. And in this is
seen most clearly how great dignity God conferred on thee, that He who
in the order of nature alone rules over thee, made other good things
for thee to rule over. Nor be surprised that they are not now in all
respects subject to thee, and that sometimes they pain thee; for thy
Lord has greater authority over the things subject to thee than thou
hast, as a master over the servants of his servants. What wonder,
then, if, when thou sinnest, that is, disobeyest thy Lord, the things
thou before ruledst over are made instrumental in thy punishment? For
what is so just, or what is more just than God? For this befell human
nature in Adam, of whom this is not the place to speak. Suffice it to
say, the righteous Ruler acts in character both in just rewards and in
just punishments, in the happiness of those who live rightly, and in
the penalty inflicted on sinners. Nor yet art thou [287] left without
mercy, since by an appointed distribution of things and times thou art
called to return. Thus the righteous control of the supreme Creator
extends even to earthly good things, which are corrupted and restored,
that thou mightest have consolations mingled with punishments; that
thou mightest both praise God when delighted by the order of good
things, and mightest take refuge in Him when tried by experience of
evils. So, as far as earthly things are subject to thee, they teach
thee that thou art their ruler; as far as they distress thee, they
teach thee to be subject to thy Lord.
Footnotes
[285] John i. 14.
[286] Rom. viii. 29.
[287] [Augustin still addresses himself to the "nature of the rational
soul."--A.H.N.]
Chapter 38.--Nature Made by God; Corruption Comes from Nothing.
44. In this way, though corruption is an evil, and though it comes
not from the Author of natures, but from their being made out of
nothing, still, in God's government and control over all that He has
made, even corruption is so ordered that it hurts only the lowest
natures, for the punishment of the condemned, and for the trial and
instruction of the returning, that they may keep near to the
incorruptible God, and remain incorrupt, which is our only good; as is
said by the prophet, "But it is good for me that I keep near to God."
[288]And you must not say, God did not make corruptible natures:
for, as far as they are natures, God made them; but as far as they are
corruptible, God did not make them: for corruption cannot come from
Him who alone is incorruptible. If you can receive this, give thanks
to God; if you cannot, be quiet and do not condemn what you do not yet
understand, but humbly wait on Him who is the light of the mind that
thou mayest know. For in the expression "corruptible nature" there
are two words, and not one only. So, in the expression, God made out
of nothing, "God" and "nothing" are two separate words. Render
therefore to each of these words that which belongs to each, so that
the word "nature" may go with the word "God,"and the word
"corruptible" with the word "nothing." And yet even the corruptions,
though they have not their origin from God, are to be overruled by Him
in accordance with the order of inanimate things and the deserts of
His intelligent creatures. Thus we say rightly that reward and
punishment are both from God. For God's not making corruption is
consistent with His giving over to corruption the man who deserves to
be corrupted, that is, who has begun to corrupt himself by sinning,
that he who has wilfully yielded to the allurements of corruption may,
against his will, suffer its pains.
Footnotes
[288] Ps. lxxiii. 28.
Chapter 39.--In What Sense Evils are from God.
45. Not only is it written in the Old Testament, "I make good, and
create evil;" [289] but more clearly in the New Testament, where the
Lord says, "Fear not them which kill the body, and have no more that
they can do; but fear him who, after he has killed the body, has power
to cast the soul into hell." [290]And that to voluntary corruption
penal corruption is added in the divine judgment, is plainly declared
by the Apostle Paul, when he says, "The temple of God is holy, which
temple ye are; whoever corrupts the temple of God, him will God
corrupt." [291]If this had been said in the Old Law, how vehemently
would the Manichæans have denounced it as making God a corrupter! And
from fear of the word, many Latin translators make it, "him shall God
destroy," instead of corrupt, avoiding the offensive word without any
change of meaning. Although these would inveigh against any passage
in the Old Law or the prophets if God was called in it a destroyer.
But the Greek original here shows that corrupt is the true word; for
it is written distinctly, "Whoever corrupts the temple of God, him
will God corrupt." If the Manichæans are asked to explain the words,
they will say, to escape making God a corrupter, that corrupt here
means to give over to corruption, or some such explanation. Did they
read the Old Law in this spirit, they would both find many admirable
things in it; and instead of spitefully attacking passages which they
did not understand, they would reverently postpone the inquiry.
Footnotes
[289] Ps. xlv. 7.
[290] Matt. x. 28, and Luke xii. 4.
[291] 1 Cor. iii. 17.
Chapter 40.--Corruption Tends to Non-Existence.
46. But if any one does not believe that corruption comes from
nothing, let him place before himself existence and
non-existence--one, as it were, on one side, and the other on the
other (to speak so as not to outstrip the slow to understand); then
let him set something, say the body of an animal, between them, and
let him ask himself whether, while the body is being formed and
produced, while its size is increasing, while it gains nourishment,
health, strength, beauty, stability, it is tending, as regards its
duration and permanence, to this side or that, to existence or
non-existence. He will see without difficulty, that even in the
rudimentary form there is an existence, and that the more the body is
established and built up in form, and figure and strength, the more
does it come to exist, and to tend to the side of existence. Then,
again, let the body begin to be corrupted; let its whole condition be
enfeebled, let its vigor languish, its strength decay, its beauty be
defaced, its framework be sundered, the consistency of its parts give
way and go to pieces; and let him ask now where the body is tending in
this corruption, whether to existence or non-existence: he will not
surely be so blind or stupid as to doubt how to answer himself, or as
not to see that, in proportion as anything is corrupted, in that
proportion it approaches decease. But whatever tends to decease tends
to non-existence. Since, then, we must believe that God exists
immutably and incorruptibly, while what is called nothing is clearly
altogether nonexistent; and since, after setting before yourself
existence and non-existence, you have observed that the more a visible
object increases the more it tends towards existence, while the more
it is corrupted the more it tends towards non-existence, why are you
at a loss to tell regarding any nature what in it is from God, and
what from nothing; seeing that visible form is natural, and corruption
against nature? The increase of form leads to existence, and we
acknowledge God as supreme existence; the increase of corruption leads
to non-existence, and we know that what is non-existent is nothing.
Why then, I say, are you at a loss to tell regarding a corruptible
nature, when you have both the words nature and corruptible, what is
from God, and what from nothing? And why do you inquire for a nature
contrary to God, since, if you confess that He is the supreme
existence, it follows that non-existence is contrary to Him? [292]
Footnotes
[292] [We have already encountered in the treatise Concerning two
Souls, substantially the same course of argumentation here pursued.
The doctrine of the negativity of evil may be said to have been
fundamental with Augustin, and he uses it very effectually against
Manichæan dualism.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 41.--Corruption is by God's Permission, and Comes from Us.
47. You ask, Why does corruption take from nature what God has given
to it? It takes nothing but where God permits; and He permits in
righteous and well-ordered judgment, according to the degrees of
non-intelligent and the deserts of intelligent creatures. The word
uttered passes away as an object of sense, and perishes in silence;
and yet the coming and going of these passing words make our speech,
and the regular intervals of silence give pleasing and appropriate
distinction; and so it is with temporal natures which have this lowest
form of beauty, that transition gives them being, and the death of
what they give birth to gives them individuality. And if our sense
and memory could rightly take in the order and proportions of this
beauty, it would so please us, that we should not dare to give the
name of corruptions to those imperfections which give rise to the
distinction. And when distress comes to us through their peculiar
beauty, by the loss of beloved temporal things passing away, we both
pay the penalty of our sins, and are exhorted to set our affection on
eternal things.
Chapter 42.--Exhortation to the Chief Good.
48. Let us, then, not seek in this beauty for what has not been given
to it (and from not having what we seek for, this is the lowest form
of beauty); and in that which has been given to it, let us praise God,
because He has bestowed this great good of visible form even on the
lowest degree of beauty. And let us not cleave as lovers to this
beauty, but as praisers of God let us rise above it; and from this
superior position let us pronounce judgment on it, instead of so being
bound up in it as to be judged along with it. And let us hasten on to
that good which has no motion in space or advancement in time, from
which all natures in space and time receive their sensible being and
their form. To see this good let us purify our heart by faith in our
Lord Jesus Christ, who says, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they
shall see God." [293]For the eyes needed in order to see this good
are not those with which we see the light spread through space, which
has part in one place and part in another, instead of being all in
every place. The sight and the discernment we are to purify is that
by which we see, as far as is allowed in this life, what is just, what
is pious, what is the beauty of wisdom. He who sees these things,
values them far above the fullness of all regions in space, and finds
that the vision of these things requires not the extension of his
perception through distances in space, but its invigoration by an
immaterial influence. [294]
Footnotes
[293] Matt. v. 8.
[294] [The Neo-Platonic quality of this section cannot escape the
attention of the philosophical student.--A.H.N.]
Chapter 43.--Conclusion.
49. And as this vision is greatly hindered by those fancies which are
originated by the carnal sense, and are retained and modified by the
imagination, let us abhor this heresy which has been led by faith in
its fancies to represent the divine substance as extended and diffused
through space, even through infinite space, and to cut short one side
so as to make room for evil,--not being able to perceive that evil is
not nature, but against nature; and to beautify this very evil with
such visible appearance, and forms, and consistency of parts
prevailing in its several natures, not being able to conceive of any
nature without those good things, that the evils found fault with in
it are buried under a countless abundance of good things.
Here let us close this part of the treatise. The other absurdities of
Manichæus will be exposed in what follows, by the permission and help
of God. [295]
Footnotes
[295] Vide Preface.
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